1 2	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY			
3 4 5 6	CIVIL ACTION NUMBER:  ROOFER'S PENSION FUND, Individually and on Behalf 2:16-cv-02805-JXN-LDW of All Others Similarly Situated, ORAL ARGUMENT  Plaintiffs,			
7	v.			
8	JOSEPH C. PAPA, et al,			
9	Defendants.			
10	Martin Luther King Building & U.S. Courthouse			
11	50 Walnut Street Newark, New Jersey 07101 Thursday, April 7, 2022 Commencing at 10:03 a.m.			
12				
13				
	B E F O R E:  THE HONORABLE JULIEN XAVIER NEALS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE			
14				
15	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE			
15 16				
15 16 17	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE  A P P E A R A N C E S:  LOWENSTEIN SANDLER, LLP			
15 16 17 18	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE  A P P E A R A N C E S:  LOWENSTEIN SANDLER, LLP BY: MICHAEL B. HIMMEL, ESQUIRE One Lowenstein Drive			
15 16 17 18 19	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE  A P P E A R A N C E S:  LOWENSTEIN SANDLER, LLP BY: MICHAEL B. HIMMEL, ESQUIRE			
15 16 17 18 19 20	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE  A P P E A R A N C E S:  LOWENSTEIN SANDLER, LLP BY: MICHAEL B. HIMMEL, ESQUIRE One Lowenstein Drive Roseland, New Jersey 07068			
15 16 17 18 19 20 21	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE  A P P E A R A N C E S:  LOWENSTEIN SANDLER, LLP BY: MICHAEL B. HIMMEL, ESQUIRE One Lowenstein Drive Roseland, New Jersey 07068			
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22	UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE  A P P E A R A N C E S:  LOWENSTEIN SANDLER, LLP BY: MICHAEL B. HIMMEL, ESQUIRE One Lowenstein Drive Roseland, New Jersey 07068			
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	LOWENSTEIN SANDLER, LLP BY: MICHAEL B. HIMMEL, ESQUIRE One Lowenstein Drive Roseland, New Jersey 07068 For the Lead Plaintiffs			
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24	LOWENSTEIN SANDLER, LLP BY: MICHAEL B. HIMMEL, ESQUIRE One Lowenstein Drive Roseland, New Jersey 07068 For the Lead Plaintiffs  Melissa A. Mormile, Official Court Reporter melissa_mormile@njd.uscourts.gov			
15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23	LOWENSTEIN SANDLER, LLP BY: MICHAEL B. HIMMEL, ESQUIRE One Lowenstein Drive Roseland, New Jersey 07068 For the Lead Plaintiffs  Melissa A. Mormile, Official Court Reporter			

1	APPEARANCES: - CONTINUED	
2	POMERANTZ, LLP	
3	BY: JOSHUA B. SILVERMAN, ESQUIRE THOMAS PRZYBYLOWSKI, ESQUIRE	
4	600 Third Avenue	
5	New York, New York 10016 For the Lead Plaintiffs	
6		
7	BERNSTEIN LITOWITZ BERGER & GROSSMAN, LLP	
8	BY: JAMES A. HARROD, ESQUIRE  JESSE JENSEN, ESQUIRE	
9	1251 Avenue of the Americas New York, New York 10020	
10	For the Lead Plaintiffs	
11	GREENBAUM ROWE SMITH & DAVIS	
12	BY: ALAN S. NAAR, ESQUIRE 99 Wood Avenue South	
13	Woodbridge, New Jersey 07095  For the Defendant Perrigo Company	
14		
15	FRIED FRANK HARRIS SHRIVER & JACOBSON, LLP BY: JAMES D. WAREHAM, ESQUIRE	
16	KATHERINE ST. ROMAIN, ESQUIRE JAMES E. ANKLAM, ESQUIRE	
17	SAMUEL GRONER, ESQUIRE 801 17TH Street NW	
18	Washington, DC 20006 For the Defendant Perrigo Company	
19		
20	GIBSON DUNN & CRUTCHER, LLP	
21	BY: REED BRODSKY, ESQUIRE DAVID CROWLEY-BUCK, ESQUIRE	
22	200 Park Avenue New York, New York 10166	
23	Counsel for the Defendant Joseph C. Papa	
24		
25		

1	APPEARANCES: - CONTINUED
2	
3	SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, LLP BY: JOHN L. HARDIMAN, ESQUIRE
4	MICHAEL DEVLIN, ESQUIRE 125 Broad Street
5	New York, New York 10004 Counsel for the Defendant Judy Brown
6	
7	
8	
9	
10	
11	
12	
13	
14	
15	
16	
17	
18	
19	
20	
21	
22	
23	
24	
25	

		1
1	<u>INDEX</u>	
2	л D СПМЕНТ	PAGE
3	ARGUMENT	PAGE
4	SUMMARY JUDGMENT/LOSS CAUSATION	
5	BY MR. WAREHAM	7, 175
6	BY MR. HARDIMAN	50, 161
7	BY MR. BRODSKY	65, 166
8	BY MR. SILVERMAN	96, 182
9	BY MR. HARROD	139, 188
10	DAUBERT MOTIONS	
11	BY MR. GRONER	191
12	BY MR. HARROD	199
13		
14		
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

```
1
             (PROCEEDINGS held remotely before The Honorable JULIEN
 2
    XAVIER NEALS, United States District Judge, and The Honorable
 3
    LEDA DUNN WETTRE, United States Magistrate Judge, at 11:03
 4
    a.m.)
 5
             THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise, the Honorable Julien
    Xavier Neals presiding.
 6
 7
             THE COURT: This is by far the fullest house I have
 8
    seen since the pandemic started.
 9
           Please be seated.
10
           Counsel, your appearances, please.
11
             MR. SILVERMAN: Good morning, your Honor. Josh
12
    Silverman, of Pomerantz LLP on behalf of the plaintiffs.
13
             MR. HARROD: Good Morning, your Honor. James Harrod,
14
    of Bernstein Litowitz Berger & Grossman, also for the
15
    plaintiffs.
16
             MR. PRZYBYLOWSKI: Morning, your Honor, Thomas
17
    Przybylowski, from Pomerantz LLP on behalf of the plaintiffs.
18
             MR. JENSEN: Good Morning, your Honor. Jesse Jensen
19
    from Bernstein Litowitz, on behalf of the plaintiffs.
20
             MR. HIMMEL: Good Morning, your Honor. Michael
21
    Himmel, of Lowenstein Sandler, liaison counsel for the
22
    plaintiffs.
23
             THE COURT: Good morning.
24
             MR. WAREHAM: Good morning, your Honor. Jamie
25
    Wareham, from Fried Frank, with my partner James Anklam; my
```

```
1
    partner Sam Groner; my colleague, Kate St. Romain, on behalf of
 2
    Perrigo.
 3
             THE COURT: Good Morning.
 4
             MR. NAAR: Good Morning, your Honor. Alan Naar,
 5
    Greenbaum Rowe Smith & Davis, also for Perrigo.
 6
             THE COURT: Good Morning.
 7
             MR. BRODSKY: Good morning, your Honor. Reed Brodsky,
 8
    from Gibson Dunn on behalf of Joseph Papa as well.
 9
             MR. HARDIMAN: Good morning, your Honor. John
10
    Hardiman, of Sullivan & Cromwell. We represent Judy Brown.
11
    Michael Devlin is with me as well.
12
             THE COURT: Good Morning.
13
           Just by quick recap -- well, for housekeeping purposes,
14
    before you speak, if you could just identify yourself, because
15
    there's a number of you, and I know my court reporter has a
16
    good memory, but nobody's memory is that good.
17
           If you're comfortable from counsel table, feel free.
18
    You may just have to adjust in terms of the microphone so the
19
    court reporter may, at times, ask you to get closer to the mic
20
    if there is trouble hearing. But also feel free to use the
21
    lectern if you're more comfortable at the lectern.
22
           Just to recap, we have Perrigo's motion for summary
23
    judgment. Motion to exclude the expert testimony of Purcell
24
    Clark and Nye. Joseph C. Papa's motion for summary judgment.
25
    And Judy Brown's motion for summary judgment. I also note that
```

```
1
    Perrigo also, again, has the initial filing.
 2
           Counsel, I know that we had received communication in
 3
    terms of the time allotted for argument.
 4
           I'm going to leave it to you as to how you wanted to
 5
    proceed in the order of how you wanted to address the motions.
 6
    So as I would anticipate I would think that maybe Perrigo would
 7
    be starting. What was the preference? Were you going to
 8
    address the summary judgment and the exclusion motion together?
 9
             MR. WAREHAM: Your Honor, our preference would be to
10
    speak to the motion for summary judgment. Both the individual
11
    defendants and the company. And then have opposition to that
12
    motion. A little bit of rebuttal.
           And then have a clean break between that motion and the
13
14
    Daubert motions on the three experts.
15
             THE COURT: That's fine.
16
             MR. WAREHAM: Thank you, your Honor.
17
             THE COURT: That's fine.
18
           So the floor is yours.
                           I'm old, your Honor, so I will use the
19
             MR. WAREHAM:
20
    lectern.
21
           Good morning, may it please the court. My name is Jamie
22
    Wareham from Fried Frank on behalf of Perrigo. My partner Sam
23
    Groner and I will today present on behalf of the defendants, at
24
    sometimes all defendants, and other times, just for Perrigo.
25
           I want to begin by thanking Judge Wettre for her
```

important and rather remarkable efforts and assistance to getting this case to where it could now be dismissed.

With the Court's indulgence I will go through falsity, scienter, and loss causation; the three elements of 10b-5 that the plaintiffs have failed to meet.

As logic dictates that then my colleagues from Gibson Dunn and Sullivan & Cromwell will address similar issues with respect to scienter and falsity for their individual clients.

And then as I said, I would like to have maybe a few minutes of rebuttal.

We propose, your Honor, to -- after the summary judgment motion -- have Mr. Groner present on the question of exclusion of the three experts.

So plaintiffs, your Honor, bring claims against Perrigo under the Exchange Act 10b-5 and under 14(e).

Both claims fail.

There are also tag-a-long 20A claims called control person claims, that also fail and you will hear about that from the individual defendants.

In July, your Honor, the Court substantially narrowed this case. Plaintiffs originally pled four independent theories and now only two remain. The first remaining theory is premised on the false notion that Perrigo engaged in collusive pricing with respect to competitors for six generic topical drugs, specified in the complaint.

In particular, plaintiffs claims the defendants intended to, and did defraud investors, by failing to disclose this supposed price-fixing scheme with respect to these individual drugs.

Now, Judge Arleo barely, your Honor, allowed this claim to proceed to discovery. She quotes, the scienter allegations related to the price-fixing scheme narrowly surpassed the bar for pleading scienter. Narrowly, your Honor. You will see now how widely they have failed.

Two years of intense, expensive, intervening discovery ably overseen by Judge Wettre revealed why Judge Arleo was so skeptical to begin with about these so-called price-fixing claims. They present no admissible evidence -- none -- that Perrigo was involved in a price-fixing scheme with respect to any drug, never mind the six in the complaint.

From the outside of this case, your Honor, what the plaintiffs really hoped was that the United States Department of Justice Criminal Division of the anti-trust section was going to bring charges against Perrigo or some of its employees.

They were simply Waiting for Godot and like the play,

Godot never showed and Godot was not going to show. There are

going to be no criminal charges that come out of the DOJ that

have anything to do with respect to Perrigo's product.

Frankly, your Honor, there is no admissible evidence that

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

anyone at Perrigo fixed prices of anything at any time. Not just for generic Rx products, but for any kind of drugs. Of course, your Honor, neither DOJ nor any civil litigant has ever alleged, suggested, intimated that Mr. Papa or Ms. Brown did anything with respect to collusive pricing. Plaintiff's second remaining theory is as infirm as the first. It's that Perrigo made misrepresentations and material omissions with scienter regarding success of Perrigo's then-present integration of Omega Pharma. Omega Pharma was a large European enterprise that Perrigo acquired on March 30, 2015. Plaintiffs seek to ward off dismissal by claiming in their amended complaint that they make allegations that it plainly does not make with respect to performance. trying to now amend their complaint through pleadings. That's, of course, impermissible as a matter of law. They ask this Court to do it -- the Third Circuit has never done as well, your Honor, and that is to adopt the corporate They implicitly recognized that they have scienter theory.

And they are now proceeding to ask this Court to do what the Third Circuit has refused to do. And plaintiffs finally, your Honor, mischaracterize true statements about Perrigo's actual integration of Omega shortly after the March 15th --

failed to prove, or allege sufficiently, scienter with respect

to Mr. Brown, Ms. Brown, and Mr. Papa.

March 30, 2015 closing of the \$4 billion transaction.

Let me begin with the pricing claims, your Honor. I will put up an exhibit to my left and my right which, after all 28 fact deposition transcripts have been scoured and after two-and-a-half million pages have been scoured, produced in discovery, I am going to show you a page that shows all the direct evidence of collusive pricing in this record.

The first time in my career, your Honor, I'm putting up this following page, a blank page. There is no direct evidence of collusion. None. There are no suggestions that there is evidence that requires no inferences, as Baby Foods requires that these -- to be direct evidence that must require no inference whatsoever. It must be, your Honor, a solemnized covenant to conspire under Valspar.

It's even stronger stated, your Honor, in *Intervest* case in which to prove anything approaching a collusion in a price-fixing case there must be a smoking gun. There are no smoking guns. There is nothing.

Plaintiffs allegations, rather, rest on the allegation that parallel price increases by Perrigo and some of its competitors for the market specified, that is topical, generic drugs, are, quote, strong indicia of collusion.

That assertion is incorrect. Not only as a matter of logic, but as a matter of law. Plaintiffs claims rest as they cannot now on supposition, on inference, on conjecture, on

speculation. We're beyond that phase, your Honor.

We are at the phase, your Honor, that the Court in the Third Circuit said, it is time for the plaintiffs to put up or shut up.

In Brown v. Williamson, your Honor, the Supreme Court held that parallel-pricing behavior, without more, does not, does not support collusion. This is especially true in naturally occurring oligopolistic markets. For example, certain markets in the pharmaceutical industry and, for example, this particular set of markets with respect to topical prescription generic drugs.

The Third Circuit, your Honor, has specifically rejected antitrust claims based on the parallel pricing theory for oligopolistic markets. It has done so twice in past seven years and three times since 1999. It's done so in Baby Foods, your Honor. It's done so in Chocolate, your Honor. And it's done so in Valspar.

The Valspar, Chocolate, Baby Foods case rendered the claims for price fixing dead on arrival, DOA. As the Third Circuit held in Valspar, your Honor, parallel-pricing is only probative of price fixing in cases involving nonoligopolistic markets, markets totally unlike the markets before the Court. There is no dispute that these markets are oligopolistic, even plaintiff's supposed expert, Mr. Clark, conceded as much during his deposition.

Of course, the hallmarks of any oligopolistic market are that there are very few competitors and second, that there are strong barriers to entry. Such as the case for topical generic drug products. These markets are classic examples of naturally occurring oligopolistic markets, both the specialized manufacturing requirements for these products, very complicated, very expensive. And the very rigorous FDA approval processes make it difficult for new companies to enter into this market.

Mr. Papa spoke repeatedly, as did others in the company, to investors and to the market and analysts about the fact that this type of strategy was central to the generic drug strategy of Perrigo. Namely, that they were going to be in products that had strong barriers to entry. And they had a competitive advantage there. They want to participate in oligopolistic markets and they told the market just as much.

Now in oligopolistic markets, the Third Circuit told Valspar that parallel pricing by competitors is, quote, your Honor, a necessary fact of life. It is what it is. We understand the plaintiffs don't seem to like oligopolistic markets. Tough. They are legal. In these markets, companies track and account for efforts of their own pricing decisions with competitors, and they look at what others are doing. And of course they do that lawfully.

This, quote, mutual awareness by competitors, which the

Third Circuit identified in *Baby Foods* and recognized in more detail in *Valspar*, leads to interdependent pricing. Even though each company's pricing decisions and pricing policies are made independently.

The bottom line here is, that the existence of parallel pricing increases in naturally occurring oligopolistic markets is typical. It is expected. It is normal. It is lawful. And that's what Valspar holds, your Honor. Because the drugs at issue here are sold in oligopolistic markets, the Third Circuit in Valspar requires plaintiffs to demonstrate parallel-pricing increases went beyond mere independence -- interdependence and were so usual that in the absence of advanced agreement, no reasonable forum would have engaged in them.

Plaintiffs made no such showing. They fail to prove anything beyond the mere existence of conscious parallel-pricing, the hallmark of an oligopolistic market.

Lawful. Conscious. Parallel-pricing. As Judge Arleo explained in her July 2018 opinion, the Third Circuit considers a nonexclusive list of so-called plus factors to identify potential or illegal collusion as separate and distinct from legal parallel-pricing.

The factors are, quote, evidence that the defendants had a motive to enter into a conspiracy. Second, evidence that the defendants acted contrary to its own interest. And third, evidence implying a traditional conspiracy, an actual agreement

to fix prices.

Now, cases involving oligopolistic markets, unlike other type of markets, focus only on the third-plus factor and de-emphasize the first two factors. They do so precisely because these factors, according to *Valspar*, largely restate the phenomenon of interdependence, which is always present in oligopolistic markets. The third-plus factor is, thus, where the rubber meets the road, and it requires evidence of a traditional, classic, agreed-upon conspiracy, like discussed at the front end of this argument. Solemnized smoking guns.

The factor focuses on noneconomic evidence that there was an actual agreement among competitors not to compete. That is exactly what plaintiffs had to prove. That is what precisely what plaintiffs have failed to prove.

The only direct evidence at all related to the concept, the topic of collusion is evidence brought forth by the defendants, not by the plaintiffs. And during discovery, the plaintiffs deposed eight witnesses from the Rx division, current and former, from Perrigo. All eight unequivocally denied speaking to competitors about pricing in any way, shape, or form, never mind about price fixing.

During deposition of Perrigo's corporate designee, that designee testified it was Perrigo's policy not to speak to competitors about price issues. Each deponent from Rx reiterated that prohibition and their aware of that prohibition

and they stay to that course on that prohibition. In Valspar, Chocolate, and Baby Foods, the Third Circuit affirmed district court's grants of summary judgment to defendants where plaintiffs failed to prove the third plus factor, an agreement to fix prices existed, as these plaintiffs have failed to prove.

Now, lacking any direct evidence, a blank page, these plaintiffs try to take contortionist activities to take inadmissible evidence and circumstantial evidence and shoehorn it into a survival. Among these scattershot efforts, plaintiffs complain about Perrigo's attendance at trade association events and other social and business interactions with competitors. They argue that these events gave Perrigo opportunities to conspire.

As I mentioned earlier, your Honor, we're past the opportunity stage. We're at the smoking gun stage. We're at the put up or shut up stage. And we're not at the inference stage, we are long past that. The Third Circuit in Valspar made crystal clear that having an opportunity to conspire does not equal to actual conspiracy. The Third Circuit emphasized evidence that employees of competitors were in the same place at the same time without any evidence of specific conversations concerning an agreement to set prices, is sufficient to support an inference of collusion, never mind proof of collusion.

Perrigo has presented evidence that employees knew and

understood and stuck to the guidelines. Plaintiffs have produced no evidence that any employee ever discussed pricing with respect to products. I will get to one other point on that later with a deceased former employee about whether -- now ancient discussions, all the way back to 2010, 2011.

During discovery, Perrigo presented reams of admissible evidence that its employees had no discussions with competitors about any Perrigo products. In none of the 2 and a half million documents produced are there any emails between Perrigo and competitors about pricing. Perrigo's corporate representative testified that all interactions between competitors at industry conferences were entirely social and involved nothing specific. Each current or former Rx employee deposed by plaintiffs testified exactly the same. None prevaricated, none.

Plaintiffs impermissibly speculate that collusion may have somehow happened based on the mere proximity of price increases to trade shows and industry events. This is a silly argument, your Honor, because plaintiffs understand, and the record reflects, that the Perrigo employees attended more than 50 trade shows during the three-year relevant period. 50. One event every three weeks. Thus, any price increase, any price decrease, any decision to maintain the price, would have to happen in close proximity to one of these 50 events.

Plaintiffs do not like oligopolistic markets and they

claim to or actually do not understand them either.

Let me briefly discuss, your Honor, plaintiff's claims about Perrigo's social and business interactions. They are very similar to the claims about trade shows and other competitor discussions.

Again, plaintiffs focus on the etherial opportunity to collude during these interactions, not on any admissible evidence than actual collusion took place. None. The record has provided only legitimate reasons for these parallel discussions unrelated to collusion. The Perrigo employees occasionally did interact with competitors, your Honor, as it happens in almost every industry in it America.

If you look at the sworn testimony, you will see that these conversations and communications had to do with small talk with former employees and former colleagues. Had to do with inquiries about potential job opportunities because there is some movement in the industry between the competitors, and it had to do with communications with respect to legitimate joint ventures and product development activities that happened sometimes between Perrigo and other makers of topical Rx generic drugs. Nothing more. Nothing less. Nothing about pricing. Nothing about price fixing. Nothing controversial at all.

The Third Circuit, your Honor, has addressed this very state of affairs. It did so in the *Tose v. First Pennsylvania* 

Bank case where it made clear that opportunity alone does not create an inference of collusion. Never mind evidence of collusion, it is not even an inference. In toast, the Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for defendants like these defendants and noted in the opinion that, quote, human experience does not support the inference of actual conspiracy from the basic fact of opportunity to conspire through social and business relationships. These allegations, circumstantial evidence, all amount to nothing.

Plaintiffs contort their effort to try to rely on this evidence to stave off summary judgment. And it continues, your Honor, when they complain about the size of the price increases that are involved in the products that they brought in their complaint, the six products. But the size of the product increase in oligopolistic markets demonstrates nothing, never mind collusion.

Plaintiffs pause that the price increases here are the different magnitude than price hikes that were discussed in the Third Circuit opinions of Valspar, Chocolate, and Baby Foods.

But the holdings in those cases, your Honor, had nothing to do with the size of price increases. They didn't address that concept at all. So in comparison between though three cases in this case is pure speculation.

Moreover, your Honor, there are cases out there which we've cited in which even higher price increases in

oligopolistic markets have been deemed to be insubstantial to bring a claim for price fixing. We rely on, for example, your Honor, the Sixth Circuit case in Erie County, Ohio for that proposition. In sum, the deposition testimony and the document in your evidence completely devoid of facts supporting plaintiff's theory that Perrigo used trade means and social events as opportunities to even discuss, let alone fix prices for generic drugs.

They move even farther down the circumstantial evidence chain, your Honor, to what I think, maybe, is their silliest argument. The argument that monitoring of price increases and monitoring of price activity amongst competitors is somehow indicative of collusion.

After millions of dollars spent on discovery, including 28 facts depositions, plaintiffs are still talking about implications because they can't find any proof. Again, we are beyond the implication phase. It is time to put up or shut up.

Of great importance is as a matter of law. It is untrue that monitoring of competitor's prices is illegal or unlawful or anyway suggestive of collusion. For example, your Honor, my partners and I pay close attention to what Milbank, Tweed does with respect to associate salaries, as does Mr. Hardiman's firm, Sullivan & Cromwell, as does Mr. Brodsky's firm Gibson Dunn. And Fried Frank, Gibson Dunn, Sullivan & Cromwell follow the leader and raise our associate prices to the same level.

We don't call each. We don't talk to each other. There is no collusion. It's -- we're monitoring our competitor's pricing and we are responding in nature and in kind.

Nothing unusual about that particularly in an oligopolistic market. And that's where single firms pricing actions will have a noticeable impact on the market prices of its rivals. That's the nature of the market. As the Third Circuit described in *Baby Foods*, it's just, quote, common sense to obtain as much information as possible about competitors pricing.

Plaintiffs complain about simple common sense. The Third Circuit recognizes in that oligopolistic markets people are going to pay close attention to price movements of their competitors.

Courts have even found that very intense efforts to monitor competitors's pricing does not undercut a finding of unilateral action of lawful action.

As plaintiffs admit in paragraph 70 of the amended complaint.

(Reporter Clarification.)

MR. WAREHAM: There are public records that track these prices and they are available for purchase. There are websites -- there are data sites that give people in the generic Rx topical drug market information about other people's prices. And that's not a surprise. And indeed, your Honor, in

Valspar, the Court recognized that efforts to gain pricing information is not probative of conspiracy, but rather, this is important, undermines conspiracy.

Why does it undermine conspiracy that people in oligopolistic market would track the other people's prices?

Because if Perrigo were actually a participant in some kind of price fixing scheme, why would they need to monitor prices?

Why would it need to ask customers for pricing information, you would also know. As the Valspar Court said, it would already know about the specifics of its own conspiracy. In sum, efforts to monitor prices belie conspiracy, they don't suggest one.

Now, even further down, inadmissible circumstantial evidence chain proceed the plaintiffs. Unable to put forth any direct or any circumstantial evidence, plaintiffs then turn toward inadmissible hearsay from other adversarial proceedings in effort to breathe life into their ill-fated claims.

Plaintiffs attempt to rely on a civil complaint which is a mere set of allegations filed by various state agencies alleging anti-trust violations within the generic pharmaceutical industry.

This complaint is referred to an all-people's paper, your Honor, as the State AG complaint, and I will refer to it as that today. First, plaintiffs regurgitate allegations weighed out in the State AG complaint. All States with an AG

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

complaint, including those regarding communications between Perrigo and its competitors are, per se, flat out, inadmissible hearsay. Courts in the circuit have held squarely the complaints in other actions and the charges and allegations they contain are hearsay under the Federal Rule of Evidence. That is in the TI construction case, your Honor. Plaintiffs cannot and do not dispute the fact that the State AG complaint is hearsay. Rather, they try to rely on an exception to the hearsay rule and contend that the State AG complaint is somehow admissible under the exception 803(8) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 803(8) allows into to evidence records or statements of public officials in a civil case if they set out factual findings from illegally authorized investigation and are trustworthy. There are many reasons the State AG complaint fails under 803(8) and I will go through a few of them. First, allegations of complaint are not factual findings. They are just not. They are mere ly allegations. And we cite the 2016 Gumwood case for that very clear proposition, your Honor. Additionally, to qualify for an 803(8) hearsay exception, the statements must be trustworthy. But where a document is prepared in contemplation of litigation, there is always the risk of a lack of trustworthiness, a risk of bias.

A complaint like the Stage AG complaint is a quintessential

example of a biased document.

It is, by its very nature, is not a product of fair adversarial discovery and lacks appropriate safeguards for defendants. We rely on a WM Highfields case for that proposition and those quotes are from that case, your Honor.

This is precisely why the case efforts to bring the State AG case into this case failed. It is unreliable. It is not trustworthy. It is adversarial. Plaintiffs seek to add some heft to a very weak argument by submitting a half a page, three-paragraph affidavit from a former Sandoz employee named Anthony Thomassy.

This effort, like other things I said twice before, your Honor, is silly. The Thomassy affidavit asserts that information attributed to Mr. Thomassy in the State AG complaint is true, but it's really of no moment. It has no consequence. In the offered affidavit Mr. Thomassy identifies himself as CW6. That usually stands in these cases for confidential witness No. 6. Plaintiffs then focus on allegation s in the State AG complaint related to the logistics, but not the substance, of communications between CW6 and a deceased former employee who is in the sales department by the name of Tony Polman. I indicated I would address Mr. Polman and I will do that a few times here.

As noted in our papers, he is a disgraced former employee who took his own life on February 23, 2018, in

2

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

connection with criminal events totally unrelated to Perrigo. These allegations of communication between Mr. Thomassy and Mr. Polman took place in 2010 and 2011. That's 11 or 12 years ago, your Honor. It is six years before the class period in this case even began. Moreover, all of the alleged communications involved in the State AG complaint had to do with drugs that are not in the case. They are just not in the case. Plaintiffs never amended the complaint, your Honor, bring the drugs in. amended the complaint, your Honor, to change the time of relevance in the class period. No, Mr. Polman's alleged communication with CW6, or any other competitor, are not evidence of price collusion by And that's because Mr. Polman had no authority to set Perriao. prices at Perrigo. The record on that is very, very clear. None of the documents that the plaintiffs cite is evidence of this supposed authority suggest this. They are contorted. They are speculative. They are misstated. Indeed, the pricing authority at Perrigo rested with one single executive, a man by the name of John Wesolowski, W-E-S-O-L-O-W-S-K-I. Mr. Wesolowski reported to Mr. Douglas Boothe, B-O-O-T-H-E. And both men testified under oath that they did not know Mr. Polman was supposedly speaking with CW6, 11 or 12 years ago, let alone any content of any discussions

that Mr. Polman might have had 11 or 12 years ago.

And, of course, your Honor, the record is clear that there is no evidence that the CW6 fellow -- whoever it might be -- actually communicated with any executive at Perrigo that had pricing authority. And that's critical. Plaintiffs attempt to use Mr. Thomassy's affidavit to boot strap the allegations of the State AG complaint about alleged communications that are demonstrably, and as a matter of law, irrelevant to the issues of the case. We rely on this case, your Honor, which is quite important and I hope the Court can take time to review it, called United Food v. Pilgrim's Pride for the proposition that what Mr. Polman did or did not do 11 or 12 years ago cannot save off dismissal.

Now, United Food is a very recent district court case, your Honor, and it could be found at 2022 Westlaw 684169. The United Foods, your Honor, the defendants had even pled guilty to earlier price fixing, but the United Foods court granted defendants' motion to dismiss where, quote, nearly all of the alleged conduct in the complaint related to bid-rigging schemes that preceded the class period. Much of it by many years.

Even if Perrigo had pled guilty 10 or 11 years ago to price fixing, which it did not, it would not be any evidence of this case and would have no bearing on this case, and this Court, like the *United Foods* court, should be free to dismiss the case at the pleadings stage.

Now, they continue down the slide of circumstantial

evidence -- in the lacking direct evidence -- when they try to survive a motion for summary judgment by raising statements made in a differed prosecution agreement between the DOJ and that same pharmaceutical company that Mr. Thomassy works for, a company named Sandoz, S-A-N-D-O-Z.

Plaintiffs do not and cannot dispute that the Sandoz differed prosecution agreement is, on its face, inadmissible hearsay. The law is clear. Deferred prosecution agreements are contractual agreements to resolve criminal investigations and are inadmissible hearsay. We offer the *In Re: Oil Spill* case, your Honor, in support of that proposition.

In an ill-conceived effort to bypass the hearsay rules, plaintiffs offer a one-page affidavit executed by a Sandoz employee, with no responsibility for sales or marketing of products, named Edward Stueck, S-T-U-E-C-K. Mr. Stueck's affidavit contains no substantive information about Perrigo, none.

Rather it states, quote, the company B in the DPA -that's deferred prosecution agreement -- and the attached
statement of facts refers to Perrigo, and quote, in that DPA
Sandoz admits, accepts, and acknowledges that the facts set
forth in the statement of facts are true and accurate.

Now, the Stueck affidavit creates no issue of general -of genuine material fact that it is capable of surviving a
motion for summary judgment, pardon me. Here's why.

The affidavit does not explain how Mr. Stueck has personal knowledge of any of the supposed communications between Sandoz and Perrigo, if there were any. Nor does it explain how Mr. Stueck came to understand company B was Perrigo. He is in the law department. He never sold anything. He never met anybody from Perrigo according to the record. There is no evidence that he had any conversations with anybody who had conversations with Perrigo.

Second, the plaintiffs don't deny that Stueck's supposed understanding that Perrigo was company B comes from some amorphous unknown person at DOJ, as Stueck has no personal knowledge. He is regurgitating what he is told by some unknown person at DOJ. Plaintiffs argue that hearsay statements can be considered on a motion for summary judgment if they are, quote, capable of being admissible at trial. But Stueck can never testify at trial. His statements would be, per se, hearsay and as a matter of fact, inadmissible.

Finally, further undercutting plaintiff's theory is that the Sandoz DPA relates only to one of the six drugs at issue in this case, the drug called desonide ointment. None of the Perrigo statements alleged in the complaint have anything to do with the desonide ointment. Nothing. No reference to desonide ointment by any of the speakers of the company, ever, on the record and none identified in the amended complaint.

Rather, the complaints -- allegations that they

challenge on the fraud theory address pricing strategies across all of Perrigo's portfolios, including the Rx unit.

Sales of desonide ointment are infinitesimal percentage of Perrigo sales. Desonide ointment were 1.09 percent of total product sales for the Rx unit in 2014. And, of course, the Rx unit is a small fraction of the multi-billion-dollar Perrigo. I started at the beginning, your Honor, by referencing the Waiting for Godot play and plaintiffs for years hoped -- probably wished, probably even prayed -- that the DOJ would bring some sort of criminal action.

DOJ obtained, your Honor -- and certainly Judge Wettre knows this well -- discovery stays in this case five times in 2019 to 2020. In the almost five years since plaintiffs filed their June 17th amended complaint, DOJ brought several cases against companies that, unlike Perrigo, actually broke the law.

But there is no evidence in this record of any effort by, or consideration of DOJ, to indict Perrigo or any of its executives. No evidence of discussions with antitrust authorities about potential DPAs, or prosecution of Perrigo. There is no tolling agreement with the DOJ. The statute of limitations has long expired. Let me repeat your Honor, like Godot, the DOJ ain't coming.

Now this is important for the following reasons. Judge Arleo's July 2018 opinion specifically recognized the weakness of plaintiff's collusive pricing claim. She allowed the claim

1.3

to proceed to discovery in large measure because of the pendency of this now-dead DOJ investigation. She wrote, quote, the mere fact that the investigation is somewhat probative of scienter.

I would say that the lack of an investigation is also probative of scienter the opposite way.

The lack of any DOJ action against Perrigo confirms that Judge Arleo's initial doubts about antitrust claims were well founded.

Now, not -- it is not dead enough already with respect to this collusion claims, but the record is full of evidence as to why the price increases the plaintiffs worry about were actually put in place. And plaintiffs have the burden to prove that there were no reasons -- only illegal reasons -- for the price increases and of course, they failed to meet that burden.

We as the defendants have demonstrated during discovery the actual noncollusive reasons for the price increases at issue here. And the processes by which Perrigo determined those price increases.

Perrigo's pricing determination is generally -- and in particular for the six products in this case -- were shown in discovery to be attributable to independent business reasons. We had in Perrigo an adversary pricing committee for the Rx business that studied and reviewed and suggested pricing decisions.

Perrigo's pricing committee analyzed many factors to determine whether to recommend increases or decreases or maintain pricing for each product. The recommendations were then made to Mr. Wesolowski and the ultimate authority -- the record is clear -- laid with Mr. Wesolowski. The pricing committee considered a lot of things in making the recommendations, including competitor dynamics, similar to the discussion we had about the law firms, what were other people doing. The pricing committee considered supply and demand, number of prescriptions being written, number of people in the market, changes in the dynamic for treatments.

It considered customer relations, could you raise prices and not irritate clients? Could you cut prices and cause damage to the market? It considered the number of prescriptions written. It continued -- considered the possible volume loss of sales if you took one step left or right on the pricing.

And, of course, it very heavily considered the cost of goods sold, because as I mentioned earlier, some of these goods are quite expensive to make and, indeed, the most expensive facility in the top of the drug market is a New York facility that is owned and operated by Perrigo.

Now, the depth of Perrigo's deliberations about price increases demonstrates the absence of an agreement to collude. Indeed, in the *Chocolate* case, your Honor, the Third Circuit

found that, quote, defendants extensive unilateral discussions reflect not considered action, but the exercise of independent business judgment and divergent pricing tactics driven by practical efforts to maximize competitive advantage.

There was no collusion. The prices were moved based on independent review and consideration by a committee with final decisions from the head of that business unit.

Now, Plaintiffs assert that emails and documents reflect that it frequently declined to bid or ceded business to competitors in order to maintain, quote, a fair share agreement with its competitors. This is, again, a distaste for the oligopolistic nature of this market and probably professed lack of understanding of the very same market.

Because courts have held that ceding business -- or customers is not necessarily against the company's self interest. And certainly not an indication of collusion.

Indeed, the *Erie County*, *Ohio v. Morton Salt* case holds just that.

Of greater specificity in the Third Circuit, the Valspar court held that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden with very similar emails and very similar arguments. The emails in Valspar mentioned, quote, not undercutting a competitor's price increase. Quote, Letting other companies have market share and, quote, all major global players should be disciplined with pricing implementation.

The Third Circuit held in *Valspar* that those emails were evidence of nothing. They were not evidence of collusion at all. Rather, emails of this type showed competitors implementing pricing strategies in response to each, interdependent pricing, and a nonocclusive attempt to avoid market-wide profit decreases.

That's just standard for oligopolistic markets. And contrary to plaintiff's theory, this is exactly what occurred here; the exact same type of discussions and communications internally at Perrigo were already rejected in the *Valspar* case.

Now, they complain in the complaint -- and more likely and more often in their papers -- about broad statements having to do with the competitive nature of the market and they claim in words and substance that those were untrue statements.

Now, even if plaintiffs could somehow prove that Perrigo agreed to fix the prices for certain generic drugs, and of course they cannot, they have only put at issue very broad statements about the competitiveness of the general market in which Perrigo operated. And these statements were all demonstratively true on this well-developed record. And of course, true statements cannot sustain securities fraud liability at any stage. Particularly, the summary judgment stage.

Plaintiffs do not allege a single challenged Perrigo

statement mentioning or in any way alluding to any of the six products actually in the case. Perrigo marketed approximately 800 generic prescription products, your Honor, across 1400 SKUs. Perrigo sold products to at least 150 different customers and competed with more than 90 different competitors.

Plaintiffs have offered no evidence that the markets for any of Perrigo's hundreds of other generic prescription products were not competitive. Plaintiffs failed to understand or pretend not to understand the fundamental features of oligopolistic markets like the market for topical prescription drugs.

Your Honor, here is the net/net regarding the collusion claims. The parties have spent a majority of their summary judgment papers briefing these issues. Having done so, it is clear that plaintiffs have not met their burden of proof to show that a triable issue of fact remains. They have not even come close. We've gone through extensive and massively expensive discovery, spanning multiple years. Plaintiffs have found no evidence of actual collusion. None.

We have distilled plaintiff's alleged circumstantial evidence of collusion and the law discrediting it, your Honor, into a single demonstrative chart that takes their theories and summarizes some of the cases I reported and discussed and put it in one little demonstrative to help the Court post the hearing. And I would like to have my colleague -- permission

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

adequately plead those claims.

for my colleague to approach, to present that to the Court, and of course, to distribute copies to the counsel for the plaintiffs and for the other defendants as well. THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. MR. WAREHAM: In some, what the plaintiffs complain about is nothing more than common behavior found in oligopolistic markets. And, your Honor, case law and logic refute plaintiff's attempts to head to trial on such a spartan record. Now, I'm going to turn to the second surviving theory, which is the one that centers on the disclosures around the then current integration between Omega, which was a European-owned drug company that did business in 39 countries, and Perrigo. That's the deal that closed, your Honor, on March 30, 2015. In the Court's July 2018 ruling on a motion to dismiss, Judge Arleo permitted plaintiffs to proceed only on a narrow category of alleged misstatements or omissions related to the then present success of that very same integration. The Court correctly dismissed four working statements protected under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act -- Private Securities Litigation Reform Act, safe harbor, and claims based on Omega's under performance within four specific geographic markets. And the Court held that the complaint failed to

1.3

With respect to Omega, plaintiff challenge statements made by defendants were made between April 21, 2015, and January 5, 2016.

But none of those statements were false or misleading and none were made with the intent to defraud. I will discuss these points rather generally and my colleagues at Gibson Dunn and Sullivan & Cromwell will go more specifically into those failures.

First, plaintiffs take issue with statements concerning whether Omega acquisition was accretive to Perrigo's growth rate. Now, the record reflects very clearly that the Omega transaction was, indeed, accretive and it was accretive from day one. Thus, plaintiffs cannot get over the hump with respect to the truth of those statements. They are not false. They are true.

The accretive nature of Omega is illustrated by Omega's stand-alone value as a multibillion dollar company already participating in the European marketplace, where Perrigo at the time essentially had no real presence.

When Perrigo announced this results, your Honor, for the period ending June 2015, the very first quarter after the closing of the acquisition of Omega by Perrigo, they reported 34 percent top-line growth. 34 percent top-line growth. That was driven primarily by the addition of Omega to the Perrigo family. It defies common sense to argue that the Omega

transaction was not accretive.

And, your Honor, public companies often do non-accretive, so-called diluted deals. They buy companies that require long times of growth, lots of cap backs, lots of investment, lots of patience, but that's not the type of transaction that Mr. Papa entered into here. He enter into a day one accretive transaction, and that's clear as a bell.

Now, the plaintiffs also allege that defendants failed to adequately disclose that there were serious impediments to Perrigo's integration of Omega, and these allegations lacked evidentiary support. They turn on supposition, on speculation, on contortions.

Now, the first of these challenged statements about the integration and its lack of success was made 22 days after the acquisition closed on April 21, 2015. It's no surprise that at that point there was no evidence of any serious impediment to integration because it was in its infancy. A recent decision by the Seventh Circuit, your Honor, which came down after briefing was completed in this case is of significant value to the Court's ability to resolve this case to dismiss this case.

In City of Taylor Police and Fire Retirement Systems v.

Zebra Technology Corporation, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a securities case that alleged that a corporation had, quote, defrauded investors by making bad predictions during an integration process. That case was decided on August

10, 2021 and it could be found, your Honor, at 8F. 4th 592.

In Zebra the plaintiffs allege that the defendants statements in March of 2015 that integration was progressing as planned relies in light of defendants' later statements that acknowledge greater than expected complexities with certain aspects of integration. In other words, these statements talked about in the Zebra case are very, very similar to the statements that plaintiffs complain about here.

In a unanimous decision, the Seventh Circuit explained that plaintiffs could not show scienter because the most reasonable inference under the circumstances was that more information became available to executives as integration progressed. How could you take things you learn in 2016 and have those things impact your state of mind in 2015? You can't.

Our case is really quite similar to the Seventh Circuit case. The statements made just after the closing of Omega that it was pleased its with initial integration projects were true at the time and they were most certainly not made with the intent to defraud.

Numerous cases, your Honor, since this briefing process was completed have shed a lot of doubt on this whole concept of integration and whether it ought to be something that is actionable going forward. The case law is different now than it was when Judge Arleo made her decision to barely allow the

integration claim to sneak over the line and to get to discovery.

For example, in the In Re: Ferrellgas -
F-E-R-R-E-L-L-G-A-S -- Partners case, Ferrellgas Partners case which would be found at 2018 Westlaw 2081859, the Court held that a company's integration-relate statements cannot give rise to a securities fraud claim because, quote, Integration is far too loose an uncertain term on which I wish to premise a claim of the securities fraud. I'm not convinced at all that that case been out there for Judge Arleo to review we would be here today at all. And there were other cases since this briefing was completed that similarly kind of put shade on, if that's the right phrase, on this whole concept of using amorphous concept of integration to proceed in the securities fraud case.

In the Friedman v. Endo case at 218 Westlaw 446 189, and also in the Steamfitters Industry Pension Fund case at 2019 Westlaw 189, 0764, the courts are really starting to move towards eliminating and calling basically anything about integration inactionable, eliminating integration from the jurisprudence of securities fraud.

Now, plaintiffs also challenged a number of statements as misleading for failing to disclose supposed difficulties realizing potential revenue synergies arising from the Omega acquisition because of, quote, EU regulations, European Union regulations. There is absolutely zero evidence in the record

substantiating any problems with respect to EU regulations at Perrigo after the acquisition of Omega. None.

To the contrary, the documents and testimony demonstrate conclusively that various teams at Perrigo and Omega were collaborating effectively to identify and to analyze opportunities to sell Perrigo products in Europe through Omega's distribution channelled and to sell Omega's product in the United States through Perrigo's distribution channels.

In the amended complaint, your Honor, the plaintiffs relied on alleged statements, and when I say alleged, you will hear why in a minute, from a former employ named Christine Kincaid, K-I-N-C-A-I-D, to barely sneak over the line, your Honor, remember, your Honor. So Judge Arleo looks at these allegations from this woman, Christine Kincaid, and she allows barely this issue of Omega integration to move to the discovery stage.

And Judge Arleo specifically mentioned her when she sustained the count. And she says, quote, The plaintiffs relied heavy on the information given by Christine Kincaid. We are going to learn a little bit more about Christine Kincaid in a second.

She tells under oath a wildly different story than her alleged version of the truth is in the amended complaint. And she basically guts and debunks all of the plaintiff's allegations with respect to EU, this, integration, that. She,

of course, had been an employee, your Honor, for all of four months in Perrigo.

Now, the plaintiffs -- putting up a screen on the screen. It's going to go up here as well? Just there? Okay.

On the slide, we memorialize the plaintiff's allegation that Ms. Kincaid reported directly to the C-Suite of executive of the company. That's flat out false. She didn't report to the executive, to Mr. Papa. She didn't report to Ms. Brown. In fact, the record is that she never had any communications with Mr. Papa. She maybe ran into Ms. Brown someplace in the hallway, but she never was present when the decisions were made on integration matters, and she did not interact with Mr. Papa at all. And she did not interact with Mr. Papa at all. Brown on integration.

We really don't know what knowledge the plaintiffs had about Ms. Kincaid when they put these statements which were refuted by her under-oath testimony. Now, in the amended complaint, they attribute to Ms. Kincaid allegations that there were no integration issues and major integration impediments related to the acquisition of Omega.

This allegation, your Honor, is also just flat demonstratively false. Ms. Kincaid stated under oath that she did not hear that things were going wrong with the integration of Omega. She heard nothing about it. And we put up the allegation of the complaint on this exhibit and the truth.

Now, I alluded earlier to this EU regulation issue, which was important, clearly, to Judge Arleo. The amended complaint attributes to Ms. Kincaid the supposed fact that EU regulations would make it difficult to replace Omega's EU suppliers with Perrigo's U.S.-based supply chain.

I don't often say in open Court this is false, but this is false. During her deposition, Ms. Kincaid absolutely disavowed discussing revenue synergies or supply chain synergies, including implications of Omega switching from EU-based suppliers to Perrigo's U.S.-based suppliers with anybody but Perrigo at any time, never mind anybody speaking to the market.

Now, Ms. Kincaid's true testimony as opposed to the misleading representations in the amended complaint make it abundantly clear that the plaintiffs have failed to substantiate their allegations of, quote, serious present problems with integration.

Recognizing implicitly that they had failed to prove scienter, intent, knowledge, with respect to Mr. Papa or Ms. Brown, the plaintiffs then go down the chain of pure supposition and they ask you to adopt the corporate scienter doctrine which the Third Circuit has never adopted. They don't dispute the fact that it's never adopted, but they ask you to get out in the future and to be Nostradamus and predict that they will some day, for some reason, somehow.

Now, the Court had opportunity as recently as August 2021, again, after the briefing was completed in this case, to decide whether it as the Third Circuit would adopt a corporate scienter doctrine. And it declined again in 2021 to adopt that doctrine.

In any event, even if their Nostradamus predictions are correct, and if the Third Circuit were to adopt some variation of the corporate scienter doctrine some day for some reason, it would not apply here because that doctrine requires a connection between the person who acted with scienter and the statements at issue. Here plaintiffs have demonstrated no connection between anyone other than Ms. Brown and Mr. Papa for whom there is no scienter to the statements they challenge in the amended complaint.

Final point with respect to the main argument. The failures to meet the loss causation burden that the *Dura* case in the Supreme Court -- D-U-R-A -- mandates that they must meet.

Start with the easiest one. The 14(e) claim. The 14(e) claim is dead on arrival. Dead as a door nail. The plaintiffs claim that they lost opportunity of a successful tender offer by Mylan not that they had any actual out-of-pocket damages.

So their claims under 14(e) turn exclusively on the supposition that the Mylan transaction would have gone forward and if they would have gotten the so-called benefit of that.

But they must meet a standard they have not met. They must show that those damages are not wholly speculative. And that's what the law requires.

Here, had the alleged concealed facts been disclosed, it is wholly speculative whether the plaintiffs would have reaped the benefit of any tender offer to begin with. That's because plaintiffs theory of loss rests on the rather irrational and internally inconsistent premise that disclosure of the alleged concealed facts would have had an impact on a decision by Perrigo shareholders whether to tender their shares, but somehow would have had no impact on the bidder, no impact whatsoever on Mylan's decision, whether to pay anything at all or certainly not the price that they put forward.

And so if you don't have a -- if the transsection itself is wholly speculative, the damages are wholly speculative and 14(e) must fail under loss causation.

Now, plaintiffs 14(e) claims assume Mylan would have offered the very same tender price it did, even after Perrigo had disclosed the so-called cleansing announcements we talked about with respect to Omega and generic topical drugs. The plaintiffs claim that the damage to them -- with respect to those claims -- equals \$63 a share. So that's their own theory.

It's wrong for lots of reasons, but why would a company worth \$63 a share get the same price from Mylan, less a share,

get the same price from Mylan that the company worth \$63 more a share because was the truth was withheld. It makes no sense.

Absolutely, Mylan with a bare minimum have offered a lower price per share. How much? Who knows. I just can't speculate.

Far more likely, Mylan would have withdrawn the bid if the supposed fraudulent things were brought to their attention. And, of course, more important than anything else is plaintiffs have no evidence to the contrary.

Now, to try to bootstrap this argument -- bolster this rather illogical argument about Mylan would have gone forward with the deal had they known the truth, but the shareholders would not have -- it's internally inconsistent.

And they say, though however, your Honor, that the original tender offer from Mylan was legally binding and, thus, that's their proof that Mylan would indeed have paid that full offer, even though the company was worth at leas \$63 a share less, if the truth had been known.

The plaintiffs cite Mylan's April 24, 2000 offer -April 24, 2015 offer -- which is Exhibit 292 -- for that
proposition. But we can read. We've got the smart kids over
here. We can read the Mylan tender offer and it's not
nonbinding. Not even close to nonbinding. If the Court were
to study page 10 of that document, there is a list of
conditions to that offer.

And on page 14, Mylan makes it clear that its offer was contingent upon, quote, Mylan not having discovered that any financial, business, or other publicly disclosed information concerning the Perrigo group was materially misleading, contains a material misrepresentation of fact, or omits the State a fact necessary to make the information contained therein not materially misleading. Has the standard out for things of this nature.

About as nonbinding as completely binding -- excuse me. It is completely nonbinding deal because they had a total out, a total contingency to get out on the very type of facts the plaintiffs complain about.

There is no question that Mylan would have reduced or withdrawn its offer. Of course, we have a view on that from supposed expert, a guy named Dr. Nye, N-Y-E. You will hear about his lack of viability as an expert from Mr. Groner, but he is helpful to us in this one respect, your Honor.

He testified in his deposition that he didn't see how anyone in their right mind could think that Mylan, upon knowing that Perrigo had been lying about the prospects associated with its generic Rx division and its integration performance Omega would have completed the deal. Their own expert says the deal would have never gone forward.

And in a thing that I've not witnessed -- and Mr. Hardiman and I talked about this in the collective; we're

old -- but our collective seven years of experience, we haven't witnessed quite the effort that we saw by the plaintiff to change that testimony through an errata sheet.

They recognize the statement kills their 14(e) claims, that's why they are dead on arrival, amongst other reasons, and they try to make it less damaging by changing Mr. Nye's words, by flat changing testimony. And I will put up his fatal concession as a slide. I will put up plaintiff's effort to come back from the grave.

Plaintiffs changed Dr. Nye's testimony from saying, he does not see how anyone in their right mind could think that Mylan would have completed the deal, to him saying that, he doesn't see how anyone in their right mind could know whether Mylan would have completed the deal.

Now, even the errata sheet is the death, now, for the 14(e) claim, because it is wholly speculative as to whether they would have completed it or not through their own expert's testimony. Wholly speculative is the bar they have to get over to sustain a loss causation a burden of proof, which is on them. And so even their own expert told the truth the first time, frankly. Even when you contort his testimony, it doesn't save the day; the 14(e) claim has gone to go.

Now, there are other loss causation issues outside the 14(e) context, your Honor. Those having to do with the 10b-5 portion of the complaint. And they fail to meet their burden

to show why there is a loss causation with respect to 10b-5 claims as they have with respect to the 14(e) claim.

They acknowledge that a corrective disclosure must relate to the same subject as the misrepresentation at issue. Here, however, even just plain reading, allows the Court to understand that the alleged corrective disclosures claim they do not relate to the same subject matter of the complained about and challenged statements. We explain in great detail in our papers why they cannot prove loss causation, with respect to their 10b-5 claims, but I will focus on one glaring example.

On April 22, 2016, there were reports that Mr. Papa was resigning as Perrigo's CEO. Plaintiffs claims -- and I think rather bizarrely -- that Mr. Papa's resignation revealed the defendants previous statements about Perrigo's integration of Omega were false and misleading. There is no records in these statements to Omega.

There is no suggestion that Mr. Papa who gets an unbelievably valuable deal to go run Valeant, a big drug company in trouble, was leaving to take that unbelievable job because of problems at Omega. It's a massive jump and it's indicative of the type of speculation that is replete in their pleadings and in their complaint.

There is nothing new about Omega disclosed on April 22 2016, and their very consistent failure to connect so-called corrective disclosures to the same subjects as the alleged

misrepresentations doom them under the loss causation element they must plead under 10b-5.

Now, Dr. Nye also fails to account for negative developments in other aspects of plaintiff's business -Perrigo's business, excuse me -- on the same dates of these challenged statements, including other aspects of Omega and segments unrelated to generic drugs, or Omega. These are things that also contribute to the share price decline. This is known as his failure to disaggregate.

So to summarize quickly, if Perrigo were to put out a statement that said X, Y, or Z about its generic drug business and the stock went down and on the same day it said disappointing results in the over-the-counter market, disappointing results in some other segment, disappointing results in Rx, the share price decline has to be studied and examined and segregated.

You can't say that when there is three or four reasons for a price decline on a given day, all of that damage associates and relates to one of your complaints. And that's basically what Dr. Nye does. He's got the disaggregation phobia in spades. He basically says, Any time the stock goes down, has any disclosure at all that touches on stuff in this case, that the 100 percent of that stock price decline is attributable to that. It is just illogical.

And Mr. Groner will go to that as why that is part and

2

3

4

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

```
parcel of why he should be excluded. Dr. Nye tries to take
statements about underperformance Omega as corrective of the
allegedly misleading statements about integration. But as
we've gone through, your Honor, underperformance is not in this
case. It was only in the case for a little bit with respect to
four geographic markets, and those claims were dismissed by
Judge Arleo.
       There has been no amendment to bring performance to this
      Plaintiffs try, in their papers, to convolute and
collate integration and performance because they know they have
not carried the day with respect to integration claims, but we
take the Court through our papers how unavailing that effort
is.
       So for these reasons and others we disclosed in our
briefs, plaintiff's failure to prove loss causation is another
reason summary judgment should be granted for the defendants.
       I now turn the podium over to counsel to the individual
defendants.
       Thank you very much, your Honor.
         THE COURT: Thank you.
         MR. HARDIMAN: I will have some slides, would you like
a copy of them up at the bench to follow along?
         THE COURT: Yes, please.
         MR. HARDIMAN: My name is John Hardiman.
       I will try not to go over old ground and cover the two
```

surviving theories that exist against Ms. Brown.

The first are eight alleged misstatements regarding generic Rx pricing.

And the other is one, just one, alleged misstatement regarding the present success of Perrigo's integration of Omega.

A couple of preliminary matters, your Honor, there is no dispute that Ms. Brown can only be held liable for statements she made. Not statements of anybody else, not statements of the company.

There is also no dispute that in assessing scienter, the only documents that are relevant are those that she saw. The plaintiff's brief confuses that, mix and matches a lot of documents, but I think our brief does a pretty good job of clearing that up. I urge you to take a look at that.

Starting with the generic Rx pricing, of course, the critical elements that the plaintiffs have the burden of proving are falsity and scienter. And they just haven't done it at all with respect to Ms. Brown.

Going to slide 5, as I think Mr. Wareham has ably pointed out, when it comes to price fixing there is simply no there there, in this case. And if there is something below there -- there being no there there, -- that's what it is with respect to Ms. Brown.

If we go to slide 7, since Mr. Wareham already covered

why there is no price fixing in the case, there is simply no evidence that the Ms. Brown had any knowledge whatsoever of any price fixing going on anywhere. Even if it existed, there is no evidence that Ms. Brown knew anything about it. There is nothing direct. There is nothing circumstantial. Direct, there is no person in this case who was deposed who said anything like Judy Brown knew about price fixing. There is no document in this case which says anything, like, Judy Brown knew about price fixing.

To drive the point home more -- as Mr. Wareham said and I agree with him -- this entire claim was intended to piggyback on actions of the government. The Attorney General's litigation and the Department of Justice. Plaintiffs admit that in the entire complaint by the State Attorney General, Ms. Brown is not even mentioned.

In the affidavits that had been submitted by plaintiffs from former employees of Sandoz, Ms. Brown is not mentioned. In the Sandoz-deferred prosecution agreement which they point to, Ms. Brown is nowhere mentioned. Of course, the Department of Justice brought no claims against Ms. Brown, but even more importantly, while they blocked the depositions of many people in this case because they thought they might have information regarding their investigation, they permitted the deposition of Ms. Brown to go through.

They indicate not only did they have no claim to bring

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

against her, they didn't think she knew anything about price fixing. She simply didn't factor in the matter at all. Now, faced with this overwhelming effort, plaintiffs try in their papers to come up with some circumstantial case against Ms. Brown. Their expert, Mr. Clark, who Mr. Groner will talk about, opined that price fixing could have happened at 19 industry conferences. Of course, just because there is an industry conference doesn't mean there is any price fixing, but Mr. Clark opines maybe that's where things happened. Ms. Brown only went to two of these conferences. she was deposed for two days and they never asked her what happened at the conference. They never asked anybody else what was Ms. Brown doing at the industry conferences. Well, if they were trying to imply that Ms. Brown somehow did something untoward at these conferences, they've got to try and make their case. By not asking her a question about it or anybody else, that's not behavior trying to make a case. behavior trying to avoid summary judgment and it shouldn't work. The other thing they point to is whether or not Ms. Brown knew anything about pricing decisions at all. Undisputed, Perrigo had a pricing committee. Ms. Brown wasn't on it. Undisputed, John Wesolowski who was the senior vise

president of the commercial operations was the ultimate

decision-making authority.

Now, in trying to get some iota of a case, plaintiffs focus on some testimony from Mr. Wesolowski and also his boss, Doug Boothe, which they claim suggests that pricing decisions were past by Ms. Brown for sign-off.

Now, even if that were true, it's by no means any evidence that she knew anything about price fixing. Just the fact that you know something about prices doesn't mean you know anything about price fixing. But of course, the testimony doesn't say that. What Mr. Wesolowski said was that he believed that his boss, Mr. Boothe, in situations where a pricing increase might create a penalty, which sometimes happens — sometimes you have a deal with a customer and you decide to raise the prices and that triggers some sort of penalty payment to the customer.

He said, in those situations, Doug Boothe might give a heads-up to the financial department that there will be an impact on revenue by the price increase.

What Boothe said was that he might speak to somebody in Ms. Brown's organization -- she was the CFO -- just to give them that sort of heads-up because of the impact on revenue. There is nothing that can be drawn from that, that Ms. Brown was somehow involved in knowing about price fixing.

Now, if you take a look at the statements they focus on, they are totally vanilla statements to the effect of, you know,

we face price competition in the market. If you look at the underlying documents that she saw before making those statements, they are totally consistent with what she said. This is the rare 10b-5 case where the underlying documents and the statements made publicly are totally consistent.

What plaintiffs seem to be trying to argue is that, well, because there was a price-fixing conspiracy, which of course they haven't proven, and because Ms. Brown spoke about pricing and knew about the price-fixing conspiracy, which of course they haven't proven, the mere fact that she spoke about pricing had to be misleading because she didn't mention the price-fixing conspiracy.

That sort of convoluted argument has been tried before and rejected. I refer you to the *Utesch* case which we cite in our briefs which the court said just because somebody is talk about pricing obviously doesn't mean they know that somebody acting in criminal behavior. That is quite a leap to make, but that's the leap that you are being asked to make, your Honor, in order to keep Ms. Brown in this case on the price-fixing claim.

One other thing, I won't spend a lot of time on it, but I just want to mention it. In the plaintiff's response brief to our motion for summary judgment appeared for the first time in this case a reference to a statement Ms. Brown made on October 22, 2015. The statement which is in slide 15 is nearly

all of our revenues are insulated from the current pricing drama you see playing out in the pharmaceutical industry today.

Now, it is beyond me what exactly case they are making based on that statement. And of course, I can't look at the complaint for any explanation because they don't plead anything about this statement in their complaint. They don't plead she said anything on October 22nd at all that's important. For that reason alone, any discussion of this statement should be rejected.

But what she was talking about, what their own expert said she was talking about was you might remember a few years ago Martin Shkreli was all over the news because he had raised the price of, I think it was, an aids drug by some astronomical number. That was the pricing drama going on that she is referring to. It's got nothing to do with price fixing at Perrigo. Oh, my god, if the pricing drama was price fixing at Perrigo, it would be public, we wouldn't be here in a 10b-5 fraud case.

The plaintiffs do cite you to the fact that in other cases followed by some of the opt-out plaintiffs, this statement has been referenced unlike their complaint which doesn't reference it at all. But in those cases, the opt-out plaintiffs contend that this statement was suggesting something completely the opposite of what's being suggested here that there was, in fact, price competition that Perrigo was facing,

not that it indicated that there was lack of competition, which is the case with a price-fixing conspiracy.

In sum, your Honor, as I think you probably picked up from my presentation here, I don't think Ms. Brown can be dismissed from this price-fixing part of this case fast enough. It is offensive that she is in it. There are simply nothing that these people have developed in four years to tie her to a price-fixing conspiracy.

The other allegation against her isn't much better, and it has to do with one statement she made with regarding integration. I mean, I will give them this, she, unlike knowing about price fixing, she did know there was integration, but that's about the only thing that distinguishes the merits of this claim versus the merits of the price-fixing claim.

If -- let's go to slide 21.

Now, slide 21 is the statement, and this is the only statement that she made with respect to integration that is an issue in this case. This is the entirety of what their securities fraud claim against Ms. Brown is based on. And it's the statement, We close the transaction on March 30th. So we're about nine weeks in right now, and we are online, I would say we are in line with our going online integration process. Back office is working smoothly. We are bringing them on to all of our back office systems.

That's it.

Saying, essentially, nine weeks into the transaction, I think we're online with integration.

I would echo what Mr. Wareham said that I think there is a very strong argument that's not the kind of statement you can premise a securities fraud claim on at all. Not only is there the case that Mr. Wareham cited saying integration is far too loose a term on which the basis to base of security fraud is claimed, but I also refer you to the *Nokia* case from March 29, 2021, where the Southern District of New York said statements touting the progress of the integration are nonactionable puffery.

A couple of timing issues which I think are important when considering this comment. The merger occurred on March 30th. That's when Perrigo bought Omega, March 30th. The integration, quite obviously, cannot begin until March 30th, because that's when the companies are put together.

Nevertheless, plaintiffs cite over and over again documents that were developed in the preclosing stage when the parties were getting together trying to figure out what had to be integrated as a sign that there was some problem with integration. How could there be a problem with integration before you start to integrate? Five of the ten documents that cite are from this preintegration period.

And if you take a look at the documents, it will be pretty evident, you know, how, frankly, silly this is.

I mean, plaintiffs cite a March 2015 email in which my client, Ms. Brown, states that Omega's extraordinary accounting charges were an immediate flag for a discussion and probably a painful part of finalizing goals for this year. That's what she says a month before the integration begins. What she's saying is, we need to address extraordinary accounting charges.

Now, why did that have to be addressed. Well, that was explained by Ms. Brown and Mr. Winowiecki and other witnesses in the case. Omega was a European company and operated under a different accounting system, IRFS. Once they became a Perrigo subsidiary, they had to operate under GAAP. And one difference between IRFS and GAAP is the way extraordinary charges are treated.

Another thing they cite, a February 2015 email six weeks before the merger closes, in which somebody who works for Ms. Brown says, Oh, maybe it does not have a forecasting process. Ms. Brown said, Well, that's not unusual for European companies. They usually don't do quarterly forecasts.

And so what they talk about in this document and other documents is when we're merged, we are going to have to bring them into our forecasting process. Neither of those things shows there is a problem with integration, those are just the things you got to deal with to do the integration. For you to determine whether you're online with the integration, there needs to be a line. And that's what they were doing before the

merger occurred.

Another timing issue, and Mr. Wareham touched on this, obviously, since this case has everything with to do with what Ms. Brown knew when she made this statement on June 23, 2015, things that occurred after June -- when she made that statement on June 23, 2015, are irrelevant. Plaintiffs are in love with a retrospective that Perrigo did in May of 2016, 10 months later. This says things that we could have done things better in integration. Hey, great. Companies go back and look at things all the time. That's got nothing to do with what Ms. Brown knew on the day she spoke on June 23rd.

As the OFI Risk Arbitrages case said, Relying on a later filed document or statement is an attempt to prove fraud by hindsight which Third Circuit has long rejected.

Now, let's talk about what she actually knew during the period from March 30th when the companies closed their transaction to June 23rd, nine weeks later when she made the statement at issue, the only statement at issue, on integration.

Well, here is the May 8, 2015 document, slide 30.

And look at what the May 8th document is talking about at the top. The two topics we just went over a few minutes ago with the two issues that they raised that occurred preintegration.

IRFS as gap conversion project progressing. Good news, on the issue that was identified preclosing. Continue to have

dialogue with Omega on monthly and quarterly reporting. Again, attacking the issue that was identified preintegration, preclosure, pardon me, that needed to be addressed during integration.

So on May 8th she gets good news. May 12th, five weeks before her statement, she gets an email that says, I just finished a very positive call with Barbara regarding the finance integration work streams with Omega. Barbara is Omega's CFO. So she gets an email on May 12th saying, I just talk to Barbara, CFO at Omega, very positive.

June 8th, now less than -- a little more than two weeks before her statement on June 23rd. An email to Judy Brown from somebody at Perrigo again, Very positive approach on progress on integration. There is only one mildly negative statement that in the IETSEAP space, Perrigo was looking to take more control than originally agreed. But that's not a statement that the integration is not happening. That's a statement that they are overintegrating, if anything. Perrigo is taking control of the company they bought. All good news if you are a person wondering how is the integration going.

June 22nd, the day before her statement, gets an email that the employees at Omega, the rank and file, they are excited to feel like things are changing outside of the increased reporting requirements, smile, meaning because they have to talk to more people now, and that they are part of a

larger organization.

Also on June 22nd, the day before she speaks, she gets a document from her second in command, Ron Winowiecki, entitled, Success to date, about integration. Financial reporting, that's our old issue about IRFS and GAAP. FP&A, treasury, risk management, SOX. Who after looking at all of this wouldn't feel they could at least say, things are online. The record totally supports Ms. Brown's statement.

What do plaintiffs point to? They point to two things. The first is that there was a meeting on June 27th in which Mr. Coucke, who is the former head of Omega -- and I should point out, Omega is -- he basically controlled Omega. I think there was some public shareholders. It was basically a private company he controlled. And what he was -- sold his company to a public company in the United States. It's a different thing. He wasn't going to be in charge anymore.

And he had an outburst at a meeting that it was attended by Ms. Brown. And according to testimony from Tom Farrington who was one of the people who was there, he erupted around nothing is working right with integration in an outburst followed by comments by Ms. Brown.

So that sound bite appears in their brief over and over and over again.

But the good news is that we have context because on the same day Mr. Coucke wrote an email explaining exactly what he

was upset about.

And the email says things like, Since close, never a normal day, what we agreed on before signing with respect to functioning culture of Omega is not honored. Perrigo corporate wants to change us, not to make us better because you are the boss. It's always the Perrigo way. Look at the list where Perrigo already tried to change Omega.

You don't see in this memo things like, you know, The IRFS and GAAP isn't going right, or, Back office isn't working, or, A little worried about the forecasting. What you see is somebody complaining that, well, what he sold into was happening. Perrigo is taking over. He is not complaining that integration isn't happening. He is complaining he is being integrated out of relevance. Not an unusual tantrum for somebody who is used to being in control and not anymore, but a tantrum nonetheless, and nothing that undercuts the enormous positive information she had gotten on the nuts and bolts of integration, which was the basis for what she said on June 23rd.

The only other document that they really focus on is a document from June 22nd -- and this is slide 37 -- in which I think is Mr. Winowiecki says that, cash flow is off 70 million Euros in Quarter 2. And that Quarter 2 would have been -- Quarter 2 would have been the first quarter when Omega was within Perrigo. He does not say there, nor has anybody else

```
1
    anywhere, that it had anything to do with integration.
 2
           In fact, in the very document where he says this, there
 3
    is a separate section on integration. So this is a different
    issue entirely having nothing to do with integration.
    know Mr. Wareham talked about the fact whether this is a case
    about performance or integration, with respect to Ms. Brown and
 6
 7
    her statement, it's kind of beside the point, because the only
 8
    thing that they are focusing on from Ms. Brown, again, is one
 9
    statement that she made regarding integration, whether there's
10
    online, whether it was online.
11
           With that, your Honor, just to sum up, the price fixing,
12
    I mean, there is just nothing to connect Ms. Brown there. The
13
    integration really the same story, she was involved in
14
    integration. She wasn't involved in pricing at all, but the
15
    overwhelming record is that she received positive news and of
16
    course, proving scienter is the plaintiff's burden. So in this
17
    situation, a tie goes to the defendant.
18
           Thank you, your Honor.
19
           I don't know if you have any other questions.
20
             THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel.
21
             MR. BRODSKY: Would you like a break, your Honor?
22
             THE COURT: I'll leave it up to the parties when you
23
    want to think it would be a good time for a break.
24
    need a break.
25
             MR. SILVERMAN: You're up there.
```

MR. BRODSKY: Thank you so much. We have a PowerPoint as well.

Thank you so much. Court Reporter, my name is Reed Brodsky from Gibson Dunn on behalf of Joseph Papa.

Your Honor, as we get this, hopefully, get the PowerPoint connected, I did want to take a step back and give you guide posts as to what I was hoping to accomplish in a short period of time, now that you have heard a lot regarding the lack of merit in many of the plaintiff's claims.

We put in strong briefs, I think, that covered the law and cover a lot of the issues. What sometimes doesn't come across on the page are the documents themselves. And that's a challenge that you have in a case here where the documents are the best friends of Mr. Papa, Ms. Brown, and Perrigo. This is a case where we want you to look at the documents, and I'm going to go through some and put them on the screen.

Because when the plaintiffs describe the documents, almost every time they're shifting the meaning or they're playing with the language and they are trying to suggest to you that it is a trial court issue. It is an issue of fact for a jury. When in reality, based on the standard, they don't meet the standard. None of their claims are backed up by anything more than a scintilla of speculation. It does not meet the standard and thus, summary judgment is appropriate.

So what I hope to do is in 30 seconds or, so give you a

short background about Mr. Papa. And then talk a little bit about the lack of motive evidence. When we started this case, they had theories of motive and now they have gone by the wayside and their theories of motive have completely been eviscerated. They are actually theories of innocence.

And finally, address the two issues that are the remaining narrow theories they allege against Mr. Papa that he made allegedly materially false statements, with respect to price fixing and materially false statements with respect to Omega integration.

So if you can put up the first slide. Mr. Papa is somebody who has an unblemished record. This is literally his first case which he has ever been accused, by anybody, of securities fraud and making false statements, and it is very disheartening to him personally.

And he began as a pharmacist. He worked his way up in the industry for 35-plus years in the pharmaceutical, healthcare, and specialty industry. An industry where people are dedicated to the improvement of people's lives. The notion that somebody would suggest to him that he made a false statement intentionally in a misleading way is just preposterous, but let's address that.

He was the CEO and chairman of the bord Perrigo from October 2006 to April 2016. He had a number of units reporting to him. Perrigo marketed over 10,900 products. They had a

massive number of products in their portfolio. There were over 13,000 individuals worldwide and they operated in over 30 countries. You are going to see -- because we will show it to you -- the documents they point to, or the email they point to that they pull out to suggest that somehow he knew about something. Then you are going to see what he actually said.

And I hope, your Honor, you'll see that it's meritless what they're saying. It is not perjury. He is now presently the CEO and chairman of the board of Bausch Health, which was May 2016 to the present. So again, the two narrow theories on slide 3, this is what they're left with after the motion to dismiss was partially granted. Mr. Papa's statements concerning competitiveness and pricing in the generic drug market. And statements regarding the present success of the integration of Omega.

Now, just as a general point, his statements were factually accurate. It's provably accurate. We don't have the burden to prove they are accurate, but I think I will show you today they were actually factually accurate. And so their claim that they were somehow misleading or materially false is contrary to the record evidence.

And Mr. Papa did not act with scienter with respect to the challenged statements.

I will quickly move over slide 5 which I think your Honor knows very well that mere allegations, bare assertions,

suspicions are not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. They need to present something that is more than merely colorable. Something that's significantly probative. And that, they can't come close to.

Again, on the next slide we just want to highlight is, they have to prove and show and demonstrate significant evidence that shows his knowledge, his intent, and if they want to show a form of recklessness, it is a very strong form of recklessness in the Third Circuit. It is an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care.

Now, in the Third Circuit they don't have to prove motive, but evidence of motive might be helpful.

And when they started this case, they said -- Mr. Papa was motivated in two respects to lie to the public, which is absolutely wrong. The first they said that he had a desire to fend off the Mylan hostile tender offer and that was evidence of motive.

Now the Court has already rejected this at page 18 of Roofer's Pension 2018 Westlaw 3601229. The Court said such allegations, quote, Fall woefully short of demonstrating scienter, end quote, because they do not suggest any, quote, concrete and personal benefit.

There is nothing in the record since that time that has helped them in that respect. In fact, what the record shows is, had Mr. Papa supported the Mylan tender offer, he would be

1.3

far more wealthy today. It was against his own financial interest in what he believed to be the right thing to do, given his stock position in Perrigo.

And then second, the plaintiffs have alleged this other motive -- where they insist on it, and I think they still insist on it today, although we will have to see what they say today -- that he had some usual stock sales that somehow were evidence of motive. I want to give you a brief overview and go into those.

He did not engage in unusual stock sales. Quite to the contrary. During the relevant period his overall holdings increased -- increased, not decreased -- increased by 9.8 percent during the class period. I call that motive contrary to what they think. Had he been selling the stock during the period of making allegedly false statements, that resonates with some proof of motive, but here we're talking about somebody who increased their ownership of stock during the alleged period that he is -- that they allege that he is making false statements.

In addition, if you compare his trading during the class period to before, he took steps to stop his trading during the class period. And I want to go through, briefly, that timeline because I think it is very, very compelling.

On slide 8 we have in March 2015 Mr. Papa entered into a Rule 10b5-1 trading plan. I am sure your Honor knows this, at

the time an executive of a public company has no access to material nonpublic information pursuant to an FCC rule, they may initiate a plan in which they have no control over once the plan is initiated.

And they can't change the plan if they want to buy and sell, that plan has to be initiated. They can't change the plan when they have material nonpublic information.

So he initiated a plan at a time he didn't have material nonpublic information in March of 2015, that would only trigger sells of Perrigo stock when it reached the price of \$150 per share.

In April of 2015, Mylan made an unsolicited offer and what did he do? Now, he could have let that plan run. The stock was moving up fast. He could have benefited from letting his trading plan go. Why? At the time that he initiated the trading plan, he had no idea that Mylan would come in with this tender offer. But what did he do? I think this is very telling.

He canceled it because, quote -- and he testified about this and no one has challenged him about it, because you can't challenge the stubborn fact that he canceled. He said he, quote, Didn't feel that the CEO trading during that time period would be appropriate. That tells you everything you need to know about the character of Mr. Papa.

If we move onto the next slide, August 25, 2015, he sold

vesting shares for tax liabilities. Now, that as under the case law is heavily against an inference of scienter, there are cases that we cite in our brief for that. It was 11,000 and his holdings increased by 11,490 shares as a result.

November 13, 2015, Perrigo shareholders defeat the Mylan hostile tender offer and that's when he enters into a new plan. December 28th, Mr. Papa sells shares pursuant to the 10b5-1 plan, the only date of sale by Mr. Papa during the class period, the first sale of share in 21 months and the total shares sold on this date were one-tenth of the total number of shares in the 25 months before the class period.

Finally, leading into the fourth quarter, before the fourth quarter results are announced, he cancels his trading plan because, quote, He felt that the right thing to do was not to make any additional 10b5-1 trades until all the information became publicly available. This is significant in terms of determining scienter.

We respectfully submit that this is now probative evidence and an insight into his mind as he is making the statements during the class period. These are stubborn facts that I think the plaintiffs have a hard time grappling with.

Let's go to what they are actually trying to claim. First, with respect to generic Rx competition and allegations of price fixing.

Going to slide 13, you've already heard the evidence.

2

3

4

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

innocence.

There is an absence of any evidence of price-fixing scheme. Let's assume in a hypothetical fantasy world, there was some evidence of a price-fixing scene. Hearsay upon hearsay, speculation, whatever it may be. Assuming that was accurate, none of the direct evidence involves -- alleged direct evidence, hearsay upon hearsay -- involves Mr. Papa. plaintiffs had claimed that Mr. Papa was, quote, Involved in the pricing decisions. These are their claims. That's been proven untrue. None of the several episodes in which they rely on for alleged price fixing that their expert has put forth involve Mr. Papa. And the documents they rely on for circumstantial evidence, they don't come close to supporting any reasonable inference that Mr. Papa knew about price fixing. So stepping back, I won't reiterate and belabor the point, but there has been no allegation by any federal or state law enforcement authority, in the country, in the world, alleging wrongdoing against Mr. Papa. And they have admitted that. And then the affidavits on slides 15 that they rely on which was already addressed, they concede that the two affidavits offer no evidence with respect to Mr. Papa. So what do they rely on? Let's look at the actual documents, because we embrace these. These are evidence of

In their brief they cite these documents. So let's put them up. Slide 16, they rely on plaintiff's Exhibit 271. But there is no proof of Mr. Papa's awareness of price fixing and the proof of how much they stretch the meaning of words and they ask your Honor to overlook them is this document.

In this document Exhibit 271, your Honor, they point to the words, this is a board -- he is not on the email, but he did receive these board slides. And one of the slides that they point to -- this is the slide -- slide 16 of Exhibit 271 says, Pricing environment more difficult. And it says, Drug pricing now in the news. They point to those statements and they say, That's evidence he knew about price fixing. I'm sorry. Where?

Like if I got that document, I would be struggling how in the world am I supposed to know from pricing environment more difficult, or drug pricing now in the news, that somehow people in Perrigo might be fixing prices, or somebody in the their world they might be fixing prices. They have to come up with evidence that's significantly probative that Mr. Papa knew or recklessly disregarded there was price fixing. That document does not prove that.

Let's go to the next document because I think it's very telling -- your Honor, we're talking about millions of pages of documents, as I understand it, they reviewed and produced.

We're talking about depositions upon depositions upon

depositions. They have combed the earth for evidence against Mr. Papa knowing about price fixing and this is the exhibit they rely on in their brief.

Exhibit 272. And what is Exhibit 272? It is a single customer of the millions of customers of Perrigo who writes a letter to Mr. Papa. This is in November 12, 2014. And that gets sent -- his secretary, Genni Plyley at the time, sends it to Mr. Papa who has a practice -- as he testified -- of giving any of the letters to the various departments to handle. What does this person said? This person says that they were using a desonide cream, a form of cortisone that is more powerful.

Desonide cream and the cost from 2013 to 2014 for 60 grams went up from \$42 to \$241, a six-fold increase.

Now, I'm sorry. That cannot be, as a matter of law, evidence of someone being aware of price fixing. It just can't be. A jury should not look at that and decide whether or not that's price fixing. This is for a Court to decide. This is a thousand steps too far from alleging that someone knew about price fixing.

If this is about someone who knows about price fixing, somebody could write a letter to this Court and suggest I saw a suspicious character outside of this Court, come into the Court, several times a week, and is that supposed to be evidence of some kind of criminal conspiracy? If the Court looks at the letter and says, I'll pass it on to the marshals?

1 This is not evidence of knowledge of any kind of price fixing. 2 Next slide 18, Mr. Papa was not involved in pricing 3 decisions. I believe this is undisputed. The pricing 4 decisions were made for the generic unit, was made by a senior vice president advised by a pricing committee. The testimony 6 confirms that Mr. Papa wasn't a member of that pricing 7 committee. And the pricing committee did not regularly share 8 its specific pricing decisions with the executive committee. 9 And what is some of the best proof of this? 10 I mean if we take a look at slide 19, this is the 11 corporate representative himself of Perrigo who said that, the 12 level of detail regarding pricing decisions was, quote, simply 13 not appropriate for somebody at the executive level. 14 I mean, I think that says it all. There is zero 15 evidence that Mr. Papa was involved in pricing decisions. 16 I haven't seen it. I haven't heard it. And I'm troubled that 17 they are not voluntarily dismissing this, with respect to 18 Mr. Papa. 19 Now, he did receive monthly and quarterly reports from 20 business units. But none of those reports have any evidence of 21 a price-fixing scheme. He did attend four conferences of the 22 19 conferences that their expert said was an opportunity to 23 collude. That's what the expert said. 19 industry 24 conferences. You go to a conference. It is an opportunity to 25 collude.

Personally, I don't think that's evidence of anything because people go to conferences all the time. People go to judicial conferences. People go to lawyer conferences. People go to conferences for all sorts of reasons.

That can't be evidence of wrongdoing because you go to a conference. Put that aside, even assuming it is some kind of evidence -- which it's not -- he went to four conferences of the 19 and they were in 2013 and 2014, prior to the class period.

Now, Plaintiffs asked Mr. Papa zero questions about these conferences. I barely think they asked him any questions about price fixing at all. Your Honor, they asked for two days of Mr. Papa's testimony. That's the class plaintiffs and the opt-out plaintiffs. Two days.

We had no objection. If they asked for three days, we would have given them three days, no objection. You want any question to Mr. Papa, go ahead, here is your opportunity. He was one of the last deponents to be deposed. You built up your entire record. You loaned your documents.

And how long did they ask him questions? 14 hours they asked for. We gave them all 14. Five. They took five hours out of 14. I had to ask them the question at the end of the five hours, I was so shocked sitting there that they didn't ask any questions about the relevant issues here. They didn't want to know from the one person who can tell them what a document

meant or what he believed? It was shocking.

1.3

And I think because they didn't want to know his answers. They want to rely on these little bits and pieces from documents without actually getting to the truth. I had to ask him the single question, were you aware of -- were you involved in pricing? Which of course, he said no.

Now, I think this pretty much finishes the price-fixing issue. And it's just really troubling that they continue to pursue it. Mr. Papa did make statements about the competitiveness of the market. So let's put that up on slide 20.

He said, obviously, it's a competitive market out there. Now, I think that's true. I mean, there are, as I understand it, over 90 companies competing with Perrigo at this time. I would call that competitive. I don't think these statements that it's obviously a competitive market out there, or at the bottom, I'm not going to make any specific comments on a customer or product. How in the world can that be evidence that Mr. Papa is aware of price fixing? It is obviously not.

And at the same time, if we go to slide 21, Plaintiffs don't focus on this, but Mr. Papa made statements about the generics market, in which based on his knowledge and his experience and what he was exposed to, he understood that these products in the generic space were exposed to less competition due to relatively longer and more expensive development,

clinical trial and approval processes. I mean, that makes sense. That's logical. And so if prices were going up in a less competitive market, that made sense.

On August 5th they point to this on page -- slide 22, that Mr. Papa said, Our team has done a great job at looking at pricing. And that -- across that portfolio we think there is still opportunities to do pricing.

They claim that's misleading, your Honor. That's misleading. Our team has done a great job at looking at pricing.

It sounds like an opinion to me about trying to give a compliment to your team. And then so across that portfolio we think that there is still opportunities to do pricing. I think it's okay to look for opportunities to do pricing even in a market that's hard to do pricing. Because there are less competitors doing it.

On slide 23 he was then shown this document. This is a month and a half later. It was September 13th. And this is what the plaintiffs point to as proof that when he said our team has done a great job looking at pricing and we think there is opportunities to do pricing, that he was misleading the market intentionally.

They point to this email in which he is copied on it.

It contains a slide deck. And on one of the slides it says,
business dynamics. And there is a bullet that says, Minimal

price increase opportunities.

Well, that meant they were looking for opportunities.

And there were minimal price increase opportunities. Entirely consistent with what he said six weeks before or so. And that's what he testified to, but they are pointing to it as if it's misleading and it boggles the mind as to how they have that theory, why that works.

Turning next to this issue, and this issue is one that we've struggled with because Mr. Papa has been consistent from the beginning of this case. They have been consistent in misreading his statements. And this has happened over and over again, so I'm glad we get a final chance to show your Honor what the evidence shows.

They claim that Mr. Papa represented to the market -this is on, I believe, slide 24 -- that Mr. Papa represented to
the market a pricing goal, specific each of the six generic Rx
products at issue. And they claim that he represented a goal
for the broader generic Rx market. I mean that's what they
allege. Repeatedly, as Mr. Papa testified, when he talked
about pricing, he talked about it on a portfolio-wide basis.

Now, don't take my word for it. We're about to turn to the evidence that shows it over and over and over again. And they disregard this, so I'm hoping today they will confront this and they will address this with your Honor. And they will explain to your Honor why on February 5, 2015, when Mr. Papa

1 said, first comment I offer is that across the total Perrigo 2 portfolio, our goal is always to keep pricing flat to slightly 3 up. 4 I'd like them to explain to you today why that doesn't 5 mean it is across the total portfolio. May 12, 2015, Bank of America conference. I challenge them to explain why this 6 7 statement, our approach in our total business is to keep our 8 pricing flat to up, slightly. Why he is not talking about the 9 total business? 10 June 2, 2015, he says it again. We -- the approach we 11 take on pricing is really a portfolio approach, across all the 12 Perrigo segments. I think he is being quite clear, but let's 13 see if there is something else. 14 Next slide, 26, June 2, 2015, this is during the class 15 period, now in any individual category like Rx there may be 16 more upside. I will say over the last several years, to be 17 fair, there has been more pricing upside in the Rx category 18 than perhaps some of the other categories. But we still take 19 that kind of total portfolio view of keeping pricing flat to up 20 slightly as a view. 21 And the Goldman Sachs conference, January 5, 2016, 22 again, bookends to this entire class period. He is again 23 saying, it is across the total portfolios. 24 What do they do? 25 Your Honor, in their brief, and I really wish I had

blown up their brief, but you know what? I will turn to the page. It is their opposition brief to the motion for summary judgment. It's on page 55 and these pages, absolutely shocking to me when I read them. Page 55 and 56. And we will put it up, and we will blow up the evidence of what they are trying to persuade your Honor to do.

They turn to these words right here on page 55 of their brief, their opposition brief at page 55. And they say these are the words that Mr. Papa said. And they say, quote, defendants Papa and Perrigo said the strategy was applied not just on a portfolio-wide basis, but at product, category, and business segment levels.

And that's the words they quote to your Honor.

Page 55. They go on to say, defendants argue that Papa meant something other than what he actually said. Now they are telling your Honor that Mr. Papa, when he says it is across the portfolio pricing, he is not telling the truth. And this a jury question. In fact, their next sentence, however, quote, That is an issue for trial. Okay. What did they leave out for your Honor?

Let's go to the next slide.

How about the previous paragraph, your Honor, where it explains exactly what he is talking about which they don't point you to? Quote, On the question on pricing, certainly we see that out in the marketplace, but I would remind the

audience today that what we've always said about pricing is that our pricing across our total book of business is flat to up slightly.

Let them come up and explain why they left that out on page 55. Why they think that's a triable issue, when in that paragraph and the one right below it, he says very clearly, I'm talking about our look at our total portfolio and that explains exactly the statement that they cherry-picked out, -- which now you can see means whether we're talking about any specific product, or any specific category, or any segment of our business; the overall comment, the overall portfolio comment -- is flat to up slightly for our pricing.

Can there be any reasonable doubt about that? If this is a reasonable doubt standard, there would be no question we'd win. It is a much lower standard for us. Much higher burden them to show somehow this is significantly probative when they cherry pick a portion of the statement and they think that's up to the jury to decide.

Your Honor, they completely are taking out of the meaning of the plain language. Now, let me go to the next issue, which is Omega integration.

They can't prevail on these claims with respect to Omega integration for substantially the same reasons that they can't prevail on their other claims, because they are just taking things out of context and they are not looking at the record

1 evidence. But we have the record evidence and we want to give it to your Honor. 3 The plaintiffs have failed to establish that any of 4 Mr. Papa's statements somehow were false or misleading, or presented somehow a false or misleading picture by suggesting 6 somehow he omitted that there were serious impediments to 7 integration. 8 Okay. Let's test out their theory. 9 If we turn to slide 30, I would like to talk about 10 slide 30 and 31 briefly. 11 Because in the context of Omega integrations, they keep 12 saying the public -- because they care about the public, what 13 did the public know during the class period? I mean, as a 14 federal prosecutor, when I was prosecuting securities fraud, 15 that's what I cared about. What does the public know? 16 they receive the information they needed to assess the total 17 mix of information to figure out whether or not somebody should 18 buy or sell a security? 19 They say Omega integration was troubling. 20 say it was troubling --21 They say Omega integration, people should have been told 22 it was plaqued with systemic problems. Now, really, the 23 problems they were plagued with, which we are about to see, are 24 HR problems, IT problems, not commercial problems. 25 between us, what does the investor care about, whether the IT

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

is integrating, whether the HR departments are getting together, or whether the commercial synergy is effective? The investor cares whether or not the commercial synergies are effective. But put that aside. Even if you put that aside, on slide 30 and 31 we've excerpted out from the public filings what they want to avoid focusing on, February 5, 2015, Perrigo's Form 10K; April 29, 2015, Perrigo's Form 10Q; August 13, 2015, Perrigo's annual statements; February 25, 2016, Form 10KT. What does it do? It warns every investor that Omega integration combining two businesses is complex. It's costly. It is time consuming. It has lots of difficulties. It is unpredictable. It could be challenging. What investor doesn't know this after reading all of these public filings? Let's look at what they actually point to and at this point, I think I would like to hand up to your Honor the stack of documents, the -- I have two copies. Everybody -- my worthy colleagues to the right and my worthy colleagues to the left all have copies of this because these are the statements and documents that the plaintiffs rely on for support that Mr. Papa made false and misleading statements. And I think we identified them all. They will tell us later today if we didn't, but I would like them to explain why

these show Mr. Papa was being misleading.

They focus on Mr. Papa's statement on April 21, 2015, slide 33, and they say that Mr. Papa was deceiving the marketplace when he said 22 days after the March 30th closing of the acquisition of Omega, quote, We are very pleased with our initial integration projects with Omega. So there is a lot of good activities happening with the integration team.

They say that was false and misleading for him to say we are very pleased and a lot of good activities are happening.

Okay. Let's look at their proof.

They point to this document on slide 34, a canceled -- a January 2015 email, preclosing, and they say that Mr. Papa should have learned about this, that somebody at Perrigo -- at Omega was canceling a weekly call to plan integration that they were going to start in March. This is one of their documents they say proves Mr. Papa was somehow misleading.

I'm sorry. It does not. All it does is talk about planning and somebody canceling a weekly call. That does not mean that Mr. Papa's statements in April were false about being pleased.

Slide 35, they cite an email, again, prior to March 30th closing, in which they say in this email, and we handed up a copy to your Honor, that it raises concerns because they are missing budget from the last year. So in 2014 they missed budget.

I'm sorry. That does not make Mr. Papa's statement, We

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

are very pleased with our initial integration project with Omega, a lot of good things are happening with the integration team. I don't see the connection. There is zero connection to that. So let's go to the next document they point to, slide 35 -- that's slide 36. They point to this document. They say -- and let me get this exactly accurate. is an email that raises unspecified -- so it is from Thomas Farrington to Joseph Papa, Thomas Farrington being in IT department. I think he had the title of chief information officer. He was involved in integration, and he emails Joseph Papa on April 8, 2015, Omega integration concerns, and he says, Joe, Mike, and that refers to Mike Stewart, and I had a few meetings today on a few matters. He referenced that some integration concerns were shared by Barbara and Marc -- that's Marc Coucke and Barbara being his -- one of his executives -that you and he had some discussion around. They point to that and they say, Well, when Mr. Papa says he was pleased with all the activities with integration, that meant he was lying. There is no connection there. There was no connection. What was the testimony? Mr. Farrington testified he didn't know what those matters were referring too, but what he thought in his testimony was that Mr. Coucke complained about a lot of the added work. Mr. Hardiman already talked about how

1 Mr. Coucke had temper tantrums, and now he is complaining about 2 a lot of work. 3 Mr. Papa testified he didn't recall the specifics, but 4 he did recall concerns about functional group integration. 5 What was that? HR, IT, not commercial problems. 6 So let's go to the document they rely on. 7 Slide 37, in the packet we gave you, your Honor, and we 8 urge your Honor to look at the packet, this is their document 9 that they rely on. It is an April 10, 2015, PowerPoint that 10 Mr. Papa received, and they say this PowerPoint proves that 11 Mr. Papa was lying when he said good things, good activities 12 are happening with integration or that there are, you know, a 13 lot of initial integration projects. 14 Really? I mean, I will just point out one slide within 15 the slide, slide 37. This is slide 23, bottom left-hand 16 corner. 17 When I look at that, I look at a list of a lot of 18 integration projects. When I look at some of the headline news 19 here about some of the progress they are making, what I see is 20 a lot of good activities happening with the integration team. 21 What Mr. Papa said was true, and what they are doing is 22 misleading. 23 Slide 38, it is the same -- it is the April 14, 2015, 24 PowerPoint, and it identifies positive results of initial 25 integration projects, something Mr. Papa received, and we've

highlighted the slides.

Again, I challenge and ask the plaintiffs to point out why that is not proof that Mr. Papa was making a truthful statement and he wasn't being materially misleading.

Finally, I will put this up because they point to this repeatedly. This is the one they rely on repeatedly, your Honor, and this is on slide 39. It is in your packet. It is Thomas Farrington's May 26, 2016, document.

Now, why is it important?

Mr. Papa is no longer at Perrigo. So he had left, and the chief information officer, I believe is the chief information officer involved in IT, Thomas Farrington, who testified, was doing sort of a postmortem with the benefit of hindsight and he singularly focused on IT because that's his area. Commercial stuff he doesn't know about, but IT, back office, that's his thing, and he had some criticisms for Joe Papa.

Joe Papa is the missing guy in the room. He is no longer there. He is over at Bausch Health, otherwise, previously known as Valeant, and he is criticizing some of Joe's decision-making, but nowhere does he say anywhere here that there were serious impediments. Nowhere does he say anywhere here there is anything to do with commercial integration. Again, this is 2020 hindsight after the fact. That's what they rely on.

Now, they also point to the statement on slide 40.

Mr. Papa's statement, which people have already gone over so I will just be very brief on it, 22 days after closing, Mr. Papa confirms and says to the public that Omega has been accretive to our growth rate.

Your Honor, I do want to briefly describe Omega is in Europe, many, many countries, I believe over 30. Perrigo didn't have a presence in Europe. They had a presence in the United States. They had a presence in other countries, but they had no presence in Europe. This was an opportunity to take Perrigo's products and have a distribution throughout Europe, and then Omega was a billion-dollar plus company to have Omega products distributed in the United States and elsewhere in the country and what he said has been accretive to our growth rate was true. It was accretive to the growth rate and on slides 41, 42, 43, we prove it.

I will go quickly to slide 43.

Slide 43 was a document Mr. Papa received on April 19th, and it proves that it was accretive. It has the proof right there. So when Mr. Papa is making the statement on April 21st, a few days after receiving this document, that it was accretive, how could somebody say he doesn't have knowledge that it is accretive? I mean, the document he receives says Omega is accretive.

So when Mr. Papa made the statement, even if they could

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

were focused on.

somehow prove that wasn't true -- I believe it is factually true -- even if they somehow prove it wasn't true, Mr. Papa believed it. He received the information that said it. I would like them to point out to your Honor, when they come back up here, on slide -- this slide, this particular slide, I believe it's 43, I would like them to explain to your Honor why Mr. Papa receiving this email saying Omega is accretive doesn't completely wipe away their argument that Mr. Papa was somehow materially misleading when he repeated it to the public a few days later. Finally, we have some other slides, some additional remarks that Mr. Papa makes over and over again, the same sort of information. I'm not going to -- I realize I'm short on time. On slide 47, I don't need to restate how Mr. Hardiman very effectively portrayed and accurately portrayed Mr. Coucke's temper tantrum. It was a temper tantrum. about how he didn't want to be given a lot of work. He was tired of being told by, you know, the new boss, the new people in charge, what to do. That's all it was. Mr. Papa testified on slide 48, we excerpted it, about the challenges of integration. What he said and made very clear was that commercial groups were the ones that generate

the revenue and that was going well. That's what the investors

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

slide on 55.

Slide 49, they claim this was a false statement. Mr. Papa made this statement on September 17, 2015. He said, We supplemented it with our manufacturing infrastructure so we brought some manufacturing expertise. There is -- that is accurate. On slide 50, Mr. Papa focused on the long-term. to the public from September 17th, that Morgan Stanley conference, the Perrigo/Omega integration will take two, three, four years. It is not going to be done right away, and he was very clear about that. They were very clear about that in the public filings. On slide 51, on the same call, Mr. Papa provided an example of Perrigo's supplementation Omega with manufacturing expertise. I will spare you the details, your Honor, but he explains to the public why he believes Omega is going to provide this. You know, he is going to supplement Omega with manufacturing expertise because he was able to acquire some other brands from another company and use Omega's distribution network to further sell it. So it was a true statement. Finally, your Honor, and we proved it with some of our slides, the plaintiffs offer some evidence with respect to Ms. Kincaid. I think Mr. Wareham explained why that's no longer valid, and then I would like to just turn to one final

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The plaintiffs -- this is another one of those things where if you don't really look carefully at the documents, you might miss how I think the plaintiffs are misinterpreting -- is that a nice way of putting it -- misinterpreting the record. Here is an example where the plaintiffs claim that Mr. Papa removed slides from a board presentation that Mr. Coucke was going to make in the class period in the summer of 2015, and that was somehow nefarious and that somehow prevented Mr. Coucke from giving full information to the board. I'm not a hundred percent sure. What actually happened? Well, if we look at the record, and we put the exhibits in the bottom of the page, Mr. Farrington emailed Mr. Papa July 30, 2015. This is the same Mr. Farrington who after the fact had the postmortem from the IT perspective, and he said, Given the 30-minute window, they don't have much time with the board. I suggest we eliminate these slides and begin at slide 20. Okay. Proof. Contemporaneous evidence, it was Mr. Farrington and not Mr. Papa who suggested removing the slides. Next, Mr. Farrington testified, Despite the removal of the slides, we presented the information as I am reviewing the deck that Marc presented as well as the points that we had a minimum raised verbally with Marc. And who presented it? It was Mr. Coucke who presented

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

it, and Mr. Coucke fully agreed with these slides he says to Tom, not to Joe but to Tom, talking about the slides. So it is just another short example of where the plaintiffs have misconstrued the factual record. Your Honor, it is very easy for somebody to say, you know, these documents, we point to this evidence. We point to this statement. Leave it up to the jury, but that's not the standard. That's what they are asking you to do. Mr. Papa has been in this industry, healthcare industry, for decades. He doesn't deserve to be accused of this at the outset, but that's fine. That's what discovery is for, to test the waters, to depose people, to collect the evidence and then to question Mr. Papa, and now they have done that. They have had that opportunity, and they don't have the evidence to meet the summary judgment standard. We would ask your, Honor, really, really important, we would ask your Honor to dismiss all the claims against Mr. Papa, all the claims. He should not be before this Court. He should not be any longer a defendant in this case. Your Honor, I'm happy to answer any questions. I thank you so much for your time. THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. No questions at this time. I note when counsel came up he mentioned to the group about a break. It seems like this will probably be a good time

```
1
    for a break.
 2
           It is 12:26. I don't know what ideas the parties had
 3
    for a break. Do you want 45 minutes for a break and make it a
    lunch break and come back at that time?
 5
             MR. SILVERMAN: That's fine, your Honor.
 6
             THE COURT: And we're going to make ourselves
 7
    available for you today. So you don't have to be so concerned
 8
    about time frames in terms of when we will be finishing today.
 9
             THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise.
10
             (Luncheon Recess taken from 12:27 to 1:30 p.m.)
11
             THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise.
12
             THE COURT: Please be seated.
13
           Are we ready to proceed?
14
             MR. SILVERMAN: Yes, your Honor. Good Afternoon, your
15
            Josh Silverman for the plaintiffs. I'll address most
16
    of the liability issues before us this afternoon.
17
           My colleague, Mr. Harrod, will address loss causation
18
    and Daubert issues.
19
           First, I would like to thank your Honor for giving us
20
    the time today to explore these issues, and to thank you for
21
    your patience in wading through the several hundred pages of
22
    briefing and statements of fact, not to mention the roughly
23
    14,000-page record.
24
           To thank Judge Wettre, who is no longer here, but I
25
    would like to pass on our thanks to her for shepherding the
```

case through discovery and trying to assist the parties in attempts to mediate.

Prior to our break, defendants spent about two,

two-and-a-half hours telling your Honor what sounded very much

to me like how they would present their summation at trial to a

jury. They talked extensively about what inferences should be

drawn from the documents, what defendants, or Mr. Coucke,

really meant when they wrote the words that are in the

documents in the record. Or why defendants' self-serving

denials of wrongdoing should be weighed more heavily than

contrary evidence in the record.

They even asked for an inference to be drawn in their favor based on the amount of deposition time for Mr. Papa. Of course, they didn't mention to your Honor the reason his deposition was cut short was because he answered, I don't recall, 120 times; I don't recall or I don't remember, and he answered, I don't know, 65 times.

My guess is that he will find a cure to his memory ailment by the time we get to trial, but if not, the jury is the deliberative body that is charged with assessing his reaction to the questions and determining whether that's honest or dishonest. Credibility is always an issue for the jury.

Defendants also described through their cherry-picked evidence what sounded very much like a different company than the record actually shows. They did not mention at all that

Perrigo wrote down over \$2 billion for Omega. Instead they described it as almost trivial IT problems and HR problems in integration.

Well, those problems don't require a \$2 billion write-down. The record here reveals something far greater. They also glossed over that Perrigo's own competitor said it conspired with Perrigo to fix prices, to rig bids, to allocate markets. That's not something you saw in any of the cases that were cited by either party in the respective briefs on collusion.

They also ignored that Papa and Brown were both told before the class period that the windfall pricing that had driven generic prescription drug results, making it the most profitable division at Perrigo, would peak by 2015, just as it actually turned out to do. They hid all of this information from investors. They spoke to investors extensively about these topics, but hit all the damaging information.

We understand that defense counsel have their own spin. They have their own story to tell. They have their own inferences that they believe should be drawn from the evidence, but that's exactly what trials and juries are for. It is not what summary judgment is for.

As the Third Circuit has made clear, Rule 56 serves a very limited purpose. It cannot apply, whereas here the nonmovant has proved more than a mere scintilla of evidence

supporting its claims. That is the  $E.D.\ v.\ Sharkey$  case.

It cannot be use to draw inferences in favor of the movements. All inferences must go to the nonmovant at summary judgment. That is the *Marino* case, also in *Nathanson*. It cannot be use to resolve credibility issues or to weigh evidence, *Marino* again. And it cannot be granted if there is a disagreement over what inferences can be drawn, even if the facts are undisputed. That is the *Nathanson* case.

Here the facts are deeply disputed. Credibility needs to be assessed. It is a very big issue, especially for somebody like Joe Papa and Judy Brown. The evidence must be weighed; that can only be done at trial. A few highlights of the evidence that was either spun in a way that is unnatural and unreasonable, and that we think that jury will be given its plain meaning, or was unmentioned altogether by my counterparts.

Even before the class period defendants were warned about problems with Omega. The pre-acquisition due diligence by PricewaterhouseCooper -- that was a company hired by Perrigo -- suggested that Omega's revenue was inflated by about 200 million Euros. That is something PWC called in a report to Ms. Brown negative revenue sensitivities, that's Exhibit 259.

Perrigo also developed with its banker, JP Morgan, something it called a deal model, which documented the baseline expectations and told Perrigo, as it integrated the company,

whether Omega was performing according to the metrics that the board of directors at Perrigo considered, when it approved making a bid for Omega in November of 2014.

But it didn't meet those. And it did not meet the deal model before the class period or during the class period. The deal model itself is expressed in Exhibit 360. It is documented there. Something that was sent to Papa and Brown, so they had actual knowledge of this baseline and it was something, of course, that Papa considered as a director when — in late 2014 when the board was deciding to bid for Omega.

By February 2015, emails sent to Papa and to Brown admitted that Omega's performance had deteriorated severely and that Omega was not meeting the deal model. It is Exhibit 162. And defendants concede in the paragraph 49 of their statement of facts -- I was surprised to see this -- but they concede that Perrigo's vice president of finance, Ron Winowiecki told Brown that his biggest concern -- that was his words at the time -- his biggest concern what that upon integration, Omega would no longer be able to boost its earnings with what he called extraordinary items. That's Exhibit 35.

As my counterpart said, the reason why they couldn't do that is that GAAP does not allow that kind of accounting manipulation. A few days later, Brown responded to Mr. Winowiecki -- this is in February 2015 -- that she could not agree more about that concern. And she called it -- she called

Omega's use of extraordinary items to boost its accounting an immediate flag. That was her words at the time.

She said it required the involvement of Joe Papa. That was her words at the time. And she said it would probably be a painful part of finalizing goals. All of that is in Exhibit 164.

Now, over the coming month PricewaterhouseCooper and Perrigo's interm finance staff debated extensively about Omega's inflated revenue. It's documented in a lot of the documents before your Honor, such as 83, 192, 441. All of this was omitted from investors when they made their positive statements about Omega.

Now, on May 6, 2015, Perrigo's vice president of finance, Mr. Winowiecki, sent an email to Papa and Brown, warning that Omega's second quarter 2015 EBIT was going to be 13.6 percent below the deal model. They didn't come out and tell investors Omega is not performing the way that we expected. They continued to make positive statements. And that is documented in Exhibit 53.

Now, we get to very close to where Ms. Brown made her statements about things being in line and going smoothly.

She made those on June 23, 2015. Let's talk about what actually happened, and what a reasonable jury can consider, and what inferences they can draw because, remember, they are obligated -- that the Court is obligated at this stage in the

litigation to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of Plaintiffs, the nonmovant.

On June 17th, six days before Ms. Brown's statement,

Omega CEO Coucke erupted in a Perrigo executive committee that

both Papa and Brown attended. What he said at that committee

was that, quote, Nothing was working right with the

integration, end quote. He didn't say commercial integration

is going swell, but we have the tiny IT problem or a tiny HR

problem. He said nothing was working right. A reasonable jury

can take that plain statement for its plain meaning.

Farrington, who was at the meeting, confirmed these statements. Let's be clear about what Mr. Farrington's role was. He was the chief information officer; that is true. That was one of the hats he wore, but the other hat he wore is that he was the head of the integration management office. And he was hand-picked by defendant Papa to be effectively Perrigo's integrations czar for the Omega integration.

The fact that Mr. Farrington confirmed, and Mr. Coucke said at a meeting attended by Ms. Brown and Mr. Papa, that nothing was working right with the integration completely undermines Ms. Brown's claim to this Court that there is no evidence that anybody actually raised integrations concerns to her. She asserts on page 11 of her reply brief.

The very next day, June 18, 2015, Farrington and Coucke agree that Perrigo and Omega need marriage counseling. That is

Exhibit 60, and I think there is another copy in the record at Exhibit 180.

In that same exchange Coucke says, that the integration problems have made it impossible to run his business. Thus, linking both the integration and the performance. It is the integration problems that are hurting the business itself.

Mr. Coucke said that. There is no evidence whatsoever to the contrary. And even if there was mixed evidence -- which there isn't here -- all inferences at this stage need to be drawn in plaintiff's favor. That's what the Third Circuit requires.

He also said, Mr. Coucke also said, Omega was out of oxygen fighting off Perrigo's demands for unusual integration measures. We know this was forwarded to Ms. Brown because the metadata from the production where they produce the documents to the plaintiffs indicates that Ms. Brown was the custodian of this document.

Five days later, Ms. Brown speaks to investors at an analyst conference. Instead of telling them the truth that there were some hitches in integration, she says integration is proceeding in line. And she says that back office integration -- and that, of course, is the thorny issue of resolving Omega's accounting into GAAP compliance and building a forecast process that was missing -- was going smoothly. Those were her words as set forth in Exhibit 63.

Two days later, two days, Ms. Brown writes to Omega CEO

Mr. Coucke suggesting that she fly to meet him at Brussels -in Brussels, where he resided -- to discuss, quote, concerns he
raised at the EC -- that's executive committee -- and also with
her one on one. That is Exhibit 206.

A reasonable jury can consider to you don't need to fly halfway around the globe to discuss concerns if there were no concerns. You don't need to fly halfway around the globe to discuss integration problems if it's going smoothly, and it's in line. It wasn't.

July 12, 2015, only a couple weeks later. An email to Brown warned Omega's cash flow was a business problem and that it manipulated Q2 earnings with a factoring scheme to conceal an earnings miss. That's Exhibit 212. Four days later, Perrigo held an integration reset meeting with Omega in London, that was discussed in advance with both Papa and Brown. That discussion is documented in Exhibit 386.

Of course, a reasonable jury can consider and the inference must be drawn at this stage, that you don't need to reset a process that is going in — that is in line or going smoothly. That's not what a reset is. Written materials from the reset meeting described integration as, quote, chaos, and, quote, promises broken. The exact opposite of what Ms. Brown described to investors. It warned that there was a lack of trust. That's Exhibit 195.

What did Mr. Farrington say, who was at this meeting?

He said that the meeting gave Perrigo, quote, Clear indications of problems relative to controls, risks, and scaling at Omega, but Perrigo, quote, Did not act on our convictions, end quote.

That's Exhibit 84.

On July 20, 2015, four days later, they have the quarterly business unit review. That is attended by Brown and Papa. And at that review that discussed multiple accounting anomalies according to Exhibit 213. Those anomalies were identified through the integration of Omega's accounting into Perrigo's financial reporting controls. That is what led to the internal audit that I will be discussing with your Honor a little bit later.

On July 23rd, three days later, Mr. Winowiecki, the vice president of finance, emails brown about how severely Omega was deviating from the deal model. He noted that the deal model called for 12 percent growth in 2015, but Omega wasn't growing at all. It was at negative 9 percent in Q1. That's Exhibit 390.

Now, if Perrigo's own documents say Omega was in -- was at -9 percent in Q1, how could Omega -- how could Perrigo possibly claim to investors after Q1 that it was accretive to growth. It wasn't growing according to Perrigo's own analysis. That's Exhibit 390.

Now, only two weeks later on August 5, 2015, on a conference call with investors, defendant Papa says, that

Perrigo has already, quote, Delivered on our Omega integration plan. A reasonable jury need not accept this lie as truth. In fact, as Perrigo's own documents admitted in May 2016, even by that time Omega was never fully integrated. That's Exhibit 83. And while speaking positively about Omega, Papa hid from investors the very concerns discussed internally only weeks before about Omega's accounting manipulations.

Another presentation dated September 14, 2015, showed that Omega's revenues and operating income had worsened in August. That's Exhibit 309. Now, remember, all of this time between April and November, Perrigo is doing one main thing. It is fighting off a takeover bid, a hostile takeover bid from Mylan. And defendants say, well, that Judge Arleo did not accept that as a motive for scienter at the pleading stage. It's true she didn't accept it as an independent motive. But now the record's developed evidence that Mylan -- that fighting Mylan, in fact, was the main focus of the company. It was something that Brown and Papa spent an enormous amount of time on. And we will see later on that Mr. Coucke himself says that Omega was asked by Perrigo to stretch its guidance to fight off the Mylan bid.

Things grew even worse in October. Kirsten Young would not expertise Perrigo's guidance. Now, this matters because of the takeover bid. The Irish takeover rules, they require that an accounting firm expertise guidance as well as the board of

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

directors, and that they faithfully revealed to investors what the assumptions are that go to that guidance, et cetera. That's Exhibit 397, is the communication describing Mr. Winowiecki's concerns to Ms. Brown. October 8, 2015, Brown pressed Coucke about whether Omega's miss was related to having previously used the Belgian generics unit to do sales. And Coucke responded that the situation with the Belgium generic unit, quote, Has been discussed in detail several times with Joe Papa on our weekly calls. And he also said with respect -- this is with respect to the dialogue between Omega and Perrigo, he said Omega, quote, Can't be more transparent. That's Exhibit 371. Perrigo was not equally transparent with its investors. It said nothing about the accounting manipulations at Omega. It said nothing about the integration problems that were described to it. October 15, 2015, only one week later, Coucke wrote to Joe Papa begging him, quote, Not to push nonrealistic guidance, and warning Papa that they were engaged in, quote, Extreme guidance stretching, end quote. It is Exhibit 238. This pushback made Brown furious. She wrote in an email to Papa and others that she had no idea what Omega was going to put into the numbers that had to be expertised the following week. And that she was, quote, personally feeling very exposed, Exhibit 182.

On the 18th, October 18, 2015, four days before Perrigo published its official guidance, a draft internal audit report confirming the accounting manipulations was distributed to Papa and to Brown. It's Exhibit 213. It found that at the end of the second quarter, 2015, remember, this was the only quarter that they could mention that had results which were even nominally accretive.

It found that quarter was manipulated by what -- what the internal auditors called a loading practice. That is a fancy word for channel-stuffing with its generic distributor for Bellco. And that manipulation was done because, quote, Perrigo expected a big quarter from Omega, end quote. Exhibit 213.

So Perrigo applied the pressure and got the result that its pressure caused. The following day, October 19, 2015, only three days before the guidance was published, Papa and Brown discussed the internal audit findings. And on the 20th, only two days before, they met with the audit committee to discuss those findings. That's Exhibit 402 and Exhibit 216.

Nevertheless, when they published their guidance, they said absolutely nothing about this. Incredibly, it all -Perrigo also hid these problems from Ernst & Young, the auditors it hired to expertise the guidance, the external auditors. And the deposition in this case, because somebody from Ernst & Young said as their representative witness, the

Ernst & Young partner who was involved in this said he was astounded when he heard that -- saw the audit committee findings saying that's the first he ever heard of it. That is Exhibit 167, is his deposition.

Not telling the truth about what was going on at Omega served its purpose, Perrigo defeated the hostile tender offer on November 13, 2015. And wouldn't you know it, Brown and Papa immediately sought to sell their personal shares at prices even lower than they had just told investors what's too low for investors to depart with their own shares. Papa said about dumping shares at \$140, as you can see in his form 4s that are in the record at Exhibit 6 and 196 and deposition testimony and Exhibit 169, pages 107 to 110. Brown likewise said that she planned to, quote, Sell all vested, restricted, and performance shares right after the Mylan offer collapsed. That's Exhibit 299.

The next month, early December 2015, Winowiecki and Brown and Papa discussed the likelihood of an impairment at Omega. Quite frankly, it looks like it should have been -- it should have taken place earlier. A jury is entitled to draw the inference, and your Honor should at this stage, that it was time to coincide after the end of the Mylan tender offer.

The following days after those initial discussions, which were documented in Exhibit 410, Brown said she was apoplectic about Omega, and Papa was catatonic about Omega.

Perrigo's finance vice president said it looks horrible and that he had been warning about Omega since Q1 2015. In other words, he told them about the problems with Omega before the beginning of the class period. That is Exhibit 409.

From all of this evidence, a reasonable jury can determine that Perrigo and Papa and Brown knew that Omega was far worse than their optimistic statements described it to investors. Defendants wants to put their own spin on a particular sentence or two of this very damning evidence or to say that one document should be read in the context of another statement from another document. Well, they can put that spin on it at trial. Drawing inferences in the movant's favor is absolutely prohibited on a motion for summary judgment as the Third Circuit makes clear in these cases.

This is only a part of the evidence we outline in our brief at pages 23 to 31, showing that Papa and Brown were informed of the actual integration and performance problems at Omega that they withheld from investors. That's classic evidence of scienter. Additionally, Perrigo's integration are Tom Farrington, admitted in the candid postmortem that Joe Papa was not only aware of the problems with Omega integration, but he was a driver of it. That is Exhibit 181.

He said that Papa decided to forego crucial integration controls that were called must-haves that were adopted by Perrigo's executive committee in June 2014, then included deep

due diligence. According to Farrington's postmortem report, these were standards that Perrigo had decided it would always do for acquisitions, but, quote, Didn't do in this case at the CEO's direction. That's Exhibit 181.

Defendants tried to reimagine this document in their briefs. They say it was just aspirational or a gold standard, but that's not the words that the actual document use. The document called them must-haves, not might haves or want-to-haves or try-to-haves. It said there were things that Perrigo had decided it would, quote, Always do. Not might do some of the time or if convenient. A reasonable jury is entitled to take Perrigo's own words at their plain meaning. A reasonable jury can also consider that Brown even counselled Papa on how to manipulate the truth for Wall Street.

A text she met Papa right after they met with the audit committee to discuss Omega's accounting manipulations said, quote, Please think through your Wall Street answer as to whether this signals you plan to retire soon. And of course, we can never, and I emphasize that word because she used all caps in her text, we can never reference the reason underlying from weekend calls, even in one by one. That is Exhibit 289.

This scienter evidence, of course, has to be weighed by a jury. Scienter is a jury issue under the law in this circuit unless viewing all evidence and drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmovant no reasonable trier of fact could find the

element of scienter satisfied. It doesn't require a smoking gun as counsel said four or five times. That's not the case here. There is plenty of evidence from which a jury can draw a reasonable inference of scienter.

And let me be clear. They said strong inference time and time again in their briefs, but that's not the standard either.

The Bristol-Myers Squibb case that both sides cited to your Honor, that's at 2005 U.S. District Lexus 18448 at pages starred 43 to 44, reviews Third Circuit controlling law and says that a PSLRA implemented a heightened pleading standard that refers to strong inference, but that didn't alter the substantive standard at trial. The substantive standard it recognized was merely that a plaintiff, quote -- must, quote, Supply a basis from which to draw reasonable inference that defendants recklessly or knowingly issued a materially false and misleading statement. That's the standard before your Honor.

Defendants also speak about corporate scienter
extensively in their briefs, and we also use that term in our
briefs. But really, at the pleadings stage corporate scienter
is a doctrine that's often used by courts in their
descriptions. But at the proof stage, it's really just another
word for indirect or circumstantial evidence. Of course, there
is tons of cases that both sides have cited that scienter can

be shown by both direct and circumstantial evidence. There is no question about that, and the Supreme Court has made that absolutely clear.

So while there are certain -- almost all of our scienter, especially with respect to the Omega side of it, is thrown through direct evidence of what Brown and Papa were shown. A jury is also entitled to consider circumstances under which Brown and Papa routinely relied on the advice of other Perrigo executives who were on documents saying that they had knowledge of wrongdoing or of facts contrary to their statements to investors. That's something that a jury can consider as circumstantial evidence as long as the attenuation is not so attenuated that it's unreasonable.

On the generic drug cite, defendants also covered up problem with generic drugs. We assert three categories of misrepresentations on the generic drug site. Number one, they concealed that they relied on unsustainable super competitive practices. Number two, that they misrepresented Perrigo's generic drug pricing strategy. And number three, that they misrepresented the competitive environment to hide the fact that they were not actually competing on many key drugs.

None of these three categories hinge on proof of a Sherman Act violation. They cite a lot of Sherman Act cases. This isn't a Sherman Act case. We allege securities fraud in violation of 10b-5. Some of that security -- and 14(e). Some

of that securities fraud involves the concealment of unsustainable super competitive practices and illegal practices.

But they didn't -- they didn't come out and tell investors, We're engaged in this crazy pricing scheme, but they didn't come out and tell investors, we're engaged in this crazy pricing scheme, but they didn't come out and tell investors.

investors, We're engaged in this crazy pricing scheme, but it's just part of an oligopoly. It is not technically illegal.

They just didn't say that at all. So they didn't tell the

In terms of the -- and all of these three categories are

also broader than the six to nine drugs that the defendants

11 reference. In terms of the concealment of unsustainable and

12 anticompetitive conduct, the evidence shows that at least in

 $13 \mid 2013$  to 2015, and it probably started as early as 2010.

truth whether it was legal or illegal.

14 Counsel is right, that some of this does date back. But it

15 really came to a head in 2013 to 2015 that Perrigo relied on

16 massive super competitive price hikes to spike operating

17 profits in it's most profitable decision, prescription generic

18 drugs.

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

And when I say prescription generic drugs, your Honor, to be clear, I'm not talking about the Omega generic unit.

Right now I am talking about domestic generic drugs, and I think so were my counterparts when they spoke about the generic unit. I am just not going to repeat that phrase over and over.

Record evidence shows that defendants understood these ploys were unsustainable regardless of whether they were

illegal or legal. On April 13, 2015, days before the class period, Papa and Brown conducted a three-day review, including what they called a domestic pricing review. That showed that before the class period Perrigo anticipated that the windfall domestic generic prescription drug pricing profits would peak in Q3, 2015. The pricing as a factor would peak in Q3, 2015, and turn and stay negative beginning in early 2016. Exhibit 183.

And are there review slides that Papa and Brown personally reviewed or approved for this exercise, highlighted their pricing would turn negative by 2016 as well such as Exhibit 242.

As 2015 progressed, pricing deteriorated just as they expected before the class period, but didn't tell investors. Exhibit 245, July 2015 document sent to Brown and Papa showed that pricing was several millions worse than only a few months earlier. Exhibit 241. September 2015 update warned Brown and Papa that there were minimal pricing opportunities in generic prescription drugs.

Well, you heard Mr. Brodsky get up there. I believe it was Mr. Brodsky, and he said, there is a way to infer this that's non-culpable. If you say that minimal pricing opportunities doesn't mean the same thing as no pricing opportunities, then we were free to hide this to investors and to speak as positively as we wanted about generic drug pricing.

2

3

4

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Well, a jury doesn't have to accept his inference, and at this stage, your Honor, cannot. This is not the stage in the litigation where you select the inference that is where you are at liberty to adopt an inference in favor of the movement opposing the non-movement where both inferences are reasonable. It's equally reasonable and I think far more reasonable for a jury to think that when somebody is asked a pointed question about the sustainability of pricing and they are told internally that there is minimal pricing opportunities, that they don't go out and lie about it. That they either tell the investors, We're not at liberty to answer that question at this time, or they say it looks like the pricing opportunities are That's the information he had. That's the minimal. information he hid from investors. Exhibits 243, 244, 246, 295 are multiple additional reports that were sent to Brown and Papa in September and October 2015 warning of pricing deterioration in generic prescription drugs just as they had expected. Now, the evidence overwhelmingly shows that Perrigo's conduct was illegal at times as well as super competitive. Again, it's not necessary for our claims to advance to a jury, but we think a jury will find that they were both unsustainable, super competitive and illegal. There is both direct and circumstantial evidence.

direct evidence, Sandoz, and Sandoz is a company that embodies

two of Perrigo's competitors, Sandoz and a company called Fougera, which merged into Sandoz in approximately 2012. Sandoz admitted that it fixed prices, rigged bids and allocated markets with Perrigo. They didn't just say that about desonide cream, as counsel said. They said they did that — they conducted those illegal practices on products including desonide. That's powerful evidence that wasn't present in any of the collusion cases that defendants cite. That will be presented by a live witness at trial but for the summary judgment record, it can be found at Exhibit 120, and, Tom, if you could, put up the thing on Sandoz.

It would be presented by live witness at trial but for the time being, we have a summary judgment record that has Sandoz's deferred prosecution agreement. That's Exhibit 120, an affidavit from Sandoz saying that their deferred prosecution agreement statements were accurate and that they would -- and that Perrigo was the company identified as company B and that they would present a witness at trial to testify to those facts. We also have a letter agreement with Sandoz's counsel saying they will present a witness at trial to testify to those facts. That's Exhibit 161.

The record also contains additional direct evidence from the admission of sales -- a sales executive for Sandoz and Fougera and another company called Aurobindo at other times, Tony Thomassy that said he had hundreds of improper

communications with Perrigo around and about price increases. That is Exhibit 116. And what Mr. Thomassy was referring to was confirming the evidence that is the findings of the state attorney's general that are documented in their complaint.

Let's speak a little bit about that complaint.

Perrigo itself injected the state attorney general complaint into the summary judgment record. It presented the complaint for the Court's consideration from its opening brief. We believe that this is proper and that the Court should consider the summary -- the state AG complaint at this juncture. At summary judgment, the question isn't whether a document itself is admissible. We don't foresee asking your Honor to admit this document at trial but rather to have people testify about the findings. At summary judgment, the proponent of evidence need only describe the form of evidence that, quote, is capable of being admissible at trial. That is the Fraternal Order of Police case at 842 F. 3. 231 from the Third Circuit.

We don't -- there is no need for your Honor to rule on the admissibility at this time but whether the Court, in fact, decides to admit it at trial should be made in consideration of the precise context for which the party seeks to address it at trial, but we think there is at least four ways that this can come in -- the factual parts of this can come in at least, number one, for impeachment.

You heard counsel talk extensively about their claims that the Department of Justice and regulators never went after Perrigo. Well, if they want to open the door and ask the jury to infer that Perrigo was somehow cleansed of its sins, that it was somehow exonerated by regulators, we are entitled to introduce evidence that is nowhere near the truth, that 48 state attorney general and the attorney general of the District of Columbia and a couple places like Guam, et cetera, have brought -- where all the highest law enforcement officers in their respective jurisdictions, the fact that all of them have brought charges against Perrigo completely impeaches any idea that it has been exonerated for price fixing.

The second way it comes in, Federal Rule of Evidence 703. That's because it is of the type of evidence that is normally considered and relied upon by experts in forming their opinions. Our generic drug expert, Todd Clark, relied on it. Defendants' damages expert, Paul Gompers, also cited a number of antitrust cases that -- and both complaints, unadjudicated complaints and investigations in his report, and defendants set that forth in their own statement of facts that they tell your Honor is the undisputed information upon which your Honor should consider summary judgment at paragraphs 365 to 382. Even the Third Circuit considers unadjudicated pending antitrust cases in considering the cases before it.

For example, in Chocolate, it is cited in expert report

extrapolating the facts from a still pending Canadian antitrust case. That's 801 F.3d. At page 402 to 404.

It is also true that this can come in under Federal Rule of Evidence 803, 8(A)3, which excludes from hearsay a record of a public office if it sets forth factual findings from a legally authorized investigation unless the opposing party demonstrates the findings lack trustworthiness.

The proponent need only establish the foundation for the record by showing that it does, in fact, set forth findings resulting from an investigation made pursuant to authority granted by law and as this district has said, once the foundation is established, the evidence will be admitted unless the opposing party shows that it is untrustworthy. That is GAMMA VINS, 334 F. Supp 2nd 662.

So what are the three components? Public office. No one disputes that the state AG complaint is from a public office. They are by definition public offices.

Was the investigation authorized? No one disputes that state attorney generals are authorized to look into price fixing in their respective states, and no one disputes that as part of the investigation here phone records and text records were provided to the state attorney general. They analyzed those records. They created a database allowing them to be cross referenced, and they publish findings in their complaint indicating how those calls were made and from whom they are

made, from whom they are received, what time to the second. Those are findings. Those are factual. Those are not saying we believe this constitutes X, Y or Z. They're saying, We conducted this investigation of the phone records and here is what we found.

Defendants offer no plausible alternative explanation that it can be anything other than findings from a public body filing an authorized investigation. In fact, it would make no sense that the state attorney general would be able to link up those calls had they not done the groundwork in their investigation, which brings us to the trustworthiness.

Defendants haven't made any showing that they were not trustworthy. The fact that virtually every state attorney general signed onto the complaint, including from this good state, is indicia of trustworthiness. And witnesses, such as Andrea Felix, consistently testified that they could not have dispute — they could not dispute having made the communications identified to them in the state attorney general complaint.

Mr. Thomassy agreed that the allegations ascribed to him in the state attorney general complaint as CW6 were accurate. On dozens of occasions, Perrigo admitted that the communications set forth in the state attorney general complaint took place. That is documented in footnote 22 of our brief and in Exhibit 88, which is Perrigo's request to --

request -- Perrigo's response to request for admission.

Defendants cite a few cases suggesting that not every complaint from a government agency falls within that exception to Federal Rule of Evidence to the hearsay rule. That is a red herring because that is not at all what we argue; although, some courts have held that regulatory complaints presumptively fall under Federal Rule 803, such as U.S. v. Gluck, which we cite on page 52, that's not necessary to reach here. This case involves a limited context where a complaint that has been factually verified by repeated witnesses and by the company itself as to certain allegations that they deemed worthy of responding to sets forth the detailed determinations of an investigation from law enforcement, that those portions are capable of being admitted under 803(A)3.

Finally, your Honor, the fourth way that this could be introduced as evidence is through the defendants own admissions. As I mentioned, your Honor, defendants admitted in their responses to request for admission that hundreds of these phone calls identified to the second in the state AG's complaint actually took place.

So what do we have here in addition to the actual findings of the state AG, the actual direct evidence from Sandoz and Mr. Thomassy about fixing prices and rigging bids and allocating customers. We have a lot of circumstantial evidence as well indicating collusion.

The Third Circuit in *Valspar* made clear that where as here direct evidence is provided, no circumstantial evidence is required, but we also provide extensive circumstantial evidence showing that Perrigo, in fact, colluded with other drug manufacturers. That's on page 44 to 53 of our brief.

Our expert, Mr. Clark, who literally wrote the book on generic prescription drugs in the United States -- it's called The Generic Handbook, has opined that the evidence he reviewed shows hallmarks of collusion and is inconsistent with actual competition, even within an oligopoly. That is Exhibits 102, and 158 is his reply report.

Perrigo's internal documents show that it frequently declined to bid. A May 2014 contract form for Permethrin, for example, says, Per J.W. -- that's John Wesolowski -- we need to give up the product due to market share. A July 2014 email stated that Perrigo did not want to win customer account for desonide because we have taken enough business.

An October 2014 email telling a customer, from Perrigo to a customer, McKesson, said that Perrigo would not bid for that customer's business even after requested because it, quote, Would really upset our competitor, end quote. That is Exhibit 253.

Now, a reasonable jury can look at this, and it might accept the spin that's proffered by the defendants. I don't think that's the natural reading of these documents, but it

might also say that all of these times that Perrigo told -said internally, candidly, it wasn't going to bid or even told
a customer that it could not risk upsetting its competitor, all
of that is consistent with a tacit fair share agreement, which
is exactly what the evidence shows here. Perrigo couldn't show
legitimate reason.

And I know that counsel said repeatedly that there were margin issues, that there was, I think he said, an expensive factory in New York, but here is what he didn't tell your Honor. When they were pressed for details at the 30(b)(6) deposition, that is where it's binding, not where a counsel can get up and just testify as if he was a witness, but where a corporate representative needs to tell the truth and bind the company, the 30(b)(6) witness testified that Perrigo wasn't able to tell why it implemented any of its particular price hikes. That's Exhibit 170 at pages 166 to 167.

A reasonable jury could also consider circumstantial evidence of collusion, the magnitude of the price hikes, three, five, 700 percent. That is not something that a business owner would dream to do without a reason to believe that its competitors would go along and not undercut its pricing.

This is a very different case from those like *Chocolate* and *Flat Glass* and *Baby Foods* and *Valspar* in the Third Circuit that involve tiny price hikes. And in *Valspar*, the Third Circuit distinguished between the magnitude hikes. It

distinguished between abrupt and radical price rises, which is what we see here, and those that are just an uptick in preestablished industry practice.

I believe in *Valspar* they were dealing with roughly 16 price hikes that in the aggregate dealt with -- boosted prices 31 percent. We're talking about an overnight change that's ten times in magnitude. Even defendants don't dispute that a reasonable jury could view a 300, 500, 700 percent overnight price increase as abrupt or radical.

Jurors come in with a world of experience. They don't see -- they know that prices go up sometimes, but they don't see the price of a loaf of bread going from \$3 to \$21 overnight. They don't see the price of a sedan they are looking at going from 20,000 to 140,000 overnight. Price hikes of this magnitude don't happen under normal circumstances and a reasonable jury is not required to pretend that they do.

Perrigo cites two cases in its reply brief. They mention briefly about the magnitude but neither holds that a radical and abrupt price hike can't be evidence of collusion. First in the Blomkest Fertilizer case, that involved a consent decree that required prices to be raised because the prior prices were dumping -- were deemed to be dumping prices in violation of the federal antidumping laws.

There is nothing like that here. There is no consent decree requiring Perrigo to raise it. It decided to raise it.

The Erie County is other case that they cited. That case involved bidding for road salt in Ohio, and it determined that the price increases there were mostly due to the State's bidding rules and unusual demand. The holding was limited to those unique facts.

It never adopted any rule that the magnitude of price hikes cannot be circumstantial evidence of collusion, and at any rate, it was an Ohio case and doesn't undercut the Third Circuit's discussion in *Valspar* about the magnitude having some bearing.

A reasonable jury could also consider the huge risk that Perrigo took of incurring massive penalties when it implemented price hikes. This is the opposite situation that the Third Circuit considered in Valspar, where the Third Circuit noted there was no or minimal risk under the contracts that Valspar had with -- that the defendants in that case had with their customers.

Here, if the price hikes didn't stick, Perrigo could lose tens of millions of dollars on a single drug that's described by our expert in Exhibit 158. It is admitted by defendants' expert, perhaps at least, as to the mechanism in Exhibit 100. It is discussed by Perrigo's former vice president of -- former CFO of the generic prescription drug unit, Mr. Gallagher, in his deposition which was Exhibit 172 at page 206.

A reasonable jury could conclude that Perrigo took this massive risk because it understood that it's competitors would go along. Now, if defendants feel that there is an innocuous version of why Perrigo would take this risk, they can argue that to the jury. The jury is entitled to consider the natural effect of Perrigo's actions.

Additionally, a jury can consider this wasn't a situation like in *Chocolate* or the Third Circuit noted that compressed margins would make it irrational for a competitor to undercut a price hike. Here it was the exact opposite. While Perrigo's experts did not get into the actual gross margins, our expert did.

Mr. Clark examined the gross margins for all the products that he detailed in his report. That's Exhibit 102. And he found that they were all very high margin products, as much as 96 percent, and that's before the price hike. So the price hike wasn't a situation where the gross margins had compressed because of the new factory or because of a supply shortage. By the way, a supply shortage is supposed to be reported to the FDA, and nobody has offered any evidence here that any supply shortage was provided to the FDA about any of the drugs we are talking about.

If there is no collusion, a competitor could easily undercut a price hike without facing any margin pressure here. The margins were already very high they could say, we are going

to drop from let's say, 90 percent to 80 percent and undercut Perrigo and take the entire market. That didn't happen here.

So the fact it didn't happen suggests -- is something that a reasonable jury could find probative, circumstantial evidence of collusion. A reasonable jury could also consider circumstantial evidence the fact that similar price hikes did not occur in similarly structured generic prescription drug markets.

Now, Mr. Wareham indicated to your Honor and on this limited point, I agree, that topical generic prescription drugs are more difficult to manufacture than, let's say, a pill. But there are other generic -- and as a result, it takes a little more testing. There are not quite as many competitors. But there are other generic prescription drug markets that are similar in structure. Our expert, Mr. Clark has identified two of them; Ophthalmics, the eye drugs and injectables.

Neither of those demonstrated the same kind of abrupt and massive price spikes as you found in markets in which Perrigo competed. Reasonable jury could also consider that many of the price hikes occurred right after industry meetings. I realize that defendants say that there is innocuous spin, that this might not have meant anything.

But a jury doesn't have to turn its eye to the fact that, for example, on February 22nd, 23rd in 2013, Papa and Brown both attended the annual -- GPhA meeting, I'm sorry, let

me spell that out. Capital G. Capital P. Lower case H. Capital A. G-P-h-A. That's in Exhibit 160.

Three days later, Perrigo's internal documents indicated it considered, quote, Pricing opportunities. There goes that word again, including hikes for permethrin, desonide, Halobetasol, Clindamycin and hydrocortisone valerate. Exhibit 284.

A reasonable jury doesn't have to imagine that has to be a coincidence. They can infer based on the proximal, the temporal proximity. Perrigo's -- especially because Perrigo can't come up with any legitimate reason specifically why it hiked any of those drugs.

Finally, Perrigo's own documents indicate that it planned on losing very, very little market share despite massive price hikes. For example, Exhibit 269 identifies zero to two percent anticipated share losses for price hikes exceeding 100 percent. A reasonable jury could infer from this that Perrigo knew its so-called competitors would play ball.

Now, with respect to the pricing strategy, Perrigo's misrepresentations were equally misleading. Defendants don't dispute that, at an individual drug level, Perrigo's massive price spikes were not flat to slightly up. And a reasonable jury could, and we think will conclude, that spiking the drug by 300 to 700 percent in price is not flat and it is not slight.

Instead, defendants argue that if you construe sentences from this document with another sentence that's a couple lines earlier that if you spin it a particular way, you can erase the words that were actually said and construe it as only applying on a portfolio level. But that's not what the actual words that were used said.

The exact words that Papa used are cited in our brief. They are in the record at Exhibit 76 and he said that it didn't matter whether you are talking had about on a granular level about a specific product or specific category. The answer is the same. The exact words are, quote, Whether we're talking about any specific product or any specific category or any segment of our business, the overall comment is flat to slightly up for our pricing. A reasonable jury can take these words for their plain meaning.

We don't think Papa's inference is plausible. But that is a trial argument. It is not a summary judgment argument. At summary judgment, all inferences have to be drawn in the nonmovant's favor, all reasonable inferences. It is unquestionable that taking words for their plain meaning, the actual words that defendants use before adopting a strategy for litigation, that that is a reasonable inference.

That is for the jury to choose as the Third Circuit made clear in *Nathanson* and *Marino*. With respect to the competitive environment, for example, Mr. Papa said on May 12, 2015 -- it

is in Exhibit 124 -- the generic prescription drugs operated in what he called, quote, obviously a competitor environment. And other times defendants described it as heavily competitive.

But a reasonable jury could find that massive parallel price hikes by so-called competitors are the exact opposite of heavy competition.

They could find that declining to bid because you did not want to upset a competitor is the exact opposite of heavy competition and Perrigo argues that should get a free pass, because it was competitive on certain other drugs. That's like a basketball team saying we only shave points on a couple games, so, you know, what was the big deal?

Most importantly here, Perrigo's statements to investors did not say that only some of its generics operated in competitive environment and others did not. It made that comment generally. It made a sweeping comment. It did not qualify it in any way. Again, a reasonable jury can properly take Perrigo's words for their plain meaning. If defendants want to argue an alternate inference, they are free to do so, but undermining precedent, that is a jury issue.

The scienter for the generic prescription drug misstatements is also well-supported by record evidence.

Besides the plain inferences from Sandoz's confession that it rigged bids and fixed prices with Perrigo, they are at least five additional reasons why a reasonable jury could find that

Perrigo and Papa and Brown were, at least reckless, if not intentionally misleading, in their false statements to investors.

First, Papa and Brown held themselves out to investors and analysts as being knowledgeable about generic prescription drug pricing, the pricing strategy, and the competitive environment. As Judge Arleo noted in her motion to dismiss opinion, she found that supported an inference of scienter. She said they repeatedly responded to pointed analyst questions regarding prices in the generic prescription drug division and, quote, in their answers, indicated personal knowledge.

She also said -- explained, in the context of specific inquiries, defendants' omissions of actual circumstances that were contrary to their answers presents an obvious risk of misleading investors. We believe it will be equally obvious to the jurors who will be charged with determining this at trial. But that was at the pleadings stage. Record evidence has borne out those allegations.

For example, on August 5, 2015, as shown in Exhibit 241, Papa claimed to investors that he knew whether pricing was sustainable and how the Perrigo's team was doing on pricing decisions. I think they put up a small portion of that in one of their slides where Papa said that the success was due to Perrigo's team doing good on pricing decisions -- or making good pricing decisions.

1.3

If Papa claims to know both the sustainability of pricing — of the pricing windfalls and the cause for those pricing windfalls, he is holding himself out to investors as being knowledgeable. Now, either he was or he wasn't. Either he actually investigated these topics and knew the truth when he spoke falsely to investors, or is reckless in claiming to have that knowledge without investigation.

We also see this on October 22, 2015, with Ms. Brown, where she claimed to know whether or not Perrigo was insulated from pricing pressures. That's Exhibit 76. And counsel says that that relates to Martin Shkreli, and it may. It may. But it was because Mr. Shkreli raised, as counsel admitted, the price of it's drugs by a massive amount. Well, that is the exact same practice that Perrigo was doing.

That is the exact same practice that was causing an unsustainable drama that she said that Perrigo was insulated from. So either she investigated this at that time that she made that statement or she had not. But shes should not have held herself out as having knowledge of insulation if she didn't.

The second reason that -- additional reason why a reasonable jury could find that defendants had scienter in their generic drug statements is that, the record shows that Papa and Brown were regularly briefed about generic prescription drug pricing. In late 2014, both were advised

about how the economics of the large price increases worked, that they would be some penalties, and it would be unprofitable if the competitive environment didn't cause the price increase to stick. If someone had to roll that back, they would be stuck with the penalties and they wouldn't get the benefit of the price increase.

They knew that well before the class period that was described in Exhibit 278, a presentation that the email attachment says -- or the transmittal email expressly says was sent to Joe and Judy; that is Joe Papa and Judy Brown.

November 12, 2014. Even before the class period, a customer sent Papa a letter regarding a six-fold increase in desonide. That is Exhibit 272.

So these were not unknown to the defendants. These were well known to the defendants. They just chose not to speak honestly about them. And as we already discussed, the pricing review that Papa and Brown conducted on April 13, 15, 2015, warned that generic prescription drug pricing would cease to be a tailwind by the third quarter of 2015, and would become a headwind soon after that. That is Exhibit 183 and 242.

Papa and Brown were sent reports in July 2015, that's Exhibit 245. September 2015, Exhibit 241. October 2015, exhibits 243, 244 246, 295, all showing that pricing was unsustainable and that pricing opportunities were evaporating. Pap and Brown also both personally reviewed and approved the

scripted comments that Brown presented regarding being insulated.

That review is documented in Exhibit 276, which is the transmittal of a draft of that statement to defendant Papa.

Judge Arleo stated that she believed that statement to be palpably reckless, and defendants can't explain why a reasonable jury couldn't reach the same inference.

Just after giving these warnings, Papa published to investors guidance claiming that the facts known to him -- he said this as part of his guidance -- the facts known to him indicated that the competitive environment would remain unchanged. That is Exhibit 69. In truth, he was told the exact opposite. From the beginning of the class period and worsening through the summer and early fall of 2015, he was repeatedly warned that the competitive environment was changing and for the worse. More competition.

The third element that defendants could -- I'm sorry, that a reasonable jury could consider when contemplating defendants -- the circumstantial evidence the defendants' recklessness, at least scienter with respect to the generic drug statements, is record evidence showing that Papa and Brown were actually involved -- albeit at a high level -- in generic prescription drug pricing decisions.

Doug Boothe -- the head of Perrigo's generic prescription drug division -- testified that because of the

risk of upfront penalties that might not be recouped, the price hike decision sometimes required input, quote, from the CFO or the CEO. That's Papa and Brown.

John Wesolowski also testified that the normal part of approving a price hike was that Mr. Boothe -- here is the exact words he said -- quote, would normally take that to Judy Brown and then it would cascade back. That was Exhibit 171. Her claims to not have been informed need not be credited by a reasonable jury. They are directly contrary to the evidence. And Perrigo's 30(b)(6) witness also admitted that price increases very well could have been raised with Perrigo's executive committee, which included both Papa and Brown.

As Perrigo -- as Brown admitted at deposition, the competition on key products and pricing pressure for Perrigo's generic drugs was an issue that she and Perrigo's management team kept, quote, front and center. That is Exhibit 166.

That's her words.

The fourth thing that a reasonable jury could consider is the -- in the scienter is the magnitude of the price hikes, that they would not go unnoticed in an organization. Price hikes of hundred percent to 800 percent or more, they are huge in magnitude. It is a stark contrast to the price hikes of one to two percent that Perrigo said it aimed for in other parts of its business.

A reasonable jury could conclude that if Papa or Brown

decided not to inquire about why Perrigo was able to achieve such enormous price hikes is because they didn't want to know the details so they could maintain plausible deniability.

After all, if they did not think that there was anything wrong with the way that they went about these price hikes, they would, of course, want to study these price hikes and try to implement them in other parts of their business.

All businesses want to have a better margin structure if they can improve their pricing. That's just a windfall to the bottom line. Any reasonable manager would want to know that if there wasn't a reason to not know it, and that reason, of course, is plausible deniability. It is just a matter of common sense. A jury is not required to dismiss common sense when they go -- when they enter the jury room.

Additionally, Papa and Brown each attended industry events during the time that Sandoz described its price fixing with Perrigo. The GPhA meeting -- capital G, capital P, lower H, capital A -- described in Exhibit 160, three days later, Perrigo hiked prices on desonide and, of course, when you go to the deferred prosecution agreement with Sandoz, Sandoz says, We fixed prices with Perrigo about desonide, including desonide. We rigged bids and allocated markets on drugs including desonide.

Defendants cite some cases where meeting attendance was found not to be convincing, and none of those cases involve a

competitor where -- that admitted having engaged in price fixing and market rigging at the time of the meetings.

Defendants also argue that there were dozens of meetings so any price hike would be close to a meeting. That is a strained inference that a jury is not bound to accept. A reasonable jury could also see this the opposite way. If so-called competitors were actually competing, why would they need to meet dozens of times at industry meetings? This is an additional piece of the scienter puzzle.

Each of these items on its own is sufficient to get to a jury, but together they easily allow a jury -- they provide very strong evidence of scienter easily allowing a jury to find a reasonable inference that Papa and Brown and Perrigo were at least reckless in their statements to investors.

Finally, I would like to make two additional points, and then I know we've gone later than anyone expected, and I will be very brief.

Tom, if you could, put up the scope slide.

Number 1, there's been a lot of statements that were made from the other side about claims that this action was somehow gutted and made into a very tiny action. In fact, our main two categories -- we brought four categories of misrepresentations in the amended complaint, the two most significant were upheld virtually in their entirety. This was -- we don't need to guess about what a particular word in a

footnote of the opinion might mean. We have an order.

None of the orders say they were dismissed and the orders in this case say the exact opposite for class notice, which went out to tens -- to about 100,000 potential class members. It was agreed to by everyone at this table, and everyone at this table and Judge Arleo also agreed that it accurately and concisely described the claims -- clearly and concisely states the nature of the claims in this action. That is ECF 292.

The notice that she made that about said that this lawsuit involves both performance and integration of Omega, misrepresentations involving the performance and integration of Omega, and with respect to generic drugs, that Perrigo's pricing strategy, noncompetitive practices, and the competitive environment for Perrigo's generic prescription drug unit. It doesn't say anything about being limited to only six drugs. It doesn't say anything about being limited to only noncompetitive practices that can also be charged under the Sherman Act. It says nothing of the sort.

Secondly, there has been -- the second brief point I would like to make is that defendants went on and on about what they claim to be a lack of motive. It is true that we do not have all of the underlying documents that we now have that tell the truth about Perrigo's motive in the -- during the time of this fighting in the Mylan acquisition. We don't have all of

the documents describing how Papa and Judy Brown spent days and days and days, a huge amount of their time meeting with investors trying to persuade them to ditch the Mylan tender offer as described in our papers.

We didn't have the evidence that Papa and Brown themselves sold their own shares for lower than the Mylan tender offer, undermining their statements to investors that that offer was too low, but, most importantly, we don't have the Omega executive committee minutes. Remember, Omega is part of Perrigo at this point. Perrigo's president, John Hendrickson, said at this meeting, signed on to these minutes, that these minutes concede that, quote, Perrigo -- this is an actual quote, your Honor -- Perrigo overpromised because of Mylan's situation, end quote, Exhibit 236. That's why we're here.

Perrigo chose not to tell the truth because it had a distinct problem fighting the Mylan tender offer and investors bored the brunt of that dishonesty. That is the nature of our case. That is the claims we intend to present at trial and a reasonable jury can decide whether our inference is the inference to draw or defendants' inference is the inference to draw from the record documents. But there is far more than a mere scintilla of evidence and any suggestion to the contrary is simply wrong.

At this point, I would be happy to answer any questions

1 your Honor may have or I will turn it over to Mr. Harrod to address loss causation. 3 THE COURT: No questions at this point, Counsel. 4 Thank you. 5 MR. SILVERMAN: Thank you. 6 MR. HARROD: Good afternoon, your Honor, James Harrod 7 for the plaintiffs. 8 I'm going to start -- I planned to start with a 9 different subject, but I'm going to start and mirror my 10 argument with what Mr. Wareham started with, and that's on our 11 It is a Williams Act claim related to the tender 14(e) claim. 12 offer and the alleged false statements that the defendants made 13 in defense of that tender offer. 14 As Mr. Silverman just talked about, Perrigo and its 15 executives, the defendants here, really did not want the tender 16 offer to be successful and they fought it, and here our claim 17 alleges violations of section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange 18 Act in connection with that tender offer. 19 These claims seek to compensate Perrigo's investors. 20 a result of the misstatements that were made by the defendants, 21 the shareholders of Perrigo were deprived of the opportunity to 22 participate on a fair basis in that tender offer that Mylan 23 These misrepresentations caused Mylan's tender offer to made. 24 fail. 25 Our damage and loss causation analysis tracks that

outcome and the purpose of the statute, which provides a conservative -- and our damages assessment here provides a very conservative measure of those damages.

Defendants argue that there are no damages on the 14(e) claim. We completely disagree, and the damages under 14(e) are purposely designed to effectuate the remedial purpose of this statute. This statute is designed to ensure that misrepresentations are not made in connection with tender offers. It's designed to provide those damaged investors with compensation for what they would have received in the absence of defendants' statements interfering with the acceptance of the tender offer.

Judge Arleo held in the motion to dismiss whether the shareholder had a fair opportunity to make that decision, the decision to tender or not, based on the information, the disclosures available is the critical question.

The Rudinger case that Perrigo cited also supports the conclusion that if a defendant is liable for a violation, they bear the risk on the damages flowing from that liability.

Specifically in denying the summary judgment, the Rudinger

Court said, Once a plaintiff establishes damage from a lost opportunity, the defendant must bear the risk of its uncertain amount. Otherwise, the securities laws could be violated with impunity in any situation in which the violation does not cause out-of-pocket loss.

Mr. Wareham talked about speculation and the damages here being speculative and the loss causation being speculative. They are not, and that's not just because they didn't cause an out-of-pocket loss but because we have a very concrete methodology for establishing both the loss causation and the damages here. We cite the *Rudinger* case that I just quoted from at 87 of our opposition brief.

Okay. So I'm just going to go through the facts related to the Mylan tender offer briefly. I think it is important to understand them in the context of understanding how the defendants' misrepresentations caused the loss or the injury that the shareholders suffered.

Mylan launched a tender offer for Perrigo that was ultimately valued at \$174.36 per share. That tender offer value is based on the exchange of 2.3 Mylan shares plus \$75 for one share of Perrigo. So if the tender offer had succeeded on November 13, 2015, the shareholders of Perrigo tendered their shares would have received compensation equivalent to \$174 and change. The tender offer expired on November 13, 2015. The one condition to completion of the tender offer and the receipt of that compensation by Perrigo shareholders was that 50 percent of the Perrigo shareholders agreed to tender their shares. So they are saying we will give you our Perrigo shares. You will give us, as of that date, something that would have been valued at \$174.

This is where Perrigo's defense of this came in. They needed to ensure that less than 50 percent of the shares be tendered and in doing so, that would cause the tender offer to fail. They were successful in doing that. Forty percent of Perrigo's shareholders tendered their shares.

In the measure of damages that we propose as a result of the tender offer failing to be consummated is the difference between what they would have received on November 13th and the price the Perrigo shares traded at immediately after the tender offer failed, and so that difference is 100 -- the tender offer compensation is \$174. On November 13, 2015, on the day the tender offer failed, Perrigo shares traded at \$140.53 at the opening. There is a difference of \$33.82 per share.

So what we're saying is if you had tendered your shares, if the defendants had not insinuated themselves improperly by lying to you about the conditions of their company, you would have immediately got a benefit of \$33.82 per share. I want to highlight, and our expert report goes through this in some detail, but that is a very conservative measure of damages. The spread between or the premium that the tender offer provided was higher at different points in time. We chose this because, A, it is not speculative. You can look at the numbers. They are concrete and they are objective, and you can conclude. You can do the arithmetic. Anybody can do this arithmetic.

1.3

So what I want to talk about next is that the defendants have come up with a counterfactual scenario. They are saying that the tender offer would have never gone through had Mylan known the true facts.

We have evidence that we can present by our expert and in the record showing that we believe the tender offer would have gone through. Our expert, Dr. Nye, opines as much. He looked at the fact that 40 percent of the shares tendered and he then concluded that there are a number of lawsuits, including the one that we're here today, and there is a number of individual lawsuits. Those people are making the same claim that these shareholders in this class action are making, that they were deprived of the opportunity to participate in the tender offer because of the misrepresentations in violation of section 14(e). If you add up the number of shares that are represented by those lawsuits, it eclipses 50 percent. So those people are saying we would have tendered. We couldn't tender, and we were deprived of the benefit of this. So you would get the 50 percent.

In addition to that fairly objective quantification of the fact that we would have eclipsed the 50 percent sharehold, Dr. Nye looks at the facts and the pricing of the two company shares and concludes it would have been economically rational for you to tender your shares because you would have achieved an immediate economic benefit. In fact, as we talked about,

both Mr. Brodsky and Mr. Silverman talked about the fact that Mr. Papa had agreed to sell his shares at \$150 per share. So he believed, certainly, that 150 was a fair value for his shares. He could have gotten more than that and other shareholders could have gotten more than that in connection with the tender offer.

Our other expert, Mr. Purcell, an investment banker, opines in that the absence misrepresentations, the tender offer would have also succeeded.

So there were no -- and there were no impediments to the tender offer succeeding. Mylan, very interestingly, despite what we have heard earlier today, Mylan agreed to engage in this binding tender offer without conducting any due diligence. It agreed to, basically, buy these shares of Perrigo without getting any nonpublic information, very common in these kinds of corporate transactions for people to have nondisclosure agreements, to be provided with many, many reams and rooms full of data that they could pour over that's nonpublic to understand exactly what it is that they are choosing to buy.

It's important that Mylan chose not to do that here, and they didn't.

So if we look at that evidence and we conclude that there were economic reasons why the tender offer should have succeed, and if the tender offer had succeeded, these shareholders would have achieved that \$33.86 benefit.

Defendants disagree with this. And their primary disagreement with it is based on what I will kindly refer to as a hypothetical. And the hypothetical presumes, like I said before, that if Mylan had told the truth -- or if, sorry. If defendants had told the truth, Mylan would have never launched the tender offer. But their hypothetical assumes they don't violate the statues.

And so what we say is, if you violate the statute and we have a finding of liability, you are now responsible for the damages that ensue from that liability.

Their assumption is, I think, circular. It also conflates the questions of liability and causation, which is improper. And it basically would allow any defendant in this situation to get out of any guilt on a Williams Act claim by just saying, Well, you can't unscramble this egg, you can't know that the purchaser would have preceded with the transaction.

Their basis for this hypothetical is entirely hypothetical. There is no testimony in the record from anyone, from anyone at Perrigo, from anyone at Mylan, from anyone at any other place suggesting that if the things that we say were misrepresented were told to Mylan, that they wouldn't have done the tender offer. It is pure speculation. It is entered by their expert, Dr. Subraminian. And interestingly, his statement, his conclusion that Mylan would not have conducted

the tender offer as they did is, in fact, speculation about Mylan's state of mind which they criticize our expert,

Dr. Purcell -- or Mr. Purcell, that he should be excluded because he wants to testify, which he doesn't, about the state of mind of certain of the defendants.

So if Purcell can't testify about the state of mind of the defendants, Dr. Subramanian certainly can't testify without any record support as to what Mylan would or would have not done.

The other thing that I want to point out is the idea that Mylan would have been impeded by certain of this information is contradictory to what the defendants said when they were defending themselves against the tender offer.

One of Perrigo's defenses, and I will just quote one thing, is a release on November 10, 2015, Mylan had chosen to hide the ball. And it had resorted to half truths and empty promises, and scare tactics. We cite that at paragraph 36 of our statement of facts.

Perrigo had repeatedly and earlier cited Mylan's ethical challenges and difficulty with basically operating above board throughout the process. So the idea that they would now say that this company would be completely put off by the minor things that they say they are doing, which they don't admit that they were doing, doesn't really make any sense or hold together.

What they are really saying is, if there is no liability, there can be no loss causation. And we agree, except for the fact that we think there is liability on this claim, and therefore, we have presented a measure of damages that are, certainly, appropriate.

And the fact -- the fact of whether or not the tender offer would have been completed is a question for the trier of fact. Just like all of the other things that Mr. Silverman talked about. We cite in our opposition, the *Daimler Chrysler AG* case from the district of Delaware, 2003, which holds that.

Defendants, the last thing I'm going to cover on this is the idea that our expert, Dr. Nye, said that -- or the contention that he said that Mylan would have never done the tender offer if they had known the truth. That's not what he said. And he said he would not know what Mylan would have done, and he said he didn't have any understanding of that.

But also, based on defendants' contention regarding expert's testifies regarding the state of mind of other people, whether or not Dr. Nye -- notwithstanding our disagreement with their characterization of his testimony, even if that were his testimony, they say you are not allowed to testify about the state of mine of somebody else. And so what the value of that other than a nice gotcha point in an argument and in a brief, I'm not sure, but we don't think it has any value.

I'm going to move on to the 10(b), the open market

claims. In that context, I want to talk generally about loss causation and what's required for loss causation on those claims.

I want to first say that it's important really to consider what's actually required here. In loss causation is the measurement or the process by which information that was previously misrepresented or omitted comes to be known by the market. And that can come in one of many forms. What this Semerenko case from this Third Circuit says, it just requires a showing that the alleged misrepresentations were a substantial cause of the inflation and in the securities subsequent declined value.

So there has to be a substantial relationship between the misrepresentations and the news that causes the stocks to decline in value. Importantly, this affects some of defendants' arguments, because we hear about this repeatedly in their briefs. There is no requirement that a corrected disclosure be a mirror image of the prior misrepresentations. If you said -- just to give a very basic example -- the car was black and it turned out the car had rust on it, could be a corrective disclosure of that potential statement. It doesn't have to be the car was white.

That kind of mirror image disclosure is not what's required under the Securities laws. In the *Merck* case from this district from 2011 says that -- supports the idea that no

mirror-image requirements are embedded in the juris prudence on loss causation.

Defendants, you know, seek to apply a very different standard, a standard where everything is objective and there is no room for interpretation of facts at summary judgment.

That's improper.

They say in their reply brief at page 27, oddly on their motion for summary judgment, that Plaintiffs have the burden of proving loss causation but that we have failed to do so. It may be true, and in fact, I think it is true that we would have the burden at trial. But they have the burden now of showing that there are no issues of material fact related to loss causation. And there are.

We have detailed evidence from the record. We have Dr. Nye's very detailed reports supporting contentions of loss causation and damages. And specifically for each -- we have seven corrective disclosure dates in the case, your Honor. Those are dates in which news released a cause Perrigo share price to decline materially.

On each of those dates, based on economic studies that Dr. Nye has conducted, we show that there is a statistically significant decline on those dates. After controlling for the market and the peers of Perrigo, meaning that, this is a statistical measure of the movement in Perrigo stock that controls for other market and industry factors. So it is just

the news affecting Perrigo. The defendants do not contest this. In fact, their expert, Dr. Gompers did not conduct an event study to determine whether or not any of our experts' statistics were wrong. They concede that they are correct.

And since we have provided that information, we have the evidence to prove loss causation. We have the evidence to prove damages. And so in this scenario there's no way that summary judgment can be granted on loss causation.

They, again, cite the *McCabe* case in their reply at 27, and in that case, the difference is that the plaintiffs did not cite any -- they did not make any allegations regarding loss causation. They didn't say that news came out that corrected a prior misstatement and that's what caused the price of their securities to decline. This case is totally different.

Here we have the seven corrective disclosures we're talking about. And one thing that I really want to emphasize, because a lot of what we heard earlier today was that the defendants really didn't misrepresent anything. They were really tell ing the truth.

Well, the thing is, is that the stock price reactions to the information that we set forth in our complaint and in our papers in support of -- opposition of summary judgment and certainly in Dr. Nye's reports reflect something very different.

On the disclosures at issue here, we have a 9.9 percent

decline, a 17 percent decline, another 9 percent decline. So what that reflects in general is that the market and investors -- very smart people who studied these companies in great detail -- saw the news that Perrigo released and said, Huh, I'm going to have to reduce the value of your firm by 17 percent today. That's controlling for the market. That's just the Perrigo-specific drop.

That doesn't happen unless something in that news release shocked people. Made them think, something that I didn't know came out today, and that's because the defendants didn't tell the them the truth. So that's why we see a 17 percent drop on the April 25, 2016, disclosure.

I'm going to go through a couple of examples to sort of talk about some of the things that Mr. Wareham talked about.

I'm not going to talk about each one of the seven disclosures, unless your Honor would like me to. I think it's highly unlikely that you would want that.

But I will do some and I think they will be illustrative of the others dates.

THE COURT: You predicted correct.

MR. HARROD: Okay. So I will start with the first collective disclosure state in the case. That was February 18th of 2016. And on that date, Perrigo disclosed its fourth quarter fiscal year 2015 financial results. Those results were significantly below investors and analysts expectations.

Specifically, they were poor earnings in the announcement of an impairment of the value of the Omega assets. Mr. Silverman talked about that.

This was the first of several impairment charges, meaning that the value of that asset that they had bought, which was the biggest acquisition that had ever made, was going to be worth less than they expected. So it's an indication that that transaction is not panning out in the way that they expected, and that the value that the shareholders of Perrigo put into the acquisition of Omega is now worthless. That's what that signals.

So there were comments related to that by Perrigo and by the CEO, Mr. Papa, expressly linking the poor earnings in the impairment of Omega assets to issues with the integration and operation of Omega. Perrigo stock fell by 10 percent. That's after isolating the market and peer factors. That's a very large decline.

This was a partial disclosure of the problems at Omega. Dr. Nye, and if you look at his reports, there is excruciating painstaking detail in them. He looks at news, analyst reports, he compares them. He weighs the relationship between the prior misrepresentations and the news that's coming out and does a detailed analysis of that. I will spare you reading through that. But if you were to look at it, I'm sure that you would see the amount of detail and thought that went into that.

So he looked at analyst commentary on the February 18th disclosure. And he determined that there wasn't any other news that day that affected the stock. This goes to the point, and I will get to this more, about confounding information. And I think Mr. Wareham might have referred to it as a phobia disaggregation. That means that if there is multiple pieces of information affecting the stock on a certain day, Dr. Nye concludes that he doesn't need to parse that out. Meaning that if there is some pieces of information that are negative, that area about one aspect of the business that's unrelated to the fraud, he has to remove the effect of that.

He says he can do that, and he can do it. He just says for these disclosures, not that he is afraid to do it, but that he doesn't need to, because the information affecting, causing the decline on these dates is all about things that are at issue in this case.

Defendants disagree with that, and that's fine. They can tell that story to the jury. But they can't get summary judgment on it.

So Perrigo argues specifically to this case that the narrow interpretation of the case related to integration of Omega is not implicated by those disclosures. We have detailed statements in the record why that's wrong. We disagree with it. There is no need to disaggregate it. We believe we have more than readily established loss causation on February 18th.

I will do a couple more dates.

The next corrective disclosure is another one that Mr. Wareham talked about. This is news that comes out after the close of the financial market on April 21st. It is information indicating that Mr. Papa's going to leave the company, he is going to go take on a job at Valeant.

And our interpretation of this information is that the disclosure was -- was indicated to investors of further worsening conditions at Omega, and that Mr. Papa was leaving because his project of making this European acquisition was not going well. Again, defendants do not contest the statistical analysis on this date. They agree that it's statistically significant and that the company stock went down by 5.8 percent.

They argue it is not a corrective disclosure because
Papa's resignation was not the subject of any of the alleged
misrepresentations. Again, I will turn you back to what I said
earlier. There is no mirror image requirement. Information
about complex multinational companies that have multiple lines
of business with CEO's moving around and tender offers that are
being launched and failing, the information is dynamic. It
doesn't mean one thing. They look at this and they are saying
we have report that Mr. Papa is leaving.

They look at that and say well, Mr. Papa is closely associated with the purchase of Omega. In fact, he was the

executive at Perrigo that was, by far, most closely associated with it. In the prior earnings release that I talked about, he was the one who said I will stick around and basically I'm going to right the ship at Omega.

So about two months later he's like I'm leaving, I'm out, I will take over Valeant and see what they can do. So unsurprisingly, the investors are like, that doesn't seem too good. That seems like maybe if he said he was going to stick around and fix it, he should stick around and fix it. He didn't; he left. The stock dropped.

Analysts covering the company looked at this and said, the mere thought -- this is just one quote -- that he would consider a new role could lead one to conclude that Perrigo is far from being fixed and that Papa may see moderating growth prospects at Perrigo. So he had hitched his wagon to the idea that Omega would achieve growth. That obviously wasn't happening, he left. The market interpreted that correctly, frankly, and he ended up leaving.

The defendants on this date make a specific argument about confounding information. They say that the reason why the stock dropped, at least in part was, because of concerns regarding the new CEO, Mr. Hendrickson -- who was the president -- was going to replace him and he's might not be as good as Papa.

Dr. Nye analyzed this and said well, the two issues of

Mr. Papa's leadership and what they represented to investors and the role of his successor, and the qualifications of his successor are inextricably intertwined. Those two things are related in such a way that can't be disentangled. He said, not that he couldn't disaggregate the effect of that confounding information, but that it wasn't necessary.

I am going to talk about a disclosure that just happens three days later on April 25, 2016. I want to focus in particular here on the defendants' arguments about confounding information, because this is a really critical disclosure date, in terms of what the types of arguments they are presenting on this subject are.

On April 25th, Perrigo announced preliminary results for the first quarter of 2016. They were substantially below investors expectations and they reduced — the company also at that time reduced its earning's guidance for the rest of 2016. Perrigo explained that the poor results and reduced guidance were caused by bad generic Rx pricing reductions, poor BCH performance — which is Brand and Consumer Healthcare, that's what they started to call Omega — and several indicators of impairment at Omega/BCH. Dr. Nye, again, concludes that these disclosures partially revealed information about defendants' prior false statements.

This drop is the one that I referenced earlier on a company-specific basis, 17.7 percent. The stock fell almost 18

percent after controlling for the market and the peers. This is a very, very big drop.

Defendants raise a few arguments here. They again say that this is not revelatory of the misrepresentations because this is not -- this is not about Omega integration. It is about performance. Both -- Mr. Silverman addressed that point, showed you what Judge Arleo had ordered in connection with class certification. We have more of that in our brief.

Dr. Nye did a detailed assessment of why this was related to the Omega misrepresentations that had been made. He does the same for the generic pricing issues. They say -- the defendants say with respect to this, that we need to give consideration and effect to the confounding information which they say was related to the fact that they were -- Perrigo in this day confirmed that Mr. Papa was leaving.

And they also disclosed -- in addition to the information that I talked about earlier regarding Omega and generics -- that their other divisions, the CHC division, was having delayed product launches. And I just want to point this out because I do think its important. What Dr. Nye looks at is, he looks at what that information means and what the significance of it would have been to investors.

He says that the analysts, as a proxy for the broader market, the commentary that they made, their negative reactions were overwhelmingly related to competitive pressures in

generics in the weaker-than-expected Omega performance. He says that the two pieces of information -- that they are citing as being confounding -- is being unrelated to the fraud. That need to be taken out of the loss causation analysis on this date are Papa's departure. He said the market already knew that, they adjusted it when it was first announced on the 21st, no one came out and said it wasn't true.

So the market had fully ingested or taken account that fact as of the date of earnings, on the 25th. He had also said not a single analyst report cited the CHC, the delay in the CHC product launches in any way as a result of -- as being a factor in the re-evaluation of the firm, as of the announcement of that information on April 25th.

So, again, Nye says I can disaggregate this. I can use valuation principles. I can look at the cash flows that would be attributed to something like those delayed product launches. I can measure that. I didn't. I don't have to because that information didn't cause the stock price to go down on that day. And so defendants make virtually the same arguments regarding our May 12th and August 10th disclosures in 2016. I want to focus just lastly the two disclosures from 2017. Because defendants make a distinct argument with respect to those two disclosures.

What happened on March 3, 2017 and May 3, 2017, were two pieces of information related to the government's investigation

in the generic antitrust area, and in particular what that meant for Perrigo.

On March 3rd, Bloomberg reported -- during the trading day -- that U.S. prosecutors are examining the prices of skin treatments made by Perrigo and a handful of other companies as part of a sweeping criminal investigation into possible collusion and the generic drug business.

According to the May report, it is based on a court document. That news came out at 10:25 in the morning. If you look at an intraday chart showing the ticks during the trading day, Perrigo stock immediately declined ultimately by around four percent beginning with the information that was released there.

On May 3rd after the close of the markets on May 2nd -May 3rd being the next day -- the stock drops, but on May 2nd
the Wall Street Journal reported -- first, Perrigo released an
information that the Department of Justice had executed a
search warrant at its corporate headquarters in connection with
the generic drug investigation.

The Wall Street Journal reported that evening on May 2nd -- so this is before the market opens on the 3rd -- that the execution of search warrants may suggest investigators are stepping up the probe, searching for evidence to support allegations of collusion.

So on each of these dates, Dr. Nye concludes that the

increased regulatory scrutiny was, unsurprisingly, the result of the very same fraudulent conduct alleged by plaintiff.

Accordingly, as the glare of the DOJ was a direct and foreseeable consequence of the risk inherent to the company's allegedly collusive price-fixing scheme.

So we provided evidence regarding the relationship between price fixing and the company statements and this was a correction of those statements. And we have established through Dr. Nye's studies that the stock declined both days in a statistically significant fashion.

So defendants' arguments in response to these two corrective dates is different. Their argument is that the market already knew about this information. This is what's referred to generally as a truth-on-the-market defense.

Defendants here bear the burden to show equivocally that the information on these two corrective disclosure dates was conveyed today the public with a degree of intensity and credibility sufficient to counterbalance, effectively, any misleading information created by the alleged misstatements.

So what that means in this context is, their prior information would have told the investors and the public that they were going to be -- there was going to be news reports that the generic drug investigation was ramping up, and that the Department of Justice was going to execute a search warrant on their headquarters.

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

```
So we don't think beyond the legal standard, which makes
it very difficult for them to win such an argument on summary
judgment, that the fact that they purport to say were in the
public as of those dates because they were conveyed
unequivocally to the public with a degree of intensity and
credibility. They have not met that standard.
       So your Honor, that's all I had on loss causation for
now.
       I think it probably makes sense, unless you disagree,
for us to either take a short break or for me to turn to
argument back over to defendants and I think that they are
going to -- they made motions to challenge our experts and it
probably makes sense for them to argue first on those.
         THE COURT: We will take a five-minute break, and then
we will come back. It is 3:18. Let's say 3:25.
         MR. HARROD: Thank you, your Honor.
         THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise.
         (Recess taken at 3:18 to 3:26 p.m.)
         THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise.
         THE COURT: Thank you, please be seated.
         MR. HARDIMAN: John Hardiman for Judy Brown, again.
Your Honor, if I get -- and this is probably something Mr.
Wareham said, but I'll say it anyhow -- if I get their theory
here, as long as they say there is a price hike and then they
attach to it, actually, adverbs like astronomical, really high;
```

they get to go to a jury. And that's not what the rule is, all right.

This case is all supposition which is become blindly obvious from that response. And that is what summary judgment is meant to weed out and not permit to go to a jury. So a jury isn't given misleading evidence, supposition, and speculation in an effort to try and push the plaintiffs to some sort of settlement. That's why this case has got to go. It surely has to go against Judy Brown.

I said there was no evidence against her own price fixing, and I must have been right, because what happened when the plaintiffs were speaking is you will hear -- they kind of change the case. The case is, and always has been -- as Judge Arleo said -- a case about hiding a price-fixing scheme.

As I said to you before and I'll say again, there is no evidence Judy Brown knew anything about the price fixing scheme, the fact that may have know the prices went up, or that there may be penalties that some prices went up. How does that possibly translate to knowing there is criminal behavior going on within the organization?

And what they do, what they did was sort of drift away from that and there was all this talk about, you know, they withheld the fact they were in a competitive market? What? That is completely the opposite of a price-fixing scheme. A price-fixing scheme means that there is no competition, because

1 everyone agrees what the prices are --2 (Reporter clarification.) 3 MR. HARDIMAN: Completely the opposite what they are 4 starting to try to work in the case now, but that's not the 5 case they pled. 6 They didn't plead a case that Ms. Brown or Perrigo kept 7 from the shareholders the extensive competition in the market. 8 They pled completely the opposite, and by the way, if you look 9 at Ms. Brown's statements, the statements they are premising 10 this case on, the cases would say -- the statements would say 11 there's a lot of competition in the market. 12 I still don't what they are arguing about with respect 13 to being insulated from the pricing drama. I mean, yes, 14 Shkreli's prices were high. He wasn't involved in a 15 price-fixing conspiracy. No one alleged that. 16 I have to say, your Honor, this idea -- the last refuge 17 of scoundrels, right, which is -- okay, they didn't know 18 because they didn't want to know. Wait a minute. 19 Judy Brown, Joe Papa these are people that work really 20 hard to get big jobs at a big company. You're going to tell me 21 that it's logical to reasonable inference when they have no 22 evidence of any price fixing for them to say in a company 23 selling 800 generic products to assume that in six or so there 24 might be criminal behavior, and their reaction to that is going 25 to be good work guys, keep going?

People go to jail for that, okay? That is a totally unreasonable inference. That is them not doing their job.

They brought a case that accused my client of a really bad thing and it was their job to come up with evidence to show that was true, and they didn't do it. And then they get to go to a jury by saying well, maybe, well, she didn't know, but she didn't want to know. That is preposterous.

One thing that really doesn't address my client, but I just have to mention it because it is just so dumb, this argument that Brown and Papa sold their stock at a lower price than what Mylan was offering indicates that they really thought the Mylan price was okay is ridiculous.

When you or I sell stock, ten shares of stock, we get what the market gives us but when you're selling a whole company, that's a bigger deal. Because when you sell a company, you are selling control of the company and you've got to get a control premium for that company.

In mergers and acquisitions law -- believe me, we have enough law today. I don't need to get into that. In mergers and acquisitions law, you have a duty to get the highest price possible. The plaintiffs know that. Their firms wrote that law, and, therefore, this comparison between what I sell something on the market and what I'm selling an entire company is ridiculous and when people say things like that, your Honor, you should question all of their arguments.

Now going to integration, again, it was a very undisciplined presentation. As I warned at the outset of my argument, a lot of their arguments went into time periods that have nothing to do with what Mrs. Brown knew on June 23rd when she spoke. They talk about the problems of the impairment in 2016. None of that has anything to do with the issues on June 23rd.

They said at one point that she knew in the preintegration process before the closing that revenue was overstated at Omega. That is the IRFS GAAP problem that we spoke about. Under the IRFS rules, you record revenue differently than under GAAP. Therefore, it had to be fixed. And as you saw from the documents I showed you, it was fixed and it was getting fixed by the time she talked on June 23rd. As a matter of fact, he admitted that the statements she made, the modest statement, We're online, back office is online, he admitted that the back office stuff she is referring to is the IRFS GAAP issue. And, yes, the documents show quite clearly that that was getting remedied.

By the way, I never asked you -- I didn't ask you to take any inference from any document. I asked you to read them because if you read them, they come out our way.

The Coucke document, I already told you the only way I think that can reasonably be read. They referred to a document the next day in which Mr. Coucke said that what I think we need

2

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

is marriage counseling. Precisely my point. The issue wasn't that the things that needed to be integrated, the nuts and bolts of putting the companies together wasn't working. His problem was that it was working with Perrigo, basically, taking over and he needed to talk to people about that, which is, by the way, why, obviously, the CFO got on the plane to go meet with him because the guy was upset and he was having a tantrum, not because -- that doesn't indicate anything was going wrong with respect to putting the companies together. On the day before she spoke, she had a memo from her staff saying all the succusses to date with respect to integration and those were the things that were the nuts and bolts of getting done about integration. That's all I've got. Thank you, your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. MR. BRODSKY: Your Honor, I'll try to be relatively short. Mr. Silverman went through a litany of document after document after document. Didn't quote from almost all of them. Misquoted it or misstated what it was. Didn't give you the timing of exactly what statement was at issue by Mr. Papa or Ms. Brown and what was known at that time and mixed up time periods, but I'll go through a few examples to point that out.

I would just ask your Honor what we did in our presentation was

actually show the documents and the words on the page because

7

8

25

1 the words on the page of the documents, they all go in favor by the plain language of the defendants. The interpretations they 3 are insisting people can make, well, they have those 4 The first thing I'd like to do, though, is interpretations. Mr. Silverman besmirched Mr. Papa by suggesting that they 6 didn't go past five hours because he said I don't recall a number of times. And you know what I thought we would do? Let's go 9 through the first ten times he said I don't recall. Let's look 10 at what he actually said because I'd urge you to do that. 11 tried to suggest Mr. Papa wasn't giving the answers, that he 12 was trying to avoid answers. Let's go through the first half. 13 The first time he was asked: What was your position at 14 the time of the deposition you are referring to? 15 I don't recall to the best of my recollection, and then 16 he gives the answer. Well, that's one I don't recall. One out 17 of one is an attempt to answer the question. 18 Number 2, in a personal capacity, yes, he said as part 19 of my company, the company has been involved. 20 Are you asking me specifically in a personal capacity? 21 Yes. 22 He said, I don't recall being involved in any additional 23 lawsuits beyond those that had been part of the company. 24 That's true. That's a true statement. Two out of two. Let's go to the next I don't recall.

```
1
           Two out of two reasonable I don't recalls, if you can
 2
    get there.
 3
           Yes. When was the last time you spoke to
 4
    Bradley Joseph?
 5
           I don't recall speaking with Bradley Joseph since my
 6
    departure from the Perrigo company.
 7
           That's true. He did not speak to Bradley Joseph, and he
 8
    didn't recall. That's three out of three reasonable I don't
 9
    recalls.
10
           Let's go to the fourth.
11
           Down below, how large was Watson during the time he
12
    served as president?
13
           I don't recall the specific numbers, sir.
14
           And then he was asked, was is it something that you
15
    considered to be a large pharmaceutical company?
16
           Answer: I don't know how you define large. I believe
17
    it to be a good company. I don't know.
18
           How can that be considered a nonresponsive answer?
19
           Let's go to the next I don't recall.
20
           While you were at Watson, did you work with anyone who
21
    later worked at Perrigo?
22
           I don't recall anyone from Watson Pharmaceuticals coming
23
    and joining the Perrigo company.
24
           Not a false answer, a true answer.
25
           To your knowledge, did you work with anyone at Watson
```

1 who later worked for another company? 2 I don't recall any specific individuals. I'm sure there 3 was some people. 4 I could go on and on. Every I don't recall -- almost 5 every I don't recall was I don't recall, but here is what I can 6 tell you. I don't recall, but if you have my calendar. 7 don't recall, but let me give you the information I have. 8 So they didn't spend five hours with -- more than 9 five hours with him because they didn't want to ask the hard 10 questions and they didn't like the responses. 11 Let's go through a few documents. 12 If we put up -- they mentioned Exhibit 386, and they 13 said Exhibit 386 was a significant document. Mr. Silverman ran 14 through these one after the other so fast, so rapid, I could 15 hardly understand what he was saying. 16 July 14, 2015, he offers this document from 17 Mr. Farrington to Joseph Papa and others. It's about the 18 integration reset. 19 I encourage your Honor. He interpreted it as some kind 20 of evidence that there was wrongdoing or that there was some 21 serious problem at Omega. I urge your Honor to look at that 22 document and look through it because he is wrong. It's -- it 23 doesn't exist. 24 And, in fact, let's assume he is right. Let's assume it 25 showed some issue with Omega, some problems with the

1 integration process. That document is dated July 14th. 2 Let's go to the disclosure on slide 31 of our 3 presentation, and let's look what happens on August 13, 2015, 4 in terms of a disclosure. Quote, We face risks associated with 5 successful integration of our recently acquired Omega business, 6 and it gives all the issues or problems one can encounter. 7 I challenge them to talk to your Honor about these risks 8 that were disclosed. I challenge them to answer certain 9 questions, and they didn't want to do that. 10 Let's go to the next one. 11 They put -- if we can, go to my slide 44. 12 They mentioned this really quickly. They threw it out 13 there. They suggested that Mr. Papa was saying on this date of 14 August 5th that the integration was delivered, that they, 15 quote, It was over. Integration was over, Omega integration. 16 He used the words, and we highlighted it in our 17 presentation as he talks, I would like to start by thanking 18 Perrigo employees for their diligent focus, and he says, 19 delivered on our Omega integration plans. 20 We all know here, because of all the disclosures before 21 this and after it by Mr. Papa in the SEC filings, that they 22 kept saying that the integration is going to take two or three 23 That does not mean we're done with the integration. 24 just closed in March, and we're completely finished. 25 not a reasonable inference to be drawn from the evidence.

is a Hail Mary. That is not even colorable under the summary judgment standard.

Let's go to another one. I can't go through them all, but I'm just going to go quickly to another one.

Slide 27, this is another one they put up there and this is one where they doubled down, your Honor, on what I would say is, at best, a very significant material omission from page 55 of their opposition brief. They doubled down on your Honor and said, You should draw -- look at this plain language, and you should decide this is a jury question as to whether Mr. Papa said the overall comment is flat to up slightly is a reference to a specific product or specific category. I respectfully submit that epitomizes their entire case.

And if you go to the next slide, if your Honor looks at the plain language, and that is what, thankfully, a United States District Court judge has the power to do, you, your Honor, have the power to look at the plain language and decide that their interpretation is so far beyond the pale of unreasonableness that it cannot belong in a courtroom in front of a jury, and that is why district court judges are gatekeepers to evidence.

Plaintiff lawyers, defense lawyers don't get to decide what juries get to see and in this particular instance, their interpretation is not even within the realm of reasonable. I think it epitomizes many things about their view of the

evidence.

I don't think they had an answer for your Honor as to why they excerpted all of that language above from page 55 of their brief. I wish they did.

I would like to go to my slide 22 because I think they misspoke unintentionally, I assume, when they described as Mr. Silverman said that Mr. Papa said pricing was sustainable. That's a quote from him as I heard him say it. Now there is a transcript so people can look back.

That is not Mr. Papa's words. He was at a conference, Mr. Papa, speaking and Mr. Goodman from UBS Securities asked him how sustainable you feel like those increases are? Thanks. Asked about the generics business, how sustainable are the price increases? He never uses the word sustainable. In fact, Mr. Papa's answer avoids using that, and, essentially -- the language is right there -- says, Our team has done a good job looking at pricing and will continue to look at it.

Last two lines, We think there is something that we'll be talking about in the future for pricing. There is no, we think it's sustainable.

So it's not reasonable for any lawyer to claim Mr. Papa said words he did not say.

They -- Mr. Silverman also said that Mr. Boothe and another corporate representative said Mr. Papa was involved in pricing decisions. Mr. Boothe's transcript, page 27 to 28,

actually said in a general question of who was involved in pricing, at the very end, sometimes there might be input from the CFO or CEO. That is not evidence that there was input with respect to any particular date, time, drug.

And then the other corporate representative said, and they didn't quote him right, quote, Very well could have been raised with Mr. Papa referring to pricing.

Your Honor, if a witness got up on the stand and was asked a question before a jury, could you very well have been informed of something? Your Honor would sustain that objection. It's like asking somebody is it possible that this could have occurred? Anything is possible. Is it possible Mr. Papa could have been consulted? Could have happened. That's not admissible evidence, and so they are relying on inadmissible evidence.

Mr. Silverman also said that Mr. -- I could not believe my ears. He actually said you could draw an inference, he thought, a reasonable inference from the fact that Mr. Papa attended some industry conferences years ago prior to the class period and somehow you could draw some inference that he knew about some kind of price hike and price fixing from it. I mean, that's pure speculation. That's not a reasonable inference.

Then there's the issue of selling shares.

I got so confused by this because I thought -- and two

final issues, one, they said that Mr. Papa, I think they also said Ms. Brown, sold shares after December or around December 2015, maybe early 2016, lower than the Mylan tender offer price. So if I -- and that's evidence that somehow they had a the motive to do something wrong with respect to the tender offer or to give the market misinformation.

Now, if I have their facts right, they are saying that Mr. Papa and Ms. Brown decided, let's defeat the tender offer which will give us \$150 a share, make us rich. We will walk out of here with a fortune. They had so many shares. They never have to work again. But you know what we're going to do? We're going to fight the tender offer under our fiduciary duty to represent all shareholders. We're going to give up all of that money so that we could try to sell it at a lower price later.

That is the scheme? That's the plan? It belies common sense. Once again, I respectfully submit, they have the stubborn fact they have to deal with that Mr. Papa stopped his 10b5-1 plan. He didn't have to, and didn't sell shares when the Mylan tender offer price drove the stock price through the roof and he gave up a fortune of money. That's a stubborn fact they can't get around that undercuts any idea of motive.

And then finally, I think I heard somebody say up here that if the stock price drops on any day, then it's not because a company is disclosed something legitimately that they just

2

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

learned or that's happened over the last quarter. It's that some fraud happened. And that's not the law, your Honor. If that were the law, then any company on any given week, because it happens every week, when their stock price drops 10 percent, 20 percent, there had to have been fraud. That is the kind of conclusory thinking that's not proper, and before any district court, especially at the motion for summary judgment stage. Your Honor, thank you very much for your time today. You have been incredibly patient. I don't know if you have any questions? THE COURT: No questions. Thank you, Counsel. MR. BRODSKY: Thank you, your Honor. Thank you, your Honor. MR. WAREHAM: Mr. Silverman referenced this class notice concept, that the class notice can expand the case. Plaintiff's characterization of the class notice's brief description of the case as binding. It's interesting because they don't cite a case to that effect in their brief, and that's because there is no such case in the land. And, of course, the Court was very clear in issuing the class notice. That the controlling document for purpose of that notice was the amended complaint. The Court held on November 11, 2019, as reflected in the class notice order, the classes may pursue the following claims as set forth in the

amended complaint and consistent with the Court's opinion and order of July 27, 2018. The complaint clearly alleges nothing about Omega's performance. The Court's motion to dismiss the opinion did not permit the plaintiffs to pursue claims about Omega's performance.

Now, unsurprisingly this is quite consistent with operative case law. The operative complaint controls -- and is the document where the complaint and notices of class members are to look. And any confusion about those documents go to the amended complaint. And the Court in the EOC v. State PUC case makes it crystal clear. Any conflict tie goes to the amended complaint. Logical. It makes total sense. Consistent with every case in the land.

Plaintiffs wanted to conclude or now want to include claims about Omega's performance in their case. That time is long past. They could have amended the complaint. They did not.

Now, as a technical matter and brief point with respect to this class notice, there are two class notices, your Honor. One goes to the shareholders in Israel and one goes to the shareholders in the United States. And they are inconsistent. The one in Israel doesn't talk about performance, and the one in the United States has, as the plaintiff's said, does talk about performance. It also says, for any conflict, go look at the amended complaint. Again, there is a reason they cite no

case in support of this bizarre theory, none exists.

Now, Mr. Silverman said, your Honor, with respect to the Sherman Act that the plaintiffs need not demonstrate unlawful collusive pricing to survive this motion for summary judgment. But, your Honor, in the complaint, the plaintiffs allege that, quote, defendants failed to disclose uncharged illegal conduct. That's their argument.

And the record lacks any evidence at all of illegal conduct. The plaintiffs have failed today show any basis for securities fraud claim. Judge Arleo made it clear in her motion to dismiss opinion that plaintiffs securities fraud claims must fall, whereas here there is no evidence of collusion.

She wrote, and this is clear, the allegations here and the misrepresentations and omissions identified in the amended complaint concerning collusive pricing are sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss. That's it. Criminal issues, collusive pricing, not some state of the market, not some competitive babble that we're hearing now in the papers. It's not part of the case.

Now, with respect to loss causation in Mr. Harrod's presentation on loss causation, first he made the statement at one point in time that some argument was circular. Let me give you the most circular argument I've heard today, and I've heard a lot from this side of the table. And that is that on the

10b-5 side of the case, they claim that these so-called misrepresentations equal \$63 worth of overstatement in Perrigo's price.

And yet, on their 14(e) claims, they claim to get the benefit of that. That the 174 that they are using as the Perrigo trading price is the measure of damages. Well, how can that be? How can you say on the one hand the price is inflated \$63 and on other side say, I get the benefit of the inflation. Talk about circular.

We also talk in our papers at some length about the realities of 14(e) claims, your Honor. And the way they are really supposed to be handled, and it's not in cases like this, postoperatively. The Supreme Court held in a leading case under section 14(e) that in corporate control contests the stage of preliminary injunctive relief rather than post control lawsuits is the time when relief can best be given.

That's the Piper v. Chris-Craft case, your Honor, at 430 U.S. 1. And indeed, in this very case, Mylan, when it proposed its tender offer, brought a section 14(e) claim against Perrigo. They did so in the fall of 2015. During the pendency of the tender offer itself. And Mylan saw an injunctive relief based on the allegation, quote, If Perrigo shareholders were to refuse to tender their shares based upon Perrigo's false and misleading statements, they would be irreparably injured by losing the opportunity to make an informed decision on Mylan's

offer.

Sound familiar? It kind of sounds what they are saying postoperatively.

Now, Mylan sought an order in joining and directing

Perrigo to provide corrective disclosures to their

shareholders. And enjoining them from making further false and

misleading statements. That went down to the southern district

of New York, not too far away. They denied Mylan's request for

that injunctive relief. They did so on October 29, 2015.

In this entire country's history, and the plaintiffs cannot cite one, there are no cases where a Court has ever permitted to proceed past the summary judgment stage a 14(e) claim premised on the notion that if only the allegedly concealed information would have been disclosed, a tender offer would have succeeded rather than failed.

We are not aware of one because there isn't one.

A few conclusory comments, your Honor, in connection with the motion for summary judgment.

There is a dearth of disputed admissible evidence. I think that's clear through today's argument. That's just a fact.

Now, no torture effort to squeeze civil adversarial complaints or confidential settlements with no connection to Perrigo and Spartan conclusion affidavits to a narrow hearsay exception can save this case, can change the lack of evidence.

No number of supposed experts with a history of being excluded for offering the same form of inadmissible statements as offered here can save this case.

No one's seen an unprecedented use of the errata sheet to reverse clear testimony gutting a claim can alter this landscape. Plaintiff's heavy reliance on the so-called witness like Ms. Kincaid, who could not pick Mr. Papa or Ms. Brown out of a crowd of two, and who under oath testified the exact opposite of what they were representing in the complaint she was going to say can save this case.

You might have recognized, your Honor, the only words —the only people using the word Kincaid were myself. We never herd the name Christine Kincaid from those folks, and you know what, I would be bloody embarrassed myself.

No matter of time with some lawyer telling the Court minimal means no can save this case. Minimal doesn't mean no. Minimum means minimum.

No amount of guesswork about how we might try the case, we might open the door, we might wow this hearsay evidence and circumstantial evidence to come in because we are stupid enough to let that happen, guess what might happen in front of a jury can save this case.

Promises to deliver witnesses, your Honor, who did not show up. Their witnesses under subpoena did not show up.

These are the two fellows from Sandoz who know little about

much. Can deliver this case from summary judgment. And are they going, maybe they will come, maybe they won't. But what they will testify to if anything was events that are now 11, and 12 years old about a dead man. That doesn't move this case an inch. Doesn't survive this motion.

Now, attempts to rely on events that took place long before an event or long after an event in an effort to misconstrue a defendants' state of mind cannot substitute for missing evidence. Blatant mischaracterization of Mr. Papa's statements about portfolio wide pricing strategy salvaged nothing. We have seen that very clearly from Mr. Brodsky.

Now, no Nostradamus like prediction about what the Third Circuit might someday do with respect to corporate scienter. They are going to first adopt it even though they haven't done it in years, and then they are going to pick the one avenue in which plaintiffs can survive on a corporate scienter. That's going to happen. Let's go to the jury so that we can let the Third Circuit get off its hind legs and do something it hasn't done forever. That's not how cases get to the jury.

I saw here today something that worried me. They are so clearly misrepresenting the state of this market, and so clearly complaining about things that are normal in a naturally occurring oligopolistic market that I feel a jury nullification. I fear that they are trying to say to somebody, a loaf of bread got multiplied by 500 percent. This is -- a

loaf of bread is not a topical generic Rx product. Okay? It is a loaf of bread. And jurors are not to be misled in ways like that.

The law on the Third Circuit's point of view with respect to oligopolistic markets is crystal clear. It is in Valspar, it is in Baby Foods, and it's in Chocolate. And to let a jury kind of take a whack at nullifying those I think would be a gross injustice.

Now, these theories that they have left barely, barely, barely survived a motion to dismiss. And after years of noisy and wasteful discovery, it is time to put up or shut up. And plaintiffs must defend, your Honor, the claims they pled. Not ones they wished they pled.

Two critical documents govern what's in this case. The operative complaint, the amended complaint which they wrote, and the Judge's opinion narrowing that and sending to your Honor these two issues. The integration -- present sense of integration of Perrigo into -- Omega into Perrigo and the price-fixing conspiracy on six products. No number of cries to please, please, please, your Honor, let us go to a jury, can save this case.

Stripped of this entire set of contortion and speculations, your Honor, this is really a pretty bloody easy case. I ask you right now to, please, silence these plaintiffs and to dismiss this case.

1 THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. 2 MR. WAREHAM: Thank you, your Honor. 3 MR. SILVERMAN: Thank you, your Honor. Given this 4 late hour, I don't know how this will be taken, but I'm not so 5 easily silenced. I have been called over the last half hour 6 and earlier this morning dumb. My argument is silly. 7 arguing a last refuge of scoundrels. That we are 8 undisciplined. I don't have the same kind of pejorative 9 comments for my adversaries. I think they actually put forth 10 some very creative, strained inferences. But there are 11 creative arguments that I think, you know, will be something 12 that will have to grapple with in front of the jury. But that 13 is the place --14 I'll be real quick on the substance. 15 First, Mr. Hardiman misstated our competitive 16 environment claims. They've been the same since day 1. It's 17 real simple. Perrigo said to instill in a confidence in investors that the generic drug price profitable was 18 19 They told investors that they achieved that sustainable. 20 profitability despite operating in a competitive environment. 21 Sometimes they said obviously competitive. Sometimes they had 22 they said heavy competition. 23 But that suggested to investors that there is 24 sustainable profitability when instead they are relying on 25 unsustainable pricing opportunities. That's the nature of the

1 It was in the amended complaint. It was in the class 2 notice. It was not rejected by Judge Arleo. It's still -- it 3 has been part of the case since day 1. Second, there was a comment by, I believe, both 4 5 Mr. Hardiman and Mr. Brodsky that denigrating Mr. Coucke as if 6 he was just some guy who was a little bit begrudged. Well, he 7 wasn't some guy. He was the CEO of Omega. You can't integrate 8 Omega without its CEO. What a CEO has to say is a very high 9 level, important commentary on the nature of the integration. 10 He was also a Perrigo director during most of his -- the 11 time between when he -- Omega was acquired and when it left. 12 So he was a guy with a lot of influence and power there. 13 Mr. Brodsky spent a lot of time arguing about inferences 14 to try to rehabilitate Papa, whether or not he was credible at 15 his deposition. 16 That just shows you we are now in the prohibited 17 territory from the Third Circuit. You don't -- you don't 18 decide credibility at summary judgment. The Third Circuit says 19 that's within the exclusive province of the jury. 20 In terms of what was an integration reset, he says infer 21 that it's -- that the term "integration reset" means something 22 other than reset, and it's consistent with it being online. 23 I don't think that's a very convincing argument, but, 24 again, that's an inference. A jury decides whether to accept

that inference, however strained it may be or not.

25

With respect to the class notice, the class notice didn't expand the case one bit. It just -- as all the parties here agreed and as Judge Arleo agreed, it consists -- it concisely described the claims at issue in the case as it existed at that time. They have always been there.

Now, Ms. Kincaid, they are right. I didn't mention

Ms. Kincaid, and there is a reason for that. I don't expect

that she will be a witness at trial. She -- at the pre-motion

to dismiss stage, at the amended complaint stage, she came

forward and she said a lot of stuff. We got her -- she, in

fact, was asked to verify that in writing. We sent her this is

what we think you said, and she said approved indicating that's

what she did, in fact, say, and she admitted that at

deposition.

But she also did have all kinds of stories that may make her a little less credible than we initially thought. We don't anticipate that she will be a big part of our case or theirs, but if they call her, they will -- the jury will hear that she agreed to every single word that's in the amended complaint from her.

There's also been lot of assertions in this that the defendants respective denials of their own misconduct somehow are what matter here. They may be convincing in front of a jury, but they are not what matters at summary judgment.

Outside the securities context, the Third Circuit had to

1.3

visit this issue just a few weeks ago in a case called Zamichieli v. Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 2022
U.S.F. Lexus 6473 at star 12 to 13. That's Third Circuit,
March 14, 2022. The Third Circuit held that a jury was free to disbelieve a defendants' self-serving assertion of his and his fellow defendants' states of mind in light of circumstantial evidence supporting intent.

That's what we have here. We have some direct evidence, some circumstantial evidence, but we have loads of evidence.

They just prefer that it not reach a jury, and I can understand why. I can understand why.

The fact that the CEO of Omega is saying that the integration, that nothing is going right, doesn't make their client's comments seem honest when they tell investors it is in line and going smoothly. I can see why, but that's for the jury to decide.

Finally, with the expect -- with the attempt to divorce integration and performance, number one, there is no order from Judge Arleo that says performance is out of this case. There is no order on the -- the one reference that they cite is from a footnote, not from an order, not from a holding of her opinion. It is a footnote that says when she is considering the holistic inference of scienter, which as we described from the Bristol-Myers Squibb case, it's a totally different standard than the jury considers at trial or your Honor has

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

as causes of problems.

before him at this summary judgment stage, but when she considered that, when she weighed that under the PSLRA's heightened pleading standard requirement, she didn't find the allegations of underperformance in a couple markets convincing. But here is what we now know. We now know that performance was temporarily juiced. Why do we know that? Because Perrigo's own documents, as well as Omega's, show that. The internal audit report shows that, that in Q2, 2015 it was spiked. And it says that Q2, 2015 was manipulated by loading practices. So we know that that related, and it was the very integration of the two firms accounting that revealed all of those practices. So you can't divorce integration from that respect. You also can't divorce integration and performance because the integration problems were exactly what caused, according to Omega, the performance declines. The Omega CEO, Coucke, said in July 2015 that because of integration problems, they had made it -- that Perrigo had made it impossible to run the business. We're out of oxygen, he That's Exhibit 180. said. In Exhibit 195, the Omega presentation that was given to Brown and Papa and Farrington described Omega Pharma's situation as declining vastly and lists integration activities

Exhibit 197, Omega's CEO, Coucke, advised Papa that,

quote, The actual bad results of Omega are due to all reasons I am warning for months.

What had he been warning for months, that the integration attempts of Perrigo were causing problems interfering with his -- the operation of his business and starving the company of oxygen. They are one in the same. Our claims have been consistent throughout this. All of the Omega and generic drug claims that we describe in our summary judgment brief and all that are described in the class notice have been with us all along. These aren't an expansion in any way, shape or form.

So this comes back to the central issue here.

Are we here to decide inferences? Are we here to accept one party's spin over another? Absolutely not. That would be error. The Third Circuit has made that clear. We must allow the jury to decide between the reasonable inferences. We must allow the jury to decide credibility. We must allow the jury to weigh evidence. That is what Rule 56 requires, and I will leave the loss causation issues to Mr. Harrod.

Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. HARROD: I will be very brief, your Honor.

I think -- I can't remember which one of the -- if it was Mr. Brodsky -- I think it was Mr. Brodsky said that I said, Every time a stock drops, it indicates there was prior fraud.

I don't think that that's what I said. Like you said, we can look at the transcript and see what I said, but let me just be clear. A big stock drop means that the market wasn't expecting the information, and in the circumstances that we're talking about here with the seven corrected disclosures, we allege and connect those to the misrepresentations.

The market was undoubtedly surprised. Their expert, who is a superstar professor at Harvard -- you could ask him. He will tell you -- doesn't contest that the information reaching the market on the seven corrected disclosure dates was surprising, that it caused a statistically significant decline. So that's the one thing I wanted to respond to about that.

Mr. Wareham talked about -- I guess he talked about the circular area of the 14(e) claim and about how we could have gotten injunctive relief, and he said that there are no cases upholding a 14(e) claim under these circumstances.

If you look at their brief, I will concede that there are not a lot of 14(e) cases under this circumstance, but the law and the statute is very clear. You can't make misrepresentations in connection with a tender offer. If you do, you basically bought the damages that come from that. That's what our theory is.

He doesn't have a case. They don't have a case finding that a situation like this one cannot be successful for the plaintiffs in the context of a 14(e) claim. So that's that.

2

3

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

2.5

With respect to the question of we could have gotten injunctive relief during the pendency of the tender offer, well, if you look at the sequence of events and the timing of when things became known to the investors, our claims that they violated 14(e) didn't become known. The first corrective disclosure is in 2016. So if he thinks that I had some ability to bring a claim in 2015 making these allegations about misrepresentations before these people told the market about them, I would like to know how I could have done that. But there would have been no way for me to get injunctive relief in 2015 about events that the defendants are alleged to have withheld held from the investors. So I don't think that that argument gets them very far. I appreciate your Honor's time and patience this afternoon. Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you, Counsel. MR. WAREHAM: Your Honor, we would propose to move the Daubert motions, if that's acceptable. THE COURT: That's acceptable. MR. WAREHAM: Thank you very much. THE COURT: How long do you anticipate we will need for the Daubert motions? MR. GRONER: I will try to get him down to like ten minutes --

1 THE COURT: Okay. 2 MR. GRONER: -- considering it's late in the day. 3 Thank you, your Honor. 4 THE COURT: I think that time will come. 5 MR. GRONER: Good afternoon, your Honor. 6 THE COURT: Good afternoon. 7 MR. GRONER: My name is Samuel Groner. 8 The admissibility of expert testimony is governed by 9 Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and Daubert v. Merrell Dow 10 Pharmaceuticals. 11 The Third Circuit held in the In Re: Zoloft case that 12 any step in the expert's analysis that renders the analysis 13 unreliable under the Daubert factors renders the expert's 14 testimony inadmissible. 15 Furthermore, experts may only offer an opinion on a 16 subject about which they possessed, quote, specialized 17 expertise. That quote is from the Elcock v. Kmart case from 18 the Third Circuit. I am going to walk through each of the 19 plaintiff's experts and show why they don't meet the standards. 20 First let me discuss William Purcell. 21 Plaintiffs seek to use Mr. Purcell to spin out their 22 version of the facts through the mouth of a so-called expert. 23 Mr. Purcell claims he is an investment banking and financial 24 expert offering testimony about information that investors find 25 important. However, Mr. Purcell's reports largely consist of

discussion of topics outside the scope of permissible expert testimony.

First, on pages 58 to 59 of our opening brief, we provide a long list of examples of Mr. Purcell improperly speculating about the defendants' state of mind, knowledge, or intent. Because Mr. Purcell's reports are full of speculation about defendants' supposed knowledge, the proper remedy here is exclusion. That is the approach the Court took in the 2008 Highland Capital Management LP v. Schneider decision cited in our brief in which the Court excluded Mr. Purcell's testimony for attempting to, quote, opine on a party's state of mind.

In the 2008 Highland decision, the Court explained that, quote, Purcell cannot state assumptions or make inferences regarding the knowledge of certain employees because such inferences lie outside the bounds of expert testimony.

That's not the only time Mr. Purcell's opinions have been excluded for this exact reason. In VSI Holdings v. SPX, also cited in our brief, the Court excluded testimony from Mr. Purcell about what either parties intent was and, quote, whether either party was honest. Once again here, Mr. Purcell's opinions on these topics should be excluded.

Second, Mr. Purcell's opinions should be excluded because he opines on whether defendants' statements were false or misleading, and I'm not going to go through each statement, but on page 60 of our opening brief, we list the spots where he

does that.

The quotations are not ambiguous. Mr. Purcell repeatedly opined that Perrigo made false and misleading statements and omitted information that he believes was necessary for Perrigo's public statements not to be misleading. Mr. Purcell's similar testimony was excluded in the Brown Jordan International v. Carmicle case, again, cited in our briefs, in which the Court found Mr. Purcell's legal conclusions were a quote, inappropriate subject of expert opinion. So we're seeking to exclude him for doing the exact same things that Courts have excluded him for doing before.

Exclusion of testimony by an expert that a challenged statement was false or misleading is particularly appropriate in a securities case where one of the ultimate issues in the case is whether the statement is false or misleading. The Court in the SEC v. ITT Educational Services case, that's cited on page 60 of our opening brief held just that. That experts, quote, may not testify that the disclosures were misleading because the jury will make those determinations.

And, finally, one final point with regard to

Mr. Purcell's testimony, he opines on the applicable disclosure
standard.

As the Court held in the *ITT* case, a company's obligation to disclose information is governed by a standard and defined by the law. An expert testimony regarding the

standard encroaches on the Court's role of instructing the jury.

The Court in the ITT case made clear that an expert's opinion regarding whether defendants' complied with that standard is not appropriate. Yet here, Mr. Purcell improperly offers opinions on both the applicable disclosure standard and whether the defendants satisfied it.

Mr. Purcell opined that defendants are governed by a, quote, Full disclosure, close quote, standard, meaning they must -- and, again, I'm quoting -- quote, Tell everything. Let it all hang out.

That's a clear misstatement of the law. In TSC

Industries v. Northway, the Supreme Court specifically advised against using this full disclosure standard. The Supreme Court warned that if that standard was used, companies might -- again, this is a quote from Supreme Court -- The company might bury the shareholders in an avalanche of trivial information.

In the ITT case, the Court excluded opinions nearly identical to those offered here by Mr. Purcell. The expert in ITT advanced the same full disclosure standard and opined that the defendants did not achieve full disclosure. The Court excluded that testimony, explaining that it did not need an expert to set forth what defendants were legally obligated to disclose, and it was improper for an expert to opine regarding whether defendants complied with legal obligations.

I will speak very briefly about Dr. Nye and Mr. Clark. Those will be even briefer than the discussion about Mr. Purcell.

With regard to Dr. Nye. Dr. Nye gives opinions on section 14(e) loss causation and on section 10b-5 loss causation.

With regard to his 14(e) opinions, section 14(e) prohibits fraudulent, deceptive, and manipulative acts in connection with a tender offer. Where, as here, a tender offer fails determining what losses to investors were caused by the tender offer's failure requires evaluation of two things.

One, the chances that the tender offer would have been successful had the information that was allegedly concealed been known to the market. And two, the price at which the tender offer would have been completed, if it was completed at all, in the but-for world.

Dr. Nye lacked the expertise necessary to conduct these analyses. Dr. Nye admitted during his deposition that he is only, quote, Qualified to assess the definition of a tender offer and how it relates to the potential change of ownership which he believed was, quote, pretty straightforward. So he could testify he said about the definition of a tender offer. What is a tender offer.

But he testified that he, quote, Is not an expert in the legal and fine-tuned details of tender offers and does not,

quote, Get into the weeds on the subject. An expert is supposed to be getting into the weeds on the subject.

He testified that he has never published, taught, or taken courses on tender offers. No court has ever accepted him an expert on 14(e) claims. In light of these facts, it is unsurprising that Dr. Nye fails to identify a methodology to evaluate whether Mylan would have made the tender offer and, if so, at what price, if Mylan would have known the purported truth that defendants supposedly concealed.

Let me now turn briefly to Dr. Nye's section 10(b) analysis. Most significantly, Dr. Nye fails to disaggregate the effects of confounding information from his events study. For example, Dr. Nye should have treated the April 2016 news reports about Mr. Papa's departure to become the CEO of Valeant, and Mr. Hendrickson's appointment to take Mr. Papa's place as CEO of Perrigo, as confounding information unrelated to the fraud rather than as fraud-related information.

And on May 12, 2016 and August 10, 2016, the market learned that Perrigo's over-the-counter business, about which nothing is alleged in the complaint, Perrigo's over-the-counter business in the United States -- what's referred to as the CHC business in some of the papers -- is completely distinct from the Omega business or from the Rx pharmaceuticals business.

Yet on those dates, the company gave negative information about the over-the-counter CHC business, in

addition to the negative information about those other topics, and yet Dr. Nye -- as was alluded to by Mr. Harrod before -- assumes that the entirety of the price -- of the stock drop was due to the information that they allege in their complaint, and that none of it was due to the information about the CHC business. But under well-accepted methodology that even their expert accepts, he supposed to disaggregate the different factors.

Let me now turn very, very briefly to Mr. Clark.

Mr. Clark is the plaintiff's expert with regard to the Rx pricing. The fundamental reason why Mr. Clark's methodology is unreliable is that he fails to take into account that the markets for the drugs at issue are oligopolistic. During his deposition, Mr. Clark belatedly admitted that these markets are oligopolistic. Yet in his reports, Mr. Clark did not account for that fact. We're not saying, as the plaintiffs say in their papers, that he had to do a certain type of analysis.

We're saying that his failure to take into account the oligopolistic nature of the markets means that his methodology is just wrong.

He stated during his deposition, in trying to explain why he doesn't talk about oligopoly in his opening report at all, that he, quote, doesn't think it comes into play. But as Mr. Wareham discussed earlier, the Third Circuit has repeatedly made clear that whether a market is oligopolistic not only

comes into play, but it a critical factor in determining whether parallel price increases suggest collusion.

As Mr. Wareham explained in the Valspar, Chocolate, and Baby Foods cases, the Third Circuit has specifically rejected antitrust claims premised on parallel-pricing theory in oligopolistic markets. That is because as the Third Circuit held in Valspar, parallel pricing can only demonstrate price fixing in cases involving non-oligopolistic markets.

Mr. Clark's failure to take into account that the markets at issue here are oligopolistic means his methodology is unreliable. For example, Mr. Clark stated in his opening report that because for most of the studied drugs, quote, Competitors maintained actual pricing that was highly correlated for a substantial period following a large price increase that, quote, Such pricing suggests collusion; or at least the absence of vigorous price competition.

But the whole point is that highly correlated pricing for a substantial period of time is the parallel pricing that <code>Valspar</code> and all of the Third Circuit cases have said does not show collusion. So the fact that he is not in an oligopolistic market -- so the fact that Mr. Clark thinks it does show collusion and thinks that the fact it is an oligopolistic market does not come into play shows that his methodology is at odds with the way the Third Circuit thinks about the meaning of parallel pricing in an oligopolistic market.

2

3

4

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

In Concord Boat Corporation v. Brunswick Corp., the Eighth Circuit held that an expert's opinion, quote, should not have been admitted because it did not incorporate all aspects of the economic reality of the market and because it did not separate lawful from unlawful conduct. Because of the deficiencies in the foundation of the opinion, the expert's resulting conclusions were mere speculation, close quote. Similarly, in Williamson Oil v. Philip Morris, the Eleventh Circuit uphold the exclusion of testimony of an expert who, like Mr. Clark here, quote, Did not differentiate between legal and illegal pricing behavior and instead simply grouped both of these phenomena under the umbrella of illegal conclusive price fixing. The Court explained in that case, the Williamson case, that the expert's failure to, quote, Distinguish conscious parallelism from cartel behavior makes his subsequent opinion inadmissible as he finds inferences of collusion where the law finds none. The Court concluded that because of this failure, the expert's opinions, quote, Could not have aided a finder of fact to determine whether the behavior was or was not legal. Similarly, Mr. Clark finds inferences of collusion where the law finds none. For these reasons as well as the others discussed in our briefs, the Court should grant the Daubert motions and exclude the testimony of plaintiff's expert witnesses. Thank you, your Honor.

1 Thank you, Counsel. THE COURT: 2 MR. HARROD: Thank you, your Honor. I'll -- in view 3 of the time and the Court's extreme patience throughout today, 4 I will try to be as brief as I can be. 5 I want to recognize from the outset that it should 6 not -- we have many disagreements with the defendants' experts, 7 as we do on the merits of the case. We also respect that the 8 bar for both summary judgment and for excluding experts under 9 Daubert is very high. So we should not be misread as to 10 believing that we are ceding to any of the positions that they 11 espouse either on the merits or with respect to the expert 12 testimony. 13 So with that, I want to talk about the fact that the 14 defendants' identify purportedly, with respect to three of the 15 experts, methodological flaws that make their testimony 16 unreliable, but admissibility under Rule 702 does not require 17 that a Court agree with an expert or find her opinion's 18 convincing. It boils down to three requirements, that is 19 qualification, reliability and fit. They only challenge 20 qualification as to Dr. Nye. They challenged reliability as to 21 all three, and I don't believe the challenge fit as to any of 22 them. 23 And, largely, as on the merits of the summary judgment 24 motions, these reflect disagreements with our experts' 25 conclusions and to a lesser extent, they manifest as criticisms

of their methodologies.

But defendants' challenges are actually inconsistent with the Court here exercising the gatekeeping function to preclude offering these parties to the jury. Reliability does not require that expert opinion be supported by the best foundation, methodology, or research. That is from the Wojciechowski case, and the reliability standard requires that the experts' opinions rest on good grounds. Experts are granted wide latitude in determining what data is needed to reach a conclusion. These are all authorities that are cited in our briefs.

At this stage, the Court's role is not to determine whether the testimony is correct but only whether it falls outside the range where experts might reasonably differ. So the disagreements here don't reach that standard.

I'm going to start with Mr. Purcell.

He is an investment banker. He is offering the perspective of his profession on the structure and process of Perrigo's response and its opposition to Mylan's hostile tender offer and the importance of information related to plaintiff's allegations, the importance of the information that was provided to the investors in light of plaintiff's allegations. Those are complicated issues of disclosures and financial markets and a corporate transaction spanning a period of, I think, seven months or six months. The jurors will undoubtedly

benefit from Mr. Purcell's 50 years of experience in these matters and in describing why an investor would have looked at this information and what about that information would have been important.

Mr. Groner identified a few cases where Mr. Purcell had been excluded, but as we put forth in his CV, he was -- he's testified in over 200 cases. He served as an expert for both the Securities Exchange Commission and Department of Justice. His testimony here is reliable, and it fits the issues in the case.

The defendants concerns really here go to the weight or -- the weight of the evidence that's to be provided by Mr. Purcell, and he is not -- and I want to reiterate this and I will get into the specifics of the points that they touched on, he is not providing opinions on legal issues of materiality or conclusions regarding the state of mind of the defendants. He will not instruct the jury. Only your Honor will be able to instruct the jury in this case. Therefore, there is no basis to exclude Purcell's proffered opinions, which, as I said before, will be really helpful to the jury.

Regarding state of mind, Mr. Purcell is not testifying about the suggestive state of mind of any defendant. He is simply indicating -- and they criticize him for using the word known, and he is using that in the colloquial sense of this person received information and it was in their possession.

They knew it. He is not using that word as a basis for a legal conclusion as to someone's scienter, which, obviously, relates to their knowledge of facts that were misrepresented or hidden.

This kind of testimony is appropriate, and he is not, you know, he is not reaching a legal conclusion.

With respect to falsity, Purcell's purported testimony assumes that plaintiffs will establish falsely and the defendants statements were false and misleading. That is not his conclusion; that's an assumption. He is offering an opinion on the importance of that information to investors. Regarding disclosure standards, Mr. Purcell is not offering a legal definition or conclusion regarding those standards. His full disclosure standard is one of industry ethics. It's from the Library of Investment Banking, which is cited at Exhibit 138 at page 35.

He is describing the financial and investment importance of the information at issue. This is totally proper. Experts may opine on industry standards in their application of the facts. That is from the *Reilly v. Vivint Solar* case. We cite additional — that case and additional cases in our opposition at page 114.

Given these considerations and the ability to limit

Purcell's testimony to the extent it is necessary and for the

Court to instruct the jury at trial, there is absolutely no

basis to exclude his opinions under -- as unreliable under the

Daubert standard.

Moving on to Dr. Nye, we have offered Dr. Nye as an expert on loss causation and damages. He is -- just to talk about his qualifications -- because they have apparently come under scrutiny here -- he is an Ivy League-educated PhD economist. His academic and research credentials are unsalable, at least until today, and he has been accepted an expert in similar cases to offer similar testimony many times over.

Defendants limited challenge to Dr. Nye's qualification concern only his opinions on the tender offer. In our brief we cite, at 97, several cases showing Dr. Nye's qualifications here are adequate, in particular, because Dr. Nye possesses the skill or knowledge that is far greater than the average layman.

He is not opining that -- their criticism of him largely stems from the idea that he is not an expert in the legal mechanisms of tender offers. That's -- first of all, he is not. I'm not sure that that is an appropriate province for an expert to opine on anyway because those would be legal issues, and he is not opining on them.

He is opining on the subject of the economic impact of the tender offer and the causation, the likelihood that the tender offer would have been accepted in the absence of defendants' misrepresentations.

As an economist who studies public markets and looks at

cause and effect of information that reaches public markets and measuring that effect, Dr. Nye is undoubtedly qualified to testify on these subjects.

The fact that they only challenge him with respect to the tender offer based on the fact that he is not a person who says I am an expert in the legal structure of tender offers should be rejected.

Going to the reliability of his analysis under 14(a), they criticize him, essentially, for what I think is a disagreement between the parties in this case, and I think the plaintiffs obviously have the better argument, but I think at the end of the day what he is doing on the 14(e) claim is an analysis, that in the absence of the misrepresentations, the tender offer would have gone forward.

We set forth in our brief that Dr. Nye's 14(e) analysis builds upon the 10(b) analysis in this case, meaning that there were misrepresentations that were made to the investors, and he looked at very specific analyses to come to the conclusion that in the absence of the misreps the tender offer would have gone through. He looks at the number of share s that were tendered. He looks at the number of the shares that are now seeking a remedy based on the misrepresentations in connection with the tender offer, concludes that that amount of shares exceeds the 50 percent threshold and the tender offer would have gone through. He looks at analyst reports and commentary, and he

concludes, based on that and the fact that he finds that the consideration to be paid in the tender offer, provided an immediate economic benefit, that all of those things are sufficient to reach the conclusion that the tender offer would have gone through in the absence of the fraud. And so then he calculates on a nonspeculative basis how one would measure the damages there.

On the 10(b) side there are criticism -- and I talked about this in our argument about loss causation, so I will try not to repeat anything that I have said -- is, basically, that he doesn't disaggregate, that they say that there is this confounding unrelated information. Mr. Groner talked about the CHC Division, the over-the-counter division of Perrigo.

He didn't -- I think the words that were used is he assumes that that didn't affect the stock price. That is not true.

If you look at Dr. Nye's reports, he doesn't assume at all. He looks at the public information that is out there about the company, what the company said, what securities analysts who follow the company said, what news reports say. And he looks at that and says, I'm a professional economist. I'm going to look at this, and I can try to interpolate from that information what factors, what information that reached the market on a particular day changed the price of the stock.

For that day that they were talking about and the other

days they were talking about, it is not that he doesn't -- that he assumed he doesn't have to disaggregate. He reaches the conclusion based on that analytical process that he does not need to. So the idea that he should be excluded under Daubert for that has to be rejected.

Finally, I am going to touch on Mr. Clark for a few minutes.

The primary challenge that we heard about today is that he doesn't take properly into account the fact that the defendants have posited that Perrigo's generics business operated in an oligopolistic market. Whatever the analytical conclusions that are reached for that should not govern the process of whether or not his analysis and his conclusions are reliable because they are -- and, in fact, we would pose that Mr. Clark actually did consider and he did consider the fact that Perrigo's generics business operated in an oligopolistic market.

First of all, we need to be clear that the defendants themselves never described the market that they were operating in as a premise for what Mr. Clark was doing as an oligopoly. They never characterized that in any way.

They characterized it as competitive. They said the pricing would be flat to slightly up, which we have talked about that ad nauseam. I won't belabor it anymore, but while Mr. Clark does not use the term oligopolistic in his initial

2

3

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

report, his analysis concludes that the features of the market for generic topicals that we are talking about in this case are, in fact, the same ones that their experts and they point to as reflecting an oligopoly. He says -- and his report is This is at page 5 of his report -- the market for Exhibit 102. generic drugs and, in particular, topical generic drugs contains several structural elements that makes it conducive to anticompetitive behavior, including highly concentrated markets, pricing elasticity, fungible products among competitors, informal and formal mechanisms for dissemination of pricing in market share information among competitors. These are among the same characteristics that they say make the market for these products oligopolistic. Moreover, Clark did specifically consider the market report in his reply. And even when considering the defendants, what defendants referred to as oligopoly concluded that the evidence here demonstrates substantial indicia of collusion --(Reporter clarification.) MR. HARROD: So what he looked at there is he is basically saying, I accept that you may have an oligopoly here. I look at your pricing behavior and what happened with your products, and the oligopoly does not explain that. So he took into account the thing that the defendants say he did not. He looks at including -- the evidence that he

points to showed that the features -- or the actions that

Perrigo took are not explained by oligopoly include -- these are just a few examples -- that Sandoz, for one, admitted to engaging in anticompetitive conduct with Perrigo, including rigging bids and fixing prices. So that's one piece of evidence that exists in support of the conclusion that the behavior is not just explained by oligopoly.

Second one, evidence that Perrigo declined customer business or declined to bid for business to appease a competitor or to avoid taking market share, so that is the kind of behavior that exists in addition to an oligopoly that Perrigo engaged in. And despite -- and this is something that Mr. Silverman talked about. He looked at other markets where there were oligopolistic features, ophthalmic and injectable generic drugs also exhibit the same type of features the defendants point to. Those markets did not experience the same type of pricing actions and changes as did generic prices that, you know, Perrigo and its competitors were engaged in.

So I just want to make one point. The defendants' expert on the subject, Dr. -- I think he's a doctor -- Dr. Lackdawalla, he doesn't talk about Perrigo's public statements. He doesn't look at the record evidence. He doesn't talk about their actual practices.

He creates, basically, a spherical, you know, completely sterile universe where he can examine a lot of these features in an environment that doesn't include the evidence.

2

3

5

7

8

15

21

Dr. Clark's reports talk a lot about things that Perrigo He looks at the record, emails, deposition testimony, and analyzes that. Their expert does not do that. 4 So I feel like, if anything, Dr. Clark's report and conclusions are highly reliable and, in fact, more reliable 6 than the defendants' expert. The fact that Dr. Clark disagrees with their conclusions is not a basis to exclude him under Daubert. They talked about 9 the Williamson case. And here the difference is, and we --10 here Clark addresses the market structure, as I said, including 11 that it has these oligopolistic features, which is the 12 criticism in Williamson, and concludes that those structural 13 features cannot explain the price changes. 14 Your Honor, I'm going to go back to counsel table. I thank you very much for listening all day today and to 16 the courtroom staff for bearing with us. 17 Thank you. 18 Thank you, Counsel. THE COURT: MR. WAREHAM: Your Honor, one last thing, if I may? 19 20 THE COURT: One last thing. MR. WAREHAM: I want to thank the Court for your 22 courtesy and indulgence, and I want to thank your staff for all 23 the help with the equipment, all the patience. I certainly 24 want to thank the court deputy and probably most importantly, I 25 want to thank the court reporter because there are lot of fast

```
1
    talkers here, and it's been really quite a pleasure to be here.
 2
           Thank you all very much.
 3
             THE COURT: Counsel, thank you both, also, for your
 4
    cooperation because I understand with the transition. This is
 5
    a quite old case and justice delayed is justice denied, as my
 6
    judge used today tell me when I clerked a million years ago.
 7
    So we're going to endeavor to try and get this decision out to
 8
    you as soon as possible.
 9
           But I do want to commend you on the argument because you
10
    were able to synthesize 152 pages of facts and thousands of
11
    pages of documents and, basically, aid us to point us in the
12
    right direction in terms of how to decide this.
13
           I do remember my days on the other side over there as
14
    well, so I appreciate your efforts, and thank you.
15
                             Thank you, your Honor.
             MR. SILVERMAN:
16
             THE COURTROOM DEPUTY: All rise.
17
         (Whereupon the proceedings are adjourned at 4:43 p.m.)
18
19
             FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
20
21
             I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript
22
    from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
23
24
    /S/ Melissa A. Mormile RDR, CCR, CRCR
                                                  4/7/2022
25
    Official Court Reporter
                                                  Date
```

\$	111:25, 178:1, 195:5	111:25, 143:15	<b>1:30</b> [1] - 94:10	131:8, 132:17,
Ψ	<b>10b5-1</b> [4] - 69:25,	14,000-page [1] -		132:19, 132:21,
<b>\$140</b> [1] - 107:11	71:7, 71:15, 174:19	94:23	2	132:22, 133:14,
<b>\$140.53</b> [1] - 142:12	<b>10K</b> [1] - 84:8	<b>140,000</b> [1] - 123:14		141:17, 141:19,
\$150 [3] - 70:10,	<b>10KT</b> [1] - 84:10	<b>1400</b> [1] - 34:3	<b>2</b> [9] - 17:8, 63:23,	142:11, 146:15,
144:2, 174:9	<b>10Q</b> [1] - 84:8	<b>14th</b> [1] - 170:1	63:24, 80:10, 80:14,	151:24, 169:16,
<b>\$174</b> [3] - 141:18,	<b>10th</b> [1] - 158:20	<b>15</b> [4] - 55:25, 72:20,	96:1, 96:4, 167:18	170:3, 174:3,
141:25, 142:11	<b>11</b> [8] <b>-</b> 25:3, 25:24,	105:17, 132:17	<b>2.3</b> [1] - 141:15	178:20, 179:9,
\$174.36 <sub>[1]</sub> - 141:14	25:25, 26:11, 26:20,	<b>150</b> [2] <b>-</b> 34:4, 144:3	<b>20</b> [4] - 77:11, 92:17,	187:9, 187:10,
<b>\$21</b> [1] - 123:12	100:23, 175:24,	<b>150</b> [2] - 34.4, 144.3	103:5, 175:5	187:17, 190:7,
<b>\$21</b> [1] - 123.12 <b>\$241</b> [1] - 74:13	181:3	<b>158</b> [2] - 121:11,	<b>20,000</b> [1] - 123:14	190:11
	<b>11,000</b> [1] - 71:3		<b>200</b> [3] - 2:21, 97:21,	<b>2016</b> [26] - 23:19, 36:3,
<b>\$33.82</b> [2] - 142:13,		124:20	202:7	38:13, 48:11, 48:24,
142:17	<b>11,490</b> [1] - 71:4	<b>15th</b> [1] - 10:25	<b>2000</b> [1] - 45:19	60:7, 66:24, 67:10,
<b>\$33.86</b> [1] - 144:25	<b>110</b> [1] - 107:13	<b>16</b> [3] - 73:2, 73:9,	<b>2000</b> [1] - 40:10	80:21, 84:10, 88:8,
<b>\$42</b> [1] - 74:13	<b>114</b> [1] - 203:21	123:4	<b>2006</b> [1] - 2.17 <b>2003</b> [1] - 147:10	104:3, 113:7,
<b>\$63</b> [6] - 44:22, 44:25,	<b>116</b> [1] - 116:2	<b>160</b> [2] - 127:2, 135:18	<b>2005</b> [1] - 147:10	113:11, 151:12,
45:1, 45:17, 178:2,	<b>11:03</b> [1] - 5:3	<b>161</b> [2] - 4:5, 115:21		151:23, 156:8,
178:8	<b>12</b> [13] - 25:3, 25:24,	<b>162</b> [1] - 98:13	<b>2006</b> [1] - 66:24	156:14, 156:16,
<b>\$75</b> [1] - 141:15	25:25, 26:12, 74:6,	<b>164</b> [1] - 99:6	<b>2008</b> [2] - 192:8,	158:20, 165:6,
	80:5, 102:10,	<b>166</b> [3] - 4:6, 122:16,	192:12	174:3, 190:6,
/	103:16, 128:25,	134:16	<b>2010</b> [3] - 17:5, 25:3,	196:13, 196:18
	132:11, 181:4,	<b>167</b> [2] - 107:4, 122:16	112:13	<b>2017</b> [3] - 158:21,
/ <b>S</b> [1] - 211:24	186:3, 196:18	<b>169</b> [1] - 107:13	<b>2011</b> [3] - 17:5, 25:3,	158:24
	<b>120</b> [3] <b>-</b> 95:16,	<b>17</b> [4] <b>-</b> 91:2, 151:1,	148:25	
0	115:10, 115:14	151:5, 151:11	<b>2012</b> [1] - 115:2	<b>2018</b> [7] - 14:18,
	<b>124</b> [1] - 129:1	<b>17.7</b> [1] - 156:25	<b>2013</b> [5] - 74:12, 76:8,	24:25, 29:24, 35:16,
<b>07068</b> [1] <b>-</b> 1:19	<b>125</b> [1] - 3:4	<b>170</b> [1] - 122:16	112:13, 112:15,	39:5, 68:19, 176:2
<b>07095</b> [1] - 2:12	<b>1251</b> [1] - 2:8	<b>171</b> [1] - 134:7	126:24	<b>2019</b> [3] - 29:13,
<b>07101</b> [1] - 1:11	<b>12:26</b> [1] - 94:2	<b>172</b> [1] - 124:24	<b>2014</b> [13] - 29:5, 74:6,	39:16, 175:24
<b>0764</b> [1] <b>-</b> 39:17	<b>12:27</b> [1] - 94:10	<b>174</b> [1] - 178:5	74:12, 76:8, 85:23,	<b>2020</b> [2] - 29:13, 88:24
	<b>12th</b> [3] - 61:5, 61:9,	<b>175</b> [1] - 4:4	98:3, 98:10, 108:25,	<b>2021</b> [4] - 38:1, 43:2,
1	158:20	17th [3] - 29:14, 91:7,	121:13, 121:15,	43:4, 58:9
	<b>13</b> [11] - 71:5, 71:25,	100:3	121:18, 131:25,	<b>2022</b> [4] - 1:12, 26:14,
<b>1</b> [4] <b>-</b> 136:19, 178:18,	84:9, 107:7, 113:1,	<b>17TH</b> [1] - 2:17	132:11	186:2, 186:4
183:16, 184:3	132:17, 141:17,	<b>18</b> [5] <b>-</b> 68:18, 75:2,	<b>2015</b> [88] - 10:11, 11:1,	<b>206</b> [2] - 102:4, 124:25
<b>1.09</b> [1] - 29:4	141:19, 142:11,	100:24, 106:1,	35:15, 36:2, 36:21,	<b>2081859</b> [1] - 39:5
<b>10</b> [9] <b>-</b> 26:20, 38:1,	170:3, 186:3	156:25	37:15, 38:3, 38:14,	<b>20A</b> [1] - 8:17
45:24, 60:7, 87:9,	<b>13,000</b> [1] - 67:2	<b>180</b> [2] - 101:2, 187:20	45:20, 55:25, 59:1,	<b>20th</b> [1] - 106:17
146:15, 152:15,	<b>13.6</b> [1] - 99:16	<b>181</b> [2] - 108:22, 109:4	59:14, 60:4, 60:6,	<b>21</b> [7] <b>-</b> 36:2, 37:15,
175:4, 196:18	<b>138</b> [1] - 203:15	<b>182</b> [2] - 4:7, 105:25	60:20, 69:24, 70:9,	57:15, 57:16, 71:9,
<b>10(b</b> [4] - 147:25,	<b>139</b> [1] - 4:8	<b>183</b> [2] - 113:8, 132:20	70:12, 70:25, 71:5,	77:20, 85:1
196:10, 205:16,	<b>13th</b> [2] - 78:18, 142:8	<b>18448</b> [1] - 110:9	79:25, 80:5, 80:10,	<b>212</b> [1] - 102:13
206:8	<b>14</b> [8] <b>-</b> 46:1, 76:20,	<b>188</b> [1] - 4:8	80:14, 84:7, 84:8,	<b>213</b> [3] - 103:8, 106:4,
<b>10,900</b> [1] <b>-</b> 66:25	76:21, 76:22, 87:23,	<b>189</b> [2] - 39:15, 39:17	84:9, 85:1, 85:11,	106:13
<b>100</b> [4] <b>-</b> 49:23,	104:8, 169:16, 186:4	<b>18th</b> [4] - 106:1,	86:12, 87:9, 87:23,	<b>216</b> [1] - 106:19
124:22, 127:17,	<b>14(a</b> [1] - 205:8	151:23, 153:1,	91:2, 92:8, 92:13,	<b>218</b> [1] - 39:15
142:10	<b>14(e</b> [30] - 43:19,	151.25, 155.1,	96:14, 98:11, 98:24,	<b>21st</b> [3] - 89:20, 154:4,
<b>100,000</b> [1] - 137:4	43:23, 44:16, 44:17,	153.25 <b>19</b> [6] - 53:7, 75:10,	99:13, 99:15, 99:22,	158:6
<b>10004</b> [1] - 3:4	47:4, 47:16, 47:22,	75:22, 75:23, 76:8,	100:24, 102:10,	<b>22</b> [10] - 37:14, 48:11,
<b>10016</b> [1] - 2:4	47:24, 48:2, 139:11,	106:15	103:5, 103:16,	48:23, 55:25, 78:4,
<b>10020</b> [1] - 2:9	139:17, 140:4,	106.15 <b>191</b> [1] - 4:11	103:24, 104:8,	85:3, 89:3, 119:24,
<b>10166</b> [1] - 2:22	140:5, 178:4,	<b>191</b> [1] <b>-</b> 4.11 <b>192</b> [1] <b>-</b> 99:10	105:5, 105:17,	131:8, 172:5
<b>102</b> [3] - 121:10,	178:11, 178:14,	<b>192</b> [1] <b>-</b> 99.10 <b>195</b> [2] <b>-</b> 102:24,	106:1, 106:5,	<b>22nd</b> [5] - 56:7, 61:21,
125:14, 208:5	178:19, 179:12,	187:21	106:15, 107:7,	62:2, 63:21, 126:24
<b>107</b> [1] - 107:13	189:14, 189:16,		107:17, 108:2,	<b>23</b> [7] - 24:25, 60:4,
<b>10:03</b> [1] - 1:12	189:18, 189:25,	<b>196</b> [1] - 107:12	112:13, 112:15,	60:6, 78:17, 87:15,
<b>10:25</b> [1] - 159:9	190:5, 195:5, 195:7,	<b>197</b> [1] - 187:25	113:1, 113:6,	99:22, 108:16
<b>10b-5</b> [11] - 8:4, 8:15,	196:5, 205:12,	<b>199</b> [1] - 4:12	113:13, 113:15,	<b>231</b> [1] - 116:17
47:24, 48:1, 48:10,	205:15	<b>1999</b> [1] - 12:15	113:17, 114:17,	<b>236</b> [1] - 138:14
49:2, 55:4, 56:17,	<b>14(e)</b> [3] - 8:15,	<b>19th</b> [1] - 89:18	128:25, 130:19,	<b>238</b> [1] - 105:20
	(-) (-)			

<b>23rd</b> [9] - 60:11,	122:14, 134:10	<b>49</b> [2] - 91:1, 98:14	86:12, 105:5	accept [9] - 104:2,
60:17, 61:12, 63:19,	30-minute [1] - 92:15	<b>4:43</b> [1] - 211:17	<b>8(A)3</b> [1] - 118:4	104:14, 104:15,
103:13, 126:24,	<b>300</b> [2] - 123:8, 127:24	<b>4s</b> [1] - 107:11	<b>80</b> [1] - 126:1	114:1, 121:24,
165:4, 165:7, 165:14	<b>309</b> [1] - 104:10	4th [1] - 38:1	<b>800</b> [3] - 34:3, 134:21,	136:5, 184:24,
<b>24</b> [3] - 45:19, 45:20,	<b>30th</b> [7] - 57:20, 58:14,	-այլյ - JO. I	163:23	188:13, 208:20
<b>24</b> [3] - 45.19, 45.20, 79:15		_		acceptable [2] -
	58:15, 60:16, 85:3,	5	<b>801</b> [2] - 2:17, 118:2	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
<b>241</b> [3] - 113:17,	85:20	F 20:2 F4:20	<b>803</b> [2] - 118:4, 120:7	190:19, 190:20
130:19, 132:22	<b>31</b> [5] <b>-</b> 83:10, 84:6,	<b>5</b> [9] <b>-</b> 36:3, 51:20,	<b>803(8</b> [4] - 23:10,	acceptance [1] -
<b>242</b> [2] - 113:12,	108:16, 123:6, 170:2	67:24, 79:25, 80:21,	23:11, 23:15, 23:21	140:11
132:20	<b>33</b> [1] - 85:2	84:7, 103:24,	<b>803(A)3</b> [1] - 120:14	accepted [4] - 196:4,
<b>243</b> [2] - 114:15,	<b>334</b> [1] - 118:14	130:19, 208:5	<b>83</b> [2] - 99:10, 104:4	197:6, 204:7, 204:23
132:23	<b>34</b> [3] - 36:23, 85:10	<b>5.8</b> [1] - 154:13	<b>84</b> [1] - 103:4	accepts [2] - 27:21,
<b>244</b> [2] - 114:15,	<b>35</b> [4] <b>-</b> 85:20, 86:6,	<b>50</b> [13] - 1:11, 4:5,	<b>842</b> [1] - 116:17	197:7
132:23	98:20, 203:15	17:21, 17:24, 91:6,	<b>87</b> [1] - 141:7	access [1] - 70:1
<b>245</b> [2] - 113:15,	<b>35-plus</b> [1] - 66:17	141:22, 142:2,	<b>88</b> [1] - 119:25	accomplish [1] - 65:7
132:22	<b>36</b> [2] <b>-</b> 86:6, 146:17	143:16, 143:19,		according [9] - 15:5,
<b>246</b> [2] - 114:15,		143:21, 202:1,	<b>8F</b> [1] - 38:1	28:6, 62:18, 98:1,
	<b>360</b> [1] <b>-</b> 98:6	205:24	8th [3] - 60:21, 61:5,	
132:23	<b>3601229</b> [1] - 68:19		61:11	103:8, 103:22,
<b>25</b> [5] <b>-</b> 70:25, 71:11,	<b>365</b> [1] - 117:22	<b>500</b> [2] - 123:8, 181:25		109:1, 159:8, 187:15
84:9, 151:12, 156:8	<b>37</b> [3] - 63:21, 87:7,	<b>51</b> [1] - 91:12	9	accordingly [1] -
<b>253</b> [1] - 121:22	87:15	<b>52</b> [1] - 120:8		160:3
<b>259</b> [1] - 97:22	<b>371</b> [1] - 105:12	<b>53</b> [2] <b>-</b> 99:19, 121:5	<b>9</b> [3] - 103:17, 103:20,	account [10] - 13:22,
25th [3] - 156:13,	<b>38</b> [1] <b>-</b> 87:23	<b>55</b> [9] <b>-</b> 81:3, 81:4,	151:1	49:3, 121:16, 158:8,
158:9, 158:13	<b>382</b> [1] - 117:22	81:7, 81:8, 81:14,	<b>9.8</b> [1] - 69:12	197:12, 197:15,
<b>26</b> [2] - 80:14, 88:8	<b>386</b> [3] - 102:16,	82:5, 91:25, 171:7,	<b>9.9</b> [1] - 150:25	197:18, 198:9,
<b>269</b> [1] - 127:15		172:3	<b>90</b> [3] - 34:5, 77:14,	207:9, 208:23
	169:12, 169:13	<b>56</b> [3] - 81:4, 96:23,		accounting [14] -
<b>27</b> [5] - 149:7, 150:9,	<b>39</b> [2] <b>-</b> 35:13, 88:7	188:18	126:1	59:2, 59:6, 59:10,
171:5, 172:25, 176:2	<b>390</b> [2] <b>-</b> 103:18,		<b>96</b> [2] - 4:7, 125:16	
<b>271</b> [3] - 73:2, 73:6,	103:23	<b>58</b> [1] - 192:3	<b>97</b> [1] - 204:12	98:22, 99:1, 101:22,
73:9	<b>397</b> [1] - 105:3	<b>59</b> [1] - 192:3	973)776-7710 [1] -	103:7, 103:9, 104:7,
<b>272</b> [3] - 74:4, 132:13	<b>3:18</b> [2] - 161:15,	<b>592</b> [1] - 38:1	1:25	104:25, 105:14,
	• · · • [=] · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·			400 0 400 40
<b>276</b> [1] - 133:3	161:18	<b>5th</b> [2] - 78:4, 170:14	99 [1] - 2:12	106:3, 109:16,
	161:18			187:12
<b>276</b> [1] - 133:3	161:18 <b>3:25</b> [1] - 161:15	5th [2] - 78:4, 170:14	99 [1] - 2:12	187:12 <b>accretive</b> [17] - 36:10,
<b>276</b> [1] - 133:3 <b>278</b> [1] - 132:8 <b>27th</b> [1] - 62:10	161:18 <b>3:25</b> [1] - 161:15 <b>3:26</b> [1] - 161:18			187:12
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15,	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3,		99 [1] - 2:12	187:12 <b>accretive</b> [17] - 36:10,
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25	161:18  3:25 <sub>[1]</sub> - 161:15  3:26 <sub>[1]</sub> - 161:18  3rd <sub>[4]</sub> - 159:3,  159:14, 159:15,	6	99 [1] - 2:12  A  a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4	187:12 <b>accretive</b> [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1,
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3,	<b>6 6</b> [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12	99 [1] - 2:12  A  a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4 ability [3] - 37:20,	187:12 accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19,
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7 289 [1] - 109:21	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21	<b>6 6 6 3 107:12 60 4 1-74:12, 101:1,</b>	99 [1] - 2:12  A  a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4 ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24,
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7 289 [1] - 109:21 28th [1] - 71:7	161:18  3:25 <sub>[1]</sub> - 161:15  3:26 <sub>[1]</sub> - 161:18  3rd <sub>[4]</sub> - 159:3,  159:14, 159:15,	<b>6 6</b> [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 <b>60</b> [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17	99 [1] - 2:12  A  a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4 ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22 able [7] - 91:17, 98:19,	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7 289 [1] - 109:21 28th [1] - 71:7 29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8,	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4	99 [1] - 2:12  A  a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4 ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22 able [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15,	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22,
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7 289 [1] - 109:21 28th [1] - 71:7 29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8, 179:9	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  4 4 [1] - 11:1	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24	<b>A</b> a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4  ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22 able [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17,	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19,
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7 289 [1] - 109:21 28th [1] - 71:7 29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8,	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24 6473 [1] - 186:3	<b>A</b> a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4  ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22 able [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17, 211:10	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19, 72:4, 86:7, 91:5,
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7 289 [1] - 109:21 28th [1] - 71:7 29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8, 179:9	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  4 4 [1] - 11:1	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24 6473 [1] - 186:3 65 [2] - 4:6, 95:17	<b>A a.m</b> [2] - 1:12, 5:4 <b>ability</b> [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22 <b>able</b> [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17, 211:10 <b>ably</b> [2] - 9:11, 51:20	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19, 72:4, 86:7, 91:5, 115:16, 119:21
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7 289 [1] - 109:21 28th [1] - 71:7 29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8, 179:9 292 [2] - 45:20, 137:9	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  4 4 [1] - 11:1 4/7/2022 [1] - 211:24	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24 6473 [1] - 186:3 65 [2] - 4:6, 95:17 662 [1] - 118:14	<b>A</b> a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4  ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22 able [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17, 211:10	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19, 72:4, 86:7, 91:5, 115:16, 119:21 accurately [2] - 90:16,
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7 289 [1] - 109:21 28th [1] - 71:7 29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8, 179:9 292 [2] - 45:20, 137:9 295 [2] - 114:15,	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  4 4 [1] - 11:1 4/7/2022 [1] - 211:24 40 [2] - 89:1, 143:8	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24 6473 [1] - 186:3 65 [2] - 4:6, 95:17	<b>A a.m</b> [2] - 1:12, 5:4 <b>ability</b> [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22 <b>able</b> [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17, 211:10 <b>ably</b> [2] - 9:11, 51:20	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19, 72:4, 86:7, 91:5, 115:16, 119:21 accurately [2] - 90:16, 137:7
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7 289 [1] - 109:21 28th [1] - 71:7 29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8, 179:9 292 [2] - 45:20, 137:9 295 [2] - 114:15, 132:23 299 [1] - 107:16	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  4  4 [1] - 11:1 4/7/2022 [1] - 211:24 40 [2] - 89:1, 143:8 402 [2] - 106:19, 118:2 404 [1] - 118:2	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24 6473 [1] - 186:3 65 [2] - 4:6, 95:17 662 [1] - 118:14	<b>A a.m</b> [2] - 1:12, 5:4 <b>ability</b> [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22 <b>able</b> [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17, 211:10 <b>ably</b> [2] - 9:11, 51:20 <b>above-entitled</b> [1] -	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19, 72:4, 86:7, 91:5, 115:16, 119:21 accurately [2] - 90:16,
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7 289 [1] - 109:21 28th [1] - 71:7 29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8, 179:9 292 [2] - 45:20, 137:9 295 [2] - 114:15, 132:23 299 [1] - 107:16 2:16-cv-02805-JXN-	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  4  4 [1] - 11:1 4/7/2022 [1] - 211:24 40 [2] - 89:1, 143:8 402 [2] - 106:19, 118:2 404 [1] - 118:2 409 [1] - 108:4	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24 6473 [1] - 186:3 65 [2] - 4:6, 95:17 662 [1] - 118:14 684169 [1] - 26:14	99 [1] - 2:12  A  a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4  ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22  able [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17, 211:10  ably [2] - 9:11, 51:20  above-entitled [1] - 211:22	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19, 72:4, 86:7, 91:5, 115:16, 119:21 accurately [2] - 90:16, 137:7
276 [1] - 133:3  278 [1] - 132:8  27th [1] - 62:10  28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15,  172:25  284 [1] - 127:7  289 [1] - 109:21  28th [1] - 71:7  29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8,  179:9  292 [2] - 45:20, 137:9  295 [2] - 114:15,  132:23  299 [1] - 107:16  2:16-cv-02805-JXN-  LDW [1] - 1:4	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  4  4 [1] - 11:1 4/7/2022 [1] - 211:24 40 [2] - 89:1, 143:8 402 [2] - 106:19, 118:2 404 [1] - 118:2 409 [1] - 108:4 41 [1] - 89:16	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24 6473 [1] - 186:3 65 [2] - 4:6, 95:17 662 [1] - 118:14 684169 [1] - 26:14 69 [1] - 133:12	<b>A</b> a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4  ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22  able [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17, 211:10  ably [2] - 9:11, 51:20  above-entitled [1] - 211:22  abrupt [4] - 123:1,	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19, 72:4, 86:7, 91:5, 115:16, 119:21 accurately [2] - 90:16, 137:7 accused [3] - 66:13,
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7 289 [1] - 109:21 28th [1] - 71:7 29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8, 179:9 292 [2] - 45:20, 137:9 295 [2] - 114:15, 132:23 299 [1] - 107:16 2:16-cv-02805-JXN- LDW [1] - 1:4 2nd [4] - 118:14,	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  4  4 [1] - 11:1 4/7/2022 [1] - 211:24 40 [2] - 89:1, 143:8 402 [2] - 106:19, 118:2 404 [1] - 118:2 409 [1] - 108:4 41 [1] - 89:16 410 [1] - 107:24	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24 6473 [1] - 186:3 65 [2] - 4:6, 95:17 662 [1] - 118:14 684169 [1] - 26:14	<b>A</b> a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4  ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22  able [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17, 211:10  ably [2] - 9:11, 51:20  above-entitled [1] - 211:22  abrupt [4] - 123:1, 123:9, 123:19, 126:17	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19, 72:4, 86:7, 91:5, 115:16, 119:21 accurately [2] - 90:16, 137:7 accused [3] - 66:13, 93:10, 164:3
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7 289 [1] - 109:21 28th [1] - 71:7 29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8, 179:9 292 [2] - 45:20, 137:9 295 [2] - 114:15, 132:23 299 [1] - 107:16 2:16-cv-02805-JXN- LDW [1] - 1:4 2nd [4] - 118:14, 159:14, 159:15,	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  4  4 [1] - 11:1 4/7/2022 [1] - 211:24 40 [2] - 89:1, 143:8 402 [2] - 106:19, 118:2 404 [1] - 118:2 409 [1] - 108:4 41 [1] - 89:16 410 [1] - 107:24 42 [1] - 89:16	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24 6473 [1] - 186:3 65 [2] - 4:6, 95:17 662 [1] - 118:14 684169 [1] - 26:14 69 [1] - 133:12	99 [1] - 2:12  A  a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4  ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22  able [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17, 211:10  ably [2] - 9:11, 51:20  above-entitled [1] - 211:22  abrupt [4] - 123:1, 123:9, 123:19, 126:17  absence [10] - 14:12,	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19, 72:4, 86:7, 91:5, 115:16, 119:21 accurately [2] - 90:16, 137:7 accused [3] - 66:13, 93:10, 164:3 achieve [3] - 135:1, 155:16, 194:21
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7 289 [1] - 109:21 28th [1] - 71:7 29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8, 179:9 292 [2] - 45:20, 137:9 295 [2] - 114:15, 132:23 299 [1] - 107:16 2:16-cv-02805-JXN- LDW [1] - 1:4 2nd [4] - 118:14,	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  4 4 [1] - 11:1 4/7/2022 [1] - 211:24 40 [2] - 89:1, 143:8 402 [2] - 106:19, 118:2 404 [1] - 118:2 409 [1] - 108:4 41 [1] - 89:16 410 [1] - 107:24 42 [1] - 89:16 43 [5] - 89:16, 89:17,	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24 6473 [1] - 186:3 65 [2] - 4:6, 95:17 662 [1] - 118:14 684169 [1] - 26:14 69 [1] - 133:12  7 7 [3] - 1:12, 4:4, 51:25	<b>A</b> a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4  ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22  able [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17, 211:10  ably [2] - 9:11, 51:20  above-entitled [1] - 211:22  abrupt [4] - 123:1, 123:9, 123:19, 126:17  absence [10] - 14:12, 31:24, 72:1, 140:10,	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19, 72:4, 86:7, 91:5, 115:16, 119:21 accurately [2] - 90:16, 137:7 accused [3] - 66:13, 93:10, 164:3 achieve [3] - 135:1, 155:16, 194:21 achieved [3] - 143:24,
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7 289 [1] - 109:21 28th [1] - 71:7 29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8, 179:9 292 [2] - 45:20, 137:9 295 [2] - 114:15, 132:23 299 [1] - 107:16 2:16-cv-02805-JXN- LDW [1] - 1:4 2nd [4] - 118:14, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  4 4 [1] - 11:1 4/7/2022 [1] - 211:24 40 [2] - 89:1, 143:8 402 [2] - 106:19, 118:2 404 [1] - 118:2 409 [1] - 108:4 41 [1] - 89:16 410 [1] - 107:24 42 [1] - 89:16 43 [5] - 89:16, 89:17, 89:18, 90:6, 110:10	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24 6473 [1] - 186:3 65 [2] - 4:6, 95:17 662 [1] - 118:14 684169 [1] - 26:14 69 [1] - 133:12  7 7 [3] - 1:12, 4:4, 51:25 70 [2] - 21:18, 63:22	A  a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4  ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22  able [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17, 211:10  ably [2] - 9:11, 51:20  above-entitled [1] - 211:22  abrupt [4] - 123:1, 123:9, 123:19, 126:17  absence [10] - 14:12, 31:24, 72:1, 140:10, 144:8, 198:16,	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19, 72:4, 86:7, 91:5, 115:16, 119:21 accurately [2] - 90:16, 137:7 accused [3] - 66:13, 93:10, 164:3 achieve [3] - 135:1, 155:16, 194:21 achieved [3] - 143:24, 144:25, 183:19
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7 289 [1] - 109:21 28th [1] - 71:7 29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8, 179:9 292 [2] - 45:20, 137:9 295 [2] - 114:15, 132:23 299 [1] - 107:16 2:16-cv-02805-JXN- LDW [1] - 1:4 2nd [4] - 118:14, 159:14, 159:15,	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  4  4 [1] - 11:1 4/7/2022 [1] - 211:24 40 [2] - 89:1, 143:8 402 [2] - 106:19, 118:2 404 [1] - 118:2 409 [1] - 108:4 41 [1] - 89:16 410 [1] - 107:24 42 [1] - 89:16 43 [5] - 89:16, 89:17, 89:18, 90:6, 110:10 430 [1] - 178:17	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24 6473 [1] - 186:3 65 [2] - 4:6, 95:17 662 [1] - 118:14 684169 [1] - 26:14 69 [1] - 133:12  7 7 [3] - 1:12, 4:4, 51:25 70 [2] - 21:18, 63:22 700 [3] - 122:19,	<b>A</b> a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4  ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22  able [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17, 211:10  ably [2] - 9:11, 51:20  above-entitled [1] - 211:22  abrupt [4] - 123:1, 123:9, 123:19, 126:17  absence [10] - 14:12, 31:24, 72:1, 140:10, 144:8, 198:16, 204:23, 205:13,	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19, 72:4, 86:7, 91:5, 115:16, 119:21 accurately [2] - 90:16, 137:7 accused [3] - 66:13, 93:10, 164:3 achieve [3] - 135:1, 155:16, 194:21 achieved [3] - 143:24, 144:25, 183:19 acknowledge [2] -
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7 289 [1] - 109:21 28th [1] - 71:7 29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8, 179:9 292 [2] - 45:20, 137:9 295 [2] - 114:15, 132:23 299 [1] - 107:16 2:16-cv-02805-JXN- LDW [1] - 1:4 2nd [4] - 118:14, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  4 4 [1] - 11:1 4/7/2022 [1] - 211:24 40 [2] - 89:1, 143:8 402 [2] - 106:19, 118:2 404 [1] - 118:2 409 [1] - 108:4 41 [1] - 89:16 410 [1] - 107:24 42 [1] - 89:16 43 [5] - 89:16, 89:17, 89:18, 90:6, 110:10	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24 6473 [1] - 186:3 65 [2] - 4:6, 95:17 662 [1] - 118:14 684169 [1] - 26:14 69 [1] - 133:12  7 7 [3] - 1:12, 4:4, 51:25 70 [2] - 21:18, 63:22 700 [3] - 122:19, 123:8, 127:24	A  a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4  ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22  able [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17, 211:10  ably [2] - 9:11, 51:20  above-entitled [1] - 211:22  abrupt [4] - 123:1, 123:9, 123:19, 126:17  absence [10] - 14:12, 31:24, 72:1, 140:10, 144:8, 198:16, 204:23, 205:13, 205:19, 206:5	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19, 72:4, 86:7, 91:5, 115:16, 119:21 accurately [2] - 90:16, 137:7 accused [3] - 66:13, 93:10, 164:3 achieve [3] - 135:1, 155:16, 194:21 achieved [3] - 143:24, 144:25, 183:19 acknowledge [2] - 38:5, 48:3
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7 289 [1] - 109:21 28th [1] - 71:7 29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8, 179:9 292 [2] - 45:20, 137:9 295 [2] - 114:15, 132:23 299 [1] - 107:16 2:16-cv-02805-JXN- LDW [1] - 1:4 2nd [4] - 118:14, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  4  4 [1] - 11:1 4/7/2022 [1] - 211:24 40 [2] - 89:1, 143:8 402 [2] - 106:19, 118:2 404 [1] - 118:2 409 [1] - 108:4 41 [1] - 89:16 410 [1] - 107:24 42 [1] - 89:16 43 [5] - 89:16, 89:17, 89:18, 90:6, 110:10 430 [1] - 178:17	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24 6473 [1] - 186:3 65 [2] - 4:6, 95:17 662 [1] - 118:14 684169 [1] - 26:14 69 [1] - 133:12  7 7 [3] - 1:12, 4:4, 51:25 70 [2] - 21:18, 63:22 700 [3] - 122:19, 123:8, 127:24 702 [2] - 191:9, 200:16	A  a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4  ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22  able [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17, 211:10  ably [2] - 9:11, 51:20  above-entitled [1] - 211:22  abrupt [4] - 123:1, 123:9, 123:19, 126:17  absence [10] - 14:12, 31:24, 72:1, 140:10, 144:8, 198:16, 204:23, 205:13, 205:19, 206:5 absolutely [10] -	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19, 72:4, 86:7, 91:5, 115:16, 119:21 accurately [2] - 90:16, 137:7 accused [3] - 66:13, 93:10, 164:3 achieve [3] - 135:1, 155:16, 194:21 achieved [3] - 143:24, 144:25, 183:19 acknowledge [2] - 38:5, 48:3 acknowledges [1] -
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7 289 [1] - 109:21 28th [1] - 71:7 29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8, 179:9 292 [2] - 45:20, 137:9 295 [2] - 114:15, 132:23 299 [1] - 107:16 2:16-cv-02805-JXN- LDW [1] - 1:4 2nd [4] - 118:14, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  4  4 [1] - 11:1 4/7/2022 [1] - 211:24 40 [2] - 89:1, 143:8 402 [2] - 106:19, 118:2 404 [1] - 118:2 409 [1] - 108:4 41 [1] - 89:16 410 [1] - 107:24 42 [1] - 89:16 43 [5] - 89:16, 89:17, 89:18, 90:6, 110:10 430 [1] - 178:17 44 [3] - 110:10, 121:5, 170:11	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24 6473 [1] - 186:3 65 [2] - 4:6, 95:17 662 [1] - 118:14 684169 [1] - 26:14 69 [1] - 133:12  7 7 [3] - 1:12, 4:4, 51:25 70 [2] - 21:18, 63:22 700 [3] - 122:19, 123:8, 127:24 702 [2] - 191:9, 200:16 703 [1] - 117:14	A  a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4  ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22  able [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17, 211:10  ably [2] - 9:11, 51:20  above-entitled [1] - 211:22  abrupt [4] - 123:1, 123:9, 123:19, 126:17  absence [10] - 14:12, 31:24, 72:1, 140:10, 144:8, 198:16, 204:23, 205:13, 205:19, 206:5  absolutely [10] - 39:25, 42:7, 45:3,	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19, 72:4, 86:7, 91:5, 115:16, 119:21 accurately [2] - 90:16, 137:7 accused [3] - 66:13, 93:10, 164:3 achieve [3] - 135:1, 155:16, 194:21 achieved [3] - 143:24, 144:25, 183:19 acknowledge [2] - 38:5, 48:3 acknowledges [1] - 27:21
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7 289 [1] - 109:21 28th [1] - 71:7 29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8, 179:9 292 [2] - 45:20, 137:9 295 [2] - 114:15, 132:23 299 [1] - 107:16 2:16-cv-02805-JXN- LDW [1] - 1:4 2nd [4] - 118:14, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  3 3 [5] - 67:11, 116:17,	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  4  4 [1] - 11:1 4/7/2022 [1] - 211:24 40 [2] - 89:1, 143:8 402 [2] - 106:19, 118:2 404 [1] - 118:2 409 [1] - 108:4 41 [1] - 89:16 410 [1] - 107:24 42 [1] - 89:16 43 [5] - 89:16, 89:17, 89:18, 90:6, 110:10 430 [1] - 178:17 44 [3] - 110:10, 121:5, 170:11 441 [1] - 99:10	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24 6473 [1] - 186:3 65 [2] - 4:6, 95:17 662 [1] - 118:14 684169 [1] - 26:14 69 [1] - 133:12  7 7 [3] - 1:12, 4:4, 51:25 70 [2] - 21:18, 63:22 700 [3] - 122:19, 123:8, 127:24 702 [2] - 191:9, 200:16	A  a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4  ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22  able [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17, 211:10  ably [2] - 9:11, 51:20  above-entitled [1] - 211:22  abrupt [4] - 123:1, 123:9, 123:19, 126:17  absence [10] - 14:12, 31:24, 72:1, 140:10, 144:8, 198:16, 204:23, 205:13, 205:19, 206:5  absolutely [10] - 39:25, 42:7, 45:3, 68:15, 81:3, 106:21,	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19, 72:4, 86:7, 91:5, 115:16, 119:21 accurately [2] - 90:16, 137:7 accused [3] - 66:13, 93:10, 164:3 achieve [3] - 135:1, 155:16, 194:21 achieved [3] - 143:24, 144:25, 183:19 acknowledge [2] - 38:5, 48:3 acknowledges [1] - 27:21 acquire [1] - 91:17
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7 289 [1] - 109:21 28th [1] - 71:7 29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8, 179:9 292 [2] - 45:20, 137:9 295 [2] - 114:15, 132:23 299 [1] - 107:16 2:16-cv-02805-JXN- LDW [1] - 1:4 2nd [4] - 118:14, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  3 3 [5] - 67:11, 116:17, 123:12, 158:24	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  4  4 [1] - 11:1 4/7/2022 [1] - 211:24 40 [2] - 89:1, 143:8 402 [2] - 106:19, 118:2 404 [1] - 118:2 409 [1] - 108:4 41 [1] - 89:16 410 [1] - 107:24 42 [1] - 89:16 43 [5] - 89:16, 89:17, 89:18, 90:6, 110:10 430 [1] - 178:17 44 [3] - 110:10, 121:5, 170:11 441 [1] - 99:10 446 [1] - 39:15	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24 6473 [1] - 186:3 65 [2] - 4:6, 95:17 662 [1] - 118:14 684169 [1] - 26:14 69 [1] - 133:12  7 7 [3] - 1:12, 4:4, 51:25 70 [2] - 21:18, 63:22 700 [3] - 122:19, 123:8, 127:24 702 [2] - 191:9, 200:16 703 [1] - 117:14 76 [2] - 128:8, 131:10	A  a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4  ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22  able [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17, 211:10  ably [2] - 9:11, 51:20  above-entitled [1] - 211:22  abrupt [4] - 123:1, 123:9, 123:19, 126:17  absence [10] - 14:12, 31:24, 72:1, 140:10, 144:8, 198:16, 204:23, 205:13, 205:19, 206:5  absolutely [10] - 39:25, 42:7, 45:3,	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19, 72:4, 86:7, 91:5, 115:16, 119:21 accurately [2] - 90:16, 137:7 accused [3] - 66:13, 93:10, 164:3 achieve [3] - 135:1, 155:16, 194:21 achieved [3] - 143:24, 144:25, 183:19 acknowledge [2] - 38:5, 48:3 acknowledges [1] - 27:21 acquire [1] - 91:17 acquired [3] - 10:10,
276 [1] - 133:3  278 [1] - 132:8  27th [1] - 62:10  28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25  284 [1] - 127:7  289 [1] - 109:21  28th [1] - 71:7  29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8, 179:9  292 [2] - 45:20, 137:9  295 [2] - 114:15, 132:23  299 [1] - 107:16  2:16-cv-02805-JXN-  LDW [1] - 1:4  2nd [4] - 118:14, 159:15, 159:21  3  3 [5] - 67:11, 116:17, 123:12, 158:24  30 [11] - 10:10, 11:1, 35:15, 60:20, 65:25,	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  4  4 [1] - 11:1 4/7/2022 [1] - 211:24 40 [2] - 89:1, 143:8 402 [2] - 106:19, 118:2 404 [1] - 118:2 409 [1] - 108:4 41 [1] - 89:16 410 [1] - 107:24 42 [1] - 89:16 43 [5] - 89:16, 89:17, 89:18, 90:6, 110:10 430 [1] - 178:17 44 [3] - 110:10, 121:5, 170:11 441 [1] - 99:10 446 [1] - 39:15 45 [1] - 94:3	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24 6473 [1] - 186:3 65 [2] - 4:6, 95:17 662 [1] - 118:14 684169 [1] - 26:14 69 [1] - 133:12  7 7 [3] - 1:12, 4:4, 51:25 70 [2] - 21:18, 63:22 700 [3] - 122:19, 123:8, 127:24 702 [2] - 191:9, 200:16 703 [1] - 117:14	A  a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4  ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22  able [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17, 211:10  ably [2] - 9:11, 51:20  above-entitled [1] - 211:22  abrupt [4] - 123:1, 123:9, 123:19, 126:17  absence [10] - 14:12, 31:24, 72:1, 140:10, 144:8, 198:16, 204:23, 205:13, 205:19, 206:5  absolutely [10] - 39:25, 42:7, 45:3, 68:15, 81:3, 106:21,	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19, 72:4, 86:7, 91:5, 115:16, 119:21 accurately [2] - 90:16, 137:7 accused [3] - 66:13, 93:10, 164:3 achieve [3] - 135:1, 155:16, 194:21 achieved [3] - 143:24, 144:25, 183:19 acknowledge [2] - 38:5, 48:3 acknowledges [1] - 27:21 acquire [1] - 91:17
276 [1] - 133:3  278 [1] - 132:8  27th [1] - 62:10  28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25  284 [1] - 127:7  289 [1] - 109:21  28th [1] - 71:7  29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8, 179:9  292 [2] - 45:20, 137:9  295 [2] - 114:15, 132:23  299 [1] - 107:16  2:16-cv-02805-JXN-LDW [1] - 1:4  2nd [4] - 118:14, 159:15, 159:21  3  3 [5] - 67:11, 116:17, 123:12, 158:24  30 [11] - 10:10, 11:1, 35:15, 60:20, 65:25, 67:2, 83:9, 83:10,	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  4  4 [1] - 11:1 4/7/2022 [1] - 211:24 40 [2] - 89:1, 143:8 402 [2] - 106:19, 118:2 404 [1] - 118:2 409 [1] - 108:4 41 [1] - 89:16 410 [1] - 107:24 42 [1] - 89:16 43 [5] - 89:16, 89:17, 89:18, 90:6, 110:10 430 [1] - 178:17 44 [3] - 110:10, 121:5, 170:11 441 [1] - 99:10 446 [1] - 39:15 45 [1] - 94:3 47 [1] - 90:15	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24 6473 [1] - 186:3 65 [2] - 4:6, 95:17 662 [1] - 118:14 684169 [1] - 26:14 69 [1] - 133:12  7 7 [3] - 1:12, 4:4, 51:25 70 [2] - 21:18, 63:22 700 [3] - 122:19, 123:8, 127:24 702 [2] - 191:9, 200:16 703 [1] - 117:14 76 [2] - 128:8, 131:10	A  a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4  ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22  able [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17, 211:10  ably [2] - 9:11, 51:20  above-entitled [1] - 211:22  abrupt [4] - 123:1, 123:9, 123:19, 126:17  absence [10] - 14:12, 31:24, 72:1, 140:10, 144:8, 198:16, 204:23, 205:13, 205:19, 206:5  absolutely [10] - 39:25, 42:7, 45:3, 68:15, 81:3, 106:21, 108:13, 111:3,	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19, 72:4, 86:7, 91:5, 115:16, 119:21 accurately [2] - 90:16, 137:7 accused [3] - 66:13, 93:10, 164:3 achieve [3] - 135:1, 155:16, 194:21 achieved [3] - 143:24, 144:25, 183:19 acknowledge [2] - 38:5, 48:3 acknowledges [1] - 27:21 acquire [1] - 91:17 acquired [3] - 10:10,
276 [1] - 133:3  278 [1] - 132:8  27th [1] - 62:10  28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25  284 [1] - 127:7  289 [1] - 109:21  28th [1] - 71:7  29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8, 179:9  292 [2] - 45:20, 137:9  295 [2] - 114:15, 132:23  299 [1] - 107:16  2:16-cv-02805-JXN-LDW [1] - 1:4  2nd [4] - 118:14, 159:15, 159:21  3  3 [5] - 67:11, 116:17, 123:12, 158:24  30 [11] - 10:10, 11:1, 35:15, 60:20, 65:25, 67:2, 83:9, 83:10, 84:6, 89:7, 92:13	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  4  4 [1] - 11:1 4/7/2022 [1] - 211:24 40 [2] - 89:1, 143:8 402 [2] - 106:19, 118:2 404 [1] - 118:2 409 [1] - 108:4 41 [1] - 89:16 410 [1] - 107:24 42 [1] - 89:16 43 [5] - 89:16, 89:17, 89:18, 90:6, 110:10 430 [1] - 178:17 44 [3] - 110:10, 121:5, 170:11 441 [1] - 99:10 446 [1] - 39:15 45 [1] - 94:3	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24 6473 [1] - 186:3 65 [2] - 4:6, 95:17 662 [1] - 118:14 684169 [1] - 26:14 69 [1] - 133:12  7 7 [3] - 1:12, 4:4, 51:25 70 [2] - 21:18, 63:22 700 [3] - 122:19, 123:8, 127:24 702 [2] - 191:9, 200:16 703 [1] - 117:14 76 [2] - 128:8, 131:10	A  a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4  ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22  able [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17, 211:10  ably [2] - 9:11, 51:20  above-entitled [1] - 211:22  abrupt [4] - 123:1, 123:9, 123:19, 126:17  absence [10] - 14:12, 31:24, 72:1, 140:10, 144:8, 198:16, 204:23, 205:13, 205:19, 206:5  absolutely [10] - 39:25, 42:7, 45:3, 68:15, 81:3, 106:21, 108:13, 111:3, 188:14, 203:24	187:12  accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19, 72:4, 86:7, 91:5, 115:16, 119:21 accurately [2] - 90:16, 137:7 accused [3] - 66:13, 93:10, 164:3 achieve [3] - 135:1, 155:16, 194:21 achieved [3] - 143:24, 144:25, 183:19 acknowledge [2] - 38:5, 48:3 acknowledges [1] - 27:21 acquire [1] - 91:17 acquired [3] - 10:10, 170:5, 184:11
276 [1] - 133:3 278 [1] - 132:8 27th [1] - 62:10 28 [3] - 11:4, 20:15, 172:25 284 [1] - 127:7 289 [1] - 109:21 28th [1] - 71:7 29 [3] - 58:8, 84:8, 179:9 292 [2] - 45:20, 137:9 295 [2] - 114:15, 132:23 299 [1] - 107:16 2:16-cv-02805-JXN-LDW [1] - 1:4 2nd [4] - 118:14, 159:14, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  3 3 [5] - 67:11, 116:17, 123:12, 158:24 30 [11] - 10:10, 11:1, 35:15, 60:20, 65:25, 67:2, 83:9, 83:10,	161:18 3:25 [1] - 161:15 3:26 [1] - 161:18 3rd [4] - 159:3, 159:14, 159:15, 159:21  4  4 [1] - 11:1 4/7/2022 [1] - 211:24 40 [2] - 89:1, 143:8 402 [2] - 106:19, 118:2 404 [1] - 118:2 409 [1] - 108:4 41 [1] - 89:16 410 [1] - 107:24 42 [1] - 89:16 43 [5] - 89:16, 89:17, 89:18, 90:6, 110:10 430 [1] - 178:17 44 [3] - 110:10, 121:5, 170:11 441 [1] - 99:10 446 [1] - 39:15 45 [1] - 94:3 47 [1] - 90:15	6 6 [3] - 24:18, 99:13, 107:12 60 [4] - 74:12, 101:1, 192:25, 193:17 600 [1] - 2:4 63 [1] - 101:24 6473 [1] - 186:3 65 [2] - 4:6, 95:17 662 [1] - 118:14 684169 [1] - 26:14 69 [1] - 133:12  7 7 [3] - 1:12, 4:4, 51:25 70 [2] - 21:18, 63:22 700 [3] - 122:19, 123:8, 127:24 702 [2] - 191:9, 200:16 703 [1] - 117:14 76 [2] - 128:8, 131:10	A  a.m [2] - 1:12, 5:4  ability [3] - 37:20, 190:7, 203:22  able [7] - 91:17, 98:19, 119:9, 122:15, 135:1, 202:17, 211:10  ably [2] - 9:11, 51:20  above-entitled [1] - 211:22  abrupt [4] - 123:1, 123:9, 123:19, 126:17  absence [10] - 14:12, 31:24, 72:1, 140:10, 144:8, 198:16, 204:23, 205:13, 205:19, 206:5  absolutely [10] - 39:25, 42:7, 45:3, 68:15, 81:3, 106:21, 108:13, 111:3, 188:14, 203:24  abundantly [1] - 42:15	187:12 accretive [17] - 36:10, 36:12, 36:16, 37:1, 37:3, 37:7, 89:4, 89:14, 89:15, 89:19, 89:22, 89:23, 89:24, 90:7, 103:21, 106:7 accurate [10] - 27:22, 67:17, 67:18, 67:19, 72:4, 86:7, 91:5, 115:16, 119:21 accurately [2] - 90:16, 137:7 accused [3] - 66:13, 93:10, 164:3 achieve [3] - 135:1, 155:16, 194:21 achieved [3] - 143:24, 144:25, 183:19 acknowledge [2] - 38:5, 48:3 acknowledges [1] - 27:21 acquire [1] - 91:17 acquired [3] - 10:10, 170:5, 184:11 acquisition [12] -

39:24, 40:2, 41:20,
85:4, 97:18, 137:25,
152:6, 152:10,
154:10
acquisitions [3] -
109:3, 164:18,
164:20
act [2] - 67:22, 103:3
act [2] - 67.22, 103.3
<b>Act</b> [11] - 8:15, 35:21,
35:22, 111:23,
111:24, 137:18,
139:11, 139:18,
139:11, 139:18, 145:14, 177:3
acted [2] - 14:24,
43:10
acting [1] - 55:17
<b>ACTION</b> [1] - 1:3
action [9] - 21:17,
29:10, 30:7, 32:2,
136:20, 136:21,
137:8, 143:12
actionable [1] - 38:24
actions [6] - 21:6,
23:4, 52:12, 125:6,
208:25, 209:16
activities [8] - 16:8,
18:19, 85:6, 85:8,
86:19, 87:11, 87:20,
187:23
activity [1] - 20:12
acts [1] - 195:8
actual [24] - 10:25,
14:25, 15:12, 16:20,
18:8, 19:6, 30:17,
34:19, 43:22, 72:23,
98:8, 108:17, 109:7,
120:21, 120:22,
121:9, 125:11,
128:5, 128:21,
130:13, 138:13,
188:1, 198:13,
209:22
<b>ad</b> [1] - 207:24
add [2] - 24:8, 143:15
added [1] - 86:25
addition [7] - 36:24,
69:20, 120:21,
143:20, 157:16,
197:1, 209:10
additional [11] -
71:15, 90:11,
114:15, 115:22,
129:25, 131:21,
136:9, 136:15,
167:22, 203:20
additionally [4] -
=
23:21, 108:19,
125:7, 135:15
address [15] - 7:5, 7:8,

```
29:1, 59:6, 66:6,
 66:22, 79:24, 94:15,
 94:17, 116:22,
 139:2, 164:8
addressed [5] - 18:24,
 59:7, 61:3, 72:21,
 157.6
addresses [1] -
 210:10
adequate [1] - 204:13
adequately [2] -
 35:25, 37:9
adjourned [1] - 211:17
adjust [1] - 6:18
adjusted [1] - 158:6
admissibility [3] -
 116:20, 191:8,
 200:16
admissible [10] - 9:13,
 9:25, 17:6, 18:7,
 23:10, 28:15,
 116:12, 116:16,
 173:14, 179:19
admission [3] -
 115:23, 120:1,
 120:18
admissions [1] -
 120:17
admit [5] - 21:18,
 52:13, 116:13,
 116:21, 146:23
admits [1] - 27:21
admitted [21] - 72:19,
 98:12, 104:3,
 108:20, 115:3,
 118:12, 119:22,
 120:14, 120:17,
 124:20, 131:12,
 134:10, 134:13,
 136:1, 165:15,
 165:17, 185:13,
 195:18, 197:14,
 199:3, 209:2
adopt [7] - 10:18,
 42:21, 43:3, 43:4,
 43:7, 114:4, 181:14
adopted [4] - 42:22,
 42:23, 108:24, 124:6
adopting [1] - 128:21
advance [2] - 102:15,
 114:21
advanced [2] - 14:12,
 194:20
advantage [2] - 13:15,
 32.4
adverbs [1] - 161:25
adversarial [4] -
 22:16, 24:3, 24:8,
```

179.22

adversaries [1] -

183:9 adversary [1] - 30:23 advice [1] - 111:8 advised [4] - 75:5, 131:25, 187:25, 194:13 **affairs** [1] - 18:25 affect [1] - 206:15 affected [1] - 153:3 affecting [3] - 150:1, 153:7, 153:14 affects [1] - 148:15 affidavit [9] - 24:10, 24:13, 24:16, 26:5, 27:13, 27:16, 27:23, 28:1, 115:15 affidavits [4] - 52:16, 72:20, 72:22, 179:24 affirmed [3] - 16:2, 19:4, 37:22 afraid [1] - 153:13 **Afternoon** [1] - 94:14 afternoon [5] - 94:16, 139:6, 190:15, 191:5, 191:6 **AG** [16] - 22:23, 22:25, 23:8, 23:9, 23:15, 23:25, 24:7, 24:14, 24:19, 25:7, 26:6, 116:10, 118:16, 120:22, 147:10 AG's [1] - 120:19 agencies [1] - 22:19 agency [1] - 120:3 **aggregate** [1] - 123:5 ago [10] - 25:4, 25:24, 25:25, 26:12, 26:20, 56:12, 60:22, 173:19, 186:1, 211:6 agree [7] - 52:11, 98:25, 100:25, 126:10, 147:2, 154:12, 200:17 agreed [15] - 15:9, 33:17, 61:16, 63:3, 93:1, 119:20, 137:5, 137:6, 141:22, 144:2, 144:12, 144:14, 185:3, 185:19 agreed-upon [1] -15:9 agreement [17] -14:12, 14:25, 15:12, 16:4, 16:23, 27:3, 27:7, 27:19, 29:20, 31:24, 32:10, 52:18, 115:14, 115:16, 115:19, 122:4, 135:20

agreements [3] - 27:8, 27:9, 144:17 agrees [1] - 163:1 ahead [1] - 76:17 aid [1] - 211:11 aided [1] - 199:19 aids [1] - 56:13 ailment [1] - 95:19 aimed [1] - 134:23 ain't [1] - 29:22 al [1] - 1:8 Alan [1] - 6:4 **ALAN** [1] - 2:11 albeit [1] - 133:22 all-people's [1] -22:22 allegation [8] - 11:19, 24:19, 41:5, 41:21, 41:25, 57:9, 72:16, 178:22 allegations [30] - 9:6, 10:13, 11:19, 19:8, 22:19, 22:24, 23:4, 23:17, 23:18, 25:2, 26:6, 28:25, 37:10, 40:14, 40:25, 41:18, 42:16, 67:25, 68:20, 71:23, 119:20, 120:11, 130:18, 150:11, 159:24, 177:14, 187:4, 190:8, 201:21, 201:22 allege [11] - 10:20, 33:25, 37:8, 38:2, 66:7, 69:18, 79:19, 111:24, 177:5, 189:6, 197:4 alleged [30] - 10:4, 25:6, 25:12, 26:6, 26:18, 28:21, 34:20, 35:18, 37:23, 40:10, 40:23, 44:4, 44:8, 48:6, 48:25, 51:2, 51:4, 69:4, 69:18, 72:5, 72:11, 139:12, 148:10, 154:16, 160:2, 160:19, 163:15, 190:12, 196:20 allegedly [6] - 50:3, 66:8, 69:15, 160:5, 179:13, 195:13 alleges [2] - 139:17, 176:2 alleging [3] - 22:19, 72:18, 74:18 allocate [1] - 96:7 allocated [2] - 115:3, 135:22

allocating [1] - 120:24 allotted [1] - 7:3 allow [7] - 38:25, 98:22, 136:11, 145:13, 188:15, 188:17 allowed [3] - 9:5, 29:25, 147:21 allowing [2] - 118:23, 136:12 allows [3] - 23:11, 40:14, 48:5 alluded [2] - 42:1, 197:2 alluding [1] - 34:1 almost [8] - 18:12, 29:13, 65:18, 96:2, 111:4, 156:25, 166:19, 169:4 alone [5] - 19:1, 20:7, 25:24, 36:17, 56:8 alter [2] - 110:12, 180:5 alternate [1] - 129:19 alternative [1] - 119:6 altogether [1] - 97:15 ambiguous [1] - 193:2 amend [1] - 10:15 amended [24] - 10:13, 21:18, 25:8, 25:10, 28:24, 29:14, 40:9, 40:23, 41:17, 42:2, 42:14, 43:14, 136:23, 175:23, 176:1, 176:10, 176:11, 176:16, 176:25, 177:15, 182:15, 184:1, 185:9, 185:19 amendment [1] - 50:8 America [2] - 18:12, 80:6 Americas [1] - 2:8 amorphous [2] -28:11, 39:13 amount [9] - 19:9, 95:13, 104:18, 131:13, 138:2, 140:23. 152:25. 180:18. 205:23 analyses [2] - 195:18, 205:18 analysis [15] - 103:22, 139:25, 152:23, 154:12, 158:4, 191:12, 196:11, 197:17, 205:8, 205:13, 205:15, 205:16, 207:13, 208:1

analyst [6] - 101:18, 130:9, 152:20, 153:1, 158:10, 205:25 analysts [6] - 13:11, 130:5, 151:25, 155:11, 157:23, 206:20 analytical [2] - 207:3, 207:11 analyze [1] - 40:5 analyzed [3] - 31:1, 118:22, 155:25 analyzes [1] - 210:3 ancient [1] - 17:5 Andrea [1] - 119:16 Anklam [1] - 5:25 **ANKLAM** [1] - 2:16 announced [4] -36:20, 71:13, 156:13, 158:6 announcement [2] -152:1, 158:12 announcements [1] -44:19 annual [2] - 84:9, 126:25 anomalies [2] - 103:8 answer [14] - 93:20, 109:17. 114:11. 128:10. 138:25. 167:16, 167:17, 168:16, 168:18, 168:24, 170:8, 172:2, 172:15 answered [2] - 95:15, 95:17 answers [5] - 77:3, 130:11, 130:14, 167:11, 167:12 Anthony [1] - 24:11 anti [2] - 9:18, 22:20 anti-trust [2] - 9:18, 22.20 anticipate [3] - 7:6, 185:17, 190:22 anticipated [2] -113:4, 127:16 anticompetitive [3] -112:12, 208:8, 209:3 antidumping [1] -123:23 antitrust [8] - 12:13, 29:18, 30:8, 117:18, 117:24, 118:1, 159:1, 198:5 anyhow [1] - 161:23 anyway [2] - 20:20, 204:19 apoplectic [1] -

107:25 appearances [1] -5.10 appeared [1] - 55:23 appease [1] - 209:8 applicable [2] -193:21, 194:6 application [1] -203:18 applied [2] - 81:10, 106:14 apply [3] - 43:9, 96:24, 149:3 applying [1] - 128:4 appointment [1] -196:15 appreciate [2] -190:14, 211:14 approach [6] - 35:1, 61:13, 80:7, 80:10, 80:11, 192:8 approaching [1] -11:16 appropriate [9] - 24:3, 65:24, 70:23, 75:13, 147:5, 193:13, 194:5, 203:4, 204:18 approval [2] - 13:8, approved [4] - 98:2, 113:10, 132:25, 185:12 approving [1] - 134:5 **April** [26] - 1:12, 36:2, 37:15, 45:19, 45:20, 48:11, 48:23, 66:24, 70:12, 84:8, 85:1, 85:18, 86:12, 87:9, 87:23, 89:18, 89:20, 104:11, 113:1, 132:17, 151:12, 154:4, 156:8, 156:13, 158:13, 196:13 Arbitrages [1] - 60:12 area [4] - 88:15, 153:10, 159:1, 189:14 argue [13] - 16:13, 28:13, 36:25, 55:6, 81:14, 120:5, 125:4, 128:1, 129:19, 136:3, 140:4, 154:15, 161:13 argues [2] - 129:9, 153:20 arguing [3] - 163:12, 183:7, 184:13 **ARGUMENT** [2] - 1:5,

4:2

argument [33] - 7:3, 15:10, 17:19, 20:11, 24:9, 43:15, 45:10, 45:11, 55:13, 58:4, 90:8, 128:17, 139:10, 147:23, 155:19. 158:22. 160:12. 161:2. 161:11, 164:10, 165:3, 177:7, 177:23, 177:24, 179:20, 183:6, 184:23, 190:13, 205:11, 206:9, 211:9 arguments [10] -32:21, 148:16, 156:9, 156:11, 157:3, 158:19, 160:11, 164:25, 165:3, 183:11 arising [1] - 39:23 arithmetic [2] -142:24, 142:25 Arleo [21] - 9:5, 9:11, 14:17, 35:17, 38:25, 39:10, 40:13, 40:17, 42:2, 50:7, 104:13, 130:7, 133:5, 137:6, 140:13, 157:7, 162:14, 177:10, 184:2, 185:3, 186:19 Arleo's [2] - 29:24, 30:8 arrival [3] - 12:19, 43:20, 47:5 ascribed [1] - 119:20 aside [3] - 76:6, 84:5 aspect [1] - 153:10 aspects [4] - 38:6, 49:4, 49:6, 199:3 aspirational [1] -109:6 assert [2] - 32:8, 111:15 assertion [2] - 11:23, 186:5 assertions [2] - 67:25, 185:21 asserts [2] - 24:13, 100:23 assess [2] - 83:16, 195:19 assessed [1] - 97:10 assessing [2] - 51:11, 95:20 assessment [2] -140:2, 157:9 asset [1] - 152:5 assets [2] - 152:2, 152:14

assist [1] - 95:1 assistance [1] - 8:1 associate [2] - 20:22, 20:25 associated [4] -46:20, 154:25, 155:1, 170:4 associates [1] - 49:19 association [1] -16:12 assume [7] - 44:17, 72:2. 163:23. 169:24, 172:6, 206:17 assumed [1] - 207:2 assumes [4] - 145:6, 197:3, 203:7, 206:15 assuming [2] - 72:4, 76:6 assumption [2] -145:11, 203:9 assumptions [2] -105:2, 192:13 astounded [1] - 107:2 astronomical [2] -56:13, 161:25 attach [1] - 161:25 attached [1] - 27:19 attachment [1] - 132:9 attacking [1] - 61:2 attempt [6] - 22:18, 26:5, 33:5, 60:13, 167:17, 186:17 attempting [1] -192:11 attempts [4] - 35:8, 95:2, 181:6, 188:4 attend [1] - 75:21 attendance [2] -16:11, 135:24 attended [8] - 17:20, 62:17, 100:5, 100:19, 103:6, 126:25, 135:15, 173:19 attention [3] - 20:21, 21:13, 45:7 attenuated [1] -

111:13

111:12

52:14

attenuation [1] -

Attorney [2] - 52:12,

attorney [10] - 116:6,

117:7, 118:19,

118:22, 119:9,

119:13, 119:18,

119:21. 119:23

attributable [2] -

attorney's [1] - 116:4

30:22, 49:24 attribute [1] - 41:18 attributed [2] - 24:14, 158:16 attributes [1] - 42:3 audience [1] - 82:1 audit [7] - 103:11, 106:2, 106:17, 106:18, 107:2, 109:15, 187:8 auditors [3] - 106:9, 106:23, 106:24 August [12] - 37:25, 43:1, 70:25, 78:4, 84:9, 103:24, 104:10, 130:19, 158:20, 170:3, 170:14, 196:18 Aurobindo [1] -115:24 authorities [2] - 29:19, 201:10 authority [8] - 25:14, 25:17, 25:19, 26:4, 31:4, 54:1, 72:17, 118:10 authorized [5] - 23:13, 118:6, 118:18, 118:19, 119:8 available [5] - 21:22, 38:12, 71:16, 94:7, 140:16 avalanche [1] - 194:17 Avenue [4] - 2:4, 2:8, 2:12, 2:21 avenue [1] - 181:15 average [1] - 204:14 avoid [5] - 33:5, 53:19, 84:7, 167:12, 209:9 avoids [1] - 172:15 aware [6] - 15:25, 74:15, 77:5, 77:19, 108:21, 179:16 awareness [2] - 13:25, 73:3

## В

B-O-O-T-H-E [1] - 25:22 babble [1] - 177:19 Baby [10] - 11:11, 12:15, 12:18, 14:1, 16:2, 19:19, 21:8, 122:23, 182:6, 198:4 backed [1] - 65:22 background [1] - 66:1 backs [1] - 37:4 bad [4] - 37:24, 156:18, 164:3, 188:1

ball [2] - 127:18, 146:16 Bank [2] - 19:1, 80:5 banker [3] - 97:23, 144:7, 201:17 Banking [1] - 203:14 banking [1] - 191:23 bar [3] - 9:7, 47:18, 200.8 Barbara [5] - 61:7, 61:8, 61:10, 86:15, 86:16 bare [2] - 45:3, 67:25 barely 181 - 9:5. 38:25. 40:12, 40:15, 76:11, 182:9, 182:10 barriers [2] - 13:3, 13:14 base [1] - 58:7 based [23] - 12:13, 17:17, 32:5, 35:22, 42:10, 56:4, 57:19, 65:21, 77:22, 95:13, 127:9, 140:15, 141:15, 145:2, 147:17, 149:20, 159:8, 178:22, 178:23, 205:5, 205:22, 206:1, 207:3 baseline [2] - 97:24, 98:8 basic [2] - 19:7, 148:19 basis [14] - 58:7, 63:18, 79:20, 81:11, 110:15, 139:22, 145:18, 156:25, 177:9, 202:18, 203:1, 203:25, 206:6, 210:8 basketball [1] -129:11 Bausch [2] - 67:9, 88:19 BCH[1] - 156:18 bear [3] - 140:19, 140:22, 160:15 bearing [3] - 26:22, 124:10, 210:16 became [4] - 38:12, 59:10, 71:16, 190:4 become [4] - 132:19, 162:3, 190:5, 196:14 began [2] - 25:5, 66:16 **begging** [1] - 105:18 begin [6] - 7:25, 9:12, 11:2, 44:6, 58:15, 92:17 beginning [6] - 29:7,

79:10, 108:4, 113:7, 133:13, 159:12 begins [1] - 59:5 begrudged [1] - 184:6 behalf [8] - 5:12, 5:17, 5:19, 6:1, 6:8, 7:22, 7:23, 65:4 Behalf [1] - 1:4 behavior [14] - 12:6, 35:6, 53:18, 53:19, 55:17, 162:19, 163:24, 199:11, 199:15, 199:20, 208:8, 208:21, 209:6, 209:10 belabor [2] - 72:15, 207:24 belatedly [1] - 197:14 Belgian [1] - 105:6 Belgium [1] - 105:8 belie [1] - 22:11 belies [1] - 174:16 believes [2] - 91:15, 193:4 bell [1] - 37:7 Bellco [1] - 106:11 belong [1] - 171:19 below [6] - 51:22, 82:6, 99:16, 151:25, 156:14, 168:11 bench [1] - 50:22 benefit [13] - 43:25, 44:6, 68:22, 88:13, 132:5, 142:17, 143:18, 143:25, 144:25, 178:5, 178:8, 202:1, 206:3 benefited [1] - 70:14 BERGER [1] - 2:7 Berger [1] - 5:14 **BERNSTEIN** [1] - 2:7 Bernstein [2] - 5:14, 5:19 beside [1] - 64:7 besmirched [1] -167:5 best [6] - 65:14, 75:9, 167:15, 171:7, 178:16, 201:5 better [5] - 57:9, 60:8, 63:5, 135:8, 205:11 between [31] - 7:13, 17:9, 17:11, 18:17, 18:20, 19:22, 23:1, 24:20, 25:2, 27:3, 28:3, 35:12, 36:2, 43:10, 43:12, 59:12, 83:25, 104:11, 105:11, 122:25, 123:1, 142:8,

142:20, 148:13, 152:21, 160:7, 164:22, 184:11, 188:16, 199:10, 205:10 beyond [8] - 12:1, 14:11. 14:15. 20:17. 56:3, 161:1, 167:23, 171:18 bias [1] - 23:24 biased [1] - 24:1 **bid** [14] - 26:18, 32:9, 45:6, 98:3, 98:10, 104:12, 104:21, 104:24, 121:13, 121:19, 122:2, 129:7, 209:8 bid-rigging [1] - 26:18 bidder [1] - 44:11 bidding [2] - 124:2, 124:4 bids [6] - 96:7, 115:3, 120:23, 129:24, 135:22, 209:4 big [9] - 48:18, 97:10, 106:12, 129:12, 157:2, 163:20, 185:17, 189:3 bigger [1] - 164:15 biggest [3] - 98:17, 98:18, 152:6 billion [5] - 11:1, 29:6, 89:12, 96:1, 96:4 billion-dollar [1] -89:12 **bind** [1] - 122:13 binding [5] - 45:15, 46:9, 122:11, 144:13, 175:18 bit [8] - 7:12, 40:20, 50:5, 66:1, 103:12, 116:5, 184:6, 185:2 bite [1] - 62:22 bits [1] - 77:3 bizarre [1] - 177:1 bizarrely [1] - 48:13 black [1] - 148:20 blank [2] - 11:9, 16:7 blatant [1] - 181:9 blindly [1] - 162:3 blocked [1] - 52:21 Blomkest [1] - 123:20 **bloody** [2] - 180:14, 182:23 **Bloomberg** [1] - 159:3 blow [1] - 81:5 blown [1] - 81:1 **board** [10] - 67:9, 73:7, 73:8, 92:6, 92:9, 92:16, 98:2, 98:10,

104:25, 146:20 Boat [1] - 199:1 body [2] - 95:20, 119:7 boggles [1] - 79:6 **boils** [1] - 200:18 bolster [1] - 45:10 **bolts** [3] - 63:17, 166:3, 166:12 book [2] - 82:2, 121:6 bookends [1] - 80:22 boost [2] - 98:19, 99:1 boosted [1] - 123:5 **boot** [1] - 26:5 Boothe [8] - 25:22, 54:4, 54:11, 54:16, 54:19, 133:24, 134:5, 172:23 Boothe's [1] - 172:25 bootstrap [1] - 45:10 bord [1] - 66:23 bored [1] - 138:18 borne [1] - 130:17 boss [4] - 54:3, 54:11, 63:6, 90:19 bottom [5] - 14:5, 77:17, 87:15, 92:12, 135:10 bought [4] - 58:14, 61:19, 152:5, 189:21 bound [1] - 136:5 bounds [1] - 192:15 Bradley [3] - 168:4, 168:5, 168:7 Brand [1] - 156:19 brands [1] - 91:18 bread [4] - 123:12, 181:25, 182:1, 182:2 break [12] - 7:13, 64:21, 64:23, 64:24, 93:25, 94:1, 94:3, 94:4, 95:3, 161:10, 161:14 breathe [1] - 22:17 brief [43] - 51:13, 51:14, 55:22, 62:22, 69:8, 71:3, 73:1, 74:3, 80:25, 81:1, 81:2, 81:8, 89:3, 100:23, 108:16, 116:8, 119:25, 121:5, 123:17, 128:7, 136:17, 137:20, 141:7, 147:23, 149:7, 157:8, 171:8, 172:4, 175:17, 175:19, 176:18, 188:9, 188:22, 189:17, 192:3, 192:10, 192:18, 192:25,

193:17, 200:4, 204:11, 205:15 briefed [1] - 131:24 briefer [1] - 195:2 briefing [6] - 34:14, 37:19, 38:21, 39:11, 43:2, 94:22 briefly [9] - 18:2, 69:22, 83:10, 89:6, 123:18, 141:9, 195:1, 196:10, 197:9 briefs [12] - 50:15, 55:15, 65:10, 96:9, 109:6, 110:6, 110:20, 110:21, 148:17, 193:8, 199:23, 201:11 bring [10] - 8:14, 9:19, 20:2, 24:6, 25:9, 29:10, 50:8, 52:25, 59:20, 190:7 bringing [1] - 57:23 **brings** [1] - 119:11 Bristol [2] - 110:8, 186:24 Bristol-Myers [2] -110:8, 186:24 **Broad** [1] - 3:4 broad [2] - 33:13, 33:18 broader [3] - 79:18, 112:10, 157:23 Brodsky [10] - 6:7, 65:4, 113:20, 113:21, 144:1, 181:11, 184:5, 184:13, 188:24 BRODSKY [7] - 2:20, 4:6, 6:7, 64:21, 65:1, 166:16, 175:13 **Brodsky's** [1] - 20:23 **broke** [1] - 29:15 broken [1] - 102:22 brought [11] - 15:16, 19:13, 29:14, 45:7, 52:20, 91:4, 117:9, 117:11, 136:22, 164:3, 178:19 brown [40] - 42:20, 43:12, 51:1, 53:22, 53:23, 54:5, 54:22, 55:8, 55:19, 55:24, 57:4, 57:19, 59:8, 59:16, 59:17, 60:4, 60:11, 62:18, 62:21, 64:6, 64:8, 64:12, 65:14, 97:22, 99:20, 100:19, 101:13, 101:15, 101:17, 101:25, 102:22,

capable [4] - 27:24,

capacity [2] - 167:18,

28:15, 116:16,

120:14

103:14, 105:4, 131:8, 163:6, 165:4, 166:22, 174:2, 174:8, 180:7 Brown [83] - 3:5, 6:10, 10:5, 10:21, 12:5, 41:8. 41:10. 41:14. 51:8, 51:19, 51:24, 52:2, 52:4, 52:7, 52:8, 52:15, 52:17, 52:19, 52:20, 52:24, 53:5, 53:11, 53:14, 53:15, 59:2, 61:12, 96:11, 97:11, 98:7, 98:11, 98:17, 98:23, 99:14, 100:5, 102:11, 102:15, 103:6, 104:18, 105:5, 105:21, 106:4, 106:16, 107:7, 107:13, 107:18, 107:24, 108:6, 108:16, 109:13, 111:6, 111:8, 113:2, 113:9, 113:15, 113:17, 114:16, 126:25, 130:1, 130:4, 131:24, 132:10, 132:17, 132:21, 132:25, 133:1, 133:21, 134:3, 134:6, 134:12, 134:13, 134:25, 135:15, 136:13, 138:1, 138:5, 161:21, 162:9, 162:16, 163:19, 164:10, 187:22, 193:6 brown's [4] - 54:20, 62:8, 100:21, 163:9 Brown's [2] - 6:25, 100:3 Brunswick [1] - 199:1 brunt [1] - 138:18 Brussels [2] - 102:1, 102:2 **BUCK** [1] - 2:21 budget [2] - 85:23, 85:24 Building [1] - 1:10 building [1] - 101:22 builds [1] - 205:16 built [1] - 76:18 bullet [1] - 78:25 burden [15] - 30:13, 30:15, 32:20, 34:15, 43:16, 47:19, 47:25, 51:17, 64:16, 67:18,

82:15, 149:8, 149:11, 160:15 bury [1] - 194:17 business [49] - 16:12, 18:3, 19:8, 30:22, 30:24, 32:3, 32:7, 32:9, 32:14, 35:13, 46:3, 49:4, 49:5, 49:11, 75:20, 78:25, 80:7, 80:9, 81:12, 82:2, 82:11, 101:4, 101:6, 102:11, 103:6, 121:17, 121:20, 122:19, 128:13, 134:24, 135:7, 153:10, 154:20, 159:7, 170:5, 172:13, 187:19, 188:5, 196:19, 196:21, 196:22, 196:23, 196:25, 197:6, 207:10, 207:16, 209:8 businesses [2] -84:12, 135:8 but-for [1] - 195:16 buy [5] - 37:3, 70:5, 83:18, 144:14, 144:19 **BY** [13] - 1:18, 2:3, 2:7, 2:11, 2:15, 2:20, 3:3, 4:5, 4:6, 4:7, 4:8, 4:11, 4:12 bypass [1] - 27:12 C

C-Suite [1] - 41:6 calculates [1] - 206:6 calendar [1] - 169:6 Canadian [1] - 118:1 canceled [3] - 70:19, 70:21, 85:10 canceling [2] - 85:13, 85:17 cancels [1] - 71:13 candid [1] - 108:20 candidly [1] - 122:2 cannot [23] - 11:25, 23:7, 26:12, 27:6, 33:18, 33:22, 36:13. 39:6, 48:9, 58:15, 74:14, 96:24, 97:2, 97:5, 97:6, 114:2, 124:7, 171:19, 179:11, 181:8, 189:24, 192:13, 210:13

cap [1] - 37:4

167:20 Capital [3] - 127:1, 192:9 capital [4] - 127:2, 135:17, 135:18 caps [1] - 109:20 car [3] - 148:19, 148:20, 148:22 care [3] - 68:10, 83:12, 83:25 cared [1] - 83:15 career [1] - 11:8 carefully [1] - 92:2 cares [1] - 84:3 Carmicle [1] - 193:7 carried [1] - 50:11 cartel [1] - 199:15 cascade [1] - 134:7 case [191] - 8:2, 8:21, 9:16, 11:15, 11:17, 12:18, 13:3, 19:1, 19:23, 20:3, 23:6, 23:12, 23:19, 24:4, 24:5, 24:6, 24:7, 25:5, 25:8, 26:8, 26:13, 26:22, 26:24, 27:11, 28:20, 29:12, 30:21, 31:25, 32:17, 33:11, 34:2, 35:7, 37:19, 37:20, 37:23, 37:25, 38:7, 38:16, 38:17, 38:24, 39:4, 39:10, 39:14, 39:15, 39:16, 43:2, 43:16, 49:23, 50:5, 50:9, 51:22, 52:1, 52:6, 52:8, 52:22, 53:4, 53:17, 53:18, 54:2, 55:4, 55:14, 55:19, 55:24, 56:3, 56:18, 57:2, 57:5, 57:18, 58:6, 58:8, 59:9, 60:3, 60:12, 64:5, 65:13, 65:15, 66:2, 66:13, 68:13, 71:2, 79:10, 93:19, 95:1, 97:1, 97:4, 97:8, 106:24, 109:3, 110:2, 110:8, 111:24, 116:17, 118:2, 120:8, 122:22, 123:20, 124:1, 124:8, 124:16, 127:1, 137:3, 138:19, 140:17, 141:6,

147:10, 148:9, 148:24, 149:17, 150:9, 150:10, 150:14, 151:22, 153:16, 153:20, 153:21, 162:3, 162:8, 162:13, 162:14, 163:4, 163:5, 163:6, 163:10, 164:3, 171:13, 175:16, 175:18, 175:19, 175:20, 176:7, 176:10, 176:13, 176:15, 177:1, 177:20, 178:1, 178:13, 178:17, 178:18, 179:25, 180:3, 180:10, 180:16, 180:18, 180:22, 181:1, 181:4, 182:14, 182:21, 182:24, 182:25, 184:3, 185:2, 185:4, 185:17, 186:1, 186:19, 186:24, 189:23, 191:11, 191:17, 193:7, 193:14, 193:15, 193:16, 193:23, 194:3, 194:18, 199:13, 199:14, 200:7, 201:7, 202:10, 202:18, 203:19, 203:20, 205:10, 205:16, 208:2, 210:9, 211:5 cases [39] - 12:21, 15:2, 19:20, 19:22, 19:24, 24:17, 29:14, 34:23, 38:21, 39:11, 56:20, 56:22, 71:3, 96:8, 108:14, 110:25, 111:23, 115:8, 117:18, 117:24, 120:2, 123:17, 135:24, 135:25, 163:10, 178:12, 179:11, 181:19, 189:15, 189:18, 198:4, 198:8, 198:19, 202:5, 202:7, 203:20, 204:8, 204:12 cash [3] - 63:22, 102:11, 158:15 catatonic [1] - 107:25 categories [6] - 80:18,

111:15, 111:22,

112:9, 136:22 category [8] - 35:18, 80:15, 80:17, 81:11, 82:10, 128:10, 128:12, 171:12 causation [37] - 8:4, 43:16, 44:16, 47:19, 47:23, 48:1, 48:9, 49:1, 50:15, 94:17, 139:2, 139:25, 141:2, 141:5, 145:12, 147:2, 148:2, 148:5, 149:2, 149:9, 149:13, 149:16, 150:6, 150:8, 150:12, 153:25, 158:4, 161:7, 177:21, 177:22, 188:19, 195:5, 195:6, 204:3, 204:22, 206:9 **CAUSATION** [1] - 4:3 caused [8] - 106:15, 139:23, 141:11, 150:13, 156:18, 187:15, 189:11, 195:10 causes [2] - 148:14, 187:24 causing [3] - 131:15, 153:14, 188:4 CCR [1] - 211:24 cease [1] - 132:18 ceded [1] - 32:9 ceding [2] - 32:14, 200:10 center [1] - 134:16 centers [1] - 35:11 central [2] - 13:12, 188:12 CEO [18] - 48:12, 66:23, 67:9, 70:22, 100:4, 101:25, 134:3, 152:13, 155:22, 173:3, 184:7, 184:8, 186:12, 187:17, 187:25, 196:14, 196:16 CEO's [2] - 109:4, 154:20 certain [12] - 12:9, 33:17, 38:5, 111:4, 120:11, 129:10, 146:5, 146:11, 153:7, 170:8, 192:14, 197:17 certainly [10] - 29:11, 32:16, 38:19, 44:13, 81:24, 144:3, 146:7,

147:5, 150:23, 210:23 CERTIFICATE [1] -211:19 certification [1] -157.8 certify [1] - 211:21 cetera [2] - 105:2, 117:8 **CFO** [7] - 54:20, 61:9, 61:10, 124:23, 134:2, 166:6, 173:3 chain [5] - 20:10, 22:14, 42:5, 42:8, 42:20 chairman [2] - 66:23, 67:9 challenge [15] - 29:1, 36:1, 43:13, 65:13, 70:21, 80:6, 88:2, 161:12, 170:7, 170:8, 200:19, 200:21, 204:10, 205:4, 207:8 challenged [9] -33:25, 37:13, 39:21, 48:8, 49:6, 67:23, 70:20, 193:12, 200:20 challenges [3] -90:22, 146:20, 201:2 challenging [1] -84:14 chance [1] - 79:12 chances [1] - 195:12 change [11] - 25:10, 47:3, 63:5, 63:7, 70:5, 70:6, 123:6, 141:19, 162:13, 179:25, 195:20 changed [2] - 47:10, 206:24 changes [3] - 31:11, 209:16, 210:13 changing [4] - 47:6, 47:7, 61:23, 133:15 **channel** [1] - 106:10 channel-stuffing [1] -106:10 channelled [1] - 40:7 channels [1] - 40:8 chaos [1] - 102:21 character [2] - 70:24, 74.22 characteristics [1] -208:12 characterization [2] -147:20, 175:17 characterized [2] -207:21, 207:22

charge [2] - 62:16, 90:20 charged [3] - 95:20, 130:16, 137:18 charges [8] - 9:19, 9:23, 23:4, 59:3, 59:6, 59:12, 117:11, 152.4 chart [2] - 34:22, 159:10 CHC [7] - 157:18, 158:10, 196:21, 196:25, 197:5, 206:13 cherry [3] - 82:8, 82:17, 95:23 cherry-picked [2] -82:8, 95:23 chief [4] - 86:10, 88:11, 100:13 Chocolate [10] -12:16, 12:18, 16:2, 19:19, 31:25, 117:25, 122:22, 125:8, 182:6, 198:3 **choose** [1] - 128:23 choosing [1] - 144:19 chose [4] - 132:15, 138:16, 142:21, 144:20 chosen [1] - 146:15 Chris [1] - 178:17 Chris-Craft [1] -178:17 Christine [5] - 40:11, 40:14, 40:19, 40:20, 180.13 Chrysler [1] - 147:9 Circuit [62] - 10:17, 10:23, 12:3, 12:12, 12:20, 13:17, 14:1, 14:9, 14:18, 16:2, 16:18, 16:20, 18:24, 19:4, 19:19, 20:3, 21:8, 21:12, 31:25, 32:19, 33:1, 37:18, 37:22, 38:9, 38:16, 42:22, 43:3, 43:7, 60:14, 68:9, 68:11, 96:23, 101:10, 108:14, 110:10, 116:18, 117:23, 121:1, 122:23, 122:25, 124:14, 125:8, 128:23, 148:9, 181:13, 181:18, 184:17, 184:18, 185:25, 186:3, 186:4,

188:15, 191:11,

191:18, 197:24, 198:4, 198:6, 198:19, 198:24, 199:2, 199:9 circuit [2] - 23:3, 109:23 Circuit's [2] - 124:9, 182:4 circular [5] - 145:11, 177:23, 177:24, 178:9, 189:14 circumstance [1] -189:18 circumstances [6] -38:11, 111:7, 123:15, 130:13, 189:4, 189:16 circumstantial [25] -16:9, 19:8, 20:9, 22:13, 22:15, 26:25, 34:20, 52:5, 53:4, 72:12, 110:24, 111:1, 111:12, 114:24, 120:24, 121:2, 121:3, 122:17, 124:7, 126:4, 126:6, 133:19, 180:20, 186:6, 186:9 cite [29] - 23:19, 25:16, 45:19, 55:14, 56:19, 58:17, 58:23, 59:1, 59:14, 71:3, 73:1, 85:20, 111:14, 111:23, 115:8, 120:2, 120:8, 135:24, 141:6, 146:17, 147:9, 150:9, 150:11, 175:18, 176:25, 179:11, 186:20, 203:19, 204:12 cited [18] - 19:25, 58:6, 96:9, 110:8, 110:25, 117:17, 117:25, 124:1, 128:7, 140:17, 146:19, 158:10, 192:9, 192:18, 193:7, 193:16, 201:10, 203:14 cites [1] - 123:17 citing [1] - 158:2 City [1] - 37:21 CIVIL [1] - 1:3 civil [4] - 10:3, 22:18, 23:12, 179:22 claim [55] - 9:5, 18:1, 20:2, 29:25, 33:14,

43:19, 43:20, 43:21, 44:21, 47:16, 47:22, 48:2, 48:6, 52:11, 52:25, 54:4, 55:20, 57:14, 57:19, 58:5, 67:20, 71:22, 78:8, 79:14, 79:17, 91:1, 92:5, 100:21, 103:21, 137:22, 139:11, 139:16, 140:5, 143:11, 145:14, 147:4, 172:21, 177:10, 178:1, 178:4, 178:19, 179:13, 180:5, 184:1, 189:14, 189:16, 189:25, 190:7, 205:12 claimed [4] - 58:8, 72:7, 130:20, 131:9 claiming [3] - 10:12, 131:6, 133:9 **claims** [62] - 8:14, 8:16, 8:17, 8:18, 9:1, 9:13, 11:2, 11:24, 12:13, 12:19, 18:2, 18:4, 22:17, 30:8, 30:11, 34:13, 35:22, 35:25, 43:23, 44:17, 44:22, 47:4, 48:2, 48:10, 48:12, 50:6, 50:11, 52:20, 65:9, 65:22, 72:8, 82:22, 82:24, 93:17, 93:18, 97:1, 114:21, 117:1, 131:1, 134:8, 136:20, 137:7, 137:8, 138:19, 139:19, 148:1, 148:3, 175:25, 176:4, 176:15, 177:12, 178:4, 178:11, 182:12, 183:16, 185:4, 188:7, 188:8, 190:4, 191:23, 196:5, 198:5 clarification [2] -163:2, 208:18 Clarification [1] -21:20 Clark [24] - 6:24, 12:24, 53:6, 53:10, 117:16, 121:6, 125:13, 126:15, 195:1, 197:9, 197:10, 197:14, 197:15, 198:11, 198:21, 199:10, 199:20, 207:6,

207:15, 207:20, 207:25, 208:14, 210:7, 210:10 Clark's [4] - 197:11, 198:9, 210:1, 210:4 class [43] - 25:4, 25:11, 26:19, 69:13, 69:20, 69:22, 71:8, 71:11, 71:20, 76:8, 76:13, 80:14, 80:22, 83:13, 92:7, 96:12, 97:17, 98:5, 108:4, 113:1, 113:4, 113:14, 132:7, 132:11, 133:13, 137:3, 137:4, 143:12, 157:8, 173:19, 175:15, 175:16, 175:17, 175:22, 175:24, 176:8, 176:19, 184:1, 185:1, 188:9 classes [1] - 175:25 classic [3] - 13:4, 15:9, 108:18 clean [1] - 7:13 cleansed [1] - 117:4 cleansing [1] - 44:19 clear [37] - 16:19, 19:1, 23:19, 25:15, 26:1, 27:8, 31:5, 34:15, 37:7, 42:15, 46:1, 80:12, 90:23, 91:10, 96:23, 100:12, 108:14, 110:5, 111:3, 112:20, 121:1, 128:24, 175:21, 176:11, 177:10, 177:14, 179:20, 180:5, 182:5, 188:15, 189:3, 189:19, 194:3, 194:12, 197:25, 207:18 Clear [1] - 103:1 clearing [1] - 51:15 clearly [9] - 36:11, 42:2, 82:6, 137:7, 165:18, 176:2, 181:11, 181:21, 181:22 clerked [1] - 211:6 client [3] - 59:2, 164:3, 164:8 client's [1] - 186:14 clients [2] - 8:8, 31:13 Clindamycin [1] -127:6 clinical [1] - 78:1

39:1, 39:7, 39:8,

close [15] - 17:24, 20:21, 21:13, 34:17, 45:23, 57:20, 63:2, 68:4, 72:13, 99:20, 136:4, 154:4, 159:14, 194:9, 199:7 closed [4] - 35:14, 37:15, 60:16, 170:24 closely [2] - 154:24, 155:1 **closer** [1] - 6:19 closes [1] - 59:15 closing [7] - 11:1, 36:22, 38:17, 85:3, 85:21, 89:3, 165:9 coincide [1] - 107:22 coincidence [1] -127:9 collaborating [1] -40.5 collapsed [1] - 107:15 collate [1] - 50:10 colleague [4] - 6:1, 34:25, 35:1, 94:17 colleagues [5] - 8:6, 18:15, 36:6, 84:19 collect [1] - 93:12 collective [3] - 46:25, 47:1, 151:22 colloquial [1] - 202:24 collude [4] - 18:7, 31:24, 75:23, 75:25 colluded [1] - 121:4 collusion [44] - 11:10, 11:16, 11:22, 12:7, 14:20, 15:16, 16:24, 17:16, 18:8, 18:10, 19:2, 19:3, 19:16, 20:13, 20:20, 21:2, 25:13, 30:11, 32:5, 32:16, 33:2, 34:12, 34:19, 34:21, 96:10, 115:8, 120:25, 121:9, 122:18, 123:19, 124:7, 125:23, 126:5, 159:7, 159:24, 177:13, 198:2, 198:15, 198:20, 198:22, 199:17, 199:21, 208:17 collusive [8] - 8:24, 10:5, 11:7, 29:25, 160:5, 177:4, 177:16, 177:18 colorable [2] - 68:3, 171:1 Columbia [1] - 117:8 combed [1] - 74:1 combining [1] - 84:12

comfortable [2] -6:17, 6:21 coming [4] - 29:22, 99:7, 152:22, 168:22 command [1] - 62:3 Commencing [1] -1:12 commend [1] - 211:9 comment [9] - 58:13, 80:1, 82:11, 128:13, 129:16, 171:11, 184:4 commentary [4] -153:1, 157:24, 184:9, 205:25 comments [7] - 62:21, 77:17, 133:1, 152:12, 179:17, 183:9, 186:14 commercial [9] -53:25, 83:24, 84:2, 84:3, 87:5, 88:15, 88:23, 90:23, 100:7 Commission [1] -202:8 committee [19] -30:23, 31:1, 31:6, 31:9, 32:6, 53:23, 75:5, 75:7, 75:8, 100:4, 100:5, 102:3, 106:18, 107:2, 108:25, 109:16, 134:12, 138:9 common [8] - 21:8, 21:11, 35:6, 36:25, 135:13, 144:15, 174:16 communicated [1] -26:3 communication [4] -7:2, 25:2, 25:12, 105:3 communications [12] - 18:14, 18:18, 23:1, 24:20, 25:6, 26:7, 28:2, 33:9, 41:9, 116:1, 119:18, 119:23 companies [17] - 13:8, 13:21, 29:15, 32:23, 37:2, 37:3, 58:16, 59:18, 60:9, 60:16, 77:14, 151:3, 154:19, 159:5, 166:3, 166:9, 194:15 company [67] - 7:11, 13:10, 27:4, 27:5,

27:18, 28:4, 28:10,

41:7, 44:24, 45:1,

28:23, 35:13, 36:17,

45:17, 48:19, 51:10, 59:9, 61:19, 62:14, 62:15, 70:1, 89:12, 91:18, 95:24, 97:19, 97:25, 104:17, 114:25, 115:1, 115:17, 115:24, 120:10, 122:14, 142:16, 143:22, 146:22, 154:5, 154:13, 155:11, 156:15, 156:25, 160:7, 163:20, 163:22, 164:15, 164:16, 164:17, 164:23, 167:19, 167:23, 168:6, 168:15, 168:17, 168:23, 169:1, 174:25, 175:3, 188:6, 194:16, 196:24, 206:19, 206:20 Company [2] - 2:13, 2:18 company's [5] - 14:3, 32:15, 39:6, 160:4, 193:23 company-specific [1] - 156:25 compare [1] - 69:20 compares [1] - 152:21 comparison [2] -19:22, 164:22 compelling [1] - 69:23 compensate [1] -139:19 compensation [4] -140:10, 141:18, 141:21, 142:11 compete [1] - 15:12 competed [2] - 34:5, 126:19 competing [3] - 77:14, 111:21, 136:7 competition [15] -55:1, 56:25, 57:1, 71:23, 77:24, 121:10, 129:6, 129:9, 133:16, 134:14, 162:25, 163:7, 163:11, 183:22, 198:16 competitive [30] -13:14, 32:4, 33:14, 34:8, 77:12, 77:15, 77:16, 78:3, 111:17, 111:20, 112:2, 112:16, 114:20, 114:23, 128:24,

129:3, 129:10, 129:15, 130:6, 132:3, 133:11, 133:15, 137:14, 157:25, 162:23, 177:19, 183:15, 183:20, 183:21, 207:22 competitiveness [3] -33:19, 67:13, 77:10 competitor [12] - 18:5, 25:13, 31:7, 96:6, 121:21, 122:3, 125:9, 125:23, 129:2, 129:8, 136:1, 209:9 competitor's [3] -20:19, 21:2, 32:22 competitors [35] -8:24, 11:21, 13:2, 13:18, 13:23, 13:25, 15:12, 15:20, 15:24, 16:13, 16:21, 17:7, 17:10, 17:12, 18:11, 18:17, 20:12, 21:9, 21:14, 23:2, 32:10, 32:11, 33:3, 34:5, 78:16, 115:1, 122:21, 125:2, 126:13, 127:18, 129:5, 136:7, 208:10, 208:11, 209:17 Competitors [1] -198:13 competitors's [1] -21.16 complain [7] - 16:11, 19:12, 21:11, 33:12, 35:5, 38:8, 46:12 complained [2] - 48:7, 86:24 complaining [5] -63:11, 63:12, 63:13, 87:1, 181:22 complaint [77] - 8:25, 9:15, 10:13, 10:15, 19:14, 21:19, 22:18, 22:22, 22:23, 22:25, 23:1, 23:8, 23:10, 23:15, 23:17, 23:25, 24:15, 24:19, 25:7, 25:9, 25:10, 26:6, 26:18, 28:21, 28:24, 29:14, 33:12, 35:24, 40:9, 40:23, 41:18, 41:25, 42:3, 42:14, 43:14, 47:25, 48:22, 52:14, 56:5, 56:6, 56:21, 116:4, 116:5,

116:7, 116:8, 116:10, 118:16, 118:24, 119:14, 119:19, 119:21, 119:24, 120:3, 120:9, 120:20, 136:23, 150:21, 175:23, 176:1, 176:2, 176:7, 176:8, 176:10, 176:12, 176:16, 176:25, 177:5, 177:16, 180:9, 182:15, 184:1, 185:9, 185:19, 196:20, 197:4 complaints [7] - 23:4, 28:25, 49:19, 117:18, 117:19, 120:6, 179:23 completed [11] -37:19, 38:22, 39:12, 43:2, 46:22, 47:12, 47:14, 47:17, 147:7, 195:15 Completely [1] - 163:3 completely [16] - 20:5, 46:9, 46:10, 56:24, 66:4, 82:19, 90:8, 100:20, 117:11, 140:5, 146:22, 162:24, 163:8, 170:24, 196:22, 209:23 completion [1] -141:20 complex [2] - 84:12, 154:19 complexities [1] -38:5 compliance [1] -101:22 complicated [2] -13:7, 201:23 complied [2] - 194:4, 194:25 compliment [1] -78:12 components [1] -118:15 compressed [2] -125:9, 125:18 conceal [1] - 102:12 concealed [6] - 44:4, 44:9, 111:17, 179:14, 195:13, 196:9 concealment [2] -112:1, 112:11 concede [6] - 72:21,

98:14, 98:15, 138:12, 150:4, 189.17 conceded [1] - 12:24 conceived [1] - 27:12 concentrated [1] -208:8 concept [6] - 15:15, 19:22, 38:22, 39:13, 39:14, 175:15 concern [4] - 98:17, 98:18, 98:25, 204:11 concerned [1] - 94:7 concerning [5] -16:23, 36:9, 46:4, 67:13, 177:16 concerns [12] - 85:22, 86:12, 86:15, 87:4, 100:22, 102:2, 102:6, 102:7, 104:6, 105:4, 155:21, 202:11 concession [1] - 47:8 concisely [3] - 137:7, 137:8, 185:4 conclude [7] - 125:1, 127:23, 134:25, 142:24, 144:22, 155:13, 176:14 concluded [3] - 143:9, 199:17, 208:16 concludes [8] -143:23, 153:8, 156:21, 159:25, 205:23, 206:1, 208:1, 210:12 conclusion [12] -140:18, 145:25, 179:24, 201:10, 203:2, 203:5, 203:9, 203:12, 205:18, 206:4, 207:3, 209:5 conclusions [8] -193:9, 199:7, 200:25, 202:16, 207:12, 207:13, 210:5, 210:7 conclusive [1] -199:13 conclusively [1] - 40:4 conclusory [2] -175:6, 179:17 Concord [1] - 199:1 concrete [3] - 68:22, 141:5, 142:23 condition [1] - 141:20 conditions [3] - 45:25, 142:16, 154:9 conducive [1] - 208:7 conduct [10] - 26:18,

112:12, 114:20, 150:2, 160:2, 177:6, 177:9, 195:17, 199:5, 209:3 conducted [6] - 113:2, 115:6, 119:4, 132:17. 145:25. 149:21 conducting [1] -144:13 conference [10] -53:9, 53:13, 75:24, 76:6, 80:6, 80:21, 91:8, 101:18, 103:25, 172:10 conferences [15] -17:12, 53:8, 53:11, 53:14, 53:16, 75:21, 75:22, 75:24, 76:2, 76:3, 76:4, 76:7, 76:11, 173:19 confession [1] -129:23 confidence [1] -183:17 confidential [2] -24:18. 179:23 confirmed [3] -100:11, 100:18, 157:15 confirming [2] -106:3, 116:3 confirms [3] - 30:7, 75:6, 89:4 conflates [1] - 145:12 conflict [2] - 176:11, 176:24 confounding [9] -153:4, 155:20, 156:5, 156:9, 157:13, 158:3, 196:12, 196:16, 206:12 confront [1] - 79:23 confused [1] - 173:25 confuses [1] - 51:13 confusion [1] - 176:9 conjecture [1] - 11:25 connect [3] - 48:24, 64:12, 189:6 connected [1] - 65:6 connection [17] -25:1, 43:10, 43:12, 86:3, 86:21, 139:18, 140:8, 144:5, 157:7, 159:18, 179:17, 179:23, 189:20, 195:9, 205:22 conscious [3] - 14:15,

14:17, 199:15

consent [2] - 123:20, 123:24 consequence [2] -24:16. 160:4 conservative [3] -140:2, 140:3, 142:19 consider [21] - 99:23, 102:5, 102:17, 109:13, 111:7, 111:12, 116:10, 117:22, 122:17, 124:11, 125:5, 125:7, 126:5, 126:19, 133:18, 134:18, 148:5, 155:13, 207:15, 208:14 consideration [6] -29:17, 32:6, 116:8, 116:21, 157:13, 206.2 considerations [1] -203:22 considered [16] -28:14, 31:6, 31:9, 31:12. 31:14. 31:15. 31:18. 32:2. 98:2. 98:9, 117:15, 124:14, 127:4, 168:15, 168:18, 187:2 considering [5] -58:13, 117:24, 186:22, 191:2, 208:15 considers [3] - 14:18, 117:23, 186:25 consist [1] - 191:25 consistent [12] -48:24, 55:3, 55:5, 79:4, 79:9, 79:10, 122:4, 176:1, 176:6, 176:12, 184:22, 188:7 consistently [1] -119:16 consists [1] - 185:3 conspiracy [18] -14:23, 14:25, 15:9, 16:20, 19:6, 22:2, 22:3, 22:4, 22:10, 22:11, 55:7, 55:9, 55:12, 57:2, 57:8, 74:24, 163:15, 182:19 conspire [4] - 11:14, 16:14, 16:19, 19:7 conspired [1] - 96:7 **constitutes** [1] - 119:3 construction [1] -

23:6 construe [2] - 128:1, 128:4 consulted [1] - 173:13 Consumer [1] -156:19 consuming [1] - 84:13 consummated [1] -142:7 contain [1] - 23:5 contained [1] - 46:6 contains [5] - 27:16, 46:5, 78:24, 115:22, 208:7 contemplating [1] -133:18 contemplation [1] -23:23 contemporaneous [1] - 92:18 contend [2] - 23:9, 56:23 content [1] - 25:24 contention [2] -147:13, 147:17 contentions [1] -149:15 contest [3] - 150:1, 154:11, 189:9 contests [1] - 178:14 context [13] - 47:24, 62:24, 82:25, 83:11, 108:10, 116:22, 120:9, 130:12, 141:10, 148:1, 160:20, 185:25, 189:25 contingency [1] -46:11 contingent [1] - 46:2 continue [4] - 26:25, 60:25, 77:8, 172:17 continued [2] - 31:15, 99:18 **CONTINUED** [2] - 2:1, 3.1 continues [1] - 19:11 contort [2] - 19:10, 47:21 contorted [1] - 25:17 contortion [1] -182:22 contortionist [1] -16.8 contortions [1] -37:12 contract [1] - 121:13 contracts [1] - 124:15 contractual [1] - 27:9

contradictory [1] -

146:12 contrary [13] - 14:24, 33:8, 40:3, 45:9, 67:21, 69:11, 69:13, 95:11, 101:8, 111:10, 130:14, 134:9. 138:23 contrast [1] - 134:22 contribute [1] - 49:8 control [9] - 8:17, 61:16, 61:19, 63:15, 70:3, 164:16, 164:17, 178:14, 178:15 controlled [2] - 62:12, 62:14 controlling [5] -110:10, 149:22, 151:6, 157:1, 175:22 controls [5] - 103:2, 103:10, 108:24, 149:25, 176:7 controversial [1] -18:22 convenient [1] -109:11 conversations [4] -16:22, 18:14, 28:7, 28:8 conversion [1] - 60:24 conveyed [2] - 160:17, 161:4 convictions [1] -103:3 convinced [1] - 39:9 convincing [5] -135:25, 184:23, 185:23, 187:4, 200:18 convolute [1] - 50:9 convoluted [1] - 55:13 cooperation [1] -211:4 copied [1] - 78:23 copies [3] - 35:2, 84:18, 84:20 copy [3] - 50:22, 85:22, 101:1 corner [1] - 87:16 Corp [1] - 199:1 corporate [19] - 10:18, 15:22, 17:10, 42:21, 43:3, 43:8, 63:4, 75:11, 110:19, 110:21, 122:13, 144:16, 159:18, 172:24, 173:5, 178:14, 181:13, 181:16, 201:24 Corporation [2] -

37:22, 199:1 corporation [1] -37:23 correct [5] - 43:7, 150:4, 151:20, 201:13, 211:21 corrected [4] - 148:17, 150:12, 189:5, 189:10 correction [1] - 160:8 Corrections [1] -186:2 corrective [13] - 48:3, 48:6, 48:25, 50:2, 148:21, 149:17, 150:15, 154:2, 154:15, 160:12, 160:16, 179:5, 190:6 correctly [2] - 35:20, 155:17 correlated [2] -198:14, 198:17 cortisone [1] - 74:11 cost [2] - 31:18, 74:12 costly [1] - 84:12 Coucke [26] - 62:11, 62:25, 86:16, 86:24, 87:1, 92:7, 92:9, 92:25, 93:1, 95:7, 100:4, 100:18, 100:24, 101:3, 101:7, 101:11, 102:1, 104:19, 105:5, 105:7, 105:17, 165:23, 165:25, 184:5, 187:17, 187:25 Coucke's [1] - 90:17 counsel [19] - 5:10, 5:21, 6:17, 7:2, 35:2, 50:17, 93:24, 96:18, 110:2, 112:14, 115:5, 115:19, 117:1, 122:7, 122:11. 131:10. 131:12, 210:14, 211:3 Counsel [12] - 2:22, 3:5, 35:4, 64:20, 93:22, 139:3, 166:15, 175:12, 183:1, 190:17, 200:1, 210:18 counseling [2] -100:25, 166:1 counselled [1] -109:13 count [1] - 40:18 counter [5] - 49:13, 196:19, 196:20,

196:25, 206:13 counterbalance [1] -160:18 counterfactual [1] -143:2 counterpart [1] -98:21 counterparts [2] -97:16, 112:22 countries [4] - 35:13, 67:3, 89:7, 89:9 country [2] - 72:17, 89:14 country's [1] - 179:10 County [3] - 20:3, 32:17, 124:1 couple [9] - 51:7, 58:12, 102:10, 117:8, 128:2, 129:11, 151:13, 154:1, 187:4 course [35] - 10:3, 10:16, 13:1, 13:24, 16:1, 26:1, 29:5, 30:15, 31:18, 33:18, 33:22, 35:2, 41:1, 45:8, 46:14, 51:16, 52:19, 53:8, 54:9, 55:8, 55:10, 56:4, 64:16, 77:6, 95:14, 98:9, 101:21, 102:17, 109:18, 109:22, 110:24, 135:6, 135:12, 135:19, 175:21 courses [1] - 196:4 Court [65] - 1:24, 8:20, 10:17, 10:22, 12:2, 12:5, 12:22, 22:1, 22:9, 26:9, 26:23, 34:24, 35:1, 35:19, 35:24, 39:5, 42:6, 43:1, 43:17, 45:23, 48:5, 50:12, 65:3, 68:18, 68:19, 74:17, 74:21, 74:22, 74:23, 74:24, 93:18, 99:25, 100:21, 111:2, 116:9, 116:20, 140:21, 171:16, 175:21, 175:23, 176:10, 178:13, 179:11, 180:15, 192:8, 192:10, 192:12, 192:18, 193:8, 193:16, 193:23, 194:3, 194:13. 194:14. 194:16, 194:18,

194:21, 199:13,

199:17, 199:23, 200:17, 201:3, 203:24, 210:21, 211:25 court [15] - 6:15, 6:19, 7:21, 26:13, 26:16, 26:23, 32:20, 55:15, 65:20. 159:8. 171:20, 175:7, 196:4, 210:24, 210:25 COURT [35] - 1:1, 5:7, 5:23, 6:3, 6:6, 6:12, 7:15, 7:17, 35:4, 50:20, 50:23, 64:20, 64:22, 93:22, 94:6, 94:12, 139:3, 151:20, 161:14, 161:20, 166:15, 175:12, 183:1, 188:21, 190:17, 190:20, 190:22, 191:1, 191:4, 191:6, 200:1, 210:18, 210:20, 211:3, 211:19 court's [1] - 16:3 Court's [9] - 8:3, 35:16, 37:20, 116:8, 176:1, 176:3, 194:1, 200:3, 201:12 courtesy [1] - 210:22 Courthouse [1] - 1:10 COURTROOM [6] -5:5, 94:9, 94:11, 161:17, 161:19, 211:16 courtroom [2] -171:19, 210:16 courts [6] - 21:15, 23:3, 32:14, 39:17, 110:22, 120:6 Courts [1] - 193:11 covenant [1] - 11:14 cover [3] - 50:25, 65:11, 147:11 covered [3] - 51:25, 65:10, 111:14 covering [1] - 155:11 Craft [1] - 178:17 crazy [1] - 112:5 CRCR [1] - 211:24 cream [3] - 74:11, 74:12, 115:5 create [2] - 19:2, 54:12 created [2] - 118:23, 160:19 creates [2] - 27:23, 209.23 creative [2] - 183:10,

183:11 credentials [1] - 204:6 credibility [7] - 95:22, 97:5, 97:9, 160:18, 161:6, 184:18, 188.17 credible [2] - 184:14, 185.16 credited [1] - 134:8 cries [1] - 182:19 Criminal [1] - 9:18 criminal [10] - 9:23, 25:1, 27:9, 29:10, 55:17, 74:24, 159:6, 162:19, 163:24, 177:17 critical [6] - 26:4, 51:17, 140:16, 156:10, 182:14, 198:1 criticism [3] - 204:15, 206:8, 210:12 criticisms [2] - 88:16, 200:25 criticize [3] - 146:2, 202:23, 205:9 criticizing [1] - 88:20 **CROMWELL** [1] - 3:2 Cromwell [5] - 6:10, 8:7, 20:23, 20:24, 36:7 cross [1] - 118:24 crowd [1] - 180:8 **CROWLEY** [1] - 2:21 CROWLEY-BUCK [1] - 2:21 crucial [1] - 108:23 **CRUTCHER** [1] - 2:20 crystal [3] - 16:19, 176:11, 182:5 culpable [1] - 113:22 culture [1] - 63:4 cure [1] - 95:18 current [4] - 15:19, 17:13, 35:12, 56:1 custodian [1] - 101:15 customer [11] - 31:12, 54:13, 54:15, 74:5, 77:18, 121:16, 121:18, 121:19, 122:3, 132:12, 209:7 customer's [1] -121:20 customers [6] - 22:8, 32:15, 34:5, 74:5, 120:24, 124:17 cut [2] - 31:13, 95:15 CV [1] - 202:6 **CW6** [6] - 24:17,

24:20, 25:12, 25:23,

26:2, 119:21 czar [1] - 100:17

D

Daimler [1] - 147:9 damage [5] - 31:14, 44:21, 49:18, 139:25, 140:21 damaged [1] - 140:9 damages [21] - 43:22, 44:2, 44:15, 117:17, 140:2, 140:3, 140:4, 140:5, 140:19, 141:1, 141:6, 142:6, 142:19, 145:10, 147:4, 149:16, 150:7, 178:6, 189:21, 204:3, 206:7 damaging [2] - 47:6, 96:17 damning [1] - 108:9 data [3] - 21:23, 144:18, 201:9 database [1] - 118:23 Date [1] - 211:25 date [14] - 62:4, 71:8, 71:10, 112:14, 141:24, 151:23, 154:12, 155:19, 156:10, 158:5, 158:9, 166:11, 170:13, 173:4 dated [2] - 104:8, 170:1 dates [14] - 49:5, 149:17, 149:18, 149:20, 149:22, 151:19, 153:15, 154:1, 159:25, 160:12, 160:16, 161:4, 189:10, 196:24 Daubert [11] - 7:14, 94:18, 190:19, 190:23, 191:9, 191:13, 199:23, 200:9, 204:1, 207:4, 210:8 **DAUBERT**[1] - 4:10 **DAVID** [1] - 2:21 **Davis** [1] - 6:5 **DAVIS** [1] - 2:11 days [33] - 37:14, 53:12, 76:12, 76:14, 76:15, 76:16, 85:3, 89:3, 89:21, 90:10, 98:23, 100:3, 101:17, 101:25, 102:13, 103:5,

103:13, 106:1,
106:16, 106:18,
107:23, 113:1,
127:3, 135:18,
138:1, 138:2, 156:8,
160:9, 207:1, 211:13
DC [1] - 2:17
<b>de</b> [1] - 15:4
de-emphasize [1] -
15:4
dead [7] - 12:19, 30:2,
30:10, 43:20, 47:5,
181:4
deal [20] - 35:14,
45:12, 46:10, 46:22,
47:12, 47:14, 48:18,
54:13, 59:23, 97:24,
98:4, 98:6, 98:13,
99:16, 103:15,
129:12, 164:15,
174:18
dealing [1] - 123:4
deals [1] - 37:3
dealt [1] - 123:5
dearth [1] - 179:19
death [1] - 47:15
debated [1] - 99:8
debunks [1] - 40:24
decades [1] - 93:10
deceased [2] - 17:4,
24:21
deceiving [1] - 85:2
<b>December</b> [4] - 71:7,
107:17, 174:2
deceptive [1] - 195:8
decide [15] - 43:3,
54:14, 74:16, 74:17,
82:18, 138:20,
171:10, 171:18,
171:22, 184:18,
17 1.44, 104, 10,
186:16, 188:13,
188:16, 188:17,
211:12
decided [7] - 37:25,
108:23, 109:2,
109:10, 123:25,
135:1, 174:8
decides [2] - 116:21,
184:24
deciding [1] - 98:10
decision [16] - 17:23,
37:17, 38:9, 38:25,
44:9, 44:12, 54:1,
88:21, 112:17,
134:2, 140:14,
140:15, 178:25,
192:9, 192:12, 211:7
decision-making [2] -
54:1, 88:21
decisions [18] - 13:22,
4601310113 [10] - 10.22,

```
14:3, 30:25, 32:7,
 41:11, 53:22, 54:4,
 72:8, 75:3, 75:4,
 75:8, 75:12, 75:15,
 130:22, 130:24,
 130:25, 133:23,
 172:25
deck [2] - 78:24, 92:23
decline [14] - 49:8,
 49:15, 49:18, 49:23,
 148:15, 149:19,
 149:22, 150:14,
 151:1, 152:17,
 153:15, 189:11
declined [8] - 32:9,
 43:4, 121:13,
 148:12, 159:11,
 160:9, 209:7, 209:8
declines [1] - 187:16
declining [2] - 129:7,
 187:23
decrease [1] - 17:23
decreased [1] - 69:12
decreases [2] - 31:2,
 33.6
decree [2] - 123:21,
 123:25
dedicated [1] - 66:19
deemed [3] - 20:1,
 120:11, 123:22
deep [1] - 108:25
deeply [1] - 97:9
defeat [3] - 68:1, 71:5,
 174:8
defeated [1] - 107:6
defend [1] - 182:12
Defendant [4] - 2:13,
 2:18, 2:22, 3:5
defendant [9] - 64:17,
 93:19, 100:16,
 103:25, 133:4,
 140:18, 140:22,
 145:13, 202:22
Defendants [1] - 1:9
defendants [108] -
 7:11, 7:23, 7:24,
 8:19, 9:1, 14:22,
 14:24, 15:17, 16:3,
 19:4, 19:5, 24:4,
 26:15, 30:16, 32:1,
 35:3, 36:2, 37:8,
 38:2, 48:14, 50:16,
 50:18, 81:10, 81:14,
 95:3, 95:7, 95:23,
 97:17, 98:14,
 104:13, 108:8,
 109:5, 110:16,
 110:19, 111:14,
 112:10, 112:24,
 115:8, 117:19,
```

```
119:6, 119:12,
 120:2, 120:16,
 120:17, 121:24,
 123:7, 124:16,
 125:3, 126:21,
 127:20, 128:1,
 128:21, 129:3,
 129:18, 131:22,
 132:14, 132:15,
 133:6, 133:17,
 133:19, 135:24,
 136:3, 137:21,
 139:12, 139:15,
 139:20, 140:4,
 142:15, 143:1,
 145:1, 145:5, 146:5,
 146:7, 146:12,
 147:11, 149:3,
 150:1, 150:18,
 151:10, 153:17,
 154:11, 155:19,
 157:3, 157:12,
 158:19, 158:22,
 160:15, 161:11,
 167:2, 177:6,
 185:22, 190:11,
 194:7, 194:8,
 194:21, 194:23,
 194:25, 196:9,
 202:11, 202:16,
 203:8, 204:10,
 207:10, 207:18,
 208:15, 208:16,
 208:23, 209:15
defendants' [28] -
 26:17, 38:4, 95:9,
 117:17, 124:21,
 130:13, 133:19,
 138:21, 140:11,
 141:11, 147:17,
 148:16, 156:9,
 156:22, 160:11,
 181:8, 186:5, 186:6,
 192:5, 192:7,
 192:23, 194:4,
 200:6, 200:14,
 201:2, 204:24,
 209:18, 210:6
defending [1] - 146:13
defense [5] - 96:18,
 139:13, 142:1,
 160:14, 171:22
defenses [1] - 146:14
deferred [6] - 27:8,
 27:19, 52:18,
 115:14, 115:15,
 135:20
deficiencies [1] -
 199:6
defies [1] - 36:25
```

```
define [1] - 168:16
defined [1] - 193:25
definition [4] - 118:17,
 195:19, 195:22,
 203:12
defraud [3] - 9:2, 36:5,
 38:20
defrauded [1] - 37:24
degree [2] - 160:17,
 161:5
Delaware [1] - 147:10
delay [1] - 158:10
delayed [3] - 157:19,
 158:16. 211:5
deliberations [1] -
 31:23
deliberative [1] -
 95:20
deliver [2] - 180:23,
 181:1
Delivered [1] - 104:1
delivered [2] - 170:14,
 170:19
demand [2] - 31:9,
 124:4
demands [1] - 101:12
demonstrably [1] -
 26.7
demonstrate [5] -
 14:10, 40:3, 68:6,
 177:3, 198:7
demonstrated [3] -
 30:16, 43:11, 126:17
demonstrates [4] -
 19:15, 31:24, 118:7,
 208:17
demonstrating [1] -
 68:20
demonstrative [2] -
 34:22, 34:24
demonstratively [2] -
 33:21, 41:22
deniability [2] - 135:3,
 135:12
denials [2] - 95:10,
 185:22
denied [3] - 15:20,
 179:8, 211:5
denigrating [1] -
 184:5
deny [1] - 28:9
denying [1] - 140:20
depart [1] - 107:10
department [4] -
 24:21, 28:5, 54:17,
 86:10
Department [8] - 9:17,
 52:13, 52:19, 117:2.
 159:17, 160:24,
```

186:2, 202:8

departments [2] -74:9, 84:1 departure [4] - 68:9, 158:5, 168:6, 196:14 deponent [1] - 15:24 deponents [1] - 76:18 depose [1] - 93:12 deposed [5] - 15:18, 17:14, 52:6, 53:12, 76:18 deposition [22] - 11:4, 12:25, 15:22, 20:4, 42:7, 46:18, 52:23, 95:13, 95:15, 106:24, 107:4, 107:12, 122:11, 124:24, 134:13, 167:14, 184:15, 185:14, 195:18, 197:14, 197:21, 210:2 depositions [5] -20:15, 52:21, 73:25, 74.1 deprived [3] - 139:21, 143:13, 143:18 depth [1] - 31:23 deputy [1] - 210:24 **DEPUTY** [6] - 5:5, 94:9, 94:11, 161:17, 161:19, 211:16 describe [4] - 65:17, 89:6, 116:15, 188:8 described [20] - 21:8, 95:23, 96:2, 102:21, 102:23, 105:16, 108:7, 124:20, 129:3, 132:8, 135:16, 135:18, 137:7, 138:4, 172:6, 185:4, 186:23, 187:22, 188:9, 207:19 describing [4] - 105:3, 138:1, 202:2, 203:16 description [1] -175:17 descriptions [1] -110:23 deserve [1] - 93:10 designed [3] - 140:6, 140:7, 140:9 designee [2] - 15:22, 15:23 desire [1] - 68:15 desonide [16] - 28:20, 28:22, 29:3, 29:4, 74:11, 74:12, 115:4, 115:7, 121:17, 127:5, 132:13,

135:19, 135:21, 135:23 despite [4] - 127:14, 144:11, 183:20, 209:11 Despite [1] - 92:21 detail [8] - 14:2, 48:8, 75:12, 105:9, 142:19, 151:4, 152:20, 152:25 detailed [7] - 120:12, 125:14, 149:14, 149:15, 152:23, 153:22, 157:9 details [4] - 91:14, 122:10, 135:3, 195:25 deteriorated [2] -98:12, 113:13 deterioration [1] -114:17 determination [1] -30:20 determinations [2] -120:12, 193:19 determine [6] - 31:2, 59:24, 108:6, 150:3, 199:19, 201:12 determined [3] -30:18, 124:2, 153:2 determining [6] -71:17, 95:21, 130:16, 195:10, 198:1, 201:9 developed [5] - 33:21, 57:7, 58:18, 97:23, 104:16 development [2] -18:19, 77:25 developments [1] -49.4 deviating [1] - 103:15 **DEVLIN** [1] - 3:3 **Devlin** [1] - 6:11 devoid [1] - 20:5 dialogue [2] - 61:1, 105:11 dictates [1] - 8:6 differ [1] - 201:14 differed [2] - 27:3, 27:7 difference [6] - 59:11, 142:7, 142:10, 142:13, 150:10, 210:9 different [18] - 19:18, 34:4, 34:5, 38:24, 40:22, 59:10, 62:15, 64:3, 95:24, 122:22, 139:9, 142:21,

149:3, 150:14, 150:24, 160:12, 186:24, 197:7 differentiate [1] -199:10 differently [1] - 165:12 difficult [6] - 13:8, 42:4, 73:10, 73:16, 126:11, 161:2 difficulties [2] - 39:22, 84:13 difficulty [1] - 146:20 diligence [3] - 97:18, 109:1, 144:13 diligent [1] - 170:18 diluted [1] - 37:3 direct [20] - 11:7, 11:9, 11:12, 15:15, 16:7, 22:15, 27:1, 52:5, 72:5, 111:1, 111:6, 114:24, 114:25, 115:22, 120:22, 121:2, 160:3, 186:8 directing [1] - 179:4 direction [2] - 109:4, 211:12 directly [2] - 41:6, 134:9 director [2] - 98:9, 184:10 directors [2] - 98:2, 105:1 disaggregate [8] -49:9, 153:24, 156:5, 158:14, 196:11, 197:7, 206:11, 207:2 disaggregation [2] -49:20, 153:6 disagree [5] - 140:5, 145:1, 153:17, 153:23, 161:9 disagreement [4] -97:7, 145:2, 147:19, 205:10 disagreements [3] -200:6, 200:24, 201:15 disagrees [1] - 210:7 disappointing [3] -49:13, 49:14 disavowed [1] - 42:8 disbelieve [1] - 186:5 disciplined [1] - 32:24 disclose [6] - 9:2, 37:9, 39:22, 177:6, 193:24, 194:24 disclosed [10] - 44:4, 44:19, 46:3, 48:23, 50:14, 151:23,

157:16, 170:8,

174:25, 179:14 disclosure [29] - 44:8, 48:3, 49:22, 148:18, 148:21, 148:23, 149:17, 151:12, 151:22, 152:18, 153:2, 154:2, 154:8, 154:15. 156:7. 156:10, 160:16, 170:2, 170:4, 189:10, 190:6, 193:21, 194:6, 194:9, 194:14, 194:20, 194:21, 203:11, 203:13 disclosures [18] -35:11, 48:6, 48:25, 140:16, 150:15, 150:25, 151:15, 153:13, 153:22, 156:22, 158:20, 158:21, 158:23, 170:20, 179:5, 189:5, 193:18, 201:23 discovered [1] - 46:2 discovery [17] - 9:6, 9:10, 11:6, 15:17, 17:6, 20:14, 24:3, 29:12, 30:1, 30:16, 30:22, 34:18, 39:2, 40:15, 93:11, 95:1, 182:11 discrediting [1] -34:21 discuss [9] - 18:2, 20:7, 36:5, 102:2, 102:6. 102:8. 106:18. 109:16. 191:20 discussed [14] - 15:9, 17:2, 19:18, 34:23, 102:15, 103:7, 104:6, 105:9, 106:17, 107:18, 124:22, 132:16, 197:24, 199:22 discussing [2] - 42:8, 103:11 discussion [8] - 31:8, 56:8, 59:3, 86:17, 102:16, 124:9, 192:1, 195:2 discussions [9] -17:5, 17:7, 18:5, 18:10, 25:24, 29:18, 32:1, 33:9, 107:23 disentangled [1] -156:4

disheartening [1] -66:15 dishonest [1] - 95:22 dishonesty [1] -138:18 dismiss [15] - 26:17, 26:23, 35:16, 37:20, 67:12, 93:17, 130:7, 135:13, 140:13, 176:3, 177:11, 177:17, 182:10, 182:25, 185:9 dismissal [3] - 10:12, 26:12, 37:23 dismissed [5] - 8:2, 35:20, 50:6, 57:5, 137:2 dismissing [1] - 75:17 dispute [10] - 12:23, 23:7, 27:6, 42:23, 51:8, 51:11, 119:17, 123:7, 127:21 disputed [2] - 97:9, 179:19 disputes [3] - 118:16, 118:18, 118:20 disregard [1] - 79:23 disregarded [1] -73:20 dissemination [1] -208:10 distaste [1] - 32:11 distilled [1] - 34:20 distinct [4] - 14:20, 138:17, 158:22, 196:22 Distinguish [1] -199:15 distinguished [2] -122:25, 123:1 distinguishes [1] -57:13 distribute [1] - 35:2 distributed [2] -89:13, 106:3 distribution [4] - 40:7, 40:8, 89:11, 91:18 distributor [1] -106:10 district [8] - 16:2, 26:13, 118:11, 147:10, 148:25, 171:20, 175:7, 179:7 **District** [5] - 5:2, 58:9, 110:9, 117:7, 171:16 **DISTRICT** [3] - 1:1, 1:1, 1:14 ditch [1] - 138:3 divergent [1] - 32:3

**Division** [2] - 9:18,

206:13 division [7] - 15:18, 46:21, 96:14, 130:10, 133:25, 157:18, 206:13 divisions [1] - 157:18 divorce [3] - 186:17, 187:13, 187:14 **DOA**[1] - 12:19 doctor [1] - 209:19 doctrine [6] - 42:22, 43:4, 43:5, 43:8, 43:9, 110:22 document [52] - 20:4, 23:23, 24:1, 45:24, 52:8, 59:19, 60:13, 60:20, 60:21, 62:3, 63:20, 63:21, 64:2, 73:5, 73:6, 73:14, 73:21, 73:22, 76:25, 78:17, 85:10, 86:5, 86:6, 87:6, 87:8, 88:8, 89:18, 89:21, 89:23, 101:16, 108:10, 108:11, 109:5, 109:7, 109:8, 113:15. 116:12. 116:13, 128:2, 159:9, 165:21, 165:23, 165:24, 166:18, 166:19, 169:13, 169:16, 169:22, 170:1, 175:22, 176:8 documented [9] -97:24, 98:7, 99:9, 99:19, 102:16, 107:24, 116:4, 119:24, 133:3 documents [51] -17:9, 25:16, 32:8, 40:3, 51:12, 51:14, 55:2, 55:4, 58:18, 58:22, 58:24, 59:20, 65:12, 65:13, 65:15, 65:17, 67:4, 72:12, 72:24, 73:1, 73:24, 76:19, 77:4, 84:18, 84:21, 85:14, 92:2, 93:6, 95:7, 95:9, 99:10, 101:14, 103:19, 104:3, 111:9, 121:12, 121:25, 127:3, 127:13, 137:23, 138:1, 138:22, 165:13, 165:18, 166:25, 167:1, 169:11, 176:9, 182:14, 187:7,

disgraced [1] - 24:24

211:11	195:17, 195:18,	137:15, 159:7,	112:13, 113:7,	131:17, 161:10,
<b>DOJ</b> [14] - 9:23, 10:3,	196:6, 196:10,	159:19, 160:23,	133:14, 174:3	192:19, 192:20,
27:3, 28:11, 28:13,	196:11, 196:13,	173:4, 183:18, 188:8	earning's [1] - 156:16	200:11
29:9, 29:11, 29:14,	197:2, 200:20,	drugs [40] - 8:25, 9:4,	earnings [7] - 98:19,	elasticity [1] - 208:9
29:17, 29:20, 29:22,	204:2, 204:10,	10:3, 11:22, 12:11,	102:12, 102:13,	Elcock [1] - 191:17
30:2, 30:7, 160:3	204:12, 204:13,	14:8, 18:21, 20:8,	152:1, 152:13,	element [3] - 49:1,
dollar [3] - 29:6,	205:2, 205:15,	25:7, 25:9, 28:19,	155:2, 158:9	110:1, 133:17
36:17, 89:12	206:17, 209:19,	33:17, 34:11, 44:20,		
T	•		ears [1] - 173:17	elements [3] - 8:4,
dollars [2] - 20:14,	209:20, 210:1,	49:7, 111:15,	earth [1] - 74:1	51:17, 208:7
124:19	210:4, 210:7	111:21, 112:10,	easiest [1] - 43:19	Eleventh [1] - 199:9
domestic [3] - 112:21,	draft [2] - 106:2, 133:4	112:18, 112:19,	easily [4] - 125:23,	eliminate [1] - 92:17
113:3, 113:5	drama [5] - 56:2,	112:21, 113:19,	136:11, 136:12,	eliminating [2] -
done [26] - 10:18,	56:14, 56:16,	114:18, 121:7,	183:5	39:18, 39:19
12:14, 12:15, 12:16,	131:16, 163:13	125:22, 126:10,	easy [2] - 93:5, 182:24	elsewhere [1] - 89:14
12:17, 34:14, 51:18,	<b>draw</b> [11] - 97:2,	126:16, 127:12,	<b>EBIT</b> [1] - 99:15	email [23] - 59:1,
60:8, 78:5, 78:9,	99:24, 100:1,	129:1, 129:10,		• • •
		· · · · · ·	<b>EC</b> [1] - 102:3	59:14, 61:6, 61:9,
78:20, 91:9, 93:13,	107:20, 110:3,	131:13, 134:15,	ECF [1] - 137:9	61:12, 61:21, 62:25,
97:12, 106:11,	110:15, 138:21,	135:22, 137:13,	<b>echo</b> [1] - 58:3	63:2, 67:4, 73:7,
119:10, 145:22,	138:22, 171:9,	137:16, 197:13,	eclipsed [1] - 143:21	78:23, 85:11, 85:20,
146:9, 147:13,	173:17, 173:20	198:12, 208:6,	eclipses [1] - 143:16	85:21, 86:8, 90:7,
147:16, 166:12,	drawing [2] - 108:12,	209:14	economic [6] -	99:14, 102:10,
170:23, 172:16,	109:24	<b>due</b> [10] - 77:25,	143:25, 144:23,	105:21, 121:15,
181:14, 181:19,	drawn [9] - 54:22,	97:18, 109:1,		
190:10	95:7, 95:12, 96:20,	121:15, 124:3,	149:20, 199:4,	121:18, 132:8, 132:9
			204:21, 206:3	<b>emailed</b> [1] - 92:13
doom [1] - 49:1	97:7, 101:9, 102:18,	130:23, 144:13,	economically [1] -	<b>emails</b> [10] - 17:9,
<b>door</b> [3] - 43:20,	128:18, 170:25	188:1, 197:4, 197:5	143:23	32:8, 32:21, 33:1,
117:3, 180:19	dream [1] - 122:20	<b>dumb</b> [2] - 164:9,	economics [1] - 132:1	33:3, 86:11, 98:11,
doubled [2] - 171:6,	drift [1] - 162:21	183:6	economist [3] - 204:6,	103:14, 210:2
171:8	<b>Drive</b> [1] - 1:18	dumping [3] - 107:11,	204:25, 206:21	embarrassed [1] -
doubt [3] - 38:22,	drive [1] - 52:10	123:22		180:14
82:13, 82:14	driven [3] - 32:3,	<b>Dunn</b> [6] - 6:8, 8:7,	educated [1] - 204:5	
		20:24, 36:6, 65:4	Educational [1] -	embedded [1] - 149:1
doubts [1] - 30:8	36:24, 96:13	· · ·	193:16	<b>embodies</b> [1] - 114:25
<b>Doug</b> [3] - 54:4, 54:16,	driver [1] - 108:22	<b>DUNN</b> [2] - 2:20, 5:3	Edward [1] - 27:15	embrace [1] - 72:24
133:24	<b>drop</b> [7] - 126:1,	<b>Dura</b> [1] - 43:16	effect [8] - 54:25,	emphasize [3] - 15:4,
<b>Douglas</b> [1] - 25:21	151:7, 151:12,	<b>DURA</b> [1] - 43:17	125:6, 153:11,	109:19, 150:16
<b>Dow</b> [1] - 191:9	156:24, 157:2,	during [34] - 12:24,	156:5, 157:13,	emphasized [1] -
down [17] - 20:9,	189:3, 197:3	15:17, 15:22, 17:6,	175:19, 205:1, 205:2	16:20
22:13, 26:25, 37:18,	dropped [2] - 155:10,	17:21, 18:7, 30:16,	, ,	
		37:25, 42:7, 60:15,	<b>effective</b> [2] - 84:2,	employ [1] - 40:11
42:20, 49:12, 49:22,	155:21		84:4	employee [8] - 17:2,
96:1, 96:5, 154:13,	drops [4] - 159:15,	61:3, 69:11, 69:13,	effectively [4] - 40:5,	17:4, 17:13, 24:10,
158:18, 168:11,	174:24, 175:4,	69:14, 69:17, 69:20,	90:16, 100:16,	24:21, 24:25, 27:14,
171:6, 171:8, 179:7,	188:25	69:21, 70:22, 71:8,	160:18	41:1
190:24, 200:18	drove [1] - 174:20	71:20, 80:14, 83:13,	effects [1] - 196:12	employees [11] - 9:20,
dozens [3] - 119:22,	<b>Drug</b> [1] - 73:10	98:5, 135:16,	effectuate [1] - 140:6	16:21, 16:25, 17:7,
136:3, 136:8	drug [42] - 9:15, 13:4,	137:24, 159:3,		17:20, 18:10, 18:15,
<b>DPA</b> [3] - 27:18, 27:20,	13:12, 21:24, 28:20,	159:10, 168:11,	effort [12] - 19:10,	
28:19		178:20, 184:10,	22:17, 24:12, 27:12,	52:17, 61:22,
	31:21, 35:13, 48:18,	190:2, 195:18,	29:16, 47:2, 47:8,	170:18, 192:14
<b>DPAs</b> [1] - 29:19	49:11, 56:13, 67:13,		50:12, 53:3, 162:7,	<b>empty</b> [1] - 146:16
<b>Dr</b> [48] - 46:15, 47:10,	73:16, 96:13,	197:13, 197:21	179:22, 181:7	encounter [1] - 170:6
49:3, 49:20, 50:1,	111:14, 111:16,	duty [2] - 164:20,	efforts [9] - 8:1, 13:22,	encourage [1] -
143:7, 143:22,	111:19, 113:5,	174:12	16:10, 21:15, 22:1,	169:19
145:24, 146:3,	113:25, 117:16,	<b>dynamic</b> [2] - 31:11,	22:11, 24:6, 32:4,	encroaches [1] -
146:7, 147:12,	121:4, 124:19,	154:21	211:14	194:1
147:19, 149:15,	124:23, 126:7,	dynamics [2] - 31:7,		
149:21, 150:2,	126:14, 127:21,	78:25	egg [1] - 145:15	end [13] - 15:10,
			eight [3] - 15:18,	68:21, 76:22, 100:7,
150:23, 152:19,	127:23, 129:21,		15:19, 51:2	103:3, 105:20,
153:7, 155:25,	130:6, 130:10,	E	Eighth [1] - 199:2	106:4, 106:12,
156:21, 157:9,	131:23, 131:25,	E D (4) 07:4	either [12] - 18:1, 96:9,	107:22, 121:21,
157:20, 159:25,	132:18, 133:21,	<b>E.D</b> [1] - 97:1	97:13, 110:7,	138:14, 173:2,
160:9, 195:1, 195:4,	133:23, 133:25,	<b>early</b> [5] - 107:17,	114:10, 131:4,	205:12
			117.10, 101.7,	

endeavor [1] - 211:7 ended [1] - 155:18 ending [1] - 36:21 **Endo** [1] - 39:15 enforcement [3] -72:17, 117:9, 120:13 engage [2] - 69:10, 144:12 engaged [7] - 8:23, 14:13, 105:19, 112:5, 136:1, 209:11, 209:17 engaging [1] - 209:3 enjoining [1] - 179:6 enormous [3] - 63:16, 104:18, 135:2 ensue [1] - 145:10 ensure [2] - 140:7, 142:2 enter [4] - 13:8, 14:23, 37:6, 135:14 entered [3] - 37:6, 69:24, 145:23 **enterprise** [1] - 10:10 enters [1] - 71:6 entire [9] - 52:11, 52:14, 76:19, 80:22, 126:2, 164:23, 171:13, 179:10, 182:22 entirely [4] - 17:12, 64:4, 79:3, 145:18 entirety [3] - 57:18, 136:24, 197:3 entitled [7] - 62:3, 107:20, 109:12, 111:7, 117:5, 125:5, 211:22 entry [2] - 13:3, 13:14 environment [14] -73:10, 73:15, 111:20, 128:25, 129:2, 129:15, 130:7, 132:3, 133:11, 133:15, 137:15, 183:16, 183:20, 209:25 EOC [1] - 176:10 episodes [1] - 72:10 epitomizes [2] -171:13, 171:25 equal [2] - 16:20, 178:2 equally [4] - 105:13, 114:6, 127:20, 130:15 equals [1] - 44:22 equipment [1] -210:23 equivalent [1] -

141:18 equivocally [1] -160:15 erase [1] - 128:3 Erie [3] - 20:3, 32:17, 124:1 Ernst [3] - 106:22, 106:25, 107:1 errata [3] - 47:3, 47:15, 180:4 error [1] - 188:15 erupted [2] - 62:19, especially [5] - 12:7, 97:10, 111:5, 127:10, 175:7 espouse [1] - 200:11 **ESQUIRE** [14] - 1:18, 2:3, 2:3, 2:7, 2:8, 2:11, 2:15, 2:15, 2:16, 2:16, 2:20, 2:21, 3:3, 3:3 essentially [4] - 36:19, 58:1, 172:15, 205:9 establish [3] - 83:3, 118:8, 203:7 established [3] -118:12, 153:25, 160:8 establishes [1] -140:21 establishing [1] -141:5 et [3] - 1:8, 105:2, 117:8 etherial [1] - 18:6 ethical [1] - 146:19 ethics [1] - 203:13 EU [7] - 39:24, 40:1, 40:25, 42:1, 42:3, 42:4, 42:10 EU-based [1] - 42:10 Europe [5] - 40:6, 89:7, 89:8, 89:10, 89:12 European [7] - 10:10, 35:13, 36:18, 39:24, 59:9, 59:17, 154:10 European-owned [1] -35:13 Euros [2] - 63:23, 97:21 evaluate [1] - 196:7 evaluation [2] -158:12, 195:11 evaporating [1] -132:24 evening [1] - 159:20

event [5] - 17:22, 43:6,

150:3, 181:7

events [12] - 16:12, 16:13, 17:18, 17:24, 20:7, 25:1, 135:16, 181:3, 181:6, 190:3, 190:11, 196:12 Evidence [6] - 23:5, 23:11, 117:13, 118:4, 120:4, 191:9 evidence [184] - 9:13, 9:25, 11:7, 11:9, 11:11, 11:12, 14:22, 14:23, 14:25, 15:8, 15:11, 15:15, 15:16, 16:7, 16:9, 16:21, 16:22, 16:25, 17:2, 17:7, 18:8, 19:2, 19:9, 19:11, 20:5, 20:9, 22:14, 22:15, 23:11, 25:13, 25:16, 26:2, 26:21, 27:1, 28:7, 29:16, 29:18, 30:11, 33:2, 34:6, 34:19, 34:21, 37:16, 39:25, 45:9, 52:2, 52:4, 54:7, 66:2, 67:21, 68:7, 68:12, 68:16, 69:8, 71:19, 71:25, 72:1, 72:3, 72:5, 72:6, 72:13, 72:22, 72:24, 73:12, 73:19, 74:1, 74:15, 74:24, 75:1, 75:15, 75:20, 76:1, 76:5, 76:7, 77:18, 79:13, 79:22, 81:5, 83:1, 91:22, 92:18, 93:6, 93:12, 93:14, 95:11, 95:24, 96:20, 96:25, 97:6, 97:11, 97:13, 100:22, 101:7, 101:8, 104:16, 108:5, 108:9, 108:15, 108:19, 109:22, 109:24, 110:3, 110:24, 111:1, 111:6, 111:12, 112:12, 112:24, 114:19, 114:24, 114:25, 115:7, 115:22, 116:3, 116:15, 117:6, 117:14, 118:12, 120:16, 120:22, 120:25, 121:2, 121:3, 121:8, 122:5, 122:18, 123:19, 124:7, 125:20, 126:5, 126:6, 129:22, 130:17, 133:19, 133:21, 134:9,

136:12, 138:5, 138:23, 143:5, 144:22, 149:14, 150:6, 159:23, 160:6, 162:6, 162:10, 162:16, 163:22, 164:4, 169:20, 170:25, 171:21, 172:1, 173:3, 173:14, 173:15, 174:4, 177:8, 177:12, 179:19, 179:25, 180:19, 180:20, 181:9, 186:7, 186:8, 186:9, 188:18, 202:12, 208:17, 208:24, 209:5, 209:7. 209:21. 209:25 evident [1] - 58:25 evidentiary [1] - 37:11 eviscerated [1] - 66:5 exact [15] - 33:9, 102:22, 125:10, 128:7, 128:11, 129:5, 129:8, 131:14, 131:15, 133:13, 134:5, 137:3, 180:8, 192:17, 193:10 exactly [13] - 15:13, 17:14, 33:8, 56:3, 62:25, 81:23, 82:8, 86:7, 96:21, 122:5, 144:19, 166:21, 187:15 examine [1] - 209:24 examined [2] - 49:16, 125:13 examining [1] - 159:4 example [19] - 12:8, 12:10, 20:2, 20:20, 24:1, 39:3, 48:10, 91:13, 92:5, 93:3, 117:25, 121:14, 126:24, 127:15, 128:25, 130:19, 148:19, 196:13, 198:11 examples [5] - 13:4, 151:13, 166:23, 192:4, 209:2 exceeding [1] -127:17 exceeds [1] - 205:23 except [1] - 147:3 exception [5] - 23:9, 23:10, 23:22, 120:3,

excerpted [3] - 84:6, 90:21, 172:3 Exchange [3] - 8:15, 139:17, 202:8 exchange [2] - 101:3, 141:15 excited [1] - 61:23 exclude [6] - 6:23, 193:10, 199:23, 202:19, 203:25, 210:8 excluded [14] - 50:1, 146:3, 180:1, 192:10, 192:17, 192:18, 192:21, 192:22, 193:6, 193:11, 194:18, 194:22, 202:6, 207:4 excludes [1] - 118:4 excluding [1] - 200:8 exclusion [5] - 7:8, 8:12, 192:8, 193:12, 199.9 exclusive [1] - 184:19 **exclusively** [1] - 43:23 excruciating [1] -152:19 excuse [2] - 46:9, 49:5 execute [1] - 160:24 executed [2] - 27:13, 159:17 **execution** [1] - 159:22 executive [14] - 25:20. 26:3, 41:6, 41:8, 70:1, 75:8, 75:13, 100:4, 102:3, 108:25, 115:23, 134:12, 138:9, 155:1 executives [5] - 29:18, 38:12, 86:16, 111:9, 139:15 exercise [2] - 32:2, 113:10 exercising [1] - 201:3 exhibit [12] - 11:3, 41:25, 74:2, 74:4, 105:20, 106:12, 107:12, 113:7, 113:15, 113:17, 127:6, 209:14 Exhibit [74] - 45:20, 73:2, 73:6, 73:9, 74:4, 97:22, 98:6, 98:13, 98:20, 99:5, 99:19, 101:1, 101:2, 101:24, 102:4, 102:13, 102:16, 102:24, 103:4, 103:8, 103:17, 103:23, 104:4,

179:25

```
46:22, 47:20, 53:6,
 56:10, 72:11, 75:22,
 75:23, 117:16,
 117:17, 117:25,
 121:6, 124:20,
 124:21, 125:12,
 126:15, 142:18,
 143:5, 143:7, 144:7,
 145:24, 146:2,
 147:12, 150:2,
 189:7, 191:8,
 191:22, 191:24,
 192:1, 192:15,
 193:9, 193:12,
 193:25, 194:19,
 194:23, 194:24,
 195:24, 196:1,
 196:5, 197:7,
 197:10, 199:9,
 199:24, 200:11,
 200:17, 201:5,
 202:7, 204:3, 204:8,
 204:16, 204:19,
 205:6, 209:19,
 210:3, 210:6
expert's [9] - 47:17,
 147:18, 191:12,
 191:13, 194:3,
 199:2, 199:6,
 199:14, 199:18
expertise [8] - 91:4,
 91:14, 91:17,
 104:23, 104:25,
 106:23, 191:17,
 195:17
expertised [1] -
 105:23
experts [16] - 7:14,
 8:13, 117:15,
 125:11, 161:12,
 180:1, 191:15,
 191:19, 193:17,
 200:6, 200:8,
 200:15, 201:8,
 201:14, 203:17,
 208:3
experts' [3] - 150:3,
 200:24, 201:8
expired [2] - 29:21,
 141:19
explain [13] - 28:1,
 28:4, 48:8, 79:25,
 80:4, 80:6, 82:4,
 84:24, 90:6, 133:6,
 197:21, 208:22,
 210:13
```

explained [11] - 14:18,

38:9, 59:8, 91:23,

130:12, 156:17,

192:12, 198:3,

199:13, 209:1, 209:6 explaining [2] - 62:25, 194:22 explains [3] - 81:23, 82:7, 91:15 **explanation** [2] - 56:5, 119:6 **explore** [1] - 94:20 exposed [3] - 77:23, 77:24, 105:25 expressed [1] - 98:6 expressly [2] - 132:9, 152:13 extensive [4] - 32:1, 34:17, 121:3, 163:7 extensively [5] - 95:6, 96:16, 99:8, 110:20, 117:1 extent [2] - 200:25, 203:23 external [1] - 106:23 extraordinary [5] -59:2, 59:6, 59:12, 98:20, 99:1 extrapolating [1] -118:1 extreme [2] - 68:9, 200:3 Extreme [1] - 105:19 eye [2] - 126:16, 126:23 F

F.3d [1] - 118:2 face [3] - 27:7, 55:1, 170:4 faced [1] - 53:3 facility [2] - 31:21 facing [2] - 56:25, 125:24 fact [85] - 11:4, 13:11, 13:19, 19:7, 23:7, 27:24, 28:17, 30:3, 34:16, 41:9, 42:3, 42:23, 46:5, 46:6, 54:8, 55:10, 56:19, 56:25, 64:2, 64:5, 65:20, 68:24, 70:21, 81:18, 88:24, 92:14, 94:22, 100:18, 104:3, 104:17, 109:25, 111:20, 116:20, 117:10, 118:9, 119:8, 119:13, 121:4, 126:3, 126:6, 126:23, 136:21, 143:8, 143:21, 143:25, 144:1,

147:8, 149:10, 149:12, 150:2, 154:25, 157:14, 158:9, 161:3, 162:17, 162:23, 165:15, 169:24, 172:14, 173:18, 174:18, 174:21, 179:21, 185:11, 185:13, 186:12, 197:16, 198:20, 198:21, 198:22, 199:19, 200:13, 205:4, 205:5, 206:1, 207:9, 207:14, 207:15, 208:3, 210:5, 210:7 factor [8] - 15:3, 15:7, 15:11, 16:4, 53:2, 113:6, 158:11, 198:1 **factoring** [1] - 102:12 factors [10] - 14:19, 14:22, 15:4, 15:5, 31:1, 149:25, 152:16, 191:13, 197:8, 206:23 factory [2] - 122:9, 125:18 facts [31] - 20:5, 20:15, 27:20, 27:21, 27:22, 44:4, 44:9, 46:11, 71:20, 97:8, 97:9, 98:15, 111:10, 115:19, 115:21, 117:20, 118:1, 124:5, 133:9, 133:10, 141:8, 143:4, 143:22, 146:18. 149:5. 174:7, 191:22, 196:5, 203:3, 203:19, 211:10 factual [6] - 23:13, 23:17, 93:4, 116:24, 118:5, 119:2 factually [4] - 67:17, 67:19, 90:1, 120:10 **fail** [7] - 8:16, 8:18, 14:14, 44:16, 47:25, 139:24, 142:4 failed [21] - 8:5, 9:9, 10:20, 15:14, 16:4, 16:5, 24:7, 30:15, 32:20, 34:8, 35:24, 37:8, 42:15, 42:18, 83:3, 142:10, 142:12, 149:9, 177:6, 177:9, 179:15 failing [4] - 9:2, 39:22,

146:1, 147:3, 147:6,

142:7, 154:21 fails [6] - 23:15, 49:3, 195:10, 196:6, 196:11, 197:12 failure [8] - 48:24, 49:9, 50:15, 195:11, 197:18, 198:9, 199:14, 199:18 failures [2] - 36:8, 43:16 fair [7] - 24:2, 32:10, 80:17, 122:4, 139:22, 140:14, 144:3 fairly [1] - 143:20 faithfully [1] - 105:1 fall [4] - 120:7, 133:14, 177:12, 178:20 Fall [1] - 68:20 falls [2] - 120:3, 201:13 false [33] - 8:23, 36:4, 36:14, 41:7, 41:22, 42:6, 42:7, 48:15, 66:8, 66:9, 66:14, 66:20, 67:20, 69:15, 69:19, 83:4, 83:5, 84:22, 85:7, 85:18, 91:1, 110:16, 130:2, 139:12, 156:23, 168:24, 178:23, 179:6, 192:23, 193:3, 193:13, 193:15, 203:8 falsely [2] - 131:6, 203:7 falsity [4] - 8:3, 8:8, 51:18, 203:6 familiar [1] - 179:2 family [1] - 36:25 fancy [1] - 106:10 fantasy [1] - 72:2 far [16] - 5:7, 39:7, 45:6, 58:6, 69:1, 74:18, 96:5, 108:7, 114:6, 138:22, 155:1, 155:14, 171:18, 179:8, 190:13, 204:14 Farrington [16] -62:18, 86:9, 86:22, 88:12, 92:13, 92:14, 92:19, 92:21, 100:11, 100:18, 100:24, 102:25, 108:20, 169:17, 187:22 Farrington's [3] -88:8, 100:12, 109:1 fashion [1] - 160:10

fast [4] - 57:5, 70:14, 169:14, 210:25 fatal [1] - 47:7 fated [1] - 22:17 favor [9] - 95:13, 97:2, 100:1, 101:10, 108:12, 109:24, 114:4, 128:19, 167:1 FCC [1] - 70:2 **FDA**[3] - 13:7, 125:20, 125:21 fear [1] - 181:24 features [8] - 34:9, 208:1, 208:25, 209:13, 209:14, 209:24, 210:11, 210:13 February [11] - 24:25, 59:14, 79:25, 84:7, 84:9, 98:11, 98:24, 126:24, 151:22, 153:1, 153:25 federal [3] - 72:16, 83:14, 123:23 **FEDERAL** [1] - 211:19 Federal [7] - 23:5, 23:11, 117:13, 118:3, 120:4, 120:7, 191:9 Felix [1] - 119:16 fell [2] - 152:15, 156:25 fellow [2] - 26:2, 186:6 fellows [1] - 180:25 felt [1] - 71:14 fend [1] - 68:16 Ferrellgas [2] - 39:3, 39:4 FERRELLGAS [1] -Fertilizer [1] - 123:20 few [22] - 8:9, 13:2, 23:16, 24:23, 56:11, 60:22, 86:14, 89:21, 90:9, 97:12, 98:23, 113:16, 120:2, 157:3, 166:23, 169:11, 179:17, 186:1, 202:5, 207:6, 209:2 fiduciary [1] - 174:12 fight [2] - 104:20, 174:12 fighting [5] - 101:12, 104:12, 104:16, 137:25, 138:17 figure [2] - 58:19, 83:17 file [1] - 61:22 filed [3] - 22:19, 29:13,

60:13 filing [2] - 7:1, 119:8 filings [4] - 84:6, 84:15, 91:11, 170:21 **final** [6] - 32:6, 43:15, 79:12, 91:24, 174:1, 193:20 **finalizing** [2] - 59:4, 99:5 finally [14] - 10:23, 28:18, 66:6, 71:12, 88:5, 90:11, 91:21, 120:15, 127:13, 136:15, 174:23, 186:17, 193:20, 207:6 finance [6] - 61:8, 98:16, 99:8, 99:14, 103:14, 108:1 financial [10] - 46:3, 54:17, 62:4, 69:1, 103:10, 151:24, 154:4, 191:23, 201:23, 203:16 finder [1] - 199:19 findings [14] - 23:13, 23:18, 106:17, 106:19, 107:3, 116:3, 116:14, 118:5, 118:7, 118:9, 118:24, 119:2, 119:7, 120:22 fine [6] - 7:15, 7:17, 93:11, 94:5, 153:17, 195:25 fine-tuned [1] - 195:25 finished [2] - 61:7, 170:24 finishes [1] - 77:7 finishing [1] - 94:8 Fire [1] - 37:21 firm [5] - 20:23, 104:25, 151:5, 158:12 **firms** [4] - 21:5, 31:8, 164:21, 187:11 **first** [44] - 8:22, 10:7, 11:8, 15:4, 18:25, 22:24, 23:17, 36:9, 36:21, 37:13, 47:20, 51:2, 55:23, 62:10, 63:24, 66:11, 66:13, 68:15, 71:9, 71:22, 80:1, 94:19, 107:3, 123:20, 130:4, 148:4, 151:21, 152:4, 156:14, 158:6, 159:16, 161:13, 167:4,

167:9, 167:12,

167:13, 177:22, 181:14, 183:15, 190:6, 191:20, 192:3, 204:17, 207:18 fiscal [1] - 151:24 fit [2] - 200:19, 200:21 fits [1] - 202:9 five [15] - 29:12, 29:13, 58:22, 61:5, 76:21, 76:23, 101:17, 110:2, 122:19, 129:25, 161:14, 167:6, 169:8, 169:9 five-minute [1] -161:14 fix [7] - 15:1, 16:5, 20:7, 33:17, 96:7, 155:9 fixed [8] - 10:1, 115:3, 129:24, 135:21, 155:14, 165:12, 165:13, 165:14 fixing [76] - 9:3, 9:7, 9:12, 9:14, 11:17, 12:19, 12:21, 15:21, 18:22, 20:2, 22:7, 26:16, 26:21, 51:21, 52:1, 52:3, 52:7, 52:9, 53:2, 53:7, 53:9, 54:7, 54:9, 54:23, 55:7, 55:9, 55:12, 55:19, 56:15, 56:16, 57:2, 57:5, 57:8, 57:12, 57:14, 64:11, 66:9, 71:24, 72:1, 72:3, 72:11, 72:14, 73:3, 73:12, 73:17, 73:18, 73:20, 74:2, 74:15, 74:17, 74:19, 74:20, 75:1, 75:21, 76:12, 77:7, 77:19, 117:12, 118:20, 120:23, 135:16, 136:2, 160:5, 160:7, 162:11, 162:14, 162:16, 162:24, 162:25, 163:15, 163:22, 173:21, 182:19, 198:8, 199:13, 209:4 flag [2] - 59:3, 99:2 Flat [1] - 122:23 flat [14] - 23:2, 41:7, 41:21, 47:7, 80:2, 80:8, 80:19, 82:2, 82:12, 127:22, 127:24, 128:13,

171:11, 207:23 flaws [1] - 200:15 floor [1] - 7:18 flow [2] - 63:22, 102:11 flowing [1] - 140:19 flows [1] - 158:15 fly [3] - 102:1, 102:5, 102:7 focus [13] - 15:3, 18:6, 24:18, 48:10, 54:3, 54:24, 63:20, 77:21, 85:1, 104:17, 156:8, 158:21, 170:18 focused [3] - 88:14, 90:25, 91:6 focuses [1] - 15:11 focusing [2] - 64:8, 84:7 fold [2] - 74:13, 132:12 folks [1] - 180:13 follow [3] - 20:24, 50:22, 206:20 followed [2] - 56:20, 62:21 following [7] - 11:9, 29:23, 105:23, 106:15, 107:23, 175:25, 198:14 Food [2] - 26:10, 26:13 Foods [13] - 11:11, 12:15, 12:18, 14:1, 16:2, 19:19, 21:8, 26:15, 26:16, 26:23, 122:23, 182:6, 198:4 footnote [4] - 119:24, 137:1, 186:21, 186:22 FOR [1] - 1:1 forecast [1] - 101:23 forecasting [3] -59:16, 59:21, 63:10 forecasts [1] - 59:18 forego [1] - 108:23 foregoing [1] - 211:21 foresee [1] - 116:12 foreseeable [1] -160:4 forever [1] - 181:19 Form [3] - 84:8, 84:10 form [9] - 15:21, 68:8, 74:11, 107:11, 116:15, 121:13, 180:2, 188:11 formal [1] - 208:10 former [13] - 15:19, 17:4, 17:13, 18:15,

24:10, 24:21, 24:24,

40:11, 52:17, 62:11, 124:22, 124:23 forming [1] - 117:15 forms [1] - 148:8 forth [16] - 15:16, 22:14, 27:22, 72:11, 101:24, 117:20, 118:5, 118:9, 119:23, 120:12, 150:21, 175:25, 183:9, 194:23, 202:6, 205:15 fortune [2] - 174:10, 174:21 forty [1] - 142:4 forum [1] - 14:13 forward [7] - 38:24, 43:24, 44:13, 45:11, 46:23, 185:10, 205:14 forwarded [1] - 101:13 Fougera [2] - 115:2, 115:24 fought [1] - 139:16 foundation [4] -118:8, 118:12, 199:6, 201:6 founded [1] - 30:9 four [17] - 8:21, 35:20, 35:23, 41:1, 49:17, 50:6, 57:7, 75:21, 76:7, 91:9, 102:13, 103:5, 106:1, 110:2, 116:23, 136:22, 159:12 fourth [6] - 71:12, 71:13, 120:15, 134:18, 151:23, 168:10 FP&A[1] - 62:5 fraction [1] - 29:6 frames [1] - 94:8 Frank [3] - 5:25, 7:22, 20:24 FRANK [1] - 2:14 frankly [5] - 9:25, 47:21, 58:25, 107:19, 155:18 Fraternal [1] - 116:17 fraud [25] - 29:1, 33:22. 39:7. 39:9. 39:14, 39:20, 56:18, 57:19, 58:5, 58:7, 60:13, 66:14, 83:14, 111:24, 112:1, 153:11, 158:3, 175:2, 175:5, 177:10, 177:11, 188:25, 196:17, 206:5

fraud-related [1] -196:17 fraudulent [3] - 45:7, 160:2, 195:8 free [7] - 6:17, 6:20, 26:23, 113:24, 129:9, 129:19, 186:4 frequently [2] - 32:9, 121:12 **FRIED** [1] - 2:14 Fried [3] - 5:25, 7:22, 20:24 Friedman [1] - 39:15 friends [1] - 65:14 front [6] - 15:10, 134:16, 171:19, 180:21, 183:12, 185:23 Full [1] - 194:9 full [9] - 30:11, 45:16, 92:9, 144:17, 192:6, 194:14, 194:20, 194:21, 203:13 fullest [1] - 5:7 fully [3] - 93:1, 104:4, 158:8 function [1] - 201:3 functional [1] - 87:4 **functioning** [1] - 63:4 Fund [1] - 39:16 **FUND** [1] - 1:3 fundamental [2] -34:9, 197:11 **fungible** [1] - 208:9 furious [1] - 105:21 furthermore [1] -191:15 future [2] - 42:24, 172:19

## G

G-P-h-A [1] - 127:2 GAAP [9] - 59:11, 59:12, 62:5, 63:9, 98:22, 101:22, 165:10, 165:12, 165:18 gain [1] - 22:1 Gallagher [1] - 124:24 games [1] - 129:12 GAMMA [1] - 118:14 gap [1] - 60:24 gatekeepers [1] -171:21 gatekeeping [1] -201:3 general [15] - 27:23, 33:19, 67:16, 116:4,

116:6, 117:7,

160:14 generals [1] - 118:19 generate [1] - 90:23 generic [76] - 8:24, 10:2, 11:21, 12:11, 13:3, 13:12, 18:21, 20:8, 21:24, 22:20, 33:17, 34:3, 34:7, 44:20, 46:21, 49:7, 49:11, 51:3, 51:16, 67:13, 71:23, 75:4, 77:24, 79:16, 79:18, 96:13, 105:8, 106:10, 111:14, 111:15, 111:16, 111:19, 112:17, 112:19, 112:20, 112:21, 112:22, 113:5, 113:18, 113:25, 114:17, 117:16, 121:7, 124:23, 126:7, 126:10, 126:12, 126:14, 129:1, 129:21, 130:5, 130:10, 131:23, 131:24, 132:18, 133:20, 133:22, 133:24, 134:15, 137:13, 137:15, 156:18, 157:11, 159:1, 159:7, 159:19, 160:23, 163:23, 182:1, 183:18, 188:8, 208:2, 208:6, 209:14, 209:16 Generic [1] - 121:8 generics [8] - 77:22, 105:7, 129:14, 157:18, 158:1, 172:13, 207:10, 207:16 Genni [1] - 74:7 genuine [1] - 27:24 geographic [2] -35:23, 50:6 GIBSON [1] - 2:20 Gibson [6] - 6:8, 8:6, 20:23, 20:24, 36:6, 65:4 Given [1] - 92:15

118:22, 119:9,

119:14, 119:18,

119:21, 119:23,

General [1] - 52:14

General's [1] - 52:12

generally [5] - 30:20,

36:6, 129:16, 148:1,

151:2, 173:1

given [12] - 40:19, 49:18, 69:2, 76:16, 90:18, 97:14, 162:6, 175:3, 178:16, 183:3, 187:21, 203:22 glad [1] - 79:12 glare [1] - 160:3 glaring [1] - 48:10 Glass [1] - 122:23 global [1] - 32:24 globe [2] - 102:6, 102:7 glossed [1] - 96:6 Gluck [1] - 120:7 goal [3] - 79:16, 79:17, 80:2 goals [2] - 59:4, 99:5 **god** [1] - 56:16 Godot [5] - 9:21, 9:22, 29:8, 29:22 gold [1] - 109:6 Goldman [1] - 80:21 Gompers [2] - 117:17, 150:2 goodman [1] - 172:11 goods [2] - 31:19 gotcha [1] - 147:23 govern [2] - 182:14, 207:12 governed [3] - 191:8, 193:24, 194:8 government [2] -52:12, 120:3 government's [1] -158:25 GPhA[2] - 126:25, 135:17 grams [1] - 74:12 grant [1] - 199:23 granted [7] - 26:16, 50:16, 67:12, 97:6, 118:11, 150:8, 201:9 grants [1] - 16:3 granular [1] - 128:9 grapple [1] - 183:12 grappling [1] - 71:21 grave [1] - 47:9 great [7] - 20:18, 48:8, 60:9, 78:5, 78:9, 78:20, 151:4 greater [4] - 32:19, 38:5, 96:5, 204:14 Greenbaum [1] - 6:5 GREENBAUM [1] grew [1] - 104:22 GRONER [6] - 2:16, 4:11, 190:24, 191:2,

groner [1] - 206:12 Groner [8] - 6:1, 7:23, 8:12, 46:16, 49:25, 53:6, 191:7, 202:5 gross [4] - 125:11, 125:13, 125:17, 182:8 **GROSSMAN** [1] - 2:7 Grossman [1] - 5:14 ground [1] - 50:25 grounds [1] - 201:8 groundwork [1] -119:10 group [3] - 46:4, 87:4, 93:24 grouped [1] - 199:11 **groups** [1] - 90:23 growing [2] - 103:16, 103:22 growth [11] - 36:10, 36:23, 37:4, 89:5, 89:15, 103:16, 103:22, 155:14, 155:16 Guam [1] - 117:8 guess [4] - 95:18, 136:25, 180:21, 189:13 guesswork [1] -180:18 guidance [14] -104:20, 104:23, 104:25, 105:2, 105:18, 105:20, 106:2, 106:16, 106:20, 106:23, 133:9, 133:10, 156:16, 156:17 guide [1] - 65:7 guidelines [1] - 17:1 guilt [1] - 145:14 guilty [2] - 26:15, 26:20 Gumwood [1] - 23:19 gun [3] - 11:17, 16:16, 110.2 guns [2] - 11:18, 15:10 guts [1] - 40:24 gutted [1] - 136:21 gutting [1] - 180:5 guy [6] - 46:15, 88:18, 166:7, 184:6, 184:7, 184.12 guys [1] - 163:25 Н

Hail [1] - 171:1 half [8] - 11:5, 17:8,

24:9, 78:18, 95:4, 146:16, 167:12, 183.5 halfway [2] - 102:6, 102:7 hallmark [1] - 14:16 hallmarks [2] - 13:1, 121:9 hallway [1] - 41:11 Halobetasol [1] -127:6 hand [4] - 84:17, 87:15, 100:16, 178:7 hand-picked [1] -100:16 Handbook [1] - 121:8 handed [1] - 85:21 handful [1] - 159:5 handle [1] - 74:9 handled [1] - 178:12 hang [1] - 194:11 happy [2] - 93:20, 138:25 harbor [1] - 35:22 hard [4] - 71:21, 78:15, 163:20, 169:9 Hardiman [8] - 6:10, 46:25, 50:24, 86:25, 90:15, 161:21, 183:15, 184:5 HARDIMAN [7] - 3:3, 4:5, 6:9, 50:21, 50:24, 161:21, 163:3 Hardiman's [1] - 20:22 hardly [1] - 169:15 HARRIS [1] - 2:14 harrod [1] - 197:2 **HARROD** [10] - 2:7, 4:8. 4:12. 5:13. 139:6, 151:21, 161:16, 188:22, 200:2, 208:19 Harrod [5] - 5:13, 94:17, 139:1, 139:6, 188:19 Harrod's [1] - 177:21 Harvard [1] - 189:8 hat [1] - 100:14 hats [1] - 100:14 haves [5] - 108:24, 109:8, 109:9 head [6] - 32:7, 35:8, 62:11, 100:15, 112:15, 133:24 headline [1] - 87:18 headquarters [2] -159:18, 160:25 heads [2] - 54:17, 54:21

heads-up [2] - 54:17,

191:5, 191:7

54:21
headwind [1] - 132:20
Health [2] - 67:9,
88:19
Healthcare [1] -
156:19
<b>healthcare</b> [2] - 66:18,
93:9
hear [7] - 8:18, 40:11,
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
41:23, 46:15,
148:16, 162:12,
185:18
heard [15] - 41:24,
65:8, 71:25, 75:16,
107:2, 107:3,
113:20, 117:1,
110.20, 117.1,
144:12, 150:17,
172:8, 174:23,
177:24, 207:8
hearing [3] - 6:20,
34:25, 177:19
hearsay [19] - 22:16,
23:3, 23:5, 23:8,
23:9, 23:21, 27:8,
27:10, 27:12, 28:13,
28:16, 72:3, 72:6,
118:4, 120:4,
179:24, 180:19
heavily [4] - 31:18,
71:2, 95:10, 129:3
heavy [5] - 40:19,
3 t-1
120.5 120.8 180.6
129:5, 129:8, 180:6,
129:5, 129:8, 180:6, 183:22
183:22
183:22 <b>heft</b> [1] - 24:9
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] -
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6,
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14,
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24,
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14,
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14,
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4,
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13,
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13,
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13,
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13, 186:4, 190:12,
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13, 186:4, 190:12, 191:11, 193:17,
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13, 186:4, 190:12, 191:11, 193:17, 193:23, 198:7, 199:2
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13, 186:4, 190:12, 191:11, 193:17, 193:23, 198:7, 199:2
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13, 186:4, 190:12, 191:11, 193:17, 193:23, 198:7, 199:2 help [2] - 34:24,
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13, 186:4, 190:12, 191:11, 193:17, 193:23, 198:7, 199:2 help [2] - 34:24, 210:23
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13, 186:4, 190:12, 191:11, 193:17, 193:23, 198:7, 199:2 help [2] - 34:24, 210:23 helped [1] - 68:24
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13, 186:4, 190:12, 191:11, 193:17, 193:23, 198:7, 199:2 help [2] - 34:24, 210:23 helped [1] - 68:24
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13, 186:4, 190:12, 191:11, 193:17, 193:23, 198:7, 199:2 help [2] - 34:24, 210:23 helped [1] - 68:24 helpful [3] - 46:17,
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13, 186:4, 190:12, 191:11, 193:17, 193:23, 198:7, 199:2 help [2] - 34:24, 210:23 helped [1] - 68:24 helpful [3] - 46:17, 68:12, 202:20
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13, 186:4, 190:12, 191:11, 193:17, 193:23, 198:7, 199:2 help [2] - 34:24, 210:23 helped [1] - 68:24 helpful [3] - 46:17, 68:12, 202:20 Hendrickson [2] -
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13, 186:4, 190:12, 191:11, 193:17, 193:23, 198:7, 199:2 help [2] - 34:24, 210:23 helped [1] - 68:24 helpful [3] - 46:17, 68:12, 202:20
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13, 186:4, 190:12, 191:11, 193:17, 193:23, 198:7, 199:2 help [2] - 34:24, 210:23 helped [1] - 68:24 helpful [3] - 46:17, 68:12, 202:20 Hendrickson [2] - 138:11, 155:22
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13, 186:4, 190:12, 191:11, 193:17, 193:23, 198:7, 199:2 help [2] - 34:24, 210:23 helped [1] - 68:24 helpful [3] - 46:17, 68:12, 202:20 Hendrickson [2] - 138:11, 155:22 Hendrickson's [1] -
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13, 186:4, 190:12, 191:11, 193:17, 193:23, 198:7, 199:2 help [2] - 34:24, 210:23 helped [1] - 68:24 helpful [3] - 46:17, 68:12, 202:20 Hendrickson [2] - 138:11, 155:22 Hendrickson's [1] - 196:15
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13, 186:4, 190:12, 191:11, 193:17, 193:23, 198:7, 199:2 help [2] - 34:24, 210:23 helped [1] - 68:24 helpful [3] - 46:17, 68:12, 202:20 Hendrickson [2] - 138:11, 155:22 Hendrickson's [1] -
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13, 186:4, 190:12, 191:11, 193:17, 193:23, 198:7, 199:2 help [2] - 34:24, 210:23 helped [1] - 68:24 helpful [3] - 46:17, 68:12, 202:20 Hendrickson [2] - 138:11, 155:22 Hendrickson's [1] - 196:15 herd [1] - 180:13
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13, 186:4, 190:12, 191:11, 193:17, 193:23, 198:7, 199:2 help [2] - 34:24, 210:23 helped [1] - 68:24 helpful [3] - 46:17, 68:12, 202:20 Hendrickson [2] - 138:11, 155:22 Hendrickson's [1] - 196:15 herd [1] - 180:13 herring [1] - 120:5
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13, 186:4, 190:12, 191:11, 193:17, 193:23, 198:7, 199:2 help [2] - 34:24, 210:23 helped [1] - 68:24 helpful [3] - 46:17, 68:12, 202:20 Hendrickson [2] - 138:11, 155:22 Hendrickson's [1] - 196:15 herd [1] - 180:13 herring [1] - 120:5 herself [1] - 131:19
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13, 186:4, 190:12, 191:11, 193:17, 193:23, 198:7, 199:2 help [2] - 34:24, 210:23 helped [1] - 68:24 helpful [3] - 46:17, 68:12, 202:20 Hendrickson [2] - 138:11, 155:22 Hendrickson's [1] - 196:15 herd [1] - 180:13 herring [1] - 120:5
183:22 heft [1] - 24:9 heightened [2] - 110:11, 187:3 held [24] - 5:1, 12:6, 12:20, 23:3, 32:14, 32:20, 33:1, 35:24, 39:5, 51:8, 102:14, 120:6, 130:4, 131:19, 140:13, 175:23, 178:13, 186:4, 190:12, 191:11, 193:17, 193:23, 198:7, 199:2 help [2] - 34:24, 210:23 helped [1] - 68:24 helpful [3] - 46:17, 68:12, 202:20 Hendrickson [2] - 138:11, 155:22 Hendrickson's [1] - 196:15 herd [1] - 180:13 herring [1] - 120:5 herself [1] - 131:19

```
hidden [1] - 203:3
hide [3] - 111:20,
 113:24, 146:16
hiding [1] - 162:14
high [7] - 125:15,
 125:25, 133:22,
 161:25, 163:14,
 184:8, 200:9
higher [3] - 19:25,
 82:15, 142:21
highest [2] - 117:9,
 164:20
Highfields [1] - 24:4
Highland [2] - 192:9,
 192:12
highlight [2] - 68:5,
 142:18
highlighted [3] - 88:1,
 113:10, 170:16
highlights [1] - 97:12
highly [5] - 151:16,
 198:13, 198:17,
 208:8, 210:5
hike [10] - 123:19,
 125:10, 125:16,
 125:17, 125:24,
 134:2, 134:5, 136:4,
 161:24, 173:21
hiked [2] - 127:12,
 135:19
hikes [23] - 19:18,
 112:16. 122:16.
 122:18. 122:24.
 122:25, 123:5,
 123:14, 124:7,
 124:13, 124:18,
 126:6, 126:20,
 127:5, 127:15,
 127:16, 129:5,
 134:19, 134:21,
 134:22, 135:2,
 135:5, 135:6
HIMMEL [2] - 1:18,
 5:20
Himmel [1] - 5:21
himself [4] - 24:17,
 75:11, 104:19, 131:3
hind [1] - 181:18
hindsight [3] - 60:14,
 88:14, 88:24
hinge [1] - 111:22
hired [2] - 97:19,
 106:23
history [2] - 179:10,
 180:1
hit [1] - 96:17
hitched [1] - 155:15
```

hitches [1] - 101:19

holding [3] - 124:4,

hold [1] - 146:24

```
131:3, 186:21
Holdings [1] - 192:17
holdings [3] - 19:20,
 69:11, 71:4
holds [4] - 14:8,
 32:17, 123:18,
 147:10
holistic [1] - 186:23
home [1] - 52:10
honest [3] - 95:21,
 186:14, 192:20
honestly [1] - 132:16
Honor [198] - 5:11,
 5:13, 5:16, 5:18,
 5:20, 5:24, 6:4, 6:7,
 6:9, 7:9, 7:16, 7:19,
 8:11, 8:14, 8:20, 9:5,
 9:8, 9:16, 9:25, 10:3,
 10:18, 10:24, 11:2,
 11:8, 11:13, 11:15,
 12:1, 12:2, 12:5,
 12:12, 12:16, 12:20,
 13:19, 14:8, 16:15,
 17:19, 18:2, 18:11,
 18:24, 19:12, 19:20,
 19:24, 20:3, 20:10,
 20:20, 21:25, 22:23,
 23:6, 23:20, 24:5,
 24:13, 25:4, 25:9,
 25:10, 26:1, 26:9,
 26:14, 26:15, 27:11,
 29:7, 29:11, 29:21,
 31:25, 34:3, 34:12,
 34:21, 35:7, 35:14,
 36:20, 37:2, 37:18,
 38:1, 38:21, 40:9,
 40:13, 41:1, 41:21,
 45:14, 46:17, 47:24,
 50:4, 50:19, 51:7,
 55:18, 57:3, 64:11,
 64:18, 64:21, 65:5,
 67:7, 67:25, 69:25,
 73:5, 73:6, 73:23,
 76:12, 78:8, 79:12,
 79:24, 79:25, 80:25,
 81:6, 81:13, 81:16,
 81:20, 81:22, 82:19,
 83:2, 84:17, 85:22,
 87:7, 87:8, 88:7,
 89:6, 90:4, 90:6,
 91:14, 91:21, 93:5,
 93:16, 93:17, 93:20,
 94:5, 94:14, 94:15,
 94:19, 95:4, 95:14,
 99:10, 103:11,
 107:21, 110:9,
 110:18, 112:19,
 114:2, 116:13,
 116:19, 117:21,
 120:15, 120:17,
```

```
122:10, 126:9,
 138:13, 139:1,
 139:6, 149:17,
 151:16, 161:7,
 161:16, 161:22,
 163:16, 164:24,
 166:14, 166:16,
 166:24, 169:19,
 169:21, 170:7,
 171:6, 171:8,
 171:14, 171:17,
 172:2, 173:8,
 173:10, 175:2,
 175:9, 175:13,
 175:14, 176:19,
 177:2, 177:5,
 178:11, 178:17,
 179:17, 180:11,
 180:23, 182:12,
 182:17, 182:20,
 182:23, 183:2,
 183:3, 186:25,
 188:20, 188:22,
 190:18, 191:3,
 191:5, 199:25,
 200:2, 202:17,
 210:14, 210:19,
 211:15
Honor's [1] - 190:14
Honorable [3] - 5:1,
 5:2, 5:5
HONORABLE [1] -
 1:14
honored [1] - 63:4
hope [3] - 26:9, 65:25,
 67:7
hoped [2] - 9:17, 29:8
hopefully [1] - 65:5
hoping [2] - 65:7,
 79:23
horrible [1] - 108:1
hostile [5] - 68:16,
 71:6, 104:12, 107:6,
 201:19
hour [2] - 183:4, 183:5
hours [7] - 76:20,
 76:21, 76:23, 95:4,
 167:6, 169:8, 169:9
house [1] - 5:7
housekeeping [1] -
 6.13
HR [5] - 83:24, 84:1,
 87:5, 96:2, 100:8
huge [3] - 124:11,
 134:21, 138:2
human [1] - 19:5
hump [1] - 36:13
hundred [3] - 92:10,
 94:21, 134:21
hundreds [3] - 34:7,
```

115:25, 120:18 hurting [1] - 101:6 hydrocortisone [1] -127:6 hypothetical [6] -72:2, 145:3, 145:6, 145:18, 145:19

### ı

idea [12] - 70:16, 105:22, 117:11, 146:10, 146:21, 147:12, 148:25, 155:15, 163:16, 174:22, 204:16, 207:4 ideas [1] - 94:2 identical [1] - 194:19 identified [12] - 14:1, 28:24, 60:25, 61:2, 84:23, 103:9, 115:17, 119:18, 120:19, 126:15, 177:15, 202:5 identifies [3] - 24:16, 87:24, 127:15 identify [5] - 6:14, 14:19, 40:5, 196:6, 200:14 **IETSEAP** [1] - 61:15 ignored [1] - 96:11 ill [2] - 22:17, 27:12 ill-conceived [1] -27:12 ill-fated [1] - 22:17 illegal [14] - 14:20, 20:19, 30:14, 112:2, 112:6, 112:8, 113:1, 114:20, 114:23, 115:6, 177:6, 177:8, 199:11, 199:12 illegally [1] - 23:13 illogical [2] - 45:11, 49:24 **illustrated** [1] - 36:16 illustrative [1] -151:18 image [4] - 148:18, 148:23, 149:1, 154:18 imagine [1] - 127:8 immediate [4] - 59:3, 99:2, 143:25, 206:3 immediately [4] -107:8, 142:9, 142:17, 159:11 impact [8] - 21:6, 38:14, 44:9, 44:11, 54:18, 54:21, 204:21

impairment [6] -107:18, 152:2, 152:4, 152:14, 156:21, 165:5 impeaches [1] -117:11 impeachment [1] -116:25 impeded [1] - 146:11 impediment [1] -37:16 impediments [5] -37:9, 41:19, 83:6, 88:22, 144:10 impermissible [1] -10:16 impermissibly [1] -17:16 implement [1] - 135:7 implementation [1] -32:25 implemented [3] -110:11, 122:15, 124:12 implementing [1] -33:4 implicated [1] -153:22 implication [1] - 20:17 implications [2] -20:16, 42:9 implicitly [2] - 10:19, 42:18 **imply** [1] - 53:15 **implying** [1] - 14:25 importance [5] -20:18, 201:20, 201:21, 203:10, 203:16 important [17] - 8:1, 22:3, 26:9, 29:23, 42:2, 45:8, 56:7, 58:12, 88:9, 93:16, 141:9, 144:20, 148:4, 157:20, 184:9, 191:25, 202:4 importantly [5] -52:21, 129:13, 138:8, 148:15, 210:24 impossible [2] -101:4, 187:19 improper [4] - 115:25, 145:13, 149:6, 194:24 improperly [3] -142:15, 192:4, 194:5 improve [1] - 135:9 improvement [1] -66:19

impunity [1] - 140:24 inactionable [1] -39:19 inadmissible [11] -16:9, 22:13, 22:16, 23:2, 27:7, 27:10, 28:17, 173:15, 180:2, 191:14, 199:16 inappropriate [1] -193:9 inch [1] - 181:5 include [3] - 176:14, 209:1, 209:25 included [2] - 108:25, 134:12 including [17] - 20:14, 23:1, 29:2, 31:7, 42:9, 49:6, 113:2, 115:6, 119:14, 127:5, 135:21, 135:22, 143:10, 208:8, 208:24, 209:3, 210:10 income [1] - 104:9 inconsistent [5] -44:8, 45:13, 121:9, 176:21, 201:2 incorporate [1] -199:3 incorrect [1] - 11:23 increase [13] - 17:22, 19:15, 32:23, 54:12, 54:18, 74:13, 79:1, 79:3, 123:9, 132:3, 132:6, 132:12, 198:15 increased [7] - 61:24, 69:12, 69:17, 71:4, 160:1 increases [22] - 11:20, 14:6, 14:11, 17:18, 19:12, 19:17, 19:21, 19:25, 20:11, 30:12, 30:15, 30:17, 30:19, 31:2, 31:24, 116:1, 124:3, 132:1, 134:11, 172:12, 172:14, 198:2 incredibly [2] -106:21, 175:10 incurring [1] - 124:12 indeed [8] - 21:25, 25:19, 31:20, 31:25, 32:17, 36:12, 45:16,

178:18

14:11

independence [1] -

independent [5] -

8:21, 30:22, 32:2,

32:6, 104:15 independently [1] -14.4 indicate [3] - 52:25, 127:13, 166:8 indicated [7] - 24:22, 57:1, 126:9, 127:3, 130:11, 133:11, 154.8 indicates [3] - 101:15, 164:11, 188:25 indicating [5] -118:25, 120:25, 154:5, 185:12, 202:23 indication [2] - 32:16, 152:7 indications [1] - 103:1 indicative [2] - 20:13, 48:21 indicators [1] - 156:20 indicia [3] - 11:22, 119:15, 208:17 indict [1] - 29:17 indirect [1] - 110:24 individual [8] - 7:10, 8:8, 8:19, 9:3, 50:17, 80:15, 127:21, 143:11 Individually [1] - 1:4 individuals [2] - 67:2, 169:2 indulgence [2] - 8:3, 210:22 **Industries** [1] - 194:13 Industry [1] - 39:16 industry [24] - 12:9, 17:12, 17:18, 18:12, 18:17, 22:21, 53:7, 53:8, 53:14, 56:2, 66:17, 66:18, 75:23, 93:9, 123:3, 126:20, 135:15, 136:8, 149:25, 173:19, 203:13, 203:18 inextricably [1] -156:3 infancy [1] - 37:17 infer [5] - 113:21, 117:4. 127:9. 127:17. 184:20 inference [42] - 11:13, 11:25, 16:17, 16:24, 19:2, 19:3, 19:6, 38:11, 71:2, 72:14, 95:12, 102:18, 107:21, 110:4, 110:5, 110:12, 110:15, 114:1, 114:3, 114:4,

128:16, 128:22, 129:19, 130:8, 133:7, 136:5, 136:13, 138:20, 138:21, 163:21, 164:2, 165:21, 170:25, 173:17, 173:18, 173:20, 173:23, 184:24, 184:25, 186:23 inferences [23] -11:11, 95:6, 96:20, 97:2, 97:3, 97:7, 99:24, 100:1, 101:9, 108:12, 109:24, 114:5, 128:18, 128:19, 129:23, 183:10, 184:13, 188:13, 188:16, 192:13, 192:15, 199:16, 199:21 infinitesimal [1] - 29:3 **infirm** [1] - 10:6 inflated [3] - 97:20, 99:9, 178:7 inflation [2] - 148:11, 178:8 influence [1] - 184:12 informal [1] - 208:10 information [91] -21:9, 21:24, 22:2, 22:8, 24:14, 27:16, 38:12, 40:19, 46:3, 46:6, 52:22, 63:17, 70:2, 70:7, 70:9, 71:15, 83:16, 83:17, 86:10, 88:11, 88:12, 90:3, 90:13, 92:9, 92:22, 96:15, 96:17, 100:13, 114:13, 114:14, 117:21, 140:15, 144:15, 146:12, 148:6, 150:5, 150:21, 153:4, 153:7, 153:9, 153:14, 154:4, 154:7, 154:18, 154:21, 155:20, 156:6, 156:10, 156:22, 157:13, 157:17, 157:21, 158:2, 158:13, 158:18, 158:25, 159:12, 159:17, 160:13, 160:16, 160:19, 160:21, 169:7, 179:14, 189:4, 189:9, 191:24, 193:4, 193:24, 194:17,

195:13, 196:12, 196:16, 196:17, 196:25, 197:1, 197:4, 197:5, 201:20, 201:21, 202:3, 202:25, 203:10, 203:17, 205:1, 206:12, 206:18, 206:23, 208:11 informed [4] - 108:17, 134:8, 173:10, 178:25 infrastructure [1] -91:3 ing [1] - 150:19 ingested [1] - 158:8 inherent [1] - 160:4 initial [9] - 7:1, 30:8, 38:18, 85:5, 86:1, 87:13, 87:24, 107:23, 207:25 initiate [1] - 70:3 initiated [4] - 70:4, 70:6, 70:8, 70:15 injectable [1] - 209:13 injectables [1] -126:16 injected [1] - 116:6 injunctive [6] -178:15, 178:21, 179:9, 189:15, 190:2, 190:11 injured [1] - 178:24 injury [1] - 141:11 injustice [1] - 182:8 innocence [2] - 66:5, 72.25 innocuous [2] - 125:3, 126:21 input [3] - 134:2, 173:2, 173:3 inquire [1] - 135:1 inquiries [2] - 18:16, 130:13 insight [1] - 71:19 insinuated [1] -142:15 insist [2] - 69:5, 69:6 insisting [1] - 167:3 instance [1] - 171:23 instead [5] - 96:1, 101:18, 128:1, 183:24, 199:11 instill [1] - 183:17 instruct [3] - 202:17, 202:18, 203:24 instructing [1] - 194:1 insubstantial [1] -20:1

insulated [5] - 56:1, 131:9, 131:16, 133:2, 163:13 insulation [1] - 131:19 integrate [2] - 58:22, 184.7 integrated [5] - 58:20, 63:14, 97:25, 104:4, 166:2 integrating [1] - 84:1 integration [145] -10:9, 10:25, 35:12, 35:19, 37:10, 37:14, 37:17, 37:25, 38:3, 38:6, 38:12, 38:18, 38:23, 39:1, 39:6, 39:14, 39:19, 40:15, 40:25, 41:12, 41:14, 41:19, 41:23, 42:17, 46:21, 48:14, 50:3, 50:10, 50:11, 51:5, 57:11, 57:12, 57:17, 57:22, 58:2, 58:6, 58:10, 58:15, 58:21, 59:5, 59:22, 59:23, 59:24, 60:9, 60:19, 61:4, 61:8, 61:14, 61:17, 61:20, 62:4, 62:20, 63:13, 63:18, 64:1, 64:3, 64:4, 64:6, 64:9, 64:13, 64:14, 66:10, 67:15, 82:21, 82:23, 83:7, 83:19, 83:21, 84:12, 85:5, 85:6, 85:13, 86:1, 86:2, 86:11, 86:12, 86:15, 86:19, 87:4, 87:12, 87:13, 87:18, 87:20, 87:25, 88:24, 90:22, 91:8, 96:3, 98:18, 100:7, 100:15, 100:17, 100:20, 101:3, 101:5, 101:6, 101:12, 101:19, 101:21, 102:8, 102:14, 102:21, 103:9, 104:1, 105:15, 108:17, 108:19, 108:21, 108:23, 137:11, 137:12, 152:14, 153:21, 157:5, 165:1, 166:11, 166:13, 169:18, 170:1, 170:5, 170:14, 170:15, 170:19, 170:22, 170:23, 182:17, 182:18, 184:9,

184:20, 184:21, 186:13, 186:18, 187:11, 187:13, 187:14, 187:15, 187:18, 187:23, 188:4 Integration [1] - 39:7 integration-relate [1] -39:6 integrations [3] -83:11, 100:17, 100.22 intend [1] - 138:19 intended [2] - 9:1, 52:11 intense [2] - 9:10, 21:15 intensity [2] - 160:17, 161:5 intent [7] - 36:5, 38:20, 42:19, 68:7, 186:7, 192:6, 192:19 intentionally [3] -66:21, 78:22, 130:2 interact [3] - 18:11, 41:12, 41:13 interactions [4] -16:12, 17:11, 18:3, 18:7 interdependence [2] -14:11, 15:6 interdependent [2] -14:2, 33:5 interest [3] - 14:24, 32:16, 69:2 interesting [1] -175:18 interestingly [2] -144:11, 145:24 interfering [2] -140:11, 188:5 interm [1] - 99:8 internal [7] - 103:11, 106:2, 106:9, 106:17, 121:12, 127:3, 187:8 internally [6] - 33:10, 44:8, 45:13, 104:6, 114:9, 122:2 International [1] -193:7 interpolate [1] -206:22 interpretation [5] -149:5, 153:21, 154:7, 171:18, 171:24

interpretations [2] -

167:2, 167:4

interpreted [2] -

155:17, 169:19 intertwined [1] - 156:3 intervening [1] - 9:10 Intervest [1] - 11:15 intimated [1] - 10:4 intraday [1] - 159:10 introduce [1] - 117:6 introduced [1] -120:16 investigated [2] -131:5, 131:17 investigation [18] -23:14. 30:2. 30:3. 30:5, 52:23, 118:6, 118:10, 118:18, 118:21, 119:4, 119:8, 119:11, 120:13, 131:7, 158:25, 159:6, 159:19, 160:23 investigations [2] -27:9, 117:19 investigators [1] -159:22 Investment [1] -203:14 investment [5] - 37:5, 144:7, 191:23, 201:17, 203:16 investor [5] - 83:25, 84:3, 84:11, 84:14, 202:2 investors [58] - 9:2, 13:11, 37:24, 90:24, 96:16, 99:11, 99:17, 101:17, 102:23, 103:21, 103:25, 104:6, 105:1, 105:13, 107:9, 107:10, 108:8, 108:18, 111:11, 112:5, 113:14, 113:24, 114:11, 114:14, 129:13, 130:3, 130:4, 130:15, 130:20, 131:3, 131:6, 133:9, 136:14, 138:3, 138:7, 138:17, 139:19, 140:9, 151:3, 151:25, 154:8, 155:7, 156:1, 156:15, 157:22, 160:21, 183:18, 183:19, 183:23, 186:14, 190:4, 190:12, 191:24, 195:10, 201:22, 203:10, 205:17 involve [3] - 72:11,

167:19, 167:22, 172:24, 173:1 Involved [1] - 72:7 involvement [1] - 99:3 involves [5] - 72:5, 72:6, 112:1, 120:9, 137:11 involving [4] - 12:21, 15:2, 137:12, 198:8 iota [1] - 54:2 IRFS [8] - 59:10, 59:12, 60:24, 62:5, 63:9, 165:10, 165:11, 165:18 Irish [1] - 104:24 irrational [2] - 44:7, 125:9 irrelevant [2] - 26:8, 60:6 irreparably [1] -178:24 irritate [1] - 31:13 isolating [1] - 152:16 Israel [2] - 176:20, 176:22 issue [47] - 14:9, 27:23, 28:19, 30:18, 33:18, 34:16, 36:9, 40:15, 42:1, 43:11, 48:4, 57:18, 60:2, 60:18, 60:25, 61:2, 62:5, 64:4, 65:20, 77:8, 79:8, 79:17, 81:19, 82:5, 82:21, 95:22, 97:10, 101:21, 109:23, 129:20, 134:15, 150:25, 153:16, 165:18, 166:1, 166:21, 169:25, 173:24, 185:4, 186:1, 188:12, 197:13, 198:10, 203:17 issued [1] - 110:16 issues [31] - 8:7, 15:24, 26:8, 34:14, 41:19, 47:23, 58:12, 60:23, 65:11, 66:6, 76:24, 94:16, 94:18, 94:20, 97:5, 122:8, 149:12, 152:14,

122:24, 135:25

involved [21] - 9:14,

17:13, 19:13, 25:6,

75:2, 75:15, 77:6,

123:20, 124:2,

133:22, 163:14,

155:25, 157:11, 165:6, 170:6, 174:1, 177:17, 182:17, 54:23, 64:13, 64:14, 188:19, 193:14, 201:23, 202:9, 86:11, 88:12, 107:1, 202:15, 204:19 issuing [1] - 175:21 IT [10] - 83:24, 83:25, 86:9, 87:5, 88:12, 88:14, 88:15, 92:15, 96:2, 100:8 items [3] - 98:20, 99:1, 136:10 itself [7] - 44:14, 98:6, 101:6, 116:6, 116:12, 120:11, 178:21 ITT [5] - 193:16, 193:23, 194:3, 194:18, 194:20 lvy [1] - 204:5

J.W [1] - 121:14 **JACOBSON** [1] - 2:14 jail [1] - 164:1 **JAMES** [3] - 2:7, 2:15, 2:16 James [3] - 5:13, 5:25, 139:6 Jamie [2] - 5:24, 7:21 January [3] - 36:3, 80:21, 85:11 **JENSEN** [2] - 2:8, 5:18 Jensen [1] - 5:18 **JERSEY** [1] - 1:1 Jersey [3] - 1:11, 1:19, 2:12 Jesse [1] - 5:18 JESSE [1] - 2:8 **job** [10] - 18:16, 48:19, 51:14, 78:5, 78:9, 78:20, 154:6, 164:2, 164:4, 172:16 jobs [1] - 163:20 Joe [12] - 86:13, 88:17, 88:18, 93:2, 97:11, 99:3, 105:9, 105:18, 108:20, 132:10, 163:19 Joe's [1] - 88:21 **JOHN** [1] - 3:3 John [8] - 6:9, 25:20, 50:24, 53:24, 121:14, 134:4, 138:10, 161:21 joining [2] - 168:23, 179:4

joint [1] - 18:19

Jordan [1] - 193:7 JOSEPH [1] - 1:8 Joseph [10] - 2:22, 6:8, 6:24, 65:4, 86:9, 86:12, 168:4, 168:5, 168:7, 169:17 **Josh** [2] - 5:11, 94:15 **JOSHUA** [1] - 2:3 Journal [2] - 159:16, 159:20 JP [1] - 97:23 judge [2] - 171:16, 211:6 JUDGE [1] - 1:14 Judge [29] - 5:2, 5:3, 7:25, 9:5, 9:11, 14:17, 29:11, 29:23, 30:8, 35:17, 38:25, 39:10, 40:13, 40:17, 42:2, 50:7, 94:24, 104:13, 130:7, 133:5, 137:6, 140:13, 157:7, 162:13, 177:10, 184:2, 185:3, 186:19 Judge's [1] - 182:16 judges [1] - 171:20 judgment [53] - 6:23, 6:24, 6:25, 7:8, 7:10, 8:11, 16:3, 19:4, 19:11, 27:2, 27:25, 28:14, 32:3, 33:23, 34:14, 50:16, 53:19, 55:23, 65:24, 68:2, 81:3, 93:15, 96:22, 97:4, 108:13, 115:10, 115:13, 116:7, 116:11, 116:14, 117:22, 128:17, 128:18, 140:20, 149:5, 149:8, 150:8, 150:22, 153:19, 161:3, 162:4, 171:2, 175:8, 177:4, 179:12, 179:18, 181:1, 184:18, 185:24, 187:1, 188:9, 200:8, 200:23 JUDGMENT/LOSS [1] - 4:3 judicial [1] - 76:3 **Judy** [15] - 3:5, 6:10, 6:25, 52:7, 52:8, 61:12, 97:11, 132:10, 134:6, 138:1, 161:21, 162:9, 162:16, 163:19 juiced [1] - 187:6

29:24, 35:16, 92:13, 102:10, 103:5, 103:13, 113:15, 121:15, 132:21, 169:16, 170:1, 176:2, 187:17 jump [1] - 48:20 juncture [1] - 116:11 June [23] - 29:14, 36:21, 60:4, 60:5, 60:6, 60:11, 60:17, 61:11, 61:12, 61:21, 62:2, 62:10, 63:18, 63:21, 80:10, 80:14, 99:22, 100:3, 100:24, 108:25, 165:4, 165:7, 165:14 juries [2] - 96:21, 171:23 juris [1] - 149:1 jurisdictions [1] -117:10 jurisprudence [1] -39:20 jurors [4] - 123:10, 130:16, 182:2, 201:25 jury [97] - 65:21, 74:16, 81:18, 82:18, 93:7, 95:6, 95:19, 95:22, 97:14, 99:23, 100:9, 102:5, 102:17, 104:2, 107:20, 108:5, 109:11, 109:13, 109:23, 110:3, 111:7, 111:11, 114:1, 114:7, 114:21, 114:22, 117:3, 121:23, 122:17, 123:8, 123:16, 124:11, 125:1, 125:5, 125:7, 126:4, 126:5, 126:19, 126:23, 127:8, 127:17, 127:23, 128:14, 128:23, 129:4, 129:17, 129:20, 129:25, 131:22, 133:7, 133:18, 134:9, 134:18, 134:25, 135:13, 135:14. 136:5. 136:6. 136:11. 136:12, 138:20, 153:18, 162:1,

**JULIEN** [2] - 1:14, 5:1

July [15] - 8:20, 14:18,

Julien [1] - 5:5

162:5, 164:6, 171:10, 171:20, 173:9, 180:21, 181:17, 181:19, 181:23, 182:7, 182:20, 183:12, 184:19, 184:24, 185:18, 185:24, 186:4, 186:10, 186:16, 186:25, 188:16, 188:17, 193:19, 194:2, 201:4, 202:17, 202:18, 202:20, 203:24 justice [2] - 211:5 Justice [7] - 9:18, 52:13, 52:20, 117:2, 159:17, 160:24, 202.8

## Κ

Kate [1] - 6:1 **KATHERINE** [1] - 2:15 keep [5] - 55:19, 80:2, 80:7, 83:11, 163:25 keeping [1] - 80:19 kept [3] - 134:16, 163:6, 170:22 key [2] - 111:21, 134:14 kids [1] - 45:21 kills [1] - 47:4 Kincaid [16] - 40:12, 40:14, 40:19, 40:20, 41:6, 41:16, 41:18, 41:22, 42:3, 42:7, 91:23, 180:7, 180:12, 180:13, 185:6, 185:7 **KINCAID** [1] - 40:12 Kincaid's [1] - 42:13 kind [22] - 10:2, 21:3, 22:6, 39:12, 58:4, 64:7, 74:24, 75:1, 76:6, 80:19, 98:22, 126:17, 148:23, 162:12, 169:19, 173:21, 175:6, 179:2, 182:7, 183:8, 203:4, 209:9 kindly [1] - 145:2 kinds [2] - 144:15, 185:15 King [1] - 1:10 Kirsten [1] - 104:22 Kmart [1] - 191:17 knowing [5] - 46:19,

knowingly [1] -110:16 knowledge [20] - 28:2, 28:12. 41:15. 42:19. 52:2, 68:7, 75:1, 77:22, 89:22, 98:8, 111:10, 130:11, 131:7, 131:19, 168:25, 192:5, 192:7, 192:14, 203:3, 204:14 knowledgeable [2] -130:5, 131:4 known [16] - 45:12, 45:18, 49:9, 88:20, 132:15, 133:9, 133:10, 143:4, 147:14, 148:7, 166:22, 190:4, 190:5, 195:14, 196:8, 202:24 knows [5] - 29:12, 45:4, 67:25, 69:25, 74:20

162:19

# L

lack [13] - 23:24, 30:5, 30:7, 32:12, 37:14, 46:16, 57:1, 65:9, 66:2, 102:23, 118:7, 137:22, 179:25 Lackdawalla [1] -209:20 lacked [2] - 37:10, 195:17 lacking [2] - 16:7, 27:1 lacks [2] - 24:3, 177:8 laid [1] - 31:5 land [2] - 175:20, 176:13 landscape [1] - 180:6 language [8] - 65:19, 82:20, 167:2, 171:9, 171:15, 171:17, 172:3, 172:16 large [8] - 10:10, 30:1, 132:1, 152:17, 168:11, 168:15, 168:16, 198:14 largely [4] - 15:5, 191:25, 200:23, 204:15 larger [1] - 62:1 last [12] - 76:18, 80:16, 85:23, 147:11, 163:16, 168:3, 172:18, 175:1, 183:5, 183:7,

210:19, 210:20 lastly [1] - 158:21 late [4] - 98:10, 131:25, 183:4, 191:2 latitude [1] - 201:9 launched [3] - 141:13, 145:5, 154:21 launches [3] - 157:19, 158:11, 158:16 law [34] - 10:16, 11:24, 20:18, 26:7, 27:8, 28:5, 29:15, 31:8, 34:21, 35:7, 38:24, 44:3, 65:10, 71:2, 72:17, 74:14, 109:23, 110:10, 117:9, 118:11, 120:13, 164:18, 164:19, 164:20, 164:22, 175:2, 175:3, 176:7, 182:4, 189:19, 193:25, 194:12, 199:17, 199:21 lawful [4] - 14:7, 14:17, 21:17, 199:5 lawfully [1] - 13:24 laws [3] - 123:23, 140:23, 148:24 lawsuit [1] - 137:11 lawsuits [5] - 143:9, 143:11, 143:16, 167:23, 178:16 lawyer [3] - 76:3, 172:21, 180:15 lawyers [2] - 171:22 layman [1] - 204:14 Lead [3] - 1:19, 2:5, 2:9 lead [1] - 155:13 leader [1] - 20:25 leadership [1] - 156:1 leading [2] - 71:12, 178:13 leads [1] - 14:2 League [1] - 204:5 League-educated [1]

- 204:5

40:20

leap [2] - 55:17, 55:18

learn [2] - 38:13,

learned [3] - 85:12,

least [13] - 34:4, 62:7,

112:12, 116:23,

116:24, 124:21,

129:24, 130:1,

133:20, 136:14,

155:21, 198:16,

175:1, 196:19

leas [1] - 45:17

54:23, 57:12, 74:2,

manipulated [3] -

102:12, 106:8,

187:10

204:7
leave [6] - 7:4, 64:22,
81:19, 93:7, 154:5,
188:19
leaving [6] - 48:19,
154:9, 154:23,
155:5, 155:18,
157:15
lectern [3] - 6:21, 7:20
led [1] - 103:10
<b>LEDA</b> [1] - 5:3
left [11] - 11:3, 31:16,
67:11, 82:4, 84:19,
87:15, 88:10,
155:10, 155:17,
182:9, 184:11
left-hand [1] - 87:15
legal [17] - 13:21,
14:21, 112:8, 113:1,
161:1, 193:8,
194:25, 195:25,
199:11, 199:20,
202:15, 203:1,
203:5, 203:12,
204:16, 204:19,
205:6
legally [3] - 45:15,
118:6, 194:23
legitimate [4] - 18:9,
18:18, 122:6, 127:11
legitimately [1] -
174:25
legs [1] - 181:18
length [1] - 178:10
less [11] - 18:21,
44:25, 45:18, 47:6,
61:11, 77:24, 78:3,
78:15, 142:2, 152:7,
185:16
lesser [1] - 200:25
letter [5] - 74:6, 74:21,
74:25, 115:19,
132:12
letters [1] - 74:9
letting [1] - 70:14
Letting [1] - 32:23
level [8] - 20:25,
75:12, 75:13,
127:21, 128:5,
128:9, 133:22, 184:9
levels [1] - 81:12
<b>Lexus</b> [2] - 110:9,
186:3
liabilities [1] - 71:1
liability [8] - 33:23,
94:16, 140:19,
145:9, 145:10,
145:12, 147:2, 147:3
liable [2] - 51:8,
4.40.40
140:18
140.16

```
liaison [1] - 5:21
                              35:7
                            logical [3] - 78:2,
liberty [2] - 114:4,
 114:11
                              163:21, 176:12
                            logistics [1] - 24:20
Library [1] - 203:14
lie [4] - 68:14, 104:2,
                            London [1] - 102:14
 114:10, 192:15
                            long-term [1] - 91:6
life [3] - 13:19, 22:17,
                            look [52] - 13:23,
 24:25
                              18:13, 51:15, 54:24,
light [4] - 38:4, 186:6,
                              55:1, 56:4, 58:24,
 196:5, 201:22
likelihood [2] -
 107:18, 204:22
likely [2] - 33:12, 45:6
likewise [1] - 107:13
limit [1] - 203:22
limitations [1] - 29:21
limited [7] - 96:24,
 120:9, 124:4,
 126:10, 137:16,
 137:17, 204:10
line [13] - 14:5, 36:23,
 39:1, 40:12, 57:22,
 59:25, 99:21,
 101:20, 102:9,
 102:19, 135:10,
 186:15
lines [3] - 128:2,
 154:19, 172:18
link [1] - 119:9
linking [2] - 101:5,
 152.13
list [6] - 14:19, 45:24,
 63:6, 87:17, 192:4,
 192:25
listening [1] - 210:15
lists [1] - 187:23
litany [1] - 166:18
literally [2] - 66:12,
 121:6
litigant [1] - 10:4
Litigation [2] - 35:21,
 35:22
litigation [5] - 23:23,
 52:13, 100:1, 114:3,
 128:22
Litowitz [2] - 5:14,
 5:19
LITOWITZ [1] - 2:7
live [2] - 115:9, 115:12
lives [1] - 66:19
LLP [8] - 1:17, 2:2,
 2:7, 2:14, 2:20, 3:2,
 5:12, 5:17
loading [2] - 106:9,
 187:10
loads [1] - 186:9
loaf [4] - 123:12,
 181:25, 182:1, 182:2
```

loaned [1] - 76:19

logic [3] - 8:6, 11:24,

60:9, 60:21, 63:6, 65:15, 72:23, 74:16, 75:10, 78:14, 82:7, 84:16, 85:9, 87:8, 87:17, 87:18, 92:2, 92:11, 118:19, 121:23, 142:22, 144:22, 152:19, 152:24, 154:22, 154:24, 158:15, 159:10, 163:8, 167:9, 169:21, 169:22, 170:3, 171:9, 171:17, 172:9, 172:17, 176:9, 176:24, 189:2, 189:17, 190:3, 206:17, 206:22, 208:21, 209:21 looked [7] - 143:8, 153:1, 155:11, 202:2, 205:18, 208:19, 209:12 looking [9] - 61:15, 62:6, 78:5, 78:9, 78:20, 79:2, 82:25, 123:14, 172:17 looks [18] - 40:13, 74:25, 107:19, 108:1, 114:12, 143:22, 152:20, 157:20, 157:21, 171:14, 204:25, 205:20, 205:21, 205:25, 206:18, 206:21, 208:24, 210:2 loose [2] - 39:8, 58:7 lose [1] - 124:19 losing [2] - 127:14, 178:25 loss [40] - 8:4, 31:16, 43:16, 44:7, 44:16, 47:19, 47:23, 48:1, 48:9, 49:1, 50:15, 94:17, 139:2, 139:25. 140:25. 141:2. 141:4. 141:5. 141:11, 147:2, 148:1, 148:2, 148:5,

149:2, 149:9, 149:12, 149:15, 150:6, 150:8, 150:11, 153:25, 158:4, 161:7, 177:21, 177:22, 188:19, 195:5, 204:3, 206:9 losses [2] - 127:16, 195:10 lost [2] - 43:21, 140:21 **love** [1] - 60:6 low [2] - 107:9, 138:8 LOWENSTEIN [1] -1:17 Lowenstein [2] - 1:18, lower [9] - 45:4, 82:15, 107:9, 127:1, 135:17, 138:6, 164:10, 174:3, 174:14 LP [1] - 192:9 lunch [1] - 94:4 **Luncheon** [1] - 94:10 **Luther** [1] - 1:10 ly [1] - 23:18 lying [4] - 46:20, 86:20, 87:11, 142:16

## M

Magistrate [1] - 5:3 magnitude [10] -19:18, 122:18, 122:25, 123:7, 123:15, 123:18, 124:6, 124:9, 134:19, 134:22 main [4] - 43:15, 104:11, 104:17, 136:22 maintain [4] - 17:23, 31:3, 32:10, 135:3 maintained [1] -198:13 major [2] - 32:24, 41:19 **majority** [1] - 34:13 makers [1] - 18:20 man [2] - 25:20, 181:4 Management [1] -192:9 management [3] -62:6, 100:15, 134:15 manager [1] - 135:10 mandates [1] - 43:17 manifest [1] - 200:25 manipulate [1] -109:14

manipulation [2] -98:23, 106:11 manipulations [4] -104:7, 105:14, 106:3, 109:16 manipulative [1] -195:8 manufacture [1] -126:11 manufacturers [1] -121:5 manufacturing [5] -13:6, 91:3, 91:4, 91:13, 91:17 Marc [4] - 86:15, 86:16, 92:23, 92:24 March [21] - 10:10, 10:25, 11:1, 35:14, 38:3, 57:20, 58:8, 58:13, 58:14, 58:15, 59:1, 60:16, 69:24, 70:9, 85:3, 85:14, 85:20, 158:24, 159:3, 170:24, 186:4 margin [4] - 122:8, 125:15, 125:24, 135:8 margins [5] - 125:9, 125:11, 125:13, 125:17, 125:25 Marino [3] - 97:4, 97:6, 128:24 market [86] - 11:21, 13:1, 13:9, 13:11, 13:16, 14:16, 21:5, 21:6, 21:7, 21:24, 22:5, 31:11, 31:14, 31:21, 32:12, 32:13, 32:23, 33:6, 33:14, 33:19, 34:10, 42:12, 49:13, 55:1, 67:14, 77:10, 77:12, 77:16, 77:22, 78:3, 78:15, 78:22, 79:14, 79:16, 79:18, 121:15, 126:2, 127:14, 136:2, 147:25, 148:8, 149:23, 149:25, 151:2, 151:6, 152:16, 154:4, 155:17, 157:1, 157:24, 158:5, 158:8, 159:21, 160:13, 160:14, 162:23, 163:7, 163:11, 164:14, 164:23,

474.0.477.40
174:6, 177:18,
181:21, 181:23,
189:3, 189:7,
189:10, 190:9,
195:14, 196:18,
197:25, 198:21,
198:23, 198:25,
199:4, 206:24,
207:11, 207:17,
207:19, 208:1,
208:5, 208:11,
208:13, 208:14,
209:9, 210:10
market-wide [1] - 33:6
marketed [2] - 34:2,
66:25
marketing [1] - 27:14
marketplace [3] -
36:18, 81:25, 85:3
markets [50] - 12:8,
12:9, 12:10, 12:14,
12:22, 12:23, 13:4,
13:5, 13:16, 13:17,
13:21, 14:6, 14:9,
15:2, 15:3, 15:7,
17:25, 19:15, 20:1,
21:12, 33:7, 34:6,
34:10, 35:7, 35:24,
50:6, 96:8, 115:4,
126:8, 126:14,
126:18, 135:22,
159:14, 182:5,
187:4, 197:13,
197:14, 197:19,
198:6, 198:8,
198:10, 201:24,
204:25, 205:1,
208:9, 209:12,
209:15
marriage [2] - 100:25,
166:1
marshals [1] - 74:25
<b>Martin</b> [3] - 1:10,
56:12, 131:11
Mary [1] - 171:1
-
massive [10] - 48:20,
67:1, 112:16,
124:12, 125:2,
126:18, 127:15,
127:21, 129:4,
131:13
massively [1] - 34:17
matches [1] - 51:13
material [8] - 10:7,
27:24, 46:5, 70:2,
70:7, 70:8, 149:12,
171:7
materiality [1] -
202:15
materially [9] - 46:4,
Ī

```
46:7, 66:8, 66:9,
 67:20, 88:4, 90:9,
 110:16, 149:19
materials [1] - 102:20
matter [16] - 10:16,
 11:23, 11:24, 20:18,
 26:7, 28:17, 48:7,
 53:2, 74:14, 128:9,
 135:12, 165:15,
 176:18, 180:15,
 185:23, 211:22
matters [7] - 41:12,
 51:7, 86:14, 86:23,
 104:23, 185:24,
 202:2
maximize [1] - 32:4
McCabe [1] - 150:9
McKesson [1] -
 121:19
mean [24] - 53:9, 54:8,
 55:16, 57:11, 59:1,
 64:12, 75:10, 75:14,
 77:13, 78:1, 79:18,
 80:5, 83:13, 83:24,
 85:18, 87:14, 89:23,
 113:23, 137:1,
 154:22, 163:13,
 170:23, 173:22,
 180:16
meaning [16] - 61:24,
 65:18, 73:4, 82:20,
 97:15, 100:10,
 109:12, 128:15,
 128:20, 129:18,
 149:23, 152:5,
 153:8, 194:9,
 198:24, 205:16
means [13] - 20:6,
 54:6, 82:9, 153:6,
 157:21, 160:20,
 162:25, 180:16,
 180:17, 184:21,
 189:3, 197:19,
 198:10
meant [8] - 77:1, 79:2,
 81:15, 86:20, 95:8,
 126:22, 159:2, 162:5
measure [9] - 30:1,
 140:3, 142:6,
 142:19, 147:4,
 149:24, 158:17,
 178:6, 206:6
measurement [1] -
 148:6
measures [1] - 101:13
measuring [1] - 205:2
mechanism [1] -
 124:21
```

mechanisms [2] -

204:17, 208:10

```
mediate [1] - 95:2
                           merits [5] - 57:13,
meet [16] - 8:5, 30:15,
                            57:14, 200:7,
 32:20, 43:16, 43:18,
                            200:11, 200:23
 44:1, 47:25, 65:21,
                           Merrell [1] - 191:9
 65:23, 93:14, 98:4,
                           met [7] - 28:6, 34:15,
 102:1, 136:8, 166:6,
                            44:1, 106:18,
 191:19
                            109:15, 161:6
meeting [15] - 62:10,
                           metadata [1] - 101:14
 62:17, 98:13,
                           methodological [1] -
 100:11, 100:19,
                            200:15
 102:14, 102:21,
                           methodologies [1] -
 102:25, 103:1,
                            201:1
 126:25, 135:17,
                           methodology [8] -
 135:24, 136:4,
                             141:5, 196:6, 197:6,
 138:2, 138:11
                             197:11, 197:19,
meetings [5] - 86:14,
                             198:10, 198:23,
 126:20, 136:2,
                            201:6
 136:3, 136:8
                           metrics [1] - 98:1
meets [1] - 15:8
                           mic [1] - 6:19
Melissa [2] - 1:24,
                           Michael [2] - 5:20,
 211:24
                            6:11
melissamormile@
                           MICHAEL [2] - 1:18,
 yahoo.com [1] - 1:24
                            3:3
member [1] - 75:6
                           microphone [1] - 6:18
members [2] - 137:5,
                           might [31] - 25:25,
 176:8
                            26:2, 52:22, 54:12,
memo [2] - 63:8,
                            54:16, 54:19, 56:11,
 166:10
                             68:12, 73:17, 73:18,
memorialize [1] - 41:5
                            92:3, 109:8, 109:10,
memory [3] - 6:16,
                             121:23, 122:1,
                             126:22, 134:1,
 95:18
men [1] - 25:22
                             137:1, 153:5,
                             155:23, 163:24,
mention [9] - 55:11,
 55:22, 94:22, 95:14,
                             173:2, 180:11,
 95:25, 106:6,
                             180:18, 180:19,
 123:18, 164:9, 185:6
                             180:21, 181:13,
                             194:15, 194:16,
mentioned [11] -
 16:15, 31:19, 32:22,
                            201:14
 40:17, 52:15, 52:17,
                           Mike [2] - 86:13
 52:19, 93:24,
                           Milbank [1] - 20:21
 120:17, 169:12,
                           mildly [1] - 61:14
 170:12
                           million [5] - 11:5,
                            17:9, 63:22, 97:21,
mentioning [1] - 34:1
Merck [1] - 148:24
                            211:6
mere [12] - 14:11,
                           millions [5] - 20:14,
 14:15, 17:17, 22:18,
                            73:23, 74:5, 113:16,
 23:18, 30:3, 55:10,
                             124:19
 67:25, 96:25,
                           mind [23] - 9:15,
 138:23, 155:12,
                             15:21, 16:24, 19:2,
 199:7
                             19:16, 38:14, 42:11,
                             46:19, 47:11, 47:13,
merely [2] - 68:3,
                             71:19, 79:6, 146:2,
 110:14
                             146:5, 146:6,
merged [2] - 59:20,
 115:2
                             147:18, 181:8,
merger [3] - 58:13,
                             186:6, 192:5,
                             192:11, 202:16,
 59:15, 60:1
                            202:21, 202:22
mergers [2] - 164:18,
                           mine [1] - 147:22
 164:19
                           Minimal [1] - 78:25
merit [1] - 65:9
                           minimal [8] - 79:3,
meritless [1] - 67:7
```

```
113:18, 113:22,
 114:9, 114:13,
 124:15, 180:16
minimum [4] - 45:3,
 92:24, 180:17
minor [1] - 146:22
minute [3] - 40:11,
 161:14, 163:18
minutes [8] - 8:10,
 60:22, 94:3, 138:9,
 138:11, 138:12,
 190:25, 207:7
mirror [5] - 139:9,
 148:18, 148:23,
 149:1, 154:18
mirror-image [1] -
 149:1
mischaracterization
 [1] - 181:9
mischaracterize [1] -
 10:24
misconduct [1] -
 185:22
misconstrue [1] -
 181:8
misconstrued [1] -
 93:4
misinformation [1] -
 174:6
misinterpreting [2] -
 92:3. 92:4
misleading [38] - 36:4,
 39:22, 42:14, 46:4,
 46:7, 48:15, 50:3,
 55:11, 66:21, 67:20,
 78:8, 78:9, 78:21,
 79:6, 83:4, 83:5,
 84:22, 84:25, 85:7,
 85:15, 87:22, 88:4,
 90:9, 110:17,
 127:20, 130:2,
 130:15, 160:19,
 162:6, 178:24,
 179:7, 192:24.
 193:3. 193:5.
 193:13, 193:15,
 193:18, 203:8
misled [1] - 182:2
misquoted [1] -
 166:20
misread [1] - 200:9
misreading [1] - 79:11
misrepresent [1] -
 150:18
misrepresentation [2]
 - 46:5, 48:4
misrepresentations
 [27] - 10:7, 49:1,
 111:16, 127:20,
 136:23, 137:12,
```

139:23, 140:8, 141:11, 143:14, 144:8, 148:10, 148:14, 148:18, 152:22, 154:17, 157:4, 157:10, 177:15, 178:2, 189:6, 189:20, 190:8, 204:24, 205:13, 205:17, 205:22 misrepresented [5] -111:18, 111:20, 145:22, 148:7, 203:3 misrepresenting [1] -181:21 misreps [1] - 205:19 miss [3] - 92:3, 102:13, 105:6 missed [1] - 85:23 missing [4] - 85:23, 88:18, 101:23, 181:9 misspoke [1] - 172:6 misstated [3] - 25:18, 166:20. 183:15 misstatement 131 -51:4, 150:13, 194:12 misstatements [5] -35:18, 51:2, 129:22, 139:20, 160:19 mix [2] - 51:13, 83:17 mixed [2] - 101:8, 166:22 model [7] - 97:24, 98:5, 98:6, 98:13, 99:16, 103:15 moderating [1] -155:14 modest [1] - 165:16 moment [1] - 24:15 money [2] - 174:14, 174:21 monitor [3] - 21:16, 22:7, 22:11 monitoring [4] -20:11, 20:12, 20:19, month [4] - 59:5, 78:18, 99:7, 107:17 monthly [2] - 61:1, 75:19 months [10] - 41:2, 60:7, 71:9, 71:11, 113:16, 155:5, 188:2, 188:3, 201:25 moreover [3] - 19:24, 25:6, 208:14 Morgan [2] - 91:7, 97:23 Mormile [2] - 1:24,

211:24 morning [9] - 5:11, 5:16, 5:23, 5:24, 6:7, 6:9, 7:21, 159:9, 183:6 Morning [7] - 5:13, 5:18, 5:20, 6:3, 6:4, 6:6, 6:12 Morris [1] - 199:8 Morton [1] - 32:17 most [15] - 31:20, 38:10, 38:19, 94:15, 96:13, 112:17, 129:13, 136:23, 138:8, 155:1, 177:24, 184:10, 196:11, 198:12, 210:24 mostly [1] - 124:3 motion [31] - 6:22, 6:23, 6:24, 6:25, 7:8, 7:10, 7:12, 7:13, 8:12, 26:17, 27:2, 27:25, 28:14, 35:16, 55:23, 67:11, 68:1, 81:2, 108:13, 130:7, 140:13. 149:8. 175:7, 176:3, 177:4, 177:11, 177:17, 179:18, 181:5, 182:10, 185:8 **MOTIONS** [1] - 4:10 motions [7] - 7:5, 7:14, 161:12, 190:19, 190:23, 199:23, 200:24 motivated [1] - 68:14 motive [17] - 14:23, 66:2, 66:3, 66:4, 68:12, 68:17, 69:5, 69:8, 69:13, 69:16, 104:14, 104:15, 137:22, 137:24, 174:5, 174:22 mouth [1] - 191:22 movant's [1] - 108:12 move [8] - 20:9, 39:17, 40:15, 67:24, 70:25, 147:25, 181:4, 190:18 moved [1] - 32:5 movement [4] - 18:17, 114:4, 114:5, 149:24 movements [2] -21:13, 97:3 moving [3] - 70:14, 154:20, 204:2 MR [51] - 4:4, 4:5, 4:6, 4:7, 4:8, 4:11, 4:12,

5:11, 5:13, 5:16,

5:18, 5:20, 5:24, 6:4, 6:7, 6:9, 7:9, 7:16, 7:19, 21:21, 35:5, 50:21, 50:24, 64:21, 64:25, 65:1, 94:5, 94:14, 139:5, 139:6, 151:21, 161:16, 161:21, 163:3, 166:16, 175:13, 175:14, 183:2, 183:3, 188:22, 190:18, 190:21, 190:24, 191:2, 191:5, 191:7, 200:2, 208:19, 210:19, 210:21, 211:15 multi [1] - 29:6 multi-billion-dollar [1] - 29.6 multibillion [1] - 36:17 multinational [1] -154:19 multiple [5] - 34:18, 103:7, 114:15, 153:6, 154:19 multiplied [1] - 181:25 must [24] - 11:12, 11:13, 11:17, 23:22, 43:17, 44:1, 44:16, 48:3, 49:2, 97:3, 97:11, 102:18, 108:24, 109:8, 110:14, 140:22, 162:11, 177:12, 182:12, 188:15, 188:16, 188:17, 194:10 must-haves [2] -108:24, 109:8 mutual [1] - 13:25 Myers [2] - 110:8, 186:24 Mylan [59] - 43:22, 43:24, 44:17, 44:25, 45:1, 45:3, 45:6, 45:11, 45:15, 45:16, 45:22, 46:1, 46:2, 46:13, 46:19, 47:12, 47:14, 68:16, 68:25, 70:12, 70:16, 71:5, 104:13, 104:16, 104:17, 104:21, 107:15, 107:22, 137:25, 138:4, 138:6, 138:17, 139:22, 141:9, 141:13, 141:15, 143:3, 144:11, 144:12, 144:20, 145:4, 145:5,

145:20, 145:22, 145:25, 146:8, 146:11, 146:15, 147:13, 147:15, 164:11, 164:12, 174:3, 174:20, 178:18, 178:21, 179:4, 196:7, 196:8 **Mylan's** [9] - 44:12, 45:19, 138:14, 139:23, 146:2, 146:19, 178:25, 179:8, 201:19

Ν N-Y-E [1] - 46:15 Naar [1] - 6:4 NAAR [2] - 2:11, 6:4 nail [1] - 43:20 name [7] - 7:21, 24:22, 25:20, 50:24, 65:3, 180:13, 191:7 named [5] - 24:10, 27:5, 27:15, 40:11, 46:15 namely [1] - 13:13 narrow [5] - 35:17, 66:7, 67:10, 153:21, 179:24 narrowed [1] - 8:20 narrowing [1] - 182:16 **narrowly** [2] - 9:7, 9:8 Nathanson [3] - 97:4, 97:8, 128:24 natural [2] - 121:25, 125:5 naturally [4] - 12:8, 13:4, 14:6, 181:22 nature [12] - 21:3, 21:7, 24:2, 32:12, 33:14, 36:16, 46:8, 137:8, 138:18, 183:25, 184:9, 197:19 nauseam [1] - 207:24 NEALS [2] - 1:14, 5:2 **Neals** [1] - 5:6 near [1] - 117:6 nearly [3] - 26:17, 55:25, 194:18 necessarily [1] - 32:15 necessary [8] - 13:19, 46:6, 114:21, 120:8, 156:6, 193:5, 195:17, 203:23 need [32] - 22:7, 22:8, 59:6, 64:24, 68:2, 70:23, 90:15,

100:25, 101:9,

102:5, 102:7, 102:18, 104:2, 116:15, 116:19, 118:8, 121:14, 134:8, 136:8, 136:25, 153:8, 153:14, 153:24, 157:12, 158:4, 164:19, 165:25, 177:3, 190:22, 194:22, 207:4, 207:18 needed [6] - 61:3, 83:16, 142:2, 166:2, 166:5, 201:9 needs [3] - 59:25, 97:9, 122:13 nefarious [1] - 92:8 negative [10] - 49:3, 61:14, 97:22, 103:17, 113:7, 113:11, 153:9, 157:24, 196:24, 197:1 net/net [1] - 34:12 network [1] - 91:19 never [36] - 9:15, 9:22, 10:17, 15:21, 16:24, 19:2, 19:15, 25:8, 25:9, 28:5, 28:6, 28:15, 41:9, 41:11, 42:11, 42:22, 42:23, 46:23, 53:12, 53:13, 63:2, 104:4, 109:19, 109:20, 117:2, 124:6, 143:3, 145:5, 147:13, 165:20, 172:14, 174:11, 180:12, 196:3, 207:19, 207:21 nevertheless [2] -58:17, 106:20 new [8] - 13:8, 48:23, 71:6, 90:19, 125:18, 155:13, 155:22 NEW [1] - 1:1 New [15] - 1:11, 1:19, 2:4, 2:9, 2:12, 2:22, 3:4, 31:21, 58:9, 122:9, 179:8 Newark [1] - 1:11 news [23] - 56:12, 60:24, 61:5, 61:19, 62:24, 64:15, 73:11, 73:16, 87:18, 148:14, 149:18, 150:1, 150:12, 151:4, 151:8, 152:20, 152:22, 153:2, 154:3, 159:9,

160:22, 196:13,	128:19	142:8, 142:11,	obligation [1] - 193:24	146:13, 147:7,
206:20	nonocclusive [1] -	146:15, 175:24	obligations [1] -	147:14, 174:3,
next [21] - 68:5, 70:25,	33:5	now-dead [1] - 30:2	194:25	174:6, 174:8,
73:22, 75:2, 79:8,	nonoligopolistic [1] -	nowhere [4] - 52:19,	obtain [1] - 21:9	174:12, 174:20,
80:14, 81:18, 81:21,	12:21	88:21, 88:22, 117:6	obtained [1] - 29:11	178:19, 178:21,
82:20, 86:5, 92:21,	nonpublic [5] - 70:2,	nullification [1] -	obvious [3] - 130:14,	179:1, 179:14,
100:24, 107:17,	70:7, 70:9, 144:15,	181:24	130:15, 162:4	189:20, 190:2,
143:1, 154:2,	144:18	nullifying [1] - 182:7	obviously [12] - 55:16,	191:15, 195:9,
159:15, 165:25,	nonrealistic [1] -	NUMBER [1] - 1:3	58:15, 60:3, 77:12,	195:12, 195:15,
167:25, 168:19,	105:18	number [25] - 6:15,	77:16, 77:19, 129:2,	195:20, 195:22,
170:10, 171:14	nonresponsive [1] -	31:10, 31:14, 39:21,	155:16, 166:6,	195:23, 196:7,
nice [2] - 92:4, 147:23	168:18	56:14, 66:24, 67:1,	183:21, 203:2,	201:20, 204:8,
nine [4] - 57:21, 58:1,	nonspeculative [1] -	71:10, 111:16,	205:11	204:11, 204:22,
60:17, 112:10	206:6	111:18, 111:19,	occasionally [1] -	204:23, 205:5,
nobody [1] - 125:20	normal [5] - 14:7,	116:25, 117:17,	18:11	205:14, 205:19,
nobody's [1] - 6:16	63:3, 123:15, 134:4,	136:19, 143:9,	occasions [1] -	205:23, 205:24,
noisy [1] - 182:10	181:22	143:10, 143:15,	119:22	206:2, 206:4
<b>Nokia</b> [1] - 58:8	normally [2] - 117:15,	167:7, 167:18,	occur [1] - 126:7	offer's [1] - 195:11
nominally [1] - 106:7	134:6	180:1, 182:19,	occurred [7] - 33:8,	offered [8] - 24:16,
<b>non</b> [4] - 37:3, 113:22,	Northway [1] - 194:13	186:18, 205:20,	58:13, 60:1, 60:5,	34:6, 44:18, 45:3,
114:5, 198:8	Nostradamus [3] -	205:21	60:23, 126:20,	125:20, 180:3,
non-accretive [1] -	42:24, 43:6, 181:12	numbers [3] - 105:23,	173:12	194:19, 204:2
37:3	note [2] - 6:25, 93:24	142:23, 168:13	occurring [4] - 12:8,	offering [7] - 164:11,
non-culpable [1] -	noted [6] - 19:5,	numerous [1] - 38:21	13:5, 14:6, 181:23	180:2, 191:24,
113:22	24:24, 103:15,	nuts [3] - 63:17,	October [13] - 55:25,	201:4, 201:17,
non-movement [1] -	124:14, 125:8, 130:7	166:2, 166:12	56:7, 66:24, 104:22,	203:9, 203:11
114:5	nothing [39] - 11:18,	<b>NW</b> [1] - 2:17	105:5, 105:17,	offers [8] - 140:9,
non-oligopolistic [1] -	17:13, 18:21, 18:22,	<b>nye</b> [1] - 46:15	106:1, 106:15,	154:20, 169:16,
198:8	19:9, 19:15, 19:20,	Nye [31] - 6:24, 49:3,	114:17, 121:18,	194:6, 195:25,
nonactionable [1] -	21:4, 28:22, 33:2,	49:20, 50:1, 143:7,	131:8, 132:22, 179:9	196:4, 204:17, 205:6
58:10	35:6, 41:24, 48:23,	143:22, 147:12,	<b>oddly</b> [1] - 149:7	<b>office</b> [11] <b>-</b> 57:23,
nonbinding [4] -	52:5, 54:22, 56:15,	147:19, 149:21,	odds [1] - 198:24	57:24, 63:9, 88:16,
45:23, 46:9, 46:10	57:6, 60:10, 62:20,	152:19, 153:7,	<b>OF</b> [1] - 1:1	100:15, 101:20,
noncollusive [1] -	63:16, 64:4, 64:12,	155:25, 156:21,	offensive [1] - 57:6	118:5, 118:15,
30:17	68:23, 100:9,	157:9, 157:20,	offer [94] - 27:10,	118:17, 165:16,
noncompetitive [2] -	100:20, 105:14,	158:14, 159:25,	27:13, 43:21, 44:6,	165:17
137:14, 137:17	105:15, 106:21,	195:1, 195:4,	45:15, 45:17, 45:19,	officer [4] - 86:11,
nondisclosure [1] -	123:24, 137:19,	195:17, 195:18,	45:20, 45:22, 45:25,	88:11, 88:12, 100:13
144:16	165:4, 176:2,	196:6, 196:11,	46:1, 46:14, 68:16,	officers [1] - 117:9
none [26] - 9:13,	181:11, 186:13,	196:13, 197:2,	68:25, 70:12, 70:17,	offices [1] - 118:17
11:10, 17:8, 17:14,	196:20	200:20, 204:2,	71:6, 72:22, 80:1,	Official [2] - 1:24,
17:15, 18:8, 25:16,	Nothing [1] - 100:6	204:13, 205:2	91:22, 107:6,	211:25
27:17, 28:20, 28:24,	notice [12] - 137:3,	Nye's [10] - 47:6,	107:15, 107:22,	official [1] - 106:2
34:19, 36:4, 36:5,	137:10, 175:15,	47:10, 149:15,	119:6, 138:4, 138:7,	OFFICIAL [1] - 211:19
40:2, 65:22, 72:5,	175:16, 175:22,	150:23, 160:9,	138:8, 138:17,	officials [1] - 23:12
72:10, 75:20,	175:23, 175:24,	196:10, 204:10,	139:12, 139:13,	OFI [1] - 60:12
111:22, 135:25,	176:19, 184:2,	204:12, 205:15, 206:17	139:16, 139:18,	<b>often</b> [4] - 33:13, 37:2, 42:6, 110:22
137:2, 165:6, 177:1,	185:1, 188:9	200.17	139:22, 139:23,	,
197:5, 199:17,	notice's [1] - 175:17	^	140:12, 141:9,	<b>Ohio</b> [4] - 20:3, 32:17, 124:2, 124:8
199:21	noticeable [1] - 21:6	0	141:13, 141:14, 141:16, 141:19,	oil [1] - 27:10
noneconomic [1] -	notices [2] - 176:8,	oath [5] - 25:22,	· · · · · ·	Oil [1] - 27.10 Oil [1] - 199:8
15:11	176:19	40:22, 41:17, 41:22,	141:20, 142:3, 142:7, 142:10,	ointment [5] - 28:20,
nonetheless [1] -	<b>notion</b> [3] - 8:23, 66:19, 179:13	180:8	142.7, 142.10, 142:12, 142:20,	28:22, 28:23, 29:3,
63:16	·	<b>objection</b> [3] - 76:15,	142.12, 142.20, 143:3, 143:6,	28:22, 28:23, 29:3, 29:4
nonexclusive [1] -	notwithstanding [1] - 147:19	76:16, 173:11	143.3, 143.6, 143:14, 144:6,	old [6] - 7:19, 47:1,
14:19	November [12] - 71:5,	objective [3] - 142:23,	144:8, 144:11,	50:25, 62:5, 181:4,
<b>nonmovant</b> [4] <b>-</b> 96:25, 97:3, 100:2,	74:6, 98:3, 104:11,	143:20, 149:4	144:0, 144:11,	211:5
96:25, 97:3, 100:2, 109:25	107:7, 132:11,	obligated [3] - 99:25,	144:24, 145:6,	oligopolistic [41] -
nonmovant's [1] -	141:17, 141:19,	194:23	145:23, 146:1,	12:8, 12:14, 12:23,
nominovant s [1] -	171.11, 171.10,		,,	12.0, 12.17, 12.20,

12.4 12.5 12.15	420.0 450.0	444.40 444.00	104-04 202-10	
13:1, 13:5, 13:15,	138:9, 152:2,	141:16, 141:20,	194:24, 203:18,	<b>opt</b> [3] <b>-</b> 56:20, 56:22,
13:17, 13:20, 14:6,	152:10, 152:14,	143:10, 146:14,	204:19	76:14
14:9, 14:16, 15:2,	152:15, 152:18,	148:8, 150:16,	opined [5] - 53:7,	opt-out [3] - 56:20,
15:7, 17:25, 19:15,	153:22, 154:9,	151:15, 153:10,	121:8, 193:3, 194:8,	56:22, 76:14
				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
20:1, 21:5, 21:12,	154:25, 155:4,	154:2, 154:22,	194:20	<b>optimistic</b> [1] - 108:7
22:5, 32:12, 33:7,	155:16, 156:20,	155:3, 155:12,	opines [5] - 53:10,	ORAL [1] - 1:5
34:10, 35:7, 181:23,	157:5, 157:10,	155:13, 156:24,	143:7, 144:8,	Order [1] - 116:17
182:5, 197:13,	157:17, 158:1,	158:7, 163:15,	192:23, 193:21	
			•	<b>order</b> [10] - 7:5, 32:10,
197:15, 197:19,	165:10, 169:21,	164:8, 165:8,	<b>opining</b> [3] - 204:15,	55:19, 137:1,
197:25, 198:6,	169:25, 170:5,	167:16, 167:17,	204:20, 204:21	175:24, 176:2,
198:8, 198:10,	170:15, 170:19,	169:14, 170:6,	opinion [19] - 14:18,	179:4, 186:18,
198:20, 198:22,	182:18, 184:7,	170:10, 171:3,	19:5, 29:24, 78:11,	186:20, 186:21
198:25, 207:11,	184:8, 184:11,	171:4, 171:5, 171:6,		
			130:8, 137:1, 176:1,	ordered [1] - 157:7
207:16, 207:25,	186:12, 187:16,	174:1, 176:20,	176:4, 177:11,	orders [2] - 137:2,
208:13, 209:13,	187:17, 187:21,	176:22, 177:23,	182:16, 186:22,	137:3
210:11	187:22, 188:1,	178:7, 179:11,	191:15, 193:10,	ordinary [1] - 68:10
oligopoly [11] - 112:6,	188:7, 196:23	179:16, 181:15,	194:4, 199:2, 199:6,	•
	Omega's [25] - 35:23,			organization [4] -
121:10, 197:22,		185:2, 186:18,	199:16, 201:5,	54:20, 62:1, 134:20,
207:20, 208:4,	36:16, 40:7, 42:4,	186:20, 188:6,	203:10	162:20
208:16, 208:20,	59:2, 61:9, 91:18,	188:14, 188:23,	opinion's [1] - 200:17	original [1] - 45:15
208:22, 209:1,	97:20, 98:12, 99:1,	189:12, 189:24,	opinions [15] - 19:19,	
209:6, 209:10	99:9, 99:15, 101:22,	193:14, 193:20,	117:16, 192:16,	originally [2] - 8:21,
	, , , , ,			61:16
Omega [141] - 10:9,	102:11, 103:9,	195:12, 203:13,	192:21, 192:22,	otherwise [2] - 88:19,
10:25, 35:12, 36:1,	104:7, 104:9, 105:6,	206:6, 209:2, 209:4,	194:6, 194:18,	140:23
36:10, 36:11, 36:16,	109:16, 176:3,	209:7, 209:18,	195:4, 195:7,	ought [1] - 38:23
36:22, 36:24, 36:25,	176:5, 176:15,	210:19	199:18, 201:8,	
37:10, 38:17, 39:23,	187:8, 187:25	one's [1] - 180:4	202:15, 202:19,	<b>ourselves</b> [1] - 94:6
				out-of-pocket [3] -
40:2, 40:4, 40:15,	Omega/BCH [1] -	one-page [1] - 27:13	203:25, 204:11	43:22, 140:25, 141:4
41:20, 41:24, 42:9,	156:21	one-tenth [1] - 71:10	opportunities [19] -	outburst [2] - 62:17,
44:20, 46:21, 48:15,	omission [1] - 171:7	ones [3] - 90:23,	16:14, 18:16, 20:7,	62:20
48:16, 48:20, 48:23,	omissions [4] - 10:8,	182:13, 208:3	40:6, 78:7, 78:13,	
49:6, 49:7, 50:2,	35:18, 130:13,	online [10] - 57:21,		outcome [1] - 140:1
			78:14, 78:21, 79:1,	outline [1] - 108:15
51:6, 58:14, 59:9,	177:15	57:22, 58:2, 59:24,	79:2, 79:3, 113:18,	outset [3] - 93:11,
61:1, 61:8, 61:10,	<b>omits</b> [1] - 46:5	62:7, 64:10, 165:16,	113:23, 113:24,	165:2, 200:5
61:22, 62:11, 62:12,	omitted [4] - 83:6,	184:22	114:9, 114:12,	•
63:4, 63:7, 63:24,	99:11, 148:7, 193:4	open [4] - 42:6, 117:3,	127:4, 132:24,	outside [8] - 9:16,
66:10, 67:15, 82:21,	Once [1] - 140:21	147:25, 180:19	183:25	47:23, 61:23, 74:22,
				185:25, 192:1,
82:22, 83:11, 83:19,	<b>once</b> [5] <b>-</b> 59:10, 70:3,	opening [7] - 116:8,	opportunity [17] -	192:15, 201:14
83:21, 84:11, 85:4,	118:11, 174:17,	142:13, 192:3,	16:16, 16:19, 18:6,	over-the-counter [5] -
85:5, 85:13, 86:2,	192:20	192:25, 193:17,	19:1, 19:7, 43:1,	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
86:12, 89:4, 89:6,	One [2] - 1:18, 210:20	197:22, 198:11	43:21, 75:22, 75:24,	49:13, 196:19,
89:12, 89:13, 89:24,				196:20, 196:25,
	one [111] - 17:3, 17:21,	opens [1] - 159:21	76:17, 89:10, 93:14,	206:13
90:7, 91:13, 91:15,	17:24, 22:12, 25:19,	operate [1] - 59:11	139:21, 140:14,	overall [5] - 69:11,
91:16, 96:1, 97:18,	27:13, 28:19, 31:16,	operated [8] - 31:22,	140:22, 143:13,	82:11, 128:13,
98:1, 98:3, 98:10,	34:24, 35:11, 36:13,	33:20, 59:9, 67:2,	178:25	
98:13, 98:18, 99:12,	37:7, 43:19, 46:17,	129:1, 129:14,	opposed [1] - 42:13	171:11
99:17, 100:4,			• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	overintegrating [1] -
100:17, 100:4,	48:10, 49:19, 51:4,	207:11, 207:16	opposing [3] - 114:5,	61:18
	55:21, 57:10, 59:11,	operating [5] - 104:9,	118:6, 118:13	overlook [1] - 73:5
101:11, 101:25,	61:14, 62:19, 64:8,	112:16, 146:20,	opposite [14] - 30:6,	overnight [4] - 123:6,
102:14, 103:2,	70:20, 71:10, 73:8,	183:20, 207:19	56:24, 102:22,	
103:14, 103:16,	76:18, 76:25, 78:24,	operation [2] - 152:15,	124:13, 125:10,	123:8, 123:13,
103:19, 103:20,	79:8, 82:6, 85:14,	188:5		123:14
104:1, 104:4, 104:5,			129:5, 129:8,	overpromised [1] -
	86:16, 87:14, 88:6,	operations [1] - 53:25	133:13, 136:6,	138:13
104:20, 105:11,	91:24, 92:1, 100:14,	operative [3] - 176:7,	137:3, 162:24,	overseen [1] - 9:11
105:14, 105:22,	102:4, 104:11,	182:15	163:3, 163:8, 180:9	
106:12, 107:5,	105:17, 108:10,	ophthalmic [1] -	opposition [9] - 7:11,	overstated [1] -
107:19, 107:25,	109:21, 111:16,	209:13	81:2, 81:8, 141:7,	165:10
108:2, 108:3, 108:6,				overstatement [1] -
108:18, 108:21,	116:25, 118:16,	Ophthalmics [1] -	147:9, 150:22,	178:2
	118:18, 118:20,	126:16	171:8, 201:19,	overview [1] - 69:8
111:5, 112:20,	130:22, 134:22,	opine [4] - 192:11,	203:20	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •
137:11, 137:13,		Ī		overwhelming [2] -

53:3, 64:15 overwhelmingly [2] -114:19, 157:25 own [28] - 13:22, 14:24, 22:10, 24:25, 44:22, 46:22, 47:17, 47:20, 56:10, 69:1, 96:6, 96:18, 96:19, 103:19, 103:22, 104:3, 107:10, 108:8, 109:12, 117:20, 120:16, 127:13, 136:10, 138:6, 162:10, 185:22, 187:7 owned [2] - 31:22, 35:13 owner [1] - 122:19 ownership [2] - 69:17, 195:20 oxygen [3] - 101:12, 187:19, 188:6

#### P

p.m [3] - 94:10, 161:18, 211:17 packet [3] - 87:7, 87:8, page [35] - 11:6, 11:9, 16:7, 24:9, 27:13, 45:24, 46:1, 65:12, 68:18, 78:4, 81:2, 81:3, 81:4, 81:7, 81:8, 81:14, 82:5, 92:12, 100:23, 118:2, 120:8, 121:5, 124:25, 149:7, 166:25, 167:1, 171:7, 172:3, 172:25, 192:25, 193:17, 203:15, 203:21, 208:5 PAGE [1] - 4:2 pages [11] - 11:5, 73:23, 81:3, 94:21, 107:13, 108:16, 110:9, 122:16, 192:3, 211:10, 211:11 paid [2] - 45:16, 206:2 painful [2] - 59:4, 99:5 painstaking [1] -152:20 pale [1] - 171:18 palpably [1] - 133:6 pandemic [1] - 5:8 panning [1] - 152:8 pap [1] - 132:25

**PAPA** [1] - 1:8

Papa [182] - 2:22, 6:8, 10:4, 10:21, 37:6, 41:8, 41:10, 41:13, 42:19, 43:12, 48:11, 48:17, 65:4, 65:14, 66:1, 66:7, 66:11, 67:22. 68:13. 68:25. 69:24. 70:24. 71:7. 71:8, 72:6, 72:7, 72:12, 72:14, 72:18, 72:22, 73:19, 74:2, 74:6, 74:8, 75:2, 75:6, 75:15, 75:18, 76:10, 76:17, 77:9, 77:19, 77:21, 78:5, 79:9, 79:14, 79:15, 79:19, 79:25, 81:9, 81:10, 81:14, 81:16, 84:21, 84:25, 85:2, 85:11, 85:15, 86:9, 86:12, 86:18, 87:3, 87:10, 87:11, 87:21, 87:25, 88:3, 88:10, 88:17, 88:18, 89:3, 89:18, 89:20, 89:25, 90:2, 90:7, 90:8, 90:12, 90:21, 91:2, 91:6, 91:12, 92:6, 92:13, 92:19, 93:9, 93:13, 93:18, 95:13, 96:11, 97:11, 98:7, 98:9, 98:11, 99:3, 99:14, 100:5, 100:16, 100:19, 102:15, 103:7, 103:25, 104:5, 104:18, 105:9, 105:18, 105:19, 105:22, 106:3, 106:16, 107:7, 107:10, 107:18, 107:25, 108:6, 108:16, 108:20, 108:23, 109:14, 109:15, 111:6, 111:8, 113:2, 113:9, 113:15, 113:18, 114:16, 126:24, 128:7, 128:25, 130:1, 130:4, 130:20, 130:23, 131:1, 131:24, 132:10, 132:12, 132:17, 132:21, 133:4, 133:8, 133:21, 134:3, 134:12, 134:25, 135:15, 136:13, 138:1, 138:5, 144:2, 152:13, 154:9, 154:23, 154:24,

155:14, 155:24, 157:15, 163:19, 164:10, 166:21, 167:5, 167:11, 169:17, 170:13, 170:21, 171:10, 172:7, 172:11, 172:21, 172:24, 173:7, 173:13, 173:18, 174:1, 174:8, 174:18, 180:7, 184:14, 187:22, 187:25 papa [1] - 13:10 Papa's [20] - 6:24, 48:13, 67:12, 73:3, 76:13, 83:4, 85:1, 85:18, 85:25, 89:2, 128:16, 154:5, 154:16, 156:1, 158:5, 172:10, 172:15, 181:9, 196:14, 196:15 paper [1] - 22:22 papers [13] - 24:24, 33:13, 34:14, 48:9, 50:9, 50:12, 53:4, 138:4, 150:22, 177:19, 178:10, 196:22, 197:17 paragraph [6] - 21:18, 24:10, 81:22, 82:6, 98:14, 146:17 paragraphs [1] -117:22 parallel [17] - 11:20, 12:6, 12:13, 12:20, 13:18, 14:5, 14:10, 14:16, 14:17, 14:21, 18:9, 129:4, 198:2, 198:5, 198:7, 198:18, 198:25 parallel-pricing [7] -12:6, 12:20, 14:10, 14:16, 14:17, 14:21, 198:5 parallelism [1] -199:15 parcel [1] - 50:1 pardon [2] - 27:25, 61:3 Park [1] - 2:21 parse [1] - 153:8 part [18] - 49:25, 57:5, 59:4, 61:25, 99:5, 108:15, 112:6, 118:21, 133:10, 134:4, 138:9, 155:21, 159:6, 167:18, 167:23,

177:20, 184:3, 185:17 partial [1] - 152:18 partially [2] - 67:12, 156:22 participant [1] - 22:6 participate [3] - 13:15, 139:22, 143:13 participating [1] -36:18 particular [15] - 9:1, 12:10, 30:21, 90:5, 108:9, 122:15, 128:3, 136:25, 156:9, 159:1, 171:23, 173:4, 204:13, 206:24, 208:6 particularly [3] - 21:4, 33:23, 193:13 parties [9] - 34:13, 58:19, 64:22, 94:2, 95:1, 185:2, 192:19, 201:4, 205:10 partner [4] - 5:25, 6:1, 7:22, 107:1 Partners [2] - 39:4 partners [1] - 20:21 parts [3] - 116:24, 134:23, 135:7 party [5] - 96:9, 116:22, 118:6, 118:13, 192:20 party's [2] - 188:14, 192:11 pass [3] - 74:25, 94:25, 129:9 past [7] - 12:14, 16:15, 16:18, 54:5, 167:6, 176:16, 179:12 patience [5] - 37:5, 94:21, 190:14, 200:3, 210:23 patient [1] - 175:10 Paul [1] - 117:17 pause [1] - 19:17 pay [3] - 20:21, 21:13, 44:12 payment [1] - 54:15 peak [3] - 96:14, 113:5, 113:6 peer [1] - 152:16 peers [2] - 149:23, 157:1 pejorative [1] - 183:8 penalties [5] - 124:12, 132:2, 132:5, 134:1, 162:18 penalty [2] - 54:12,

pendency [3] - 30:2, 178:20, 190:2 pending [2] - 117:23, 118.1 Pennsylvania [2] -18:25, 186:2 **PENSION** [1] - 1:3 Pension [2] - 39:16, 68:19 People [1] - 76:2 people [34] - 21:12, 21:23, 22:4, 31:8, 31:10, 52:21, 57:7, 61:25, 62:19, 66:18, 73:17, 76:2, 76:3, 83:21, 89:2, 90:19, 93:12, 116:14, 143:11, 143:17, 144:16, 147:18, 151:3, 151:9, 163:19, 164:1, 164:24, 166:5, 167:3, 169:3, 172:9, 180:12, 190:8 people's [4] - 21:24, 22:5, 22:22, 66:19 Per [1] - 121:14 per [8] - 23:2, 28:16, 45:4, 70:10, 141:14, 142:13, 142:17, 144:2 percent [43] - 29:4, 36:23, 49:23, 69:13, 92:10, 99:16, 103:16, 103:17, 103:20, 122:19, 123:6, 123:8, 125:16, 126:1, 127:16, 127:17, 127:24, 134:21, 134:23, 141:22, 142:2, 142:4, 143:8, 143:16, 143:19, 143:21, 150:25, 151:1, 151:6, 151:12, 152:15, 154:14, 156:25, 157:1, 159:12, 175:4, 175:5, 181:25, 205:24 percentage [1] - 29:3 performance [25] -10:14, 35:23, 46:21, 50:8, 50:10, 64:6, 98:12, 101:5, 107:14, 108:17, 137:11, 137:12, 156:19, 157:6, 158:1, 176:3, 176:5, 176:15, 176:22,

54:15

176:24, 186:18, 186:19, 187:6, 187:14, 187:16 performing [2] - 98:1, 99:17 perhaps [2] - 80:18, 124:21 period [38] - 17:21, 25:4, 25:11, 26:19, 36:21, 58:23, 60:16, 65:8, 69:11, 69:13, 69:15, 69:18, 69:21, 69:22, 70:22, 71:9, 71:11, 71:20, 76:9, 80:15, 80:22, 83:13, 92:7, 96:12, 97:17, 98:5, 108:4, 113:2, 113:4, 113:14, 132:7, 132:11, 133:13, 173:20, 198:14, 198:18, 201:24 periods [2] - 165:3, 166:23 perjury [1] - 67:8 Permethrin [1] -121:13 permethrin [1] - 127:5 permissible [1] -192:1 permission [1] - 34:25 permit [2] - 162:5, 176:4 permitted [3] - 35:17, 52:23, 179:12 Perrigo [236] - 2:13, 2:18, 6:2, 6:5, 7:1, 7:6, 7:22, 7:24, 8:14, 8:23, 9:14, 9:19, 10:1, 10:7, 10:10, 11:20, 13:13, 15:19, 16:13, 16:25, 17:6, 17:8, 17:9, 17:20, 18:10, 18:20, 20:6, 22:6, 23:2, 25:1, 25:14, 25:15, 25:19, 26:3, 26:20, 27:16, 27:20, 28:3, 28:5, 28:6, 28:8, 28:10, 28:21, 29:4, 29:6, 29:15, 29:17, 29:19, 30:7, 30:18, 30:23, 31:22, 33:10, 33:16, 33:20, 33:25, 34:2, 34:4, 35:14, 36:18, 36:20, 36:22, 36:24, 40:2, 40:4, 40:6, 41:2. 42:11. 44:10. 44:18, 46:4, 46:20. 49:10, 53:23, 56:16,

56:17, 56:25, 58:14, 59:10, 60:7, 61:13, 61:15, 61:18, 63:4, 63:6, 63:7, 63:12, 63:25, 65:14, 66:23, 66:25, 69:3, 70:10, 71:5, 73:17, 74:5, 75:11, 77:14, 80:1, 80:12, 81:10, 85:12, 88:10, 89:7, 96:1, 96:7, 96:14, 97:20, 97:23, 97:25, 98:2, 100:4, 100:25, 102:14, 103:1, 103:3, 103:20, 104:1, 104:11, 104:20, 105:11, 105:13, 106:1, 106:12, 106:14, 106:22, 107:6, 108:6, 109:2, 109:10, 111:9, 112:15, 113:4, 115:4, 115:17, 116:1, 116:6, 117:3, 117:4, 117:11, 119:22, 121:4, 121:16, 121:18, 121:19, 122:1, 122:5, 122:14, 123:17, 123:25, 124:12, 124:18, 125:1, 125:4, 126:2, 126:19, 127:10, 127:18, 129:9, 129:24, 130:1, 131:9, 131:14, 131:16, 134:13, 134:23, 135:1, 135:17, 135:19, 135:21, 136:13, 138:10, 138:12, 138:13, 138:16, 139:14, 139:21, 140:17, 141:13, 141:16, 141:17, 141:21, 141:22, 141:23, 142:9, 142:12, 144:14, 145:20, 146:19, 149:18, 149:23, 149:24, 150:1, 151:4, 151:7, 151:23, 152:9, 152:12, 152:15, 153:20, 155:1, 155:13, 155:15, 156:13, 156:17, 157:14, 159:2, 159:5, 159:11, 159:16, 163:6,

166:4, 168:6, 168:21, 168:23, 170:18, 178:6, 178:20, 178:22, 179:5, 179:24, 182:18, 183:17, 184:10, 187:18, 188:4, 193:3, 196:16, 206:13, 209:1, 209:3, 209:7, 209:11, 209:17, 210:1 Perrigo's [84] - 6:22, 9:24, 10:8, 10:24, 15:22, 15:23, 16:11, 17:10, 18:3, 29:2, 30:20, 31:1, 31:23, 34:7, 36:10, 37:10, 40:8, 42:5, 42:10, 48:12, 48:14, 49:5, 51:5, 84:8, 84:9, 89:11, 91:13, 96:6, 98:16, 99:8, 99:13, 100:16, 101:12, 103:10, 103:19, 103:22, 104:3, 104:23, 108:1, 108:19, 108:25, 109:12, 111:18, 114:19, 115:1, 119:25, 120:1, 121:12, 124:22, 125:6, 125:11, 127:3, 127:10, 127:13, 127:19, 127:21, 129:13, 129:18, 130:21, 130:24, 133:24, 134:10, 134:11, 134:14, 134:15, 137:13, 137:15, 137:24, 138:10, 139:19, 142:1, 142:5, 146:14, 178:3, 178:23, 187:7, 193:5, 196:19, 196:20, 201:19, 207:10, 207:16, 209:20 Perrigo-specific [1] -151:7 Perrigo/Omega [1] -91:8 person [11] - 8:18, 28:11, 28:13, 43:10, 52:6, 61:20, 74:10, 76:25, 202:25, 205:5 personal [7] - 28:2, 28:11, 68:22, 107:8, 130:11, 167:18,

167:20 personally [5] - 66:15, 76:1, 105:24, 113:10, 132:25 perspective [2] -92:15, 201:18 persuade [2] - 81:6, 138:3 Pharma [2] - 10:9 Pharma's [1] - 187:22 pharmaceutical [6] -12:9, 22:20, 27:4, 56:2, 66:17, 168:15 Pharmaceuticals [2] -168:22, 191:10 pharmaceuticals [1] -196:23 **pharmacist** [1] - 66:16 phase [3] - 12:1, 12:2, 20:17 **PhD** [1] - 204:5 phenomena [1] -199:12 phenomenon [1] -15:6 Philip [1] - 199:8 phobia [2] - 49:21, 153:5 phone [3] - 118:21, 119:4, 120:19 phrase [2] - 39:13, 112:23 pick [3] - 82:17, 180:7, 181:15 picked [4] - 57:3, 82:8, 95:23, 100:16 picture [1] - 83:5 piece [2] - 136:9, 209:4 pieces [5] - 77:3, 153:6, 153:9, 158:2, 158:25 piggyback [1] - 52:11 **Pilgrim's** [1] - 26:10 pill [1] - 126:11 Piper [1] - 178:17 place [11] - 16:21, 18:8, 25:3, 30:13, 107:20, 119:24, 120:20, 145:21, 181:6, 183:13, 196:16 places [1] - 117:8 plagued [2] - 83:22, 83:23 plain [14] - 48:5, 82:20. 97:15. 100:10, 109:12,

128:15, 128:20,

129:18, 129:23,

167:2, 171:9, 171:15, 171:17 plainly [1] - 10:14 plaintiff [6] - 36:1, 47:2, 110:14, 140:21. 160:2. 171:22 plaintiff's [28] - 10:6, 12:24, 18:2, 20:6, 28:18, 29:25, 33:8, 34:20, 35:8, 40:24, 41:5, 47:8, 49:4, 50:15, 51:13, 55:22, 64:16, 65:9, 73:2, 101:10, 175:16, 176:23, 180:6, 191:19, 197:10, 199:24, 201:20, 201:22 plaintiffs [139] - 5:12, 5:15, 5:17, 5:19, 5:22, 8:5, 8:14, 8:21, 9:1, 9:17, 10:12, 10:23, 11:19, 11:24, 12:3, 13:20, 14:10, 14:14, 15:13, 15:14, 15:17, 15:18, 16:4, 16:5, 16:8, 16:11, 17:1, 17:14, 17:16, 17:19, 17:25, 18:6, 19:10, 19:17, 20:15, 21:11, 21:18, 22:14, 22:15, 22:18, 22:24, 23:7, 24:8, 24:18, 25:8, 25:16, 26:4, 27:13, 28:9, 28:13, 29:8, 29:13, 30:12, 30:13, 32:20, 33:16, 33:25, 34:6, 34:8, 34:15, 34:18, 35:3, 35:5, 35:17, 36:9, 36:13, 37:8, 38:2, 38:8, 38:10, 39:21, 40:9, 40:18, 41:3, 41:15, 42:15, 42:20, 43:11, 43:20, 44:5, 44:7, 44:17, 44:21, 45:8, 45:19, 46:12, 47:10, 48:12, 50:9, 51:17, 52:13, 52:16, 53:3. 54:2. 55:6. 56:19, 56:20, 56:23, 58:17, 59:1, 60:6, 62:9, 65:17, 69:4, 71:21, 72:7, 76:13, 76:14, 78:19, 83:3, 84:21, 88:2, 91:22, 92:1, 92:3, 92:5, 93:3, 94:15, 101:15, 139:7, 150:10, 162:7, 162:12,

164:21, 176:4, 176:14, 177:3, 177:5, 177:9, 177:11, 179:10, 181:16, 182:12, 182:25, 189:25, 191:21, 197:16, 203:7, 205:11 Plaintiffs [10] - 1:6, 1:19, 2:5, 2:9, 27:6, 32:8, 76:10, 77:20, 100:2, 149:8 plan [18] - 69:25, 70:3, 70:4, 70:5, 70:6, 70:7, 70:8, 70:13, 70:15, 70:16, 71:6, 71:8, 71:14, 85:13, 104:2, 109:18, 174:16, 174:19 plane [1] - 166:6 planned [4] - 38:4, 107:14, 127:14, 139:8 planning [1] - 85:17 plans [1] - 170:19 plausible [4] - 119:6, 128:16. 135:3. 135:12 play [6] - 9:21, 29:8, 127:18, 197:23, 198:1, 198:23 players [1] - 32:24 playing [2] - 56:2, 65:19 plead [5] - 35:25, 49:2, 56:5, 56:6, 163:6 pleading [4] - 9:8, 104:14, 110:11, 187:3 pleadings [5] - 10:15, 26:24, 48:22, 110:21, 130:17 pleased [6] - 38:18, 85:4. 85:8. 85:19. 86:1. 86:19 pleasure [1] - 211:1 pled [7] - 8:21, 26:15, 26:20, 163:5, 163:8, 182:12, 182:13 plenty [1] - 110:3 ploys [1] - 112:25 plus [6] - 14:19, 15:3, 15:7, 16:4, 89:12, 141:15 Plyley [1] - 74:7 pocket [3] - 43:22, 140:25, 141:4 podium [1] - 50:17 point [56] - 17:3, 37:16, 43:15, 52:10,

52:18, 53:21, 62:9, 62:12, 64:7, 67:4, 67:16, 72:16, 73:6, 73:9, 73:11, 78:4, 78:19, 78:23, 81:24, 84:16, 84:17, 85:10, 86:5, 86:6, 86:18, 87:14, 88:2, 88:5, 89:1, 90:4, 93:6, 126:10, 137:20, 138:10, 138:25, 139:3, 146:10, 147:23, 153:3, 157:6, 157:19, 165:8, 166:1, 166:23, 176:18, 177:23, 182:4, 193:20, 198:17, 208:3. 209:15. 209:18, 211:11 pointed [3] - 51:21, 114:7, 130:9 pointing [1] - 79:5 **points** [7] - 36:6, 92:23, 129:11, 136:15, 142:21, 202:14, 208:25 Police [2] - 37:21, 116:17 policies [1] - 14:3 policy [1] - 15:23 Polman [7] - 24:22, 24:23, 25:3, 25:14, 25:23, 25:25, 26:11 Polman's [1] - 25:12 **POMERANTZ** [1] - 2:2 Pomerantz [2] - 5:12, 5:17 poor [4] - 152:1, 152:13, 156:17, 156:18 portfolio [14] - 67:1, 78:6, 78:12, 79:20, 80:2, 80:5, 80:11, 80:19, 81:11, 81:17, 82:7, 82:11, 128:5, 181:10 portfolio-wide [2] -79:20, 81:11 portfolios [2] - 29:2, 80.23 portion [3] - 47:25, 82:17, 130:22 portions [1] - 120:13 portrayed [2] - 90:16 pose [1] - 207:14 posited [1] - 207:10

position [2] - 69:3,

positions [1] - 200:10

167:13

positive [8] - 61:7, 61:10, 61:13, 63:17, 64:15, 87:24, 99:11, 99.18 positively [2] - 104:5, 113:25 possessed [1] -191:16 possesses [1] -204:13 possession [1] -202:25 possible [8] - 21:9, 31:15, 159:6, 164:21, 173:11, 173:12, 211:8 possibly [2] - 103:21, 162:19 post [2] - 34:24, 178:15 postmortem [4] -88:13, 92:14, 108:20, 109:1 postoperatively [2] -178:13, 179:3 posts [1] - 65:7 potential [7] - 14:20, 18:16, 29:19, 39:23, 137:4, 148:21, 195:20 pour [1] - 144:18 power [3] - 171:16, 171:17, 184:12 powerful [2] - 74:11, 115:7 PowerPoint [5] - 65:1, 65:6, 87:9, 87:10. 87.24 practical [1] - 32:4 practice [5] - 74:8, 106:9, 123:3, 131:14, 131:15 practices [9] - 111:18, 112:2, 112:3, 115:6, 137:14, 137:18, 187:10, 187:12, 209:22 prayed [1] - 29:9 pre [2] - 97:18, 185:8 pre-acquisition [1] -97:18 pre-motion [1] - 185:8 preceded [2] - 26:19, 145:16 precedent [1] - 129:20 precise [1] - 116:22 precisely [4] - 15:4, 15:14, 24:6, 166:1 preclosing [3] - 58:18, 60:25, 85:11

preclosure [1] - 61:3 preclude [1] - 201:4 predict [1] - 42:24 predicted [1] - 151:20 prediction [1] - 181:12 predictions [2] -37:24, 43:6 preestablished [1] -123:3 prefer [1] - 186:10 preference [2] - 7:7, 7:9 preintegration [4] -58:23, 60:23, 61:2, 165:9 preliminary [3] - 51:7, 156:13, 178:15 premise [4] - 39:8, 44:8, 58:5, 207:20 premised [3] - 8:23, 179:13, 198:5 premising [1] - 163:9 premium [2] - 142:20, 164:17 prepared [1] - 23:23 preposterous [2] -66:22, 164:7 prescription [24] -12:11, 34:3, 34:7, 34:10, 96:13, 112:17, 112:19, 113:5, 113:19, 114:18, 121:7, 124:23, 126:7, 126:10, 126:14, 129:1, 129:21, 130:5, 130:10, 131:25, 132:18, 133:23, 133:25, 137:15 prescriptions [2] -31:10, 31:15 presence [5] - 36:19, 89:8, 89:9, 89:10 present [20] - 7:23, 8:12, 9:13, 10:9, 15:6, 35:1, 35:19, 41:11, 42:16, 51:5, 67:10, 67:14, 68:2, 95:5, 115:7, 115:18, 115:20, 138:19, 143:5, 182:17 presentation [10] -57:4, 92:6, 104:8, 132:8, 165:2, 166:24, 170:3, 170:17, 177:22, 187:21 presented [12] -16:25, 17:6, 83:5,

92:22, 92:23, 92:25, 115:9, 115:12, 116:7, 133:1, 147:4 presenting [1] -156:11 presently [1] - 67:8 presents [1] - 130:14 president [10] - 53:25, 75:5, 98:16, 99:13, 103:14, 108:1, 124:23, 138:10, 155:23, 168:12 presiding [1] - 5:6 pressed [2] - 105:5, 122:10 pressure [4] - 106:14, 106:15, 125:24, 134:14 pressures [2] -131:10, 157:25 presumes [1] - 145:3 presumptively [1] -120:6 pretend [2] - 34:9, 123:16 pretty [5] - 51:14, 58:25, 77:7, 182:23, 195:21 prevail [2] - 82:22, 82:24 prevaricated [1] -17:15 prevented [1] - 92:9 previous [2] - 48:14, 81:22 previously [3] - 88:20, 105:6, 148:7 **price** [181] - 9:3, 9:7, 9:12, 9:14, 11:17, 11:20, 12:19, 12:21, 15:21, 15:24, 17:17, 17:22, 17:23, 18:22, 19:12, 19:17, 19:18, 19:21, 19:25, 20:2, 20:11, 20:12, 21:13, 22:7, 25:13, 26:16, 26:21, 30:12, 30:15, 30:17, 30:19, 31:23, 32:22, 44:13, 44:18, 44:25, 45:1, 45:4, 49:8, 49:15, 49:18, 49:23, 51:21, 52:1, 52:3, 52:7, 52:9, 53:1, 53:7, 53:9, 54:7, 54:9, 54:18, 54:23, 55:1, 55:7, 55:9, 55:12, 55:19, 56:13, 56:15, 56:16, 56:25, 57:2, 57:5, 57:8, 57:12, 57:14,

64.44 66:0 70:40	04.6 04.00 04.05
64:11, 66:9, 70:10,	21:6, 21:22, 21:25,
71:23, 72:1, 72:3,	22:5, 22:7, 22:11,
72:11, 72:14, 73:3,	25:15, 31:12, 31:13,
73:12, 73:20, 74:2,	32:5, 33:17, 54:8,
74:15, 74:17, 74:19,	54:14, 73:17, 73:18,
74:20, 75:1, 75:21,	78:2, 96:7, 107:8,
76:12, 77:7, 77:19,	115:3, 120:23,
79:1, 79:3, 112:16,	123:5, 123:11,
116:1, 117:12,	123:21, 123:22,
118:19, 122:15,	129:24, 130:10,
122:18, 122:24,	135:19, 135:21,
123:1, 123:5, 123:9,	159:4, 162:17,
123:12, 123:13,	162:18, 163:1,
123:14, 123:19,	163:14, 209:4,
124:3, 124:6,	209:16
124:13, 124:18,	PricewaterhouseCo
125:10, 125:16,	oper [2] - 97:19, 99:7
125:17, 125:24,	pricing [158] - 8:24,
126:6, 126:18,	10:5, 11:2, 11:7,
126:20, 127:15,	12:6, 12:13, 12:20,
127:16, 127:22,	
	13:18, 13:22, 14:2,
127:24, 129:4,	14:3, 14:6, 14:10,
131:13, 132:1,	14:16, 14:17, 14:21,
132:3, 132:6, 134:1,	15:20, 17:2, 17:10,
134:5, 134:10,	18:22, 21:2, 21:5,
134:19, 134:20,	21:10, 21:16, 22:1,
134:22, 135:2,	22:8, 25:19, 26:4,
135:5, 135:6,	29:1, 29:25, 30:20,
135:16, 136:1,	30:23, 30:24, 31:1,
136:4, 142:9,	
	31:3, 31:5, 31:9,
149:19, 150:13,	31:17, 32:3, 32:25,
150:20, 158:18,	33:4, 33:5, 51:3,
160:5, 160:7,	51:16, 53:22, 53:23,
161:24, 162:10,	54:4, 54:12, 55:9,
162:14, 162:16,	55:11, 55:16, 56:1,
162:24, 162:25,	56:14, 56:16, 64:14,
163:15, 163:22,	67:13, 72:8, 73:11,
164:10, 164:12,	73:15, 73:16, 75:2,
164:20, 172:14,	75:3, 75:5, 75:6,
173:21, 174:4,	75:7, 75:8, 75:12,
174:14, 174:20,	75:15, 77:6, 78:6,
174:24, 175:4,	78:7, 78:10, 78:13,
178:3, 178:6, 178:7,	78:14, 78:15, 78:20,
182:19, 183:18,	
195:14, 196:8,	78:21, 79:16, 79:20,
	80:2, 80:8, 80:11,
197:3, 198:2, 198:7,	80:17, 80:19, 81:17,
198:14, 198:16,	81:24, 82:1, 82:2,
199:13, 206:15,	82:12, 96:12,
206:24, 210:13	111:19, 112:5,
price-fixing [23] - 9:3,	113:3, 113:5, 113:6,
9:7, 9:12, 9:14,	113:11, 113:13,
11:17, 55:7, 55:9,	113:16, 113:18,
55:12, 55:19, 57:2,	113:22, 113:23,
57:5, 57:8, 57:14,	113:25, 114:8,
	· · ·
72:1, 72:3, 75:21,	114:9, 114:12,
77:7, 160:5, 162:14,	114:17, 122:21,
162:24, 162:25,	127:19, 128:14,
163:15, 182:19	130:6, 130:20,
prices [43] - 10:1,	130:21, 130:24,
15:1, 16:5, 16:23,	130:25, 131:2,
20:7, 20:19, 20:25,	131:3, 131:10,

```
131:25, 132:16,
 132:18, 132:23,
 132:24, 133:23,
 134:14, 135:9,
 137:14, 143:22,
 156:18, 157:11,
 163:13, 172:7,
 172:17, 172:19,
 172:25, 173:2,
 173:7, 177:4,
 177:16, 177:18,
 181:10, 183:25,
 197:11, 198:5,
 198:7, 198:13,
 198:15, 198:17,
 198:18, 198:25,
 199:11, 207:23,
 208:9, 208:11,
 208:21, 209:16
Pricing [2] - 73:10,
 127:4
Pride [1] - 26:10
primarily [1] - 36:24
primary [2] - 145:1,
 207:8
principles [1] - 158:15
private [1] - 62:13
Private [2] - 35:21
probative [9] - 12:21,
 22:2, 30:3, 30:6,
 68:3, 71:18, 73:19,
 82:16, 126:4
probe [1] - 159:23
problem [11] - 58:20,
 58:21, 59:22, 100:8,
 100:9, 102:11,
 111:15, 138:17,
 165:10, 166:4,
 169:21
problems [30] - 40:1,
 42:17, 48:20, 83:22,
 83:23, 83:24, 87:5,
 96:2, 96:4, 97:18,
 101:4, 101:6, 102:8,
 103:2, 105:15,
 106:22, 108:3,
 108:17, 108:21,
 152:18, 165:5,
 169:25, 170:6,
 187:15, 187:18,
 187:24, 188:4
proceed [8] - 7:5, 9:6,
 22:14, 30:1, 35:17,
 39:14, 94:13, 179:12
proceeding [2] -
 10:22, 101:20
proceedings [3] -
 22:16, 211:17,
 211:22
PROCEEDINGS [1] -
```

```
5:1
process [14] - 37:25,
 38:21, 57:22, 59:17,
 59:21, 101:23,
 102:19, 146:21,
 148:6, 165:9, 170:1,
 201:18, 207:3,
 207:13
processes [3] - 13:8,
 30:18, 78:1
produce [1] - 101:14
produced [4] - 11:5,
 17:2, 17:9, 73:24
product [18] - 9:24,
 18:19, 19:14, 24:2,
 29:5, 31:3, 40:7,
 77:18, 81:11, 82:10,
 121:15, 128:10,
 128:12, 157:19,
 158:11, 158:16,
 171:12, 182:1
production [1] -
 101.14
products [30] - 10:2,
 13:4, 13:6, 13:13,
 17:3. 17:8. 19:13.
 19:14, 27:15, 30:21,
 34:2, 34:3, 34:4,
 34:8, 40:6, 66:25,
 67:1, 77:24, 79:17,
 89:11, 89:13, 115:6,
 125:14, 125:15,
 134:14, 163:23,
 182:19, 208:9,
 208:13, 208:22
professed [1] - 32:12
profession [1] -
 201:18
professional [1] -
 206:21
professor [1] - 189:8
proffered [2] - 121:24,
 202:19
profit [1] - 33:6
profitability [2] -
 183:20, 183:24
profitable [3] - 96:14,
 112:17, 183:18
profits [2] - 112:17,
 113:5
progress [3] - 58:10,
 61:13, 87:19
progressed [2] -
 38:13, 113:13
progressing [2] -
 38:3, 60:24
prohibited [2] -
 108:13, 184:16
prohibition [3] -
 15:25, 16:1
```

```
prohibits [1] - 195:8
project [3] - 60:24,
 86:1, 154:10
projects [5] - 38:18,
 85:5, 87:13, 87:18,
 87:25
promises [3] - 102:22,
 146:17, 180:23
proof [16] - 16:24,
 20:16, 34:15, 45:16,
 47:19, 69:16, 73:3,
 73:4, 75:9, 78:19,
 85:9, 88:3, 89:19,
 92:18, 110:23,
 111:22
proper [4] - 116:9,
 175:7, 192:7, 203:17
properly [2] - 129:17,
 207:9
proponent [2] -
 116:15, 118:8
propose [3] - 8:11,
 142:6, 190:18
proposed [1] - 178:18
proposition [6] - 20:4,
 23:20, 24:5, 26:11,
 27:11, 45:21
prosecuting [1] -
 83:14
prosecution [9] -
 27:3, 27:7, 27:8,
 27:19, 29:19, 52:18,
 115:14, 115:15,
 135:20
prosecutor [1] - 83:14
prosecutors [1] -
 159:4
prospects [2] - 46:20,
 155:15
protected [1] - 35:20
provably [1] - 67:17
prove [22] - 10:20,
 11:16, 14:14, 15:13,
 15:14, 16:4, 16:6,
 30:13, 33:16, 42:18,
 48:9, 50:15, 60:13,
 67:18, 68:6, 68:11,
 73:21, 89:16, 90:1,
 90:2, 150:6, 150:7
proved [2] - 91:21,
 96:25
proven [3] - 55:8,
 55:10, 72:9
proves [3] - 85:15,
 87:10, 89:19
provide [6] - 91:16,
 121:3, 136:11,
 140:9, 179:5, 192:4
provided [12] - 18:9,
 91:12, 118:22,
```

129:17

121:2, 125:21, 142:21, 144:17, 150:5, 160:6, 201:22, 202:12, 206:2 provides [2] - 140:1, 140:2 providing [1] - 202:15 province [2] - 184:19, 204:18 proving [3] - 51:18, 64:16, 149:9 proximal [1] - 127:9 proximity [3] - 17:17, 17:24, 127:10 proxy [1] - 157:23 prudence [1] - 149:1 Przybylowski [1] -5:17 PRZYBYLOWSKI [2] -2:3, 5:16 **PSLRA** [1] - 110:11 PSLRA's [1] - 187:2 public [33] - 21:21, 23:12, 37:2, 56:17, 62:13, 62:15, 68:14, 70:1, 83:12, 83:13, 83:15, 84:6, 84:15, 89:4, 90:9, 91:7, 91:11, 91:15, 118:5, 118:15, 118:16, 118:17, 119:7, 160:17, 160:21, 161:4, 161:5, 193:5, 204:25, 205:1, 206:18, 209:20 publicly [3] - 46:3, 55:5, 71:16 publish [1] - 118:24 published [5] - 106:2, 106:16, 106:20, 133:8, 196:3 **PUC** [1] - 176:10 puffery [1] - 58:11 pull [1] - 67:5 Purcell [21] - 6:23, 144:7, 146:3, 146:6, 191:20, 191:21, 191:23, 192:4, 192:13, 192:19, 193:2, 194:5, 194:8, 194:19, 195:3, 201:16, 202:5, 202:13, 202:21, 203:11 Purcell's [13] - 191:25, 192:6, 192:10, 192:16, 192:21, 192:22, 193:6, 193:8, 193:21,

202:1, 202:19, Qualified [1] - 195:19 203:6, 203:23 qualify [2] - 23:21, purchase [2] - 21:22, 154:25 purchaser [1] - 145:16 pure [4] - 19:23, 42:20, 145:23, 173.22 purport [1] - 161:3 purported [2] - 196:8, 203:6 purportedly [1] -200:14 purpose [5] - 96:24, 107:6, 140:1, 140:6, purposely [1] - 140:6 purposes [1] - 6:13 pursuant [3] - 70:2, 71:7, 118:10 pursue [3] - 77:9, 175:25, 176:4 push [2] - 105:18, 162:7 pushback [1] - 105:21 put [42] - 11:3, 12:3, 16:17, 20:17, 22:14, 30:13, 33:18, 34:23, 39:12, 41:16, 41:24, 44:13, 47:7, 47:8, 49:10, 58:16, 65:10, 65:16, 66:11, 72:11, 73:1, 76:6, 77:10, 81:4, 84:5, 88:5, 92:12, 105:23, 108:8, 108:11, 115:11, 130:22, 136:18, 146:22, 152:10, 169:12, 170:11, 171:5, 182:11, 183:9, 202:6 putting [5] - 11:8, 41:3, 92:4, 166:3, 166.9 puzzle [1] - 136:9 PWC [1] - 97:21 Q **Q1** [4] - 103:17, 103:20, 103:21, 108:2

Q2 [3] - 102:12, 187:9 Q3 [2] - 113:6 qualification [3] -200:19, 200:20, 204:10 qualifications [3] -156:2, 204:4, 204:12 qualified [1] - 205:2

quantification [1] -143:20 Quarter [3] - 63:23, 63:24 quarter [13] - 36:21, 63:24, 71:12, 71:13, 99:15, 106:5, 106:8, 106:12, 132:19, 151:24, 156:14, 175:1 quarterly [4] - 59:18, 61:1, 75:19, 103:6 questions [16] - 64:19, 76:10, 76:11, 76:20, 76:24, 93:20, 93:22, 95:21, 130:9, 138:25, 139:3, 145:12, 169:10, 170:9, 175:11, 175:12 quick [2] - 6:13, 183:14 quickly [5] - 49:10, 67:24, 89:17, 170:12, 171:4 quintessential [1] -23:25 quite [14] - 26:9, 31:20, 38:16, 47:2, 55:17, 58:15, 69:10, 80:12, 107:19, 126:13, 165:18, 176:6, 211:1, 211:5 quotations [1] - 193:2 quote [105] - 11:22, 13:18, 13:25, 14:22, 19:5, 21:8, 26:17, 27:18, 27:20, 28:14, 30:2, 32:1, 32:10, 32:22, 32:23, 32:24, 37:24, 39:7, 39:24, 40:18, 42:16, 46:2, 68:20, 68:21, 70:19, 70:22, 71:14, 72:7, 75:12, 81:9, 81:13, 81:18, 81:24, 85:4, 100:6, 100:7, 102:2, 102:21, 102:22, 103:1, 103:3, 104:1, 105:8, 105:12, 105:18, 105:19, 105:20, 105:24, 106:11, 106:12, 107:14, 109:3, 109:10, 109:17, 110:14, 116:16,

128:11, 129:2, 130:11, 134:2, 134:6, 134:16, 138:12, 138:13, 138:14, 146:14, 155:12, 166:19, 170:4, 170:15, 172:8, 173:6, 177:6, 178:22, 188:1, 191:16, 191:17, 192:11, 192:13, 192:19, 193:9, 193:18, 194:9, 194:10, 194:16, 195:19, 195:21, 195:24, 196:1, 197:23, 198:12, 198:15. 199:2. 199:7. 199:10. 199:14, 199:18 quoted [1] - 141:7 quotes [2] - 9:6, 24:5 quoting [1] - 194:10

# R

radical [3] - 123:1, 123:9, 123:19 raise [6] - 20:25, 31:12, 54:14, 123:25, 157:3 raised [9] - 56:12, 60:23, 92:24, 100:22, 102:3, 123:21, 131:12, 134:11, 173:7 raises [2] - 85:22, 86:8 raising [1] - 27:2 ramping [1] - 160:23 ran [2] - 41:10, 169:13 range [1] - 201:14 rank [1] - 61:22 rapid [1] - 169:14 rare [1] - 55:4 rate [5] - 36:11, 89:5, 89:15, 124:8 rather [15] - 8:1, 11:19, 22:2, 23:8, 27:18, 28:25, 33:3, 36:6, 44:7, 45:11, 48:13, 116:13, 178:15, 179:15, 196:17 rational [1] - 143:23 **RDR** [1] - 211:24 Re [3] - 27:10, 39:3, 191:11 re [1] - 158:12 re-evaluation [1] -158:12

reach [6] - 120:8, 133:7, 186:10, 201:10, 201:15, 206:4 reached [3] - 70:10, 206:23, 207:12 reaches [2] - 205:1, 207:2 reaching [2] - 189:9, 203:5 reaction [2] - 95:21, 163:24 reactions [2] - 150:20, 157:24 read [7] - 45:21, 45:22, 81:4, 108:10, 165:21, 165:22, 165:24 readily [1] - 153:25 reading [4] - 48:5, 84:15, 121:25, 152:23 ready [1] - 94:13 **real** [3] - 36:19, 183:14, 183:17 realities [1] - 178:11 reality [2] - 65:21, 199:4 realize [2] - 90:13, 126:21 realizing [1] - 39:23 really [39] - 9:17, 24:15, 38:16, 39:17, 41:15, 63:20, 64:13, 77:8, 80:11, 80:25, 83:22, 87:14, 92:2, 93:16, 95:8, 110:21, 110:23, 112:15, 121:21, 139:15, 146:24, 147:1, 148:4, 150:16, 150:18, 150:19, 156:10, 161:25, 163:19, 164:3, 164:8, 164:11, 170:12, 178:12, 182:23, 202:11, 202:20, 211:1 realm [1] - 171:24 reams [2] - 17:6, 144:17 reaped [1] - 44:5 reason [19] - 42:25, 43:8, 50:16, 56:8, 95:14, 98:21, 109:20, 122:6, 122:20, 127:11, 131:21, 135:11, 155:20, 176:25, 185:7, 192:17,

121:21, 127:4,

197:11	recklessly [2] - 73:20,	109:20, 1
reasonable [57] -	110:16	171:11, 1
14:13, 38:11, 72:13,	recklessness [3] -	reference
82:13, 82:14, 99:23,	68:8, 68:9, 133:20	86:14, 11
100:1, 100:9, 102:5,	recognize [2] - 47:4,	156:24, 1 referencin
102:17, 104:2,	200:5	
108:5, 109:11, 109:13, 109:25,	recognized [6] -	referred [6]
110:4, 110:15,	10:19, 14:1, 22:1,	153:5, 16 165:24, 1
114:5, 114:6,	29:24, 110:14,	208:16
121:23, 122:17,	180:11	referring
123:8, 123:16,	recognizes [1] - 21:12	86:23, 11
124:11, 125:1,	recognizing [1] - 42:18	165:17, 1
126:4, 126:5,	recollection [1] -	173:7
126:19, 127:8,	167:15	refers [3] -
127:17, 127:22,	recommend [1] - 31:2	86:13, 11
128:14, 128:19,	recommendations [2]	reflect [4] -
128:22, 129:4,	- 31:3, 31:7	150:23, 2
129:17, 129:25,	record [57] - 11:7,	reflected [
131:22, 133:7,	17:20, 18:8, 25:15,	reflecting
133:18, 134:9,	26:1, 28:6, 28:24,	reflects [3]
134:18, 134:25,	29:16, 30:11, 31:5,	36:11, 15
135:10, 136:6,	33:21, 35:9, 36:11,	Reform [2]
136:13, 138:20,	39:25, 41:9, 62:7,	35:22
163:21, 168:1,	64:15, 66:12, 67:21,	refuge [2] -
168:8, 170:25,	68:23, 68:24, 76:19,	183:7
171:24, 172:21,	82:25, 83:1, 92:4,	refuse [1] -
173:18, 173:22,	92:11, 93:4, 94:23,	refused [1]
188:16	95:9, 95:11, 95:25,	refute [1] -
reasonably [2] -	96:5, 101:1, 107:12,	refuted [1]
165:24, 201:14	112:24, 115:10,	regard [4] -
<b>reasons</b> [17] - 18:9, 23:14, 29:23, 30:14,	115:13, 115:22,	195:4, 19
30:17, 30:22, 44:24,	116:7, 118:4, 118:9,	regarding
47:5, 49:17, 50:14,	128:8, 129:22,	23:1, 34:
76:4, 82:23, 129:25,	130:17, 131:23,	51:5, 52:2
144:23, 188:1,	133:21, 138:22,	61:7, 64:9
199:22	143:6, 145:19, 146:8, 149:14,	67:14, 75
rebuttal [2] - 7:12,	153:23, 165:11,	130:10, 1
8:10	177:8, 209:21,	133:1, 14
recap [2] - 6:13, 6:22	210:2, 211:22	147:18, 1
receipt [1] - 141:20	record's [1] - 104:16	155:22, 1
receive [3] - 73:8,	records [7] - 21:21,	158:20, 1 192:14, 1
75:19, 83:16	23:12, 48:15,	194:4, 19
received [11] - 7:2,	118:21, 118:23,	202:16, 2
64:15, 87:10, 87:25,	119:4	203:11, 2
89:18, 90:3, 119:1,	recouped [1] - 134:1	regardless
140:10, 141:18,	red [1] - 120:4	112:25
142:8, 202:25	reduce [1] - 151:5	regularly [
receives [1] - 89:23	reduced [4] - 46:13,	131:24
receiving [2] - 89:21,	156:15, 156:16,	regulation
90:7	156:17	regulation
recent [2] - 26:13,	reductions [1] -	39:24, 39
37:17	156:18	42:4
recently [2] - 43:1,	<b>REED</b> [1] - 2:20	regulators
170:5	Reed [2] - 6:7, 65:3	117:5
<b>Recess</b> [2] - 94:10,	refer [4] - 22:23,	regulatory
161:18	55:14, 58:8, 145:2	160:1
reckless [4] - 130:1,	reference [7] - 28:22,	regurgitat
131:6, 133:6, 136:14	55:24, 56:22,	regurgitat

112:11, 28:12 86:20 rehabilitate [1] **d** [5] - 56:21, 184:14 18:24, Reilly [1] - 203:19 175:15 reimagine [1] - 109:5 ng [1] - 29:7 reiterate [2] - 72:15, 3] - 22:22, 202:13 30:14, reiterated [1] - 15:25 196:21, rejected [10] - 12:12, 33:10, 55:14, 56:9, [6] - 56:15, 16:2, 167:14, relate [3] - 39:6, 48:4, 48:7 27:20, related [20] - 9:7, 10:12 32:2, 32:8, 200:24 139:11, 141:8, [1] - 175:24 149:12, 152:12, 153:21, 156:4, [1] - 208:4 157:10, 157:14, - 17:20, 51:2 157:25, 158:25, - 35:21, 187:11, 196:17, 201:20 relates [5] - 28:19, - 163:16, 49:19, 131:11, 178:23 195:20, 203:2 - 10:23 relations [1] - 31:12 35.8 relationship [3] -148:13, 152:21, - 41:17 160:6 - 193:20. relationships [1] -95:7, 197:10 19:8 [30] - 10:8, 12, 51:2, relative [1] - 103:2 23, 57:10, relatively [2] - 77:25, 9, 65:8, 166:16 release [3] - 146:15, 5:12, 151:9, 155:2 132:12, released [4] - 149:18, 47:17, 151:4, 159:12, 150:11, 57:17, 159:16 160:6, relevance [2] - 25:11, 193:25, 63:14 94:24. relevant [4] - 17:21, 202:21, 51:12, 69:11, 76:24 203:12 reliability [5] - 200:19, S [1] -200:20, 201:4, 201:7, 205:8 [2] - 75:7, reliable [4] - 202:9, 207:14, 210:5 n [1] - 42:1 reliance [1] - 180:6 ns [4] relied [7] - 40:10, 9:25, 40:1, 40:19, 111:8, 111:17, 112:15, s [2] - 117:2, 117:15, 117:16 relief [7] - 178:15, 178:16, 178:21, **y** [2] - 120:6, 179:9, 189:15, te [1] - 22:24 190:2, 190:11 relies [1] - 38:4 ting [1] -

rely [19] - 19:10, 20:2, 22:18, 23:8, 24:4, 26:8, 72:10, 72:12, 72:20, 72:23, 73:2, 74:3, 77:3, 84:21, 87:6, 87:9, 88:6, 88:25, 181:6 relying [2] - 173:14, 183:24 Relying [1] - 60:12 remain [2] - 8:22, 60:14, 68:18, 184:2, 133:11 198:4, 205:7, 207:5 remaining [3] - 8:22, 10:6, 66:7 remains [1] - 34:16 15:15, 24:19, 26:18, remarkable [1] - 8:1 35:18, 41:20, 105:6, remarks [1] - 90:12 remedial [1] - 140:6 remedied [1] - 165:19 remedy [2] - 192:7, 205:22 remember [9] - 40:13, 56:11, 95:16, 99:24, 104:10, 106:5, 138:9, 188:23, 211:13 remind [1] - 81:25 remotely [1] - 5:1 removal [1] - 92:21 remove [1] - 153:11 removed [1] - 92:6 removing [1] - 92:19 rendered [1] - 12:18 renders [2] - 191:12, 191:13 repeat [3] - 29:21, 112:23, 206:10 repeated [2] - 90:9, 120:10 repeatedly [11] -13:10, 79:19, 88:6, 122:7, 130:9, 133:15, 146:19, 148:16, 193:3, 197:24 replace [2] - 42:4, 155:23 replete [1] - 48:21 reply [6] - 100:23, 121:11, 123:17, 149:7, 150:9, 208:15 report [21] - 41:7, 41:8, 97:21, 106:2, 109:1, 117:19, 117:25, 121:11, 125:14, 142:18, 154:23, 158:10, 159:8, 187:8, 197:22, 198:12, 208:1, 208:4, 208:5,

208:15, 210:4 reported [8] - 25:21, 34:23, 36:22, 41:6, 125:20, 159:3, 159:16, 159:20 Reporter [5] - 1:24, 21:20, 65:3, 163:2, 211:25 reporter [4] - 6:15, 6:19, 208:18, 210:25 REPORTER'S [1] -211:19 reporting [5] - 61:1, 61:24, 62:4, 66:24, 103:10 reports [18] - 48:11, 75:19, 75:20, 114:16, 132:21, 149:15, 150:23, 152:19, 152:20, 160:22, 191:25, 192:6, 196:14, 197:15, 205:25, 206:17, 206:20, represent [2] - 6:10, 174:13 representations [1] -42:14 representative [6] -17:11, 75:11, 106:25, 122:13, 172:24, 173:5 represented [5] -79:14, 79:15, 79:17, 143:16, 156:1 representing [1] -180:9 request [5] - 119:25, 120:1, 120:18, 179:8 requested [1] - 121:20 require [7] - 11:12, 37:4. 96:4. 104:24. 110:1, 200:16, 201:5 required [9] - 99:3, 121:3, 123:16, 123:21, 134:2, 135:13, 148:2. 148:5, 148:24 requirement [3] -148:17, 154:18, 187:3 requirements [4] -13:6, 61:24, 149:1, 200:18 requires [11] - 11:11, 14:10, 15:8, 43:9, 44:3, 101:10, 148:9, 188:18, 195:11, 201:7

requiring [1] - 123:25 research [2] - 201:6, 204:6 reset [8] - 102:14, 102:19, 102:20, 102:21, 169:18, 184:20, 184:21, 184.22 resided [1] - 102:2 resignation [2] -48:13, 154:16 resigning [1] - 48:12 resolve [3] - 27:9, 37:20, 97:5 resolving [1] - 101:22 resonates [1] - 69:15 resorted [1] - 146:16 respect [68] - 8:8, 8:24, 9:3, 9:14, 9:24, 10:5, 10:14, 10:20, 12:10, 17:3, 18:18, 20:22, 30:10, 36:1, 36:14, 40:1, 40:25, 42:19, 43:15, 44:20, 44:21, 46:17, 48:1, 48:2, 48:9, 50:5, 50:11, 51:19, 51:24, 57:17, 63:3, 64:6, 66:8, 66:9, 67:22, 68:24, 71:23, 72:22, 75:17, 82:22, 91:22, 105:10, 111:5, 127:19, 128:24, 133:20, 137:13, 157:12, 158:22, 163:12, 166:9, 166:11, 173:4, 174:5, 176:18, 177:2, 177:21, 181:13, 182:5, 185:1, 187:13, 190:1, 200:7, 200:11, 200:14, 203:6, 205:4 respectfully [3] -71:18, 171:12, 174:17 respective [4] - 96:9, 117:10, 118:20, 185:22 respects [1] - 68:14 respond [1] - 189:12 responded [3] - 98:23, 105:7, 130:9 responding [2] - 21:3, 120:12

response [6] - 33:4,

55:22, 120:1,

201:19

160:11, 162:4,

responses [2] -120:18, 169:10 responsibility [1] -27:14 responsible [1] -145.9 rest [4] - 11:19, 11:24, 156:16, 201:8 restate [2] - 15:5, 90.15 rested [1] - 25:19 restricted [1] - 107:14 rests [1] - 44:7 result [7] - 71:4, 106:14, 126:12, 139:20, 142:6, 158:11, 160:1 resulting [2] - 118:10, 199.7 results [13] - 36:20, 49:13, 49:14, 49:15, 71:13, 87:24, 96:13, 106:6, 151:24, 156:13, 156:17, 188:1 retire [1] - 109:18 Retirement [1] - 37:21 retrospective [1] -60.7 revealed [5] - 9:11, 48:13, 105:1, 156:22. 187:12 reveals [1] - 96:5 revelatory [1] - 157:4 revenue [10] - 39:23, 42:8, 54:18, 54:21, 90:24, 97:20, 97:22, 99:9, 165:9, 165:11 revenues [2] - 56:1, 104:9 reverse [1] - 180:5 review [10] - 26:10, 32:6, 39:10, 103:6, 103:7, 113:2, 113:3, 113:9, 132:17, 133:3 reviewed [5] - 30:24, 73:24, 113:10, 121:8, 132:25 reviewing [1] - 92:22 reviews [1] - 110:10 rich [1] - 174:9 ridiculous [2] -164:12, 164:24 rig [1] - 96:7 rigged [3] - 115:3, 129:24, 135:22 rigging [4] - 26:18, 120:23. 136:2. 209:4 rigorous [1] - 13:7 rise [7] - 5:5, 39:6,

94:9, 94:11, 161:17, 161:19, 211:16 rises [1] - 123:1 Risk [1] - 60:12 risk [13] - 23:24, 62:5, 122:3, 124:11, 124:15, 125:2, 125:4, 130:14, 134:1, 140:19, 140:22, 160:4 risks [3] - 103:2, 170:4, 170:7 rivals [1] - 21:7 road [2] - 15:8, 124:2 role [5] - 100:12, 155:13, 156:2, 194:1, 201:12 roll [1] - 132:4 Romain [1] - 6:1 **ROMAIN** [1] - 2:15 Ron [2] - 62:3, 98:16 roof [1] - 174:21 ROOFER'S [1] - 1:3 Roofer's [1] - 68:19 room [3] - 88:18, 135:14, 149:5 rooms [1] - 144:17 Roseland [1] - 1:19 roughly [2] - 94:22, 123:4 routinely [1] - 111:8 Rowe [1] - 6:5 **ROWE** [1] - 2:11 rubber [1] - 15:8 Rudinger [3] - 140:17, 140:20, 141:6 Rule [10] - 23:5, 69:25, 96:23, 117:13, 118:3, 120:4, 120:7, 188:18, 191:9, 200:16 rule [6] - 23:9, 70:2, 116:19, 120:4, 124:6, 162:1 rules [4] - 27:12, 104:24, 124:4, 165:11 Rules [1] - 23:11 ruling [1] - 35:16 run [4] - 48:18, 70:13, 101:4, 187:19 rust [1] - 148:20 **Rx** [23] - 10:2, 15:18, 15:24, 17:13, 18:20, 21:24, 29:2, 29:5, 30:23, 46:21, 49:15, 51:3, 51:16, 71:23, 79:16, 79:18, 80:15, 80:17, 156:18, 182:1, 196:23,

197:11 S S-A-N-D-O-Z [1] - 27:5 S-T-U-E-C-K [1] -27:15 Sachs [1] - 80:21 safe [1] - 35:22 safeguards [1] - 24:3 salaries [1] - 20:22 sale [2] - 71:8, 71:9 sales [11] - 24:21, 27:14, 29:3, 29:4, 29:5, 31:16, 69:7, 69:10, 105:7, 115:23 salt [1] - 124:2 Salt [1] - 32:17 salvaged [1] - 181:10 Sam [2] - 6:1, 7:22 Samuel [1] - 191:7 **SAMUEL** [1] - 2:16 **SANDLER** [1] - 1:17 Sandler [1] - 5:21 Sandoz [23] - 24:10, 27:5, 27:6, 27:13, 27:21, 28:3, 28:19, 52:17, 52:18, 114:25, 115:1, 115:2, 115:3, 115:11, 115:15, 115:23, 120:23, 135:16, 135:20, 180:25, 209:2 Sandoz's [3] - 115:14, 115:19, 129:23 Sandoz-deferred [1] -52:18 satisfied [2] - 110:1, 194:7 save [8] - 26:12, 47:22, 179:25, 180:3, 180:10, 180:16, 180:22, 182:21 saw [10] - 47:2, 51:12, 55:2, 74:21, 96:8, 107:2, 151:4, 165:13, 178:21, 181:20 scaling [1] - 103:2 scare [1] - 146:17 scattershot [1] - 16:10 scenario [2] - 143:2, 150.7 scene [1] - 72:3 **scheme** [14] - 9:3, 9:7, 9:14, 22:7, 72:1,

75:21, 102:12,

112:5, 160:5,

162:14, 162:17, 162:24, 162:25, 174:16
schemes [1] - 26:18 Schneider [1] - 192:9
<b>scienter</b> [44] <b>-</b> 8:4, 8:8, 9:6, 9:8, 10:8, 10:19,
10:20, 30:4, 30:6, 38:10, 42:19, 42:21,
43:4, 43:8, 43:10, 43:13, 51:11, 51:18,
64:16, 67:22, 68:21, 71:2, 71:17, 104:14,
108:19, 109:22, 109:23, 110:1,
110:4, 110:19, 110:21, 110:25,
111:5, 129:21, 130:8, 131:22,
133:20, 134:19, 136:9, 136:12,
181:13, 181:16, 186:23, 203:2
<b>scintilla</b> [3] - 65:23, 96:25, 138:23
<b>scope</b> [2] - 136:18, 192:1
scoundrels [2] - 163:17, 183:7
<b>scoured</b> [2] - 11:4, 11:5
<b>screen</b> [3] - 41:3, 41:4, 65:16
scripted [1] - 133:1 scrutiny [2] - 160:1,
204:5 <b>se</b> [2] - 23:2, 28:16
search [3] - 159:18,
159:22, 160:24 searching [1] - 159:23
<b>seated</b> [3] - 5:9, 94:12, 161:20
<b>SEC</b> [2] - 170:21, 193:16
<b>second</b> [18] - 10:6, 13:2, 14:23, 28:9,
35:10, 40:21, 62:3, 69:4, 99:15, 106:5,
117:13, 119:1, 120:19, 131:21,
137:20, 184:4,
192:22, 209:7 secondly [1] - 137:20
seconds [1] - 65:25 secretary [1] - 74:7
<b>section</b> [10] <b>-</b> 9:18, 64:3, 139:17,
143:15, 178:14, 178:19, 195:5,
195:7, 196:10

```
Securities [6] - 35:21,
 35:22, 139:17,
 148:24, 172:11,
 202:8
securities [20] - 33:22,
 37:23, 39:7, 39:9,
 39:14, 39:20, 57:19,
 58:5, 66:14, 83:14,
 111:24, 112:1,
 140:23, 148:11,
 150:14, 177:10,
 177:11, 185:25,
 193:14, 206:19
security [3] - 58:7,
 83:18, 111:25
sedan [1] - 123:13
see [34] - 9:8, 18:13,
 46:18, 47:11, 47:13,
 56:2, 63:8, 63:10,
 67:3, 67:6, 67:7,
 69:6, 80:13, 81:25,
 82:9, 83:23, 86:3,
 87:19, 98:15,
 104:19, 107:11,
 123:2, 123:11,
 123:12, 123:13,
 131:8, 136:6,
 151:11, 152:25,
 155:6, 155:14,
 171:23, 186:15,
 189:2
seek [5] - 10:12, 24:8,
 139:19, 149:3,
 191:21
seeking [2] - 193:10,
 205:21
seeks [1] - 116:22
seem [4] - 13:20, 55:6,
 155:7, 186:14
segment [4] - 49:14,
 81:12, 82:10, 128:13
segments [2] - 49:7,
 80:12
segregated [1] - 49:16
select [1] - 114:3
self [3] - 32:15, 95:9,
 186:5
self-serving [2] - 95:9,
 186:5
Sell [1] - 107:14
sell [12] - 40:6, 40:7,
 70:6, 83:18, 91:19,
 107:8, 144:2,
 164:13, 164:15,
 164:22, 174:14,
 174:19
selling [6] - 69:14,
 163:23, 164:14,
 164:16, 164:23,
```

173:24

```
sells [2] - 70:10, 71:7
Semerenko [1] - 148:9
sending [1] - 182:16
sends [1] - 74:7
senior [2] - 53:24,
 75.4
sense [16] - 21:8,
 21:11, 36:25, 45:2,
 78:2, 78:3, 119:9,
 135:13, 146:24,
 161:9, 161:13,
 174:17, 176:12,
 182:17, 202:24
sensitivities [1] -
 97:22
sent [10] - 74:7, 98:7,
 98:11, 99:14,
 113:15, 114:16,
 132:10, 132:12,
 132:21, 185:11
sentence [3] - 81:18,
 108:9, 128:2
sentences [1] - 128:1
separate [3] - 14:20,
 64:3, 199:5
September [7] - 78:18,
 91:2, 91:7, 104:8,
 113:17, 114:16,
 132:22
sequence [1] - 190:3
serious [6] - 37:9,
 37:16, 42:16, 83:6,
 88:22, 169:21
served [3] - 107:6,
 168:12, 202:7
serves [1] - 96:23
Services [1] - 193:16
serving [2] - 95:9,
 186:5
set [15] - 12:10, 16:23,
 22:19, 23:13, 25:14,
 27:21, 101:24,
 117:19, 118:9,
 119:23, 150:21,
 175:25, 182:22,
 194:23, 205:15
sets [2] - 118:5,
 120:12
settlement [1] - 162:8
settlements [1] -
 179:23
seven [8] - 12:14,
 47:1, 149:17,
 150:15, 151:15,
 189:5, 189:10,
 201:25
Seventh [4] - 37:18,
 37:22, 38:9, 38:16
several [11] - 29:14,
 72:10, 74:23, 80:16,
```

```
94:21, 105:9,
 113:16, 152:4,
 156:20, 204:12,
 208.7
severely [2] - 98:12,
 103:14
shade [1] - 39:12
shape [2] - 15:20,
 188:11
share [27] - 32:10,
 32:23, 44:22, 44:25,
 45:2, 45:4, 45:17,
 49:8, 49:15, 70:11,
 71:9, 75:7, 121:15,
 122:4, 127:14,
 127:16, 141:14,
 141:16, 142:13,
 142:17, 144:2,
 149:18, 174:9,
 205:20, 208:11,
 209:9
shared [1] - 86:15
sharehold [1] - 143:21
shareholder [1] -
 140:14
shareholders [21] -
 44:10, 45:12, 62:13,
 71:5, 139:21,
 141:12, 141:17,
 141:21, 141:22,
 142:5, 143:12,
 144:5, 144:25,
 152:9, 163:7,
 174:13, 176:20,
 176:21, 178:22,
 179:6, 194:17
shares [35] - 44:10,
 71:1, 71:4, 71:7,
 71:10, 71:11, 107:8,
 107:10, 107:11,
 107:15, 138:6,
 141:15, 141:18,
 141:23, 141:24,
 142:2, 142:5, 142:9,
 142:12, 142:14,
 143:8, 143:15,
 143:23, 143:24,
 144:2, 144:4,
 144:14, 164:13,
 173:24, 174:2,
 174:10, 174:19,
 178:23, 205:21,
 205:23
Sharkey [1] - 97:1
shave [1] - 129:11
shed [1] - 38:22
sheet [3] - 47:3, 47:15,
 180:4
shepherding [1] -
```

```
Sherman [5] - 111:23,
 111:24, 137:18,
 177:3
shifting [1] - 65:18
ship [1] - 155:4
Shkreli [3] - 56:12,
 131:11, 131:12
Shkreli's [1] - 163:14
shocked [2] - 76:23,
 151:9
shocking [2] - 77:1,
 81:3
shoehorn [1] - 16:9
short [8] - 65:8, 66:1,
 68:20, 90:13, 93:3,
 95:15, 161:10,
 166:17
shortage [3] - 125:19,
 125:21
shortly [1] - 10:25
show [27] - 9:22, 11:6,
 34:16, 38:10, 44:2,
 48:1, 67:3, 67:18,
 68:6, 68:8, 79:12,
 82:16, 84:25,
 121:12, 122:5,
 149:21, 160:15,
 164:4, 165:18,
 166:25, 177:9,
 180:24, 187:8,
 191:19, 198:20,
 198:21
showed [9] - 9:22,
 33:3, 104:8, 113:3,
 113:15, 157:7,
 165:13, 169:25,
 208:25
showing [12] - 14:14,
 108:16, 118:9,
 119:12, 121:4,
 132:23, 133:21,
 143:6, 148:10,
 149:11. 159:10.
 204:12
shown [5] - 30:21,
 78:17, 111:1, 111:7,
 130:19
shows [20] - 11:6,
 17:18, 17:21, 18:4,
 59:22, 68:7, 68:24,
 79:13, 79:22, 95:25,
 112:12, 112:24,
 114:19, 118:13,
 121:9, 122:5,
 131:23, 184:16,
 187:8, 198:23
SHRIVER [1] - 2:14
shut [4] - 12:4, 16:17,
 20:17, 182:11
side [7] - 111:5,
```

94:25

136:20, 177:25,	site
178:1, 178:8, 206:8,	sit
211:13	Sit
sides [2] - 110:8,	
110:25	sit
	10
<b>sign</b> [2] - 54:5, 58:20	12
<b>sign-off</b> [1] - 54:5	1:
<b>signals</b> [2] - 109:18,	14
152:11	18
<b>signed</b> [2] - 119:14,	sit
138:11	54
significance [1] -	six
157:22	19
significant [10] -	3
37:19, 68:6, 71:16,	7
136:24, 149:22,	10
154:13, 160:10,	1:
169:13, 171:7,	10
189:11	2
significantly [5] -	six
	51X
68:3, 73:19, 82:16,	
151:25, 196:11	Six
<b>signing</b> [1] - 63:3	siz
silence [1] - 182:24	1
<b>silenced</b> [1] - 183:5	ske
silliest [1] - 20:10	ski
<b>silly</b> [4] - 17:18, 24:13,	ski
58:25, 183:6	SK
<b>SILVERMAN</b> [9] - 2:3,	slic
4:7, 5:11, 64:25,	4
94:5, 94:14, 139:5,	5
183:3, 211:15	5
Silverman [16] - 5:12,	6
94:15, 139:14,	6
144:1, 147:8, 152:2,	7
157:6, 166:18,	7
167:5, 169:13,	7
172:7, 172:23,	7
172:7, 172:23,	8
173.10, 173.13,	8
	8
similar [12] - 8:7, 18:4,	8
31:7, 32:21, 38:7,	
38:16, 126:6,	8
126:15, 193:6, 204:8	8
Similarly [1] - 1:4	9
<b>similarly</b> [4] - 39:12,	9
126:7, 199:8, 199:20	1:
simple [2] - 21:11,	1
183:17	1
<b>simply</b> [9] - 9:21,	slic
51:21, 52:1, 53:2,	7:
57:6, 75:12, 138:24,	8
199:11, 202:23	9
single [9] - 21:5,	9:
25:20, 33:25, 34:22,	9:
74:4, 77:5, 124:19,	sli
158:10, 185:19	sli
100.10, 100.10	
singularly (4) QQ-1/	×
singularly [1] - 88:14	
sins [1] - 117:4	80 82 13

```
es [1] - 21:23
ting [1] - 76:23
uated [1] - 1:5
uation [10] - 64:17,
05:8, 124:13,
25:8, 125:17,
38:14, 140:24,
45:14, 187:23,
89:24
uations [2] - 54:11,
4:16
[18] - 8:24, 9:15,
9:14, 25:4, 28:19,
0:21, 34:1, 59:14,
4:13, 79:4, 79:16,
00:3, 112:10,
32:12, 137:16,
63:23, 182:19,
01:25
-fold [2] - 74:13,
32:12
cth [1] - 20:3
e [3] - 19:12, 19:14.
9.21
eptical [1] - 9:12
ill [1] - 204:14
n [1] - 159:4
Us [1] - 34:4
de [64] - 26:25,
1:5, 47:8, 51:20,
51:25, 55:25, 57:15,
57:16, 60:20, 63:21,
6:11, 67:11, 67:24,
8:5, 69:24, 70:25,
1:25, 73:2, 73:9,
5:2, 75:10, 77:10,
7:20, 78:4, 78:17,
8:24, 79:15, 80:14,
31:21, 83:9, 83:10,
4:6, 85:2, 85:10,
5:20, 86:6, 87:7,
7:14, 87:15, 87:23,
8:7, 89:1, 89:17,
9:18. 90:5. 90:15.
0:21. 91:1. 91:6.
1:12, 91:25, 92:17,
36:18, 170:2,
70:11, 171:5,
71:14, 172:5
des [17] - 50:21,
2:20, 73:8, 78:24,
8:1, 89:16, 90:11,
1:22, 92:6, 92:17,
2:20, 92:22, 93:1,
3:2, 113:9, 130:23
ght [1] - 127:25
ghtly [9] - 80:2,
0:8, 80:20, 82:3,
2:12, 127:22,
28:14, 171:11,
```

```
207:23
small [3] - 18:14, 29:6,
 130:22
smart [2] - 45:21,
 151:3
smile [1] - 61:24
SMITH [1] - 2:11
Smith [1] - 6:5
smoking [5] - 11:17,
 11:18, 15:10, 16:16,
smoothly [6] - 57:23,
 99:21, 101:23,
 102:8, 102:20,
 186:15
sneak [2] - 39:1, 40:12
so-called [12] - 9:12,
 14:19, 37:3, 43:25,
 44:19, 48:24,
 127:18, 129:5,
 136:7, 178:1, 180:6,
 191:22
social [5] - 16:12,
 17:12, 18:3, 19:7,
 20.6
Solar [1] - 203:19
sold [11] - 14:9, 28:5,
 31:19, 34:4, 62:14,
 63:11, 70:25, 71:10,
 138:6, 164:10, 174:2
Solemnized [1] -
 15:10
solemnized [1] -
 11:13
someday [1] - 181:13
someone [4] - 74:15,
 74:18, 74:20, 132:4
someplace [1] - 41:10
sometimes [10] - 7:24,
 18:20, 54:12, 54:13,
 65:11, 123:11,
 134:2, 173:2, 183:21
somewhat [1] - 30:3
soon [3] - 109:18,
 132:20, 211:8
sorry [7] - 73:13,
 74:14, 85:16, 85:25,
 126:25, 133:17,
 145:4
sort [10] - 29:10,
 54:14, 54:21, 55:13,
 88:13, 90:12,
 137:19, 151:13,
 162:7, 162:21
sorts [1] - 76:4
sought [2] - 107:8,
 179:4
sound [2] - 62:22,
 179:2
sounded [2] - 95:4,
```

```
95:24
sounds [2] - 78:11,
 179:2
South [1] - 2:12
Southern [1] - 58:9
southern [1] - 179:7
SOX [1] - 62:6
space [2] - 61:15,
 77:24
spades [1] - 49:21
spanning [2] - 34:18,
 201:24
spare [2] - 91:14,
 152:23
Spartan [1] - 179:24
spartan [1] - 35:8
speakers [1] - 28:23
speaking [7] - 15:20,
 25:23, 42:11, 104:5,
 162:12, 168:5,
 172:11
speaks [2] - 62:2,
 101:17
specialized [2] - 13:5,
 191:16
specialty [1] - 66:18
specific [21] - 16:22,
 17:13, 35:23, 75:8,
 77:17, 79:16, 82:9,
 82:10, 128:10,
 128:12, 130:12,
 151:7, 155:19,
 156:25, 168:13,
 169:2, 171:12,
 205:18
specifically [13] -
 12:12, 29:24, 36:7,
 40:17, 127:11,
 140:20, 149:16,
 152:1, 153:20,
 167:20, 194:13,
 198:4, 208:14
specificity [1] - 32:19
specifics [3] - 22:10,
 87:3, 202:14
specified [2] - 8:25,
 11:21
speculate [2] - 17:16,
 45.5
speculating [1] -
 192:5
speculation [13] -
 12:1, 19:23, 37:11,
 48:21, 65:23, 72:4,
 141:1, 145:23,
 146:1, 162:6,
 173:22, 192:6, 199:7
speculations [1] -
 182:23
speculative [10] -
```

```
25:18, 44:2, 44:5,
 44:15, 47:16, 47:18,
 141:2, 141:3, 142:22
spell [1] - 127:1
spend [2] - 55:21,
 169.8
spent [6] - 20:14,
 34:13, 95:3, 104:18,
 138:1, 184:13
spherical [1] - 209:23
spike [1] - 112:16
spiked [1] - 187:9
spikes [2] - 126:18,
 127:22
spiking [1] - 127:23
Spill [1] - 27:10
spin [8] - 96:18, 108:8,
 108:11, 121:24,
 126:21, 128:3,
 188:14, 191:21
spots [1] - 192:25
spread [1] - 142:20
spun [1] - 97:13
SPX [1] - 192:17
squarely [1] - 23:3
squeeze [1] - 179:22
Squibb [2] - 110:8,
 186:24
St [1] - 6:1
ST [1] - 2:15
stack [1] - 84:17
staff [4] - 99:8,
 166:10, 210:16,
 210:22
stage [26] - 16:16,
 16:17, 16:18, 26:24,
 33:23, 33:24, 40:16,
 58:18, 99:25, 101:9,
 102:18, 104:14,
 107:21, 110:21,
 110:23, 114:2,
 130:17, 175:8,
 178:15, 179:12,
 185:9, 187:1, 201:12
Stage [1] - 23:25
stand [2] - 36:17,
 173:8
stand-alone [1] -
 36:17
standard [36] - 33:7,
 44:1, 46:7, 65:21,
 65:22, 65:24, 82:14,
 82:15, 93:8, 93:15,
 109:6, 110:6,
 110:11, 110:13,
 110:17, 149:4,
 161:1, 161:6, 171:2,
 186:25, 187:3,
 193:22, 193:24,
 194:1, 194:5, 194:6,
```

194:9, 194:14,
194:15, 194:20,
201:7, 201:15,
203:13, 204:1
standards [6] - 68:10,
109:2, 191:19,
203:11, 203:12,
203:18
stands [1] - 24:17
<b>Stanley</b> [1] - 91:7
star [1] - 186:3
stark [1] - 134:22
starred [1] - 110:10
<b>start</b> [9] - 43:19,
58:22, 85:14, 139:8,
139:9, 151:21,
170:17, 201:16
started [7] - 5:8, 29:7,
CC-0 CO-42 440-42
66:2, 68:13, 112:13,
139:10, 156:20
starting [4] - 7:7,
39:17, 51:16, 163:4
starving [1] - 188:6
state [35] - 18:25,
22:19, 38:14, 72:16,
116:3, 116:6,
116:10, 117:7,
110.10, 117.7,
118:16, 118:19, 118:22, 119:9,
118:22, 119:9,
119:13, 119:15,
119:18, 119:21,
119 23 120 19
119:23, 120:19, 120:22, 146:2,
120.22, 140.2,
146:4, 146:6,
147:18, 147:22,
151:22, 176:10,
177:18, 181:8,
181:21, 192:5,
192:11, 192:13,
202:16, 202:21,
202:22
State [12] - 22:23,
22:25, 23:8, 23:9,
23:15, 24:7, 24:14,
24:19, 25:7, 26:6,
46:6, 52:14
State's [1] - 124:3
statement [65] - 27:20,
27:22, 34:1, 47:4,
49:11, 55:24, 55:25,
56:4, 56:6, 56:8,
56:21, 56:23, 57:10,
57:16, 57:17, 57:20,
58:4, 60:4, 60:5,
60:13, 60:18, 61:6,
61:12, 61:14, 61:16,
61:17, 61:21, 62:8,
64:7, 64:9, 66:21,
80:7, 82:8, 82:17,
80:7, 82:8, 82:17, 85:1, 85:25, 88:4,

```
89:1, 89:2, 89:20,
 89:25, 91:1, 91:2,
 91:20, 93:7, 98:14,
 100:3, 100:10,
 108:11, 110:17,
 117:20, 131:18,
 133:4, 133:5,
 145:25, 146:18,
 148:21, 165:16,
 166:21, 167:24,
 177:22, 192:24,
 193:13, 193:15
statements [97] -
 10:24, 23:12, 23:22,
 27:2, 28:13, 28:16,
 28:21, 33:13, 33:15,
 33:19, 33:20, 33:22,
 35:20, 36:1, 36:4,
 36:9, 36:14, 37:13,
 38:3, 38:4, 38:6,
 38:8, 38:17, 39:6,
 39:21, 40:10, 41:16,
 43:11, 43:13, 48:8,
 48:14, 48:16, 49:6,
 50:2, 50:3, 51:8,
 51:9, 54:24, 54:25,
 55:3, 55:5, 58:9,
 66:8, 66:9, 66:14,
 67:12, 67:14, 67:16,
 67:23, 69:15, 69:19,
 71:20, 73:11, 77:9,
 77:15, 77:21, 79:11,
 83:4, 84:9, 84:20,
 84:22, 85:18, 94:22,
 99:12, 99:18, 99:21,
 100:12, 108:7,
 111:11, 115:16,
 129:13, 130:2,
 131:23, 133:21,
 136:14, 136:19,
 138:7, 139:12,
 140:11, 153:23,
 156:23, 160:7,
 160:8, 163:9,
 163:10, 165:15,
 178:24, 179:7,
 180:2, 181:10,
 192:23, 193:4,
 193:5, 203:8, 209:21
States [13] - 5:2, 5:3,
 9:17, 22:25, 40:8,
 62:15, 89:9, 89:13,
 121:7, 171:16,
 176:21, 176:23,
 196:21
STATES [2] - 1:1, 1:14
states [5] - 27:18,
 59:2, 118:20, 137:8,
```

186.6

statistical [2] -

```
149:24, 154:11
statistically [4] -
 149:21, 154:12,
 160:10, 189:11
statistics [1] - 150:4
statues [1] - 145:7
statute [6] - 29:20,
 140:1, 140:7, 145:8,
 189:19
stave [1] - 19:11
stay [2] - 16:1, 113:7
stays [1] - 29:12
Steamfitters [1] -
 39:16
stems [1] - 204:16
step [3] - 31:16, 65:6,
 191:12
stepping [2] - 72:15,
 159:23
steps [2] - 69:21,
 74:18
sterile [1] - 209:24
Stewart [1] - 86:13
stick [5] - 124:18,
 132:4, 155:3, 155:8,
 155:9
still [8] - 20:15, 69:5,
 78:7, 78:13, 80:18,
 118:1, 163:12, 184:2
stock [34] - 49:12,
 49:21, 49:23, 69:3,
 69:7, 69:10, 69:14,
 69:17, 70:10, 70:14,
 149:24, 150:20,
 152:15, 153:3,
 153:7, 154:13,
 155:10, 155:21,
 156:25, 158:18,
 159:11, 159:15,
 160:9, 164:10,
 164:13, 174:20,
 174:24, 175:4,
 188:25, 189:3,
 197:3, 206:15,
 206:24
stocks [1] - 148:14
stop [1] - 69:21
stopped [1] - 174:18
stories [1] - 185:15
story [4] - 40:22,
 64:13, 96:19, 153:18
straightforward [1] -
 195:21
strained [3] - 136:5,
 183:10, 184:25
strap [1] - 26:5
strategies [2] - 29:1,
 33:4
strategy [9] - 13:12,
 81:10, 111:19,
```

```
127:19, 128:21,
 130:6, 137:14,
 181:10
streams [1] - 61:8
Street [7] - 1:11, 2:17,
 3:4, 109:14, 109:17,
 159:16, 159:20
stretch [2] - 73:4,
 104:20
stretching [1] - 105:20
stripped [1] - 182:22
strong [9] - 11:22,
 13:3, 13:14, 58:4,
 65:10, 68:8, 110:5,
 110:12, 136:12
stronger [1] - 11:15
structural [2] - 208:7,
 210:12
structure [5] - 126:15,
 135:8, 201:18,
 205:6, 210:10
structured [1] - 126:7
struggled [1] - 79:9
struggling [1] - 73:14
stubborn [4] - 70:21,
 71:20, 174:18,
 174:21
stuck [2] - 17:1, 132:5
studied [4] - 30:24,
 49:15, 151:3, 198:12
studies 131 - 149:20.
 160:9, 204:25
study [4] - 45:24,
 135:6, 150:3, 196:12
Stueck [6] - 27:15,
 27:23, 28:1, 28:4,
 28:11, 28:15
Stueck's [2] - 27:15,
 28:9
stuff [4] - 49:22,
 88:15, 165:17,
 185:10
stuffing [1] - 106:10
stupid [1] - 180:20
subject [11] - 48:4,
 48:7, 139:9, 154:16,
 156:12, 191:16,
 193:9, 196:1, 196:2,
 204:21, 209:19
subjects [2] - 48:25,
 205:3
submit [3] - 71:18,
 171:13, 174:17
submitted [1] - 52:16
submitting [1] - 24:9
subpoena [1] - 180:24
Subramanian [1] -
 146:7
Subraminian [1] -
```

```
subsequent [2] -
 148:11, 199:16
subsidiary [1] - 59:11
substance [3] - 24:20,
 33:15, 183:14
substantial [5] -
 148:10, 148:13,
 198:14, 198:18,
 208:17
substantially [3] -
 8:20, 82:23, 156:14
substantiate [1] -
 42:16
substantiating [1] -
 40:1
substantive [3] -
 27:16, 110:13
substitute [1] - 181:8
succeed [1] - 144:24
succeeded [4] -
 141:16, 144:9,
 144:24, 179:15
succeeding [1] -
 144:11
success [6] - 10:8,
 35:19, 37:14, 51:5,
 67:14, 130:23
Success [1] - 62:4
successful [6] -
 43:21, 139:16,
 142:4, 170:5,
 189:24. 195:13
successor [2] - 156:2,
 156:3
succusses [1] -
 166:11
suffered [1] - 141:12
sufficient [6] - 16:23,
 68:1, 136:10,
 160:18, 177:16,
 206:4
sufficiently [1] - 10:20
suggest [11] - 22:11,
 25:17, 65:19, 66:20,
 67:5, 68:21, 74:21,
 92:16, 159:22,
 167:11, 198:2
suggested [7] - 10:4,
 30:24, 56:24, 92:19,
 97:20, 170:13,
 183:23
suggesting [6] -
 56:23, 83:5, 102:1,
 120:2, 145:21, 167:5
suggestion [2] -
 48:17, 138:23
suggestions [1] -
 11:10
suggestive [2] -
 20:20, 202:22
```

145:24

suggests [3] - 54:4, 126:3, 198:15 Suite [1] - 41:6 Sullivan [5] - 6:10, 8:7, 20:23, 20:24, 36:7 **SULLIVAN** [1] - 3:2 **sum** [4] - 20:4, 22:10, 57:3, 64:11 **summarize** [1] - 49:10 summarizes [1] -34:23 summary [53] - 6:22, 6:24, 6:25, 7:8, 7:10, 8:11, 16:3, 19:4, 19:11, 27:2, 27:25, 28:14, 33:23, 34:13, 50:16, 53:19, 55:23, 65:24, 68:1, 81:2, 93:15, 96:22, 97:3, 108:13, 115:9, 115:13, 116:7, 116:10, 116:11, 116:14, 117:22, 128:17, 128:18, 140:20, 149:5, 149:8, 150:8, 150:22, 153:18, 161:2, 162:4, 171:1, 175:8, 177:4, 179:12, 179:18, 181:1, 184:18, 185:24, 187:1, 188:8, 200:8, 200:23 **SUMMARY** [1] - 4:3 **summation** [1] - 95:5 summer [2] - 92:7, 133:14 super [5] - 111:17, 112:2, 112:16, 114:20, 114:23 superstar [1] - 189:8 Supp [1] - 118:14 supplement [1] -91:16 supplementation [1] -91:13 supplemented [1] -91:3 suppliers [3] - 42:5, 42:10 Supply [1] - 110:15 supply [6] - 31:9, 42:5, 42:8, 125:18, 125:19, 125:21 support [11] - 12:7, 16:23, 19:6, 27:11, 37:11, 84:21, 146:8, 150:22, 159:23, 177:1, 209:5

supported [4] - 68:25, 129:22, 130:8, 201:5 supporting [5] - 20:5, 72:13, 97:1, 149:15, 186.7 supports [3] - 62:8, 140:17, 148:25 supposed [17] - 9:3, 12:24, 25:17, 28:2, 28:9, 39:22, 42:3, 45:7, 46:15, 73:15, 74:23, 125:19, 178:12, 180:1, 192:7, 196:2, 197:7 supposedly [2] -25:23, 196:9 supposition [6] -11:25, 37:11, 42:21, 43:24, 162:3, 162:6 Supreme [7] - 12:5, 43:17, 111:2, 178:13, 194:13, 194:14, 194:16 **surely** [1] - 162:8 surpassed [1] - 9:7 surprise [2] - 21:25, 37:15 surprised [2] - 98:15, 189:7 surprising [1] -189:11 survival [1] - 16:10 survive [4] - 27:2, 177:4, 181:5, 181:16 survived [1] - 182:10 surviving [3] - 27:24, 35:10, 51:1 **suspicions** [1] - 68:1 suspicious [1] - 74:22 sustain [3] - 33:22, 47:19, 173:10 sustainability [2] -114:8, 131:1 sustainable [8] -130:21, 172:7, 172:12, 172:13, 172:14, 172:20, 183:19, 183:24 sustained [1] - 40:18 sweeping [2] - 129:16, 159:6 **swell** [1] - 100:8 switching [1] - 42:9 sworn [1] - 18:13 synergies [4] - 39:23, 42:8, 42:9, 84:3 synergy [1] - 84:2 synthesize [1] -

211:10

system [1] - 59:10

systemic [1] - 83:22 Systems [1] - 37:21 systems [1] - 57:24 Т table [5] - 6:17, 137:5, 137:6. 177:25. 210:14 tacit [1] - 122:4 tactics [2] - 32:3, 146:17 tag [1] - 8:17 tag-a-long [1] - 8:17 tailwind [1] - 132:19 takeover [4] - 104:12, 104:24 talkers [1] - 211:1 talks [1] - 170:17 tantrum [5] - 63:14, 63:16, 90:17, 166:7 tantrums [1] - 87:1 taught [1] - 196:3 tax [1] - 71:1 Taylor [1] - 37:21 team [12] - 78:5, 78:9, 78:12, 78:20, 85:6, 86:3, 87:20, 129:11, 130:21, 130:24, 134:16, 172:16 teams [1] - 40:4 technical [1] - 176:18 technically [1] - 112:6 Technology [1] -37:22 temper [3] - 87:1, 90:17 temporal [1] - 127:10 temporarily [1] - 187:6 ten [5] - 58:22, 123:6, 164:13, 167:9, 190:25 tender [90] - 43:21, 44:6, 44:10, 44:18, 45:15, 45:22, 68:16, 68:25, 70:17, 71:6, 107:6, 107:22, 138:4, 138:7, 138:17, 139:11, 139:13, 139:15, 139:18, 139:22, 139:23, 140:8, 140:12, 140:15, 141:9, 141:13, 141:14, 141:16, 141:19, 141:20, 141:22, 142:3, 142:7, 142:9,

143:6, 143:14, 143:18, 143:24, 144:6, 144:8, 144:11, 144:13, 144:23, 144:24, 145:6, 145:23, 146:1, 146:13, 147:6, 147:14, 154:20, 174:3, 174:5, 174:8, 174:12, 174:20, 178:19, 178:21, 178:23, 179:14, 189:20, 190:2, 195:9, 195:11, 195:12, 195:15, 195:19, 195:22, 195:23, 195:25, 196:4, 196:7, 201:19, 204:11, 204:17, 204:22, 204:23, 205:5, 205:6, 205:14, 205:19, 205:23, 205:24, 206:2, 206:4 tendered [7] - 141:17, 142:3, 142:5, 142:14, 143:8, 143:17, 205:20 tens [2] - 124:19, 137:4 tenth [1] - 71:10 term [6] - 39:8, 58:7, 91:6, 110:20, 184:21, 207:25 terms [10] - 6:18, 7:3, 71:16, 94:8, 112:9, 112:11, 156:11, 170:4, 184:20, 211:12 territory [1] - 184:17 test [2] - 83:8, 93:11 testified [22] - 15:23, 17:11, 17:14, 25:22, 46:18, 70:19, 74:8, 79:5, 79:19, 86:22, 87:3, 88:13, 90:21, 92:21, 119:16, 122:14, 133:25, 134:4, 180:8, 195:24, 196:3, 202:7 testifies [1] - 147:18 testify [13] - 28:16, 115:18, 115:20, 116:14, 122:12, 146:4, 146:6, 146:7, 147:21, 181:3, 193:18, 195:22, 205:3 testifying [1] - 202:21

testimony [46] - 6:23, 18:13, 20:4, 40:3, 41:17, 42:13, 47:3, 47:7, 47:10, 47:18, 47:21, 54:3, 54:9, 62:18, 75:5, 76:13, 86:22. 86:24. 107:12. 145:19. 147:20, 147:21, 180:5, 191:8, 191:14, 191:24, 192:2, 192:10, 192:15, 192:18, 193:6, 193:12, 193:21, 193:25, 194:22, 199:9, 199:24, 200:12, 200:15, 201:13, 202:9, 203:4, 203:6, 203:23, 204:8, 210:2 testing [1] - 126:13 text [3] - 109:15, 109:20, 118:21 thankfully [1] - 171:15 thanking [2] - 7:25, 170:17 THE [41] - 1:1, 1:14, 5:5, 5:7, 5:23, 6:3, 6:6, 6:12, 7:15, 7:17, 35:4, 50:20, 50:23, 64:20, 64:22, 93:22, 94:6, 94:9, 94:11, 94:12, 139:3, 151:20, 161:14, 161:17, 161:19, 161:20, 166:15, 175:12, 183:1, 188:21, 190:17, 190:20, 190:22, 191:1, 191:4, 191:6, 200:1, 210:18, 210:20, 211:3, 211:16 theirs [1] - 185:17 themselves [6] -65:12, 130:4, 138:6, 142:15, 146:13, 207:19 then-present [1] -10:9 theories [9] - 8:22, 34:22, 51:1, 66:3, 66:4, 66:5, 66:7, 67:10, 182:9 theory [17] - 8:22, 10:6, 10:19, 12:13, 20:6, 28:18, 29:1, 33:8, 35:10, 44:7, 44:23, 79:7, 83:8, 161:23, 177:1,

142:10, 142:12,

142:20, 143:3,

189:22, 198:5
therefore [4] - 147:4,
164:22, 165:12,
202:18
therein [1] - 46:7
they've [2] - 53:16,
183:16
thinking [1] - 175:6
thinks [4] - 190:7,
198:21, 198:22,
198:24
third [6] - 14:24, 15:3,
15:7, 16:4, 132:19,
133:17
<b>Third</b> [58] - 2:4, 10:17,
10:23, 12:3, 12:12,
12:19, 13:17, 14:1,
14.0 14.10 16.0
14:9, 14:18, 16:2,
16:18, 16:20, 18:24,
19:3, 19:19, 21:7,
21:12, 31:25, 32:19,
33:1, 42:22, 43:3,
43:7, 60:14, 68:9,
68:11, 96:23,
101:10, 108:14,
101.10, 100.14,
110:10, 116:18,
117:23, 121:1,
122:23, 122:25,
124:8, 124:13,
124:14, 125:8,
128:23, 148:9,
181:12, 181:18,
182:4, 184:17,
184:18, 185:25,
186:3, 186:4,
188:15, 191:11,
191:18, 197:24,
198:4, 198:6,
198:19, 198:24
third-plus [2] - 15:3,
15:7
<b>THOMAS</b> [1] - 2:3
<b>Thomas</b> [5] - 5:16,
86:9, 88:8, 88:12
Thomassy [10] -
24:11, 24:13, 24:14,
24:16, 25:2, 27:4,
115:25, 116:2,
119:20, 120:23
<b>Thomassy's</b> [1] - 26:5
thorny [1] - 101:21
thousand [1] - 74:18
thousands [1] -
211:10
three [30] - 7:14, 8:4,
8:13, 12:15, 17:21,
17:22, 19:22, 24:10,
49:17, 76:15, 76:16,
91:8, 103:13,
106:16, 111:15,
, , , ,

```
111:19, 111:22,
 112:9, 113:2,
 118:15, 122:18,
 127:3, 135:18,
 156:8, 168:8,
 170:22, 200:14,
 200:18, 200:21
three-day [1] - 113:2
three-paragraph [1] -
 24:10
three-year [1] - 17:21
threshold [1] - 205:24
threw [1] - 170:12
throughout [4] -
 89:11, 146:21,
 188:7, 200:3
thrown [1] - 111:6
Thursday [1] - 1:12
TI [1] - 23:6
ticks [1] - 159:10
tie [3] - 57:7, 64:17,
 176:11
timeline [1] - 69:22
timing [4] - 58:12,
 60:2, 166:21, 190:3
tiny [4] - 100:8,
 122:24, 136:21
tired [1] - 90:19
title [1] - 86:10
toast [1] - 19:3
today [32] - 7:23,
 22:24, 39:11, 56:2,
 67:19, 69:1, 69:6,
 69:7, 79:23, 80:4,
 82:1, 84:24, 86:14,
 94:7, 94:8, 94:20,
 143:10, 144:12,
 150:17, 151:6,
 151:10, 160:17,
 164:19, 175:9,
 177:9, 177:24,
 181:20, 200:3,
 204:7, 207:8,
 210:15, 211:6
today's [1] - 179:20
Todd [1] - 117:16
together [8] - 7:8,
 58:16, 58:19, 84:2,
 136:11, 146:25,
 166:3, 166:9
tolling [1] - 29:20
tom [1] - 136:18
Tom [5] - 62:18, 93:2,
 108:20, 115:10
tons [1] - 110:25
Tony [2] - 24:22,
 115:25
took [14] - 18:8, 24:25,
 25:3, 31:16, 69:21,
 76:21, 119:24,
```

```
120:20, 124:12,
 125:1, 181:6, 192:8,
 208:23, 209:1
top [4] - 31:21, 36:23,
 60:22
top-line [2] - 36:23
topic [1] - 15:16
topical [11] - 8:25,
 11:21, 12:10, 13:3,
 18:20, 21:24, 34:10,
 44:20, 126:10,
 182:1, 208:6
topicals [1] - 208:2
topics [6] - 60:22,
 96:17, 131:5, 192:1,
 192:21, 197:1
torture [1] - 179:22
Tose [1] - 18:25
total [15] - 29:4, 46:10,
 46:11, 71:9, 71:10,
 80:1, 80:5, 80:7,
 80:9, 80:19, 80:23,
 82:2, 82:7, 83:16,
 176:12
totally [10] - 12:22,
 25:1, 54:25, 55:3,
 55:5, 62:8, 150:14,
 164:1, 186:24,
 203:17
touch [1] - 207:6
touched [2] - 60:2,
 202:14
touches [1] - 49:22
tough [1] - 13:21
touting [1] - 58:10
toward [1] - 22:16
towards [1] - 39:18
track [3] - 13:22,
 21:21, 22:5
tracks [1] - 139:25
trade [5] - 16:11,
 17:18, 17:21, 18:4,
 20:6
traded [2] - 142:9,
 142:12
trades [1] - 71:15
trading [10] - 69:20,
 69:21, 69:25, 70:15,
 70:16, 70:22, 71:13,
 159:3, 159:10, 178:6
traditional [2] - 14:25,
 15:9
transaction [12] -
 11:1, 36:12, 37:1,
 37:6, 37:7, 43:24,
 57:20, 58:1, 60:17,
 145:17, 152:8,
 201:24
transactions [1] -
 144:16
```

transcript [4] - 172:9, 172:25, 189:2, 211.21 transcripts [1] - 11:4 transition [1] - 211:4 translate [1] - 162:19 transmittal [2] - 132:9, 133:4 transparent [2] -105:12, 105:13 transsection [1] -44:14 treasury [1] - 62:5 treated [2] - 59:13, 196:13 treatments [2] - 31:11, 159:5 triable [2] - 34:16, 82:5 trial [26] - 28:15, 28:16, 35:8, 65:20, 78:1, 81:19, 95:5, 95:19, 97:12, 108:12, 110:13, 115:9, 115:12, 115:18, 115:20, 116:13, 116:16, 116:21, 116:23, 128:17, 130:16, 138:19, 149:11, 185:8, 186:25, 203:24 trials [1] - 96:21 tried [4] - 55:13, 63:7, 109:5, 167:11 trier [2] - 109:25, 147:7 tries [1] - 50:1 **trigger** [1] - 70:9 triggers [1] - 54:14 trivial [2] - 96:2, 194:17 trouble [2] - 6:20, 48:19 troubled [1] - 75:16 troubling [3] - 77:8, 83:19, 83:20 true [31] - 10:24, 12:7, 24:15, 27:22, 33:21, 33:22, 36:15, 38:18, 42:13, 54:6, 77:13, 87:21, 89:15, 90:1, 90:2, 91:20, 100:13, 104:15, 118:3, 137:22, 143:4, 149:10, 158:7, 164:5, 167:24, 168:7, 168:24, 206:16 trust [3] - 9:18, 22:20,

102:24 trustworthiness [4] -23:24, 118:7, 119:11, 119:15 trustworthy [4] -23:14, 23:22, 24:8, 119.13 truth [27] - 36:14, 40:23, 41:25, 45:2, 45:12, 45:18, 47:20, 77:4, 81:17, 101:18, 104:2, 107:5, 109:14, 112:8, 117:6, 122:13, 131:5, 133:12, 137:24, 138:16, 145:4, 145:5, 147:14, 150:19, 151:11, 160:14, 196:9 truth-on-the-market [1] - 160:14 truthful [1] - 88:3 truths [1] - 146:16 try [23] - 16:8, 19:10, 23:8, 27:1, 45:10, 47:6, 50:9, 50:25, 53:3, 53:16, 109:9, 135:6, 162:7, 163:4, 166:16, 174:14, 180:18, 184:14, 190:24, 200:4, 206:9, 206:22, 211:7 try-to-haves [1] -109:9 trying [16] - 10:15, 53:15, 53:18, 53:19, 54:2, 55:6, 58:19, 65:19, 71:22, 78:11, 81:5, 95:1, 138:3, 167:12, 181:24, 197:21 TSC [1] - 194:12 tuned [1] - 195:25 turn [18] - 22:15, 35:10, 37:11, 43:23, 50:17, 79:21, 81:1, 81:7, 83:9, 91:24, 113:7, 113:11, 126:23, 139:1, 154:17, 161:10, 196:10, 197:9 turned [2] - 96:15, 148:20 turning [1] - 79:8 Tweed [1] - 20:21 twice [2] - 12:14, 24:12 **two** [61] - 8:22, 9:10, 11:5, 15:4, 50:25,

53:11, 53:12, 60:22, 60:23, 61:11, 62:9, 66:6, 67:10, 68:14, 72:21, 76:12, 76:14, 84:12, 84:18, 91:8, 95:3, 95:4, 101:25, 103:24, 106:18, 108:9, 111:18, 115:1, 123:17, 126:15, 127:16, 134:23, 136:15, 136:22, 136:23, 143:22, 155:5, 155:25, 156:3, 158:2, 158:21, 158:23, 158:24, 160:11, 160:16, 167:24, 168:1, 170:22, 172:18, 173:25, 176:19, 180:8, 180:25, 182:14, 182:17, 187:11, 195:11, 195:14 two-and-a-half [2] -11:5, 95:4 type [11] - 13:12, 15:3, 33:3, 33:9, 37:5, 46:11, 48:21, 117:14, 197:17, 209:14, 209:16 types [1] - 156:11 typical [1] - 14:7

## U

**U.S** [5] - 1:10, 110:9, 120:7, 159:4, 178:18 **U.S.-based** [2] - 42:5, 42:10 **U.S.F** [1] - 186:3 **UBS** [1] - 172:11 ultimate [3] - 31:4, 53:25, 193:14 ultimately [2] -141:14, 159:11 umbrella [1] - 199:12 unable [1] - 22:14 unadjudicated [2] -117:18, 117:23 unanimous [1] - 38:9 unavailing [1] - 50:12 unbelievable [1] -48:19 unbelievably [1] -48:18 unblemished [1] -66:12 uncertain [2] - 39:8, 140:22

unchanged [1] -133:12 uncharged [1] - 177:6 under [51] - 8:15, 11:14, 23:5, 23:10, 23:15, 25:22, 35:20, 35:23, 38:11, 40:22, 41:17, 41:22, 43:23, 44:16, 49:1, 49:2, 59:9, 59:11, 71:1, 109:23, 111:7, 118:3, 120:7, 120:14, 123:15, 124:15, 137:18, 140:5, 148:24, 165:11, 165:12, 171:1, 174:12, 178:14, 180:8, 180:24, 187:2, 189:16, 189:18, 191:13, 197:6, 199:12, 200:8, 200:16, 203:25, 204:5, 205:8, 207:4, 210:8 under-oath [1] - 41:17 undercut [6] - 21:16, 122:21, 124:8, 125:10, 125:24, 126:1 undercuts [2] - 63:16, 174:22 undercutting [2] -28:18, 32:22 underlying [4] - 55:2, 55:4, 109:20, 137:23 undermine [1] - 22:4 undermines [2] - 22:3, 100:21 undermining [2] -129:20, 138:7 underperformance [3] - 50:2, 50:4, 187:4 understood [4] - 17:1, 77:23, 112:24, 125:2 undisciplined [2] -165:2, 183:8 undisputed [5] -53:23, 53:24, 75:3, 97:8, 117:21 undoubtedly [3] -189:7, 201:25, 205:2 unequivocally [2] -15:19, 161:5 unilateral [2] - 21:17, 32:1 unintentionally [1] -172:6

Union [1] - 39:24

unique [1] - 124:5

unit [12] - 29:2, 29:5, 29:6, 32:7, 75:4, 103:6, 105:7, 105:8, 112:20, 112:23, 124:24, 137:15 United [17] - 5:2, 5:3, 9:17, 26:10, 26:13, 26:15, 26:16, 26:23, 40:8, 62:15, 89:9, 89:13, 121:7, 171:15, 176:21, 176:23, 196:21 **UNITED** [2] - 1:1, 1:14 units [2] - 66:24, 75:20 universe [1] - 209:24 unknown [3] - 28:11, 28:12, 132:14 unlawful [3] - 20:19, 177:3, 199:5 unless [6] - 109:24, 118:6, 118:12, 151:8, 151:16, 161:9 unlike [5] - 12:22, 15:2, 29:15, 56:21, 57:11 unlikely [1] - 151:17 unmentioned [1] -97:15 unnatural [1] - 97:13 unnoticed [1] - 134:20 unprecedented [1] -180:4 unpredictable [1] -84:14 unprofitable [1] -132:2 unquestionable [1] -128:20 unreasonable [3] -97:14, 111:13, 164:2 unreasonableness [1] - 171:19 unrelated [7] - 18:10, 25:1, 49:7, 153:10, 158:3, 196:16, 206:12 unreliable [6] - 24:7, 191:13, 197:12, 198:11, 200:16, 203:25 unsalable [1] - 204:7 unscramble [1] -145.15 unsolicited [1] - 70:12 unspecified [1] - 86:8 unsurprising [1] -196:6 unsurprisingly [3] -155:7, 160:1, 176:6

unsustainable [8] -111:17, 112:2, 112:11, 112:25, 114:23, 131:16, 132:24, 183:25 untoward [1] - 53:16 untrue [3] - 20:18, 33:15, 72:9 untrustworthy [1] -118:13 unusual [6] - 21:4, 59:17, 63:14, 69:10, 101:12, 124:4 up [81] - 11:3, 11:8, 12:3, 12:4, 16:17, 20:17, 41:3, 41:4, 41:24, 47:7, 47:8, 50:22, 51:15, 53:4, 54:17, 54:21, 57:3, 64:11, 64:22, 64:25, 65:22, 66:11, 66:16, 70:14, 73:2, 73:18, 74:13, 76:18, 77:10, 78:2, 80:3, 80:8, 80:19, 81:1, 81:5, 82:3, 82:4, 82:12, 82:17, 84:17, 85:21, 88:5, 90:5, 93:7, 93:24, 111:14, 113:20, 115:11, 119:9, 121:15, 122:12, 123:11, 127:11, 127:22, 128:14, 130:22, 136:18, 143:2, 143:15, 155:18, 159:23, 160:23, 162:17, 162:18, 164:4, 166:22, 169:12, 171:5, 171:11, 173:8, 174:13, 174:21, 174:23, 180:24, 182:11, 207:23 update [1] - 113:17 upfront [1] - 134:1 upheld [1] - 136:24 **uphold** [1] - 199:9 upholding [1] - 189:16 upset [4] - 63:1, 121:21, 129:8, 166:7 upsetting [1] - 122:3 upside [2] - 80:16, 80:17 uptick [1] - 123:2 urge [4] - 51:15, 87:8, 167:10, 169:21 uses [1] - 172:14 usual [2] - 14:12, 69:7 Utesch [1] - 55:14

## V

Valeant [5] - 48:18, 88:20, 154:6, 155:6, 196:15 valerate [1] - 127:6 valid [1] - 91:24 Valspar [29] - 11:14, 12:17, 12:18, 12:20, 13:18, 14:2, 14:8, 14:10, 15:5, 16:1, 16:18, 19:19, 22:1, 22:9, 32:19, 32:22, 33:1, 33:10, 121:1, 122:23, 122:24, 123:4, 124:9, 124:14, 124:15, 182:6, 198:3, 198:7, 198:19 valuable [1] - 48:18 valuation [1] - 158:15 value [12] - 36:17, 37:19, 141:15, 144:3, 147:22, 147:24, 148:12, 148:15, 151:5, 152:2, 152:5, 152:9 valued [2] - 141:14, 141:25 vanilla [1] - 54:25 variation [1] - 43:7 various [3] - 22:19, 40:4, 74:9 vastly [1] - 187:23 ventures [1] - 18:19 verbally [1] - 92:24 verified [1] - 120:10 verify [1] - 185:11 version [3] - 40:23, 125:4, 191:22 versus [1] - 57:14 vested [1] - 107:14 vesting [1] - 71:1 viability [1] - 46:16 vice [6] - 75:5, 98:16, 99:13, 103:13, 108:1, 124:22 view [7] - 46:14, 80:19, 80:20, 123:8, 171:25, 182:4, 200:2 viewing [1] - 109:24 vigorous [1] - 198:16 VINS [1] - 118:14 violate [2] - 145:7, 145:8 violated [2] - 140:23, 190:5 violation [6] - 111:23, 111:25, 123:23,

140:18, 140:24,

143:14 violations [2] - 22:20, 139:17 virtually [3] - 119:13, 136:24, 158:19 vise [1] - 53:24 visit [1] - 186:1 Vivint [1] - 203:19 volume [1] - 31:16 voluntarily [1] - 75:17 VSI [1] - 192:17

## W

W-E-S-O-L-O-W-S-K-I [1] - 25:21 wading [1] - 94:21 wagon [1] - 155:15 wait [1] - 163:18 Waiting [2] - 9:21, 29:8 walk [2] - 174:9, 191:18 Wall [4] - 109:14, 109:17, 159:16, 159:20 Walnut [1] - 1:11 want-to-haves [1] -109.9 wants [3] - 63:5, 108:8, 146:4 ward [1] - 10:12 **WAREHAM** [14] - 2:15, 4:4, 5:24, 7:9, 7:16, 7:19, 21:21, 35:5, 175:14, 183:2, 190:18, 190:21, 210:19, 210:21 Wareham [20] - 5:25, 7:22, 51:20, 51:25, 52:10, 58:3, 58:6, 60:2, 64:5, 91:23, 126:9, 139:10, 141:1, 151:14, 153:5, 154:3, 161:23, 189:13, 197:24, 198:3 warned [8] - 97:17, 102:11, 102:23, 113:17, 132:18, 133:15, 165:2, 194:15 warning [6] - 99:15, 105:19, 108:2, 114:17, 188:2, 188:3 warnings [1] - 133:8 warns [1] - 84:11 warrant [2] - 159:18, 160:24 warrants [1] - 159:22

Washington [1] - 2:17 wasteful [1] - 182:11 waters [1] - 93:12 Watson [4] - 168:11, 168:20, 168:22, 168:25 ways [2] - 116:23, 182:2 wayside [1] - 66:4 weak [1] - 24:9 weaker [1] - 158:1 weaker-thanexpected [1] - 158:1 weakness [1] - 29:24 wealthy [1] - 69:1 websites [1] - 21:23 weed [1] - 162:5 weeds [2] - 196:1, 196:2 week [5] - 74:23, 105:17, 105:24, 175:3, 175:4 weekend [1] - 109:21 weekly [3] - 85:13, 85:17, 105:9 weeks [12] - 17:22, 57:21, 58:1, 59:14, 60:17, 61:5, 61:11, 79:4, 102:10, 103:24, 104:6, 186:1 weigh [2] - 97:5, 188:18 weighed [5] - 22:25, 95:10, 97:12, 109:22, 187:2 weighs [1] - 152:21 weight [2] - 202:11, 202:12 well-accepted [1] -197:6 well-developed [1] -33:21 well-supported [1] -129:22 Wesolowski [9] -25:20, 25:21, 31:4, 31:5, 53:24, 54:3, 54:10, 121:14, 134:4 Westlaw [5] - 26:14, 39:5, 39:15, 39:17, 68:19 Wettre [4] - 7:25, 9:11, 29:11, 94:24 **WETTRE** [1] - 5:3 whack [1] - 182:7 whatsoever [4] -11:13, 44:12, 52:2,

101:7

177:12

whereas [2] - 96:24,

white [1] - 148:22 whole [4] - 38:22, 39:13, 164:14, 198:17 wholly [6] - 44:2, 44:5. 44:15, 47:16, 47:18 wide [5] - 33:6, 79:20, 81:11, 181:10, 201:9 widely [1] - 9:9 wildly [1] - 40:22 William [1] - 191:20 Williams [2] - 139:11, 145:14 Williamson [5] - 12:5. 199:8, 199:14, 210:9, 210:12 win [3] - 82:15, 121:16, 161:2 windfall [3] - 96:12, 113:4, 135:9 windfalls [2] - 131:2, 131:3 window [1] - 92:15 Winowiecki [8] - 59:8, 62:3, 63:22, 98:16, 98:24, 99:14, 103:13, 107:17 Winowiecki's [1] -105:4 wipe [1] - 90:8 wish [3] - 39:8, 80:25, 172:4 wished [2] - 29:9, 182:13 withdrawn [2] - 45:6, 46:14 withheld [4] - 45:2, 108:18, 162:23, 190:12 withstand [1] - 177:17 witness [12] - 24:18, 106:25, 115:9, 115:12, 115:18, 115:20, 122:12, 122:14, 134:10, 173:8, 180:6, 185:8 witnessed [2] - 46:24, 47.2 witnesses [7] - 15:18, 59:8, 119:15, 120:10, 180:23, 180:24, 199:24 **WM** [1] - 24:4 woefully [1] - 68:20 Wojciechowski [1] -201:7 woman [1] - 40:14 wondering [1] - 61:20 Wood [1] - 2:12

110:24, 127:5, 136:25, 172:14, 180:12, 185:19, 202:23, 203:1 words [33] - 33:15, 38:6, 47:6, 73:4, 73:7, 81:7, 81:9, 81:13, 95:8, 98:17, 99:2, 99:4, 101:24, 108:3, 109:7, 109:12, 128:4, 128:5, 128:7, 128:11, 128:15, 128:20, 128:21, 129:18, 134:6, 134:17, 166:25, 167:1, 170:16, 172:10, 172:22, 180:11, 206:14 wore [2] - 100:14 works [3] - 27:4, 59:15, 79:7 world [7] - 72:2, 72:17, 73:15, 73:18, 77:18, 123:10, 195:16 worldwide [1] - 67:2 worried [2] - 63:10, 181:20 worry [1] - 30:12 worse [4] - 104:22, 108:7, 113:16, 133:16 worsened [1] - 104:9 worsening [2] -133:14, 154:9 worth [5] - 44:25, 45:1, 45:17, 152:7, 178:2 worthless [1] - 152:10 worthy [3] - 84:18, 84:19, 120:11 wow [1] - 180:19 write [2] - 74:21, 96:5 write-down [1] - 96:5 writes [2] - 74:5, 101:25 writing [1] - 185:11 written [3] - 31:10, 31:15, 102:20 wrongdoing [5] -72:18, 76:5, 95:10, 111:10, 169:20 wrote [10] - 30:2, 62:25, 95:8, 96:1, 105:17, 105:21, 121:6, 164:21, 177:14, 182:15

word [11] - 79:21, X 106:10, 109:19, Xavier [1] - 5:6 Υ 202:1, 211:6 107:1 Ζ Zamichieli [1] - 186:2

**XAVIER** [2] - 1:14, 5:2

year [4] - 17:21, 59:4, 85:23, 151:24 years [25] - 9:10, 12:15, 25:3, 25:4, 25:24, 25:25, 26:12, 26:19, 26:20, 29:8, 29:13, 34:18, 47:1, 56:11, 57:7, 66:17, 80:16, 91:9, 170:23, 173:19, 181:4, 181:15, 182:10, York [12] - 2:4, 2:9, 2:22, 3:4, 31:21, 58:9, 122:9, 179:8 Young [4] - 104:22, 106:22, 106:25, yourself [1] - 6:14

zebra [1] - 37:22 Zebra [2] - 38:2, 38:7 zero [5] - 39:25, 75:14, 76:10, 86:3, 127:15 Zoloft [1] - 191:11

Woodbridge [1] - 2:12